The facts are stated in the opinion. The law regards the rights of passengers and holds the carrier to the highest degree of care possible and requires him to make good all damages suffered through want of that care. Pa. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451 (26: 141). entee will be entitled to recover the entire | tions of the respondents to the libel be overprofits if he elects that remedy.' This lan- ruled. Affirmed. guage was quoted with approval in Root v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 105 U. S. 189, 203 [26: 975, 980]. As in the case of the Nicholson | patent, so in the case of the Schillinger patent, the pavement was a complete combination in itself, differing from every other pavement, and the profit made by the defendant was a single profit derived from the construction of the pavement as an entirety. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 665, 666 [ante, 547, 562]. | Within the decision in Garretson v. Clark 111 U. S. 120 [28: 371], the proof in this case is satisfactory, that the entire value of the defendant's pavement, as a marketable article, was properly and legally attributable to the invention of Schillinger. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. JOHN HASKELL BUTLER, Admr., ET AL., v. THE BOSTON AND SAVANNAH SAME v. SAME. The courts of the United States, down to the Act of 1851, did not recognize the rule of the ancient or general maritime law, but refused to adopt it either in admiralty or common law. Del. Col. v. Arnold, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 333 (1: 624); The Amiable Nancy, 1 Paine. 111, 118; Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, 480, 492; Hale v. Washington Ins. Co. 2 Story, 176; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U. S. 6 How. 435 (12: 465). The Limited Liability Act is not to be extended, even in respect to goods, by construction. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. The Tangier, 6 Am. Law Reg. 504, 510; King v. Am. Transp. Co. 1 Western Law Monthly, 186; S. C. 1 Flipp. 1; The Egypt, 25 Fed. Rep. 320; The Mamie, 5 Fed. Rep. 813; 8 Fed. Rep. 367; 105 U. S. 773 (26: 937); Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 32, 33 (30:1085); Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 126; Walker v. Western Transp. Limited liability of ship owners-libel for lim- Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. 54 How. Pr. 146;' Co. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 153 (18:174); Haegi v. ited liability a bar to other actions-Act of Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co. 56 N. Y. 6; February 28, 1871-extent of the law-effect Chamberlain v. Western Transp. Co. 44 N. Y. of state statute-disaster within county lim-305; Wallace v. Providence &. C. S. S. Co. 14 Fed. its-liability for death. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 527-558.) Rep. 56. The liability of owners is not restricted by the Act of Congress providing for the security of passengers on steamboats. The Act does not take away any common-law liability. 1. The law of limited liability of ship owners applies to cases of personal injury and death, as well as to cases of loss of, or injury to, property. It extends to liability for every kind of loss and injury. 2. Proceedings taken by the owner of the vessel, by libel for limited liability, are a bar to actions commenced to recover damages for losses sustained by means of the stranding and sinking of the ves3. The Act of February 28, 1871, to provide for the better security of life on board of steam vessels, does not supersede or displace the proceeding for limited liability, in cases arising under its provis-Dwyer, 29 Tex. 383; Re Long Island Transp. sel. ions. 4. The law of limited liability was enacted by Congress as a part of the maritime law of this country, and, in its operation, extends wherever public navigation extends. 5. A statute of a State cannot neutralize or affect the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction or the oper6. The Limited Liability Act applies to the present case notwithstanding the disaster happened within the technical limits of a county of Massachusetts, and notwithstanding the liability itself may have arisen from a state law. ation of the maritime law in maritime cases. 7. This court expresses no opinion as to whether a state law can create a liability in a maritime case, within the dominion of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction, where neither the general maritime law nor an Act of Congress has created such a lia'bility. [Nos. 244, 340.] Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 47 N. Y. 292; Swarthout v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 48 N. Y. 209; Curran v. Cheeseman, 1 Cinc. Super. Ct. (Ohio) 52; Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 141; Houston & G. Nav. Co. v. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599, 624; The Alpena, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14 R. I. 344; The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. Rep. 112; Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. Rep. 727, 728, 730, 731; Craig v. Continental Ins. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 798; Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610 (30: 274); Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. S. 397 (30: 450); The Favorite, 12 Fed. Rep. 213; Providence & S. Steamship Co.v. Clare, 127 U. S. 45 (32: 199); Siemen v. Sellers, 123 U. S. 285, 286 (31: 156). When the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised to see if Congress erred in that revision. The Montana, 22 Fed. Rep. 730; Thommasen Argued April 10, 11, 1889. Decided April 22, City, 6 Fed. Rep. 413; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 V. Whitwill, 12 Fed. Rep. 903; The Marine 1889. U. S. 628-630 (28: 272); Pentlarge v. Kirby, 20 When, in a statute, general words follow particular ones, the rule is to construe them as applicable to subjects ejusdem generis. 