as it was in the center of the old channel although no water may be
flowing therein. These principles apply alike whether the rivers be
boundaries between private property or between States and Nations.
Missouri v. Nebraska, 23.

2. Missouri River as boundary not affected by avulsion of 1867.
The boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska in the vicinity of Island
Precinct is the center line of the original channel of the Missouri River
as it was before the avulsion of 1867 and not the center line of the
channel since that time, although no water is now flowing through the
original channel. Nothing in the acts of 1820 and 1836 relating to
Missouri or the act admitting Nebraska into the Union indicates an
intent on the part of Congress to alter the recognized rules of law
fixing the rights of parties where a river changes its course by accre-
tion or by avulsion. Ib.

BURDEN OF PROOF..

See FEDERAL QUESTION, 4;
WILLS, 3.

CARRIERS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
PRACTICE, 2.

CASES DISTINGUISHED.

Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, distinguished
from Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 194.

CASES FOLLOWED.

American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, followed in Adams Express
Co. v. Iowa, 147.

Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, followed in Cook v. Marshall County, 261.
Flanigan v. Sierra County, 196 U. S. 553, followed in Wheeler v. Plumas
County, 562.

Slavens v. United States, 196 U. S. 229, followed in Travis v. United States,
239.

CASES EXPLAINED.

1. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 344. The writ of error in this case was
dismissed because it did not appear that the commerce clause of the
Constitution was relied on in, was called to the attention of, or passed
on by the state court, and the case is inapposite where it appears that
the protection of commerce clause was properly set up, relied upon in,
and denied by, the state court. American Express Co. v. Iowa, 133.

2. Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S. 465, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, Rhodes
v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, Vance v. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438,
rest on the broad principle of the freedom of commerce between the
States, of the right of citizens of one State to freely contract to receive

and send merchandise from and to another State, and on the want of
power of one State to destroy contracts concerning interstate com-
merce valid in the State where made. Ib.

COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

1. Combination of dealers to regulate prices, etc., held illegal.
A combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat through-
out the United States, not to bid against, or only in conjunction with,
each other in order to regulate prices in and induce shipments to the
live stock markets in other states, to restrict shipments, establish
uniform rules of credit, make uniform and improper rules of cartage,
and to get less than lawful rates from railroads to the exclusion of
competitors with intent to monopolize commerce among the States,
is an illegal combination within the meaning and prohibition of the
act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, and can be restrained and enjoined
in an action by the United States. Swift and Company v. United
States, 375.

2. Immateriality of monopoly within single State where combination directed
against interstate commerce.

It does not matter that a combination of this nature embraces restraint
and monopoly of trade within a single State if it also embraces and is
directed against commerce among the States. Moreover the effect
of such a combination upon interstate commerce is direct and not
accidental, secondary or remote as in United States v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U. S. 1. Ib.

3. Unlawfulness of otherwise lawful separate elements of scheme when bound
together by a common intent.

Even if the separate elements of such a scheme are lawful when they are
bound together by a common intent as parts of an unlawful scheme
to monopolize interstate commerce the plan may make the parts
unlawful. Ib.

4. Shipment of cattle constituting interstate commerce.

When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation
they will end their transit, after purchase, in another State, and when
in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a
purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a constantly recurring
course, it constitutes interstate commerce and the purchase of the
cattle is an incident of such commerce.
Ib.

CONSPIRACIES.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Commerce clause-Unconstitutionality of sections 2317, 2318, Code of
Georgia.

The imposition, by a state statute, upon the initial or any connecting carrier,
of the duty of tracing the freight and informing the shipper, in writing,
when, where, how and by which carrier the freight was lost, damaged or
destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official
position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the informa-
tion can be established, is, when applied to interstate commerce, a
violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution; and
§§ 2317, 2318 of the Code of Georgia of 1895, imposing such a duty
on common carriers is void as to shipments made from points in Georgia
to other States (Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Tobacco Company,
169 U. S. 311 distinguished). Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey,

194.

See CASES EXPLAINED, 2;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

2. Contracts, impairment of—Validity of chapter-578, Laws of Massachu-
setts of 1898.

Chapter 578, Laws of Massachusetts of 1898, providing for taxation of
street railway companies is not void, as violating the impairment of
obligation clause of the Federal Constitution, so far as this case is con-
cerned, because it relieved a railroad company from the obligation to
pave and repair streets under the terms and conditions of certain
municipal ordinances which the company had duly accepted. Wor-
cester v. Street Railway Co., 539.

3. Due process of law-Failure of taxpayer to avail himself of opportunity
to test validity of tax.

If the taxpayer be given an opportunity to test the validity of a tax at any
time before it is made final, either before a board having quasi judicial
character, or a tribunal provided by the State for that purpose, due
process is not denied, and if he does not avail himself of the opportunity
to present his defense to such board or tribunal, it is not.for this court
to determine whether such defense is valid. Hodge v. Muscatine
County, 276.

4. Due process of law-Validity of section 5007, Iowa Code.
Section 5007, Iowa Code, imposing a tax against every person and upon the
real property and the owner thereof whereon cigarettes are sold does
not give a license to sell cigarettes, nor is it invalid as depriving the
owner of the property of his property without due process of law,
because it does not provide for giving him notice of the tax, §§ 2441,

2442, Iowa Code, providing for review with power to remit by the
board of supervisors. Ib.

See CORPORATIONS, 2;

EXTRADITION, 1;
TAXATION, 9.

5. Ex post facto laws-Alteration of state criminal statute subsequent to com-
mission of crime, held not within prohibition.

By chapter 99, March 9, 1903, Laws of North Dakota, the statutes in force
when plaintiff in error committed the crime for which he was tried, and
when the verdict of guilty was pronounced were altered to the follow-
ing effect: Close confinement in the penitentiary for not less than six
or more than nine months after judgment and before execution was
substituted for confinement in the county jail for not less than three
nor more than six months after judgment and before execution, and
hanging within an inclosure at the penitentiary by the warden or his
deputy was substituted for hanging by the sheriff in the yard of the
jail of the county in which the conviction occurred. Held that the
changes looked at in the light of reason and common sense are to be
taken as favorable to the plaintiff in error, and that a statute which
mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time the crime was com-
mitted cannot be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime.
Held that close confinement does not necessarily mean solitary confine-
ment and the difference in phraseology between close confinement and
confinement is immaterial, each only meaning such custody as will
insure the production of the criminal at the time set for execution.
Held that the place of punishment by death within the limits of the
States is not of practical consequence to the criminal. Rooney v.
North Dakota, 319.

6. Equal protection of laws not denied by state taxation of retail dealers and
not of others doing an interstate business.

A classification in a state taxation statute in which a distinction is made
between retail and wholesale dealers is not unreasonable and § 5007,
Iowa Code, imposing a tax on cigarette dealers is not invalid as deny-
ing equal protection of the laws to retail dealers, because it does not
apply to jobbers and wholesalers doing an interstate business with
customers outside of the State. Cook v. Marshall County, 261.

7. Equal protection of laws-State taxation of franchise of corporation at
different rates from tangible property.

A railroad company in Kentucky claimed as its only ground of Federal
jurisdiction in an action in the Circuit Court of the United States against
members of the state board of valuation and assessment that under the
tax laws of the State it was deprived of equal protection of the laws
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, because while the law of the
State required all property to be taxed at its fair cash value there
was a uniform and general undervaluation of other property but the
company's property was taxed at its full value. There was conflicting
testimony as to the valuations, most of the members of the board