want to buy from one manufacturer or jobber. When it stopped selling "chance candies" its business fell off from 40 to 50 percent. When it started again, its business increased at once. Officers and salesmen of other companies testified to similar experiences, which apparently extend through the trade. And, finally, there is evidence that candies in break and take packages are smaller in size, lighter in weight, and inferior in quality, proving rather conclusively that children are imposed upon and that in competition with "straight goods" at the same prices the "chance" is the thing that makes the sales. [86] I am of opinion this evidence supports the Commission's finding of unfair competition and that that finding alone is enough to make valid the Commission's order. I think it should be sustained. ARROW-HART & HEGEMAN ELECTRIC CO. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 No. 183 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. January 30, 1933) • TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-No. 80%. In proceeding to review Trade Commission's order, trial examiner's report and exceptions thereto should not be included in record (Clayton Act, sec. 11, 15 USCA sec. 21; Federal Trade Commission Act secs. 2, 6 (g), 15 USCA secs. 42, 46 (g); Circuit Court of Appeals Rule 13, par. 4, and Rule 21, pars. 2, 3). TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-NO. 801⁄2. Statutory authority of trial examiners to administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence in proceedings before Trade Commission is not exclusive, but discretionary (Federal Trade Commission Act sec. 9; 15 USCA sec. 49). (The syllabus is taken from 63 F. (2d) 108) Petition by Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. to review order of Commission. On petitioner's motion for order directing respondent to amplify record and on respondent's motion to strike out part of record. Petitioner's motion denied, and respondent's motion granted. [109] Charles Neave, of New York City, and Arthur L. Shipman, Charles Welles Gross, and Wallace W. Brown, all of Hartford, Conn., for petitioner. Robert E. Healy, of Washington, D.C., chief counsel for Federal Trade Commission. Before MANTON, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges. 1 Reported in 63 F. (2d) 108. For decision on the merits, see supra, at p. 683. PER CURIAM: The respondent moves for an order striking from the petition the paragraphs thereof consisting of reference to and quotations from the trial examiner's report upon the facts. The petitioner moves that the respondent be ordered to certify to the court the trial examiner's report upon the facts with the petitioner's exception thereto, alleging that this is necessary to complete the record. The respondent has not certified to this court as part of the transcript of the record, the trial examiner's report upon the facts or the petitioner's exceptions thereto, claiming that it is not properly part of the transcript under section 11 of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 734, 15 USCA sec. 21). Paragraphs 2 and 3 of rule 21 of this court make reference to the filing of records by the Federal Trade Commission and do not require the reports of the trial examiners or exceptions filed thereto to be printed. Nor does paragraph 4, rule 13 of this court so require. That section refers only to appeals and records from district courts and has no reference to certification of transcripts from the Federal Trade Commission. Such records are covered exclusively by rule 21. The Commission's report referred to in the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 734) is its order, the testimony and the pleadings. They are to be certified to this court when a review is sought by a petition for enforcement or a petition for review. But the statute contains no requirements that the trial examiner's report or the exceptions thereto be a part thereof. Such report seems to be prescribed by the rules of practice adopted by the Commission under the general statutory power. Federal Trade Commission Act (38 Stat. 721, sec. 6 (g), 15 USCA sec. 46 (g)). These reports are for the assistance of the Commission and are kept in the files of the Commission for reference. The review and the findings thereon, the statute provides, are for the Commission and not the trial examiners. The reports of the trial examiners are not binding upon one charged with violation of the act. Indeed, the act does not require the Commission to employ examiners to proceed with hearings or to make reports; it authorizes the Commission to employ examiners among other officers. (38 Stat. 718, sec. 2, 15 USCA sec. 42.) The statute authorizes such examiners to administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses and receive evidence. (38 Stat. 722, sec. 9, 15 USCA sec. 49 (and notes) p. 283.) This is not exclusive authority, but discretionary. We assume that the examiner's reports are used as of some assistance to the Commission, but the result or conclusions of the Commission, we must assume, are found in the findings adopted by it. In the instant case, when the trial examiner's report on the facts was served upon counsel for the petitioner, it was accompanied by a letter signed by the trial examiner calling attention of counsel "to the fact that the enclosed report upon the facts represents only the views of the trial examiner and is not a decision of the Commission. The Commission's final action on the case will be had only after due consideration of the entire record, including exceptions, briefs and arguments." It appears to have been the practice to omit such trial examiners' report from the records in proceedings before the Circuit Court of Appeals. See J. W. Kobi Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (No. 9614 Oct. Term 1926 C.C.A. 2) where this court denied the petitioner's motion for an order requiring the Commission to certify to the court the report of the trial examiner and the exceptions thereto. See J. W. Kobi Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A.), 23 F. (2d) 41. The First Circuit followed the practice in John Moir et al. v. Federal Trade Commission on October 14, 1925,1 by striking out the trial examiner's report and the petitioner's exceptions. See John Moir et al. v. Federal Trade Commission (C.C.A.) 12 F. (2d) 22. The Seventh Circuit, on December 3, 1928, in Breakstone v. Federal Trade Commission, for special reasons there assigned, declined to strike out the trial examiner's report and the exceptions thereto. In the instant case, the Commissions' findings of fact make no reference directly or indirectly to the trial examiner's report. The Ninth Circuit, on March 7, 1932, granted a motion to strike out a requirement