2 Pars. Cont. 7th ed. 501; Ala. v. Montague, 117 U. S. 609-611 (29: 1003). sachusetts, affirming decrees of the District Court, one of them dismissing a libel against a steamship company to recover damages for death, and the other decreeing that the libelant is entitled to the limitation of liability for loss The decree dismissing the petition and anof life and other damage, and that the excep-swer of Butler is a final decree. The appellees have separate and distinct de- | steamship City of Columbus, on Devil's crees in their favor depending on separate and Bridge, near Gay Head, at the western extremdistinct claims. ity of Martha's Vineyard, and near the mouth of Vineyard Sound, on the 18th of January, 1884. Most of the passengers and cargo were lost, and amongst the passengers lost was Eliza. beth R. Beach, a single woman, of Mansfield, in the State of Connecticut. The appellants represent her, Nathaniel Beach being appoint. ed administrator of her estate in Connecticut, Butler being appointed ancillary administrator in Massachusetts, and the other two appellants being, one an aunt, and the other a niece of the deceased, dependent on her for support. The appellees, The Boston and Savannah Steamship Company, were the owners of the ship. Davis v. The Seneca, Gilpin, 38; S. C. but on other points, 3 Wall. Jr. 395; Westcot v. Bradford, 4 Wash. C. C. 492; Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U. S. 6 How. 201, 203 et seq. (12: 404); French v. Shoemaker, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 86, 98 (20:270, 271); Bronson v. La Crosse & N. R. Co. 67 U. 8. 2 Black, 531 (17: 360); Blossom v. Milwaukee & C. R. Co. 68 U. S. 1 Wal: 657 (17: 674); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (29: 329); Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U. S. 276 (29:379); Hassall v. Wilcox, 115 U. S. 598 (29:504); Benjamin v. Dubois, 118 U. S. 48 (30: 52); Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 54 (30:305); Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27 (30: 1083); Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co. 117 U. S. 369 (29:924). Mr. Charles Theodore Russell, Jr., for appellee: Under the Limited Liability Act, the limitation is extended to all losses by any act of the master done without the owner's order. Maclachlan, Shipping, 118, 119; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 116 (20: 589); The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378; The Rebecca, 1 Ware, 188. Soon after the disaster occurred, and early in against the steamship company, in the Supe- Loss of life under the Massachusetts statute cannot affect the right or extent of the limitation of liability provided by the Act of Con-trict of Massachusetts, against the said Brown gress. Am. Steamboat Co. v. Chace, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 522 (21: 369); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (23: 819); The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (30: 358); Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14 R. I. 344; The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378; Re Long Island etc. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599; The Alpena, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. Rep. 112; The City of Columbus, 22 Fed. Rep. 460. and Vance, and against all other persons who had suffered loss or damage by said disaster. This is one of the cases now before us on appeal. The libel was in the usual form of libels in causes of limited liability. It set forth the ownership of the vessel, the business in which she was employed, namely, as a passenger and freight steamship between Boston and Savaunah, her sea-worthiness, her being well and thoroughly officered and manned and furnished and equipped as the law required. It stated that on the 17th of January, 1884, she Jones, Mortg. § 400; Hazard v. Draper, 7 Al- left Boston on a voyage to Savannah, having len, 267; Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige, 437; Crom- on board about 83 passengers and considerable well v. Brooklyn F. Ins. Co. 44 N. Y. 42; Nich- merchandise, a list of the former, as far as ols v. Baxter, 5 R. I. 491; Vernon_v. Smith, 5 known, and a schedule of the latter, being anBarn. & Ald. 1; Providence Co. Bank v. Ben-nexed to the libel. It stated that whilst prosson, 24 Pick. 204; Re Sands Ale Brewing Co. 3 Biss. 175; City Sav. Bank v. Pa. F. Ins. Co. 122 Mass. 165; Williams v. Ocean Ins. Co. 2 Met. 803; Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 259. Insurance for a mortgagee adds nothing to the owner's interest in the vessel. The insurance money cannot be claimed by the mortgagor nor by any creditor of the mortgagor. May, Ins. §§ 6, 116; White v. Brown, 2 Cush. 412; Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co. 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 495 (10: 1044); Bank of 8. C. v. Bicknell, 1 Cliff. 85; Hidden v. Slater Mut. F. Ins. Co. 2 Cliff. 266. The claim of these sufferers by the loss of the steamship is confined to the res, or its value. Spring v. Haskell, 14 Gray, 309; Farnsworth v. Boston, 126 Mass. 1; Read v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 427. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: These two cases are so intimately connected, both in the proceedings and in the questions arising therein, that it will be most convenient to consider them together. They arose out of the stranding, sinking and total loss of the ecuting said voyage, and while on the high The libel propounded other articles, as fol- "Fifth. All said great loss of life, injury and damage to persons on board, and loss of and damage to property, were occasioned and incurred without the privity or knowledge of the libelant, the owner of said steamship. Sixth. The libelant further alleges that, as [529] [530] It is informed and believes, certain persons or corporations, owners or insurers of property on board, and lost or damaged by and at the loss of said steamship as aforesaid; certain other persons, who claim to have been on board said steamship at the time of the loss aforesaid, and to have suffered in consequence thereof injuries and damage to their persons and property; and still other persons, claiming to represent persons drowned and lost in said disaster, and claiming to be entitled to recover and receive large sums of money on account of the death of and injury to said persons so represented by them all make, or may hereafter make, claim that the striking upon the rocks, and sinking and wreck of said steamship, and the loss of life, damage to persons and property aforesaid, were occasioned and incurred from the fault and neglect of the libelant, or its officers and agents, and that the libelant is liable and responsible to pay to them the loss and damages arising as aforesaid; all of which claims and allegations the libelant denies, and, on the contrary, it alleges that all such losses and damages were occasioned or incurred with out its neglect, fault, privity or knowledge, and, as it is informed and believes, without the neglect or fault of its officers or agents, or any of them." ship and her freight then pending, as by law Upon the filing of this libel a monition was Notwithstanding these proceedings the appellants, on the 27th of September, 1884, filed a libel against the steamship company, in the same District Court for the District of Massachusetts, to recover damages for the death of said Elizabeth R. Beach. This is the other suit now before us on appeal. After stating the "Eighth. The losses and damage to persons engagement of passage by Miss Beach on the and property incurred and occasioned by the steamship from Boston to Savannah, the characsaid stranding, sinking, and loss of said steam-ter of the vessel as a coastwise sea-going steamship, and the alleged claims and liabilties made ship in the coasting trade, under enrollment against the libelant, by reason thereof, greatly and license, and the circumstances of the exceed the amount or value of the interest of stranding and loss, and the drowning of Miss the libelant, as owner, in said steamship, her Beach, the libel of the appellants averred and machinery, tackle, apparel and furniture, im- charged that the disaster was caused by negli11 mediately after said loss, and in her freight gence on the part of those employed by the then pending. Upon and after the happening steamship company in managing the ship, and of said loss, said steamship, her machinery, by inefficiency in the discipline of the officers tackle, apparel and furniture, became a wreck and crew, and that no proper measures were and total loss, and, the libelant is informed taken to save the passengers. The libel further and believes, were then practically worthless, alleged that at the time of the disaster the secand the libelant's interest therein became and ond mate, one Harding, was in charge of the was of little or no value. The gross freight ship, and was not a pilot for those waters; that then pending on the voyage of said steamship it was a part of his duty to take charge of the to Savannah was of the value of about $1,000. ship alternately with the first mate; that it was "Ninth. The libelant, while not admitting an omission of duty on the part of the owner to but denying that it is under any liablity for the intrust to the second mate the charge of the ship acts, losses and damages aforesaid, and desir- without the aid of the special pilot; and that no ing and claiming the right in this court to con- pilot was on duty on the ship at the time of the test any such liability of itself or of said steam-accident. The libel further alleged that "There ship, claims and is entitled to have limited its liability, as owner therefor (if any gach liability shall hereafter be found to exist), to the amount or value of its interest, as owner, in such steamship after said loss, and her freight then pending. "Tenth. Said steamship, in her damaged and wrecked condition, now lies sunken near the shore at Gay Head, Martha's Vineyard, within this district, and within the jurisdiction and process of this honorable court." was not proper apparatus on the vessel for The libel further set out a statute of Massa- The libelant thereupon claimed and petitioned that, in case it should be found that there was any liability for the acts, losses, and damages aforesaid, upon said steamship "City "If the life of a passenger is lost, by reason of Columbus," or the libelant as owner thereof of the negligence or carelessness of the propri (which liability the libelant did not admit, but etor or proprietors of a steamboat, or stage expressly and wholly denied, and desired in coach, or of common carriers of passengers, or that court to contest), such liability should in by the unfitness or gross negligence or carelessDO event exceed the amount or value of the ness of their