in an order that the Commission certify the report of the trial examiner and held that the Commission should not be required so to certify the report of the examiner unless the report and exceptions are referred to in the findings of the Commission [110] and thereby adopted by it as its findings. Algoma Lumber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 56 F. (2d) 774. The motion of the respondent will be granted and the motion of the petitioner denied. E. GRIFFITHS HUGHES, INC., v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2 (Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Argued January 10-11, 1933. Decided January 30, 1933) TRADE MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-NO. 802. Statute imposes on Federal Trade Commission duty of public hearings on complaint of unfair methods of competition (Federal Trade Commission Act and sec. 5 thereof; 15 USCA sec. 41 et seq., and sec. 45). *Beported in 63 F. (2d) 362. For cease and desist order see 18 F.T.C. 1. Provision of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 USCA sec. 41 et seq.) that any person who may be interested in the question may make application and may, on good cause shown, be allowed by the Commission to intervene and appear in person or by counsel, was properly construed by the Commission as requiring public hearings, as against contention that Commission has no right to determine to hear evidence in public, and that until its final determination its function is wholly inquisitorial, and therefore necessarily secret. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-NO. 802. Regulation adopted by Federal Trade Commission under statutory authority has force of law, particularly in case of regulation of long standing (Federal Trade Commission Act; 15 USCA sec. 41 et seq.). TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-No. 802. In absence of fraud or arbitrary abuse of power, finding of Federal Trade Commission that complaint against corporation charged with using unfair methods of competition was issued in public interest is conclusive (Federal Trade Commission Act; 15 USCA sec. 41 et seq.). TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-NO. 802. Object of Federal Trade Commission Act is to prevent public deception and preserve free competition (Federal Trade Commission Act; 15 USCA sec. 41 et seq.). TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION KEY-NO. 802. Hearings on complaint issued by Federal Trade Commission charging false advertising of preparations manufactured, resulting in deceiving public and prejudicing competitors, held properly public (Federal Trade Commission Act and sec. 5 thereof; 15 USCA sec. 41 et seq. and sec. 45). The hearings on the complaint were properly held in public, since no charge was made in bill seeking to enjoin the public hearings that Commission was acting unfairly or arbitrarily or that result of open hearing would be to disclose trade secrets or names of plaintiff's customers or any other detail of its business which, without regard to final determination of the controversy, would result in serious injury to it. (The syllabus is taken from 63 F. (2d) 362) Suit by E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc., against Commission. From decree dismissing bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Albert E. Maves, of New York City, and Elwood H. Seal, of Washington, D.C., for appellant. Robert E. Healy, Martin A. Morrison, and Harry D. Michael, all of Washington, D.C., for appellee. Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices. GRONER, Associate Justice: This appeal challenges the right of the Federal Trade Commission to take testimony in an open or public session in a hearing on a complaint directed against the appellant charging it with false and fraudulent advertising and unfair trade methods in interstate commerce. 65419-34- 43 The act of Congress creating the Federal Trade Commission and defining its powers and duties (act Sept. 26, 1914; USCA, title 15, sec. 41, et seq.) provides for the issuance of a "complaint" against any person, partnership, or corporation (except banks and common carriers) using unfair methods of competition in commerce. The test is the public interest. The law provides for a hearing, the taking of testimony, and the filing of the same in the office of the commission. In the instant case the complaint issued and was duly served on appellant and an answer thereto was duly filed. On the day set for the hearing appellant applied to the Su[363]preme Court of the District of Columbia for an injunction restraining the commission from making the complaint public and from taking any testimony in public and from making public the transcript of the testimony. The lower court dismissed the bill and the matter is here on appeal. We think the action of the lower court was in all respects correct. A copy of the complaint issued by the commission was filed as an exhibit in the proceedings below, and by recourse to it we ascertain that it recited in the first place that it was issued in the public interest, that it charged appellant was engaged in the sale in interstate commerce of certain proprietary preparations known as Kruschen Salts and Radox Bath Salts; that the former of these preparations was advertised by appellant as a cure or remedy for obesity and that the latter as a preparation relieving pain and having medicinal and therapeutic value and that it is imported from England and combines the properties of the world-famous medical spas. The complaint then went on to state that all of this advertising was untrue because in fact the Kruschen Salts is no more than a purgative or laxative and therefore not a cure or remedy for obesity, and that the Radox Salts has no material medicinal or therapeutic value and is not imported from England and does not combine the properties of the European medical spas; and it concludes that as a result of these misrepresentations the public is misled and deceived and appellant's competitors prejudiced within the intent and meaning of section 5 of the act (15 USCA sec. 45). The bill filed in the lower court charges as the ground of injunctive relief that, because of the announcements in trade journals of the issuance by the commission of its complaint, appellant's business has been injured and that the taking of testimony in public will aggravate and increase the injury, for all of which appellant has no adequate or complete remedy at law. It will be at once noticed that there is no charge in the bill that the commission is acting unfairly or arbitrarily or that the result of an open hearing will be to disclose trade secrets or the names of appellant's customers, or any other detail of its business which, with |