servants or agents, such proprieinterest of the libelant, as owner, in said steam-tor or proprietors and common carriers shall [532] [533] 584] be liable in damages not exceeding five thou- | the steamship company in the cause of limite t The libel further alleged that after the vessel struck, said Elizabeth R. Beach suffered great mental and bodily pain upon the vessel and was afterwards washed into the sea and drowned; that the value of her clothing and baggage lost was $150; and that by virtue of the premises and under the general admiralty jurisdiction of the United States the libelants were entitled to recover $50,000, and by virtue of the statute of Massachusetts, $5,000. The steamship company, thereupon, on the 10th day of October, 1884, filed an exception and plea to this libel, setting up in bar the record and proceedings of the cause of limited liability previously instituted by them in the same district court, and then pending. To meet this exception, the appellants, on the 16th of December, 1884, filed an amendment to their libel, by way of replication, in which they claimed the benefit of the Steamboat Inspection Act, passed February 28, 1871 (Title LII of the Revised Statutes U. S.), which makes many regulations respecting the steam machimery and apparatus of steam vessels of the United States in the merchant service, navigating the waters of the United States and respecting their construction and manner of lading and accommodating passengers and merchandise, and the officers and crews with which they are to be manned, and requires sea-going steamers in the coasting trade when under way and not on the high seas, to be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the steamboat inspectors, imposes penalties for loss of life through negligence and inattention, and gives damages to the full amount against the vessel and her master and owner to persons injured, if the injury happens through any neglect or failure to comply with the provisions of the law, or through any known defects or imperfections of the steaming apparatus, or of the hull. (Rev. Stat. Title LII, passim, SS 4401, 4493.) The appellants averred that The City of Columbus was subject to this law, and when the catastrophe happened was within the waters of the State of Massachusetts, and not upon the high seas, and not under the control of a licensed pilot. They further averred that there was connivance, misconduct, or violation of law on the part of the owner in not providing or procuring the vessel to be under the control and direction of a licensed pilot, and that there was misconduct, negligence, and inattention to duty on the part of the captain, second mate, or other persons employed on the vessel, by which connivance, misconduct, and negligence the life of said Elizabeth R. Beach was destroyed. On the same day, the 16th of December, 1884, the appellants appeared to the libel of Afterwards, on the 19th of January, 1885, the appellants moved in the same cause that the steamship company be ordered to pay into court the said insurance money. To this mo tion the company filed a written reply in which they set up the fact that in pursuance [535] of an order of the court they had entered into stipulation to pay into court the amount of the appraised value of their interest in the ship and freight. They further averred that, in pursuance of a covenant made at the time of their purchasing the said steamship, in the mortgage given for the purchase money, all the insur ance procured by them had been assigned and made payable to the vendors and mortgagees, for whose benefit and security the policies were kept on foot; and said parties had collected the insurance money, and applied it in part payment of the mortgage notes, and the libelants, The Boston and Savannah Steam ship Company, had not collected or received any part of it. To this answer the appellants filed an exception in the nature of a demurrer. Upon these pleadings the parties agreed upon a statement of facts, which, after stating the titles of the two causes, was as follows, to wit: "Statement of agreed facts. "In the above entitled causes the following facts are agreed by the Boston and Savannah Steamship Company and John Haskell Butler, administrator, et al., party excepting to said libel of said company: "First. All the allegations contained in the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, nine teenth, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth articles of the answer, petition and exceptions of said John Haskell Butler, administrator, et al., in said suit are true. "Second. Except as relieved or affected by the Limited Liability Act of 1851 (U. S. Rev Stats. §§ 4283-5) and the Rules of the United States Supreme Court thereunder, the libelant, ship owner, is liable for all loss and damage caused by the stranding of said steamship 'City of Columbus.' "Third. In respect to the cause of the disas ter alleged, the respondents claim, in addition to the concession by libelant, the B. and S. Steamship Company, of negligence on the part of their agents and servants, as above agreed, that at the time of disaster the second mate was in charge of the ship; that he was not a pilot for the waters upon which the ship was then going, and was not licensed as a pilot by [596 the inspectors of steamboats; and that no pilot was on duty on said ship at the time of the dis aster; and, further, that the disaster was owing to the unfitness, gross negligence, or carelessness of the servants or agents of the libelant, who were engaged in navigating the ship at the time | sels; and at the time of loss was on a voyage "Fourth. Said loss and damage were without the privity and knowledge of the libelant, The Boston and Savannah Steamship Company, the sole owner of said steamship. ་་ Fifth. Said steamship was a coastwise, seagoing vessel, under enrolment, and was, at and before the time of loss, subject to all the laws and rules of navigation applicable to such vessels; and at the time of loss was on a voyage from Boston to Savannah, Georgia, and proceeding through Vineyard Sound, stranding on Devil's Bridge, off and near Gay Head, Martha's Vineyard. And to this extent the respondents, Butler et al., qualify any admission in their answer to the third article of the libel of the company; and the company qualify any averment pertinent thereto in said article. "Sixth. After the filing of the libel or petition in this cause, the court caused due appraisement to be had of the amount or value of the interest of the libelant, as owner, in such ship and her freight for the voyage, and thereupon made an order for the giving of a stipulalation, with sureties for the payment thereof, into court, whenever the same shall be ordered; and upon due compliance with this order the court issued a monition, February 28, 1884, against all persons claiming damages for any such loss, embezzlement, destruction, damage, or injury, citing them to appear before the said court and make due proof of their respective claims at or before July 1, 1884, and public notice of such monition was given as required; and thereafter, on the application of said owner, the court made an order to restrain the further prosecution of all and any suit or suits against said owner in respect of any such claim or claims, all as provided in the admiralty rules 537] of the United States Supreme Court. "Seventh. The Boston and Savanah Steamship Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Massachusetts, and is located at Boston, in said State." The following additional statement was agreed to in the action of the appellants, to wit: "1. Except as relieved or affected by the Limited Liability Act of 1851 (U. S. Rev. Stat. SS 4283-5), and the Rules of the United States Supreme Court thereunder, the respondent, ship owner, is liable for all loss and damage caused by the stranding of said steamship 'City of Columbus.' "2. The respondent claims that the captain was in charge of the ship at the time of the disaster. 3. Said loss and damage were without the privity and knowledge of the respondent, the Boston and Savanah Steamship Company, the sole owner of said steamship. "4. Said steamship was a coast wise, seagoing vessel, under enrolment, and was, at and before the time of loss, subject to all the laws and rules of navigation applicable to such ves The two causes were argued together upon the pleadings and these statements of fact; and on the 10th of April, 1885, the following decrees were made, to wit: In the suit of the appellants the following decree was made: "This cause was heard upon libel and respondent's exceptions thereto, and upon agreed facts; and it appearing to the court that the record alleged in said exceptions exists, it is thereupon ordered, adjudged and decreed that the exceptions be sustained, and the libel dismissed with costs." In the limited liability cause the following decree was made: "It is found and decreed by the court that the libelant is entitled to the limitation of liabil ity for loss of life, and other damage, as claimed in said libel; and that evidence tending to establish the facts, claimed by the respondents in clause three of the agreed facts on file, is immaterial, and therefore inadmissible; and that the allegations in the libelant's answer to respondents' motion that insurance money be paid into court are true; and it is thereupon ordered, adjuged and decreed by the court that the said respondents' exceptions to the libelants' answer to said respondents' motion that insurance money be paid into court, be overruled, and their said motion denied; and that the exceptions of said respondents to the libel be overruled, and their petition be dismissed." These decrees were affirmed by the circuit court, and from the decree of the latter court the present appeal was taken. We will first consider the principal point taken in the cause of damage, instituted by the appellants, to which the owners of the steamship pleaded the pendency of the proceedings in the cause of limited liability; and will then discuss the questions presented in both causes, and those which are peculiar to the cause last named. In the former cause the principal point raised was, that the law of limited liability does not apply to personal injuries, and hence that the appellants were not bound to litigate their claim in the limited liability cause; but had a right to file a separate and independent libel. The appellants in their brief say: The single question thus presented is, whether the Act limiting the liability of ship owners applies to damages for personal injury and damages for loss of life, and thus deprives those entitled to damages of the right to entertain suit for recovery, provided that the ship owner has taken appropriate proceedings by libel or petition to limit his liability; in other words, whether the said Act extends to all damages for personal injury, and damages for loss of life." It is virtually conceded that if the Limited Liability Act applies to damages for personal injury, and damages for loss of life, the proceedings taken by the steamship company by their libel for limited liability were a bar to the appellants' action; and that the controversy between the parties should have been settled in 538] [549] |