of democracy and the idea of German unity were closely connected with one another, and for the most part the advocates of the one were also the protagonists of the other.

The attempted revolution of the year 1848 was founded upon the union of these two ideals; but the defeat of that movement restored the conditions which had existed in the earlier decades of the century. The year 1848 was therefore a turning-point in German history, for the developments which took place during the succeeding fifteen years led in an entirely different direction from that along which the progressive elements in the country appeared to be carrying the nation before the failure of the revolution.

After 1852, when the monarchic confederation was restored, the epoch began which was to continue until it ended in storm in 1918. It was conceivable that Germany might have progressed along the lines of a monarchic federation with political power distributed much as it was between 1815 and 1848. But, as we know, such was not the actual line of development. Between 1852 and 1871 the disastrous aggrandisement of Prussia took place, with the result that the distribution of political power between the different states and provinces was entirely altered, the full German unity was destroyed-Austria, probably the most enlightened of the German States, being forced out of the federation-and the whole political character and trend of the greater part of Germany, now under the domination of Berlin, was changed fundamentally and greatly for the worse.

It is important for the comprehension of German politics to realise that from 1815 onwards there had been three possible roads along which the nation might have travelled. There was, firstly, a balanced and comparatively enlightened monarchic federation, with Vienna continuing to occupy the most important position-but not a position of domination. It was this policy which had the first chance of success, for the foundations of it were laid by the Congress of Vienna. And its failure must be attributed in the main to the fact that the governing statesmen in the first half of the century proved incapable of uniting monarchic Constitutionalism, with the economic and political progress, which was inevitable in a country like Germany. And this possible type of German polity was, of course, finally destroyed by the unprecedented egotism of the second most important State, Prussia. Then, secondly, there was the ideal of a united democratic Germany, the realisation of which had been attempted in 1848, but which, having once failed, quickly passed out of practical politics. And then, thirdly, there was the development which actually took place after 1870, of an immensely aggrandised Prussia, by means of which that State succeeded in impressing its character upon four-fifths of Germany. The new partial federation became in truth something which could hardly be distinguished from an enlarged Prussia. It is interesting and important to realise these three possible

courses of development for Germany, because during the years 1917 and 1918 there was in reality an internal struggle proceeding in the country between modern adaptations of all these three ideals. And all three policies were represented by different parties in all the German States during those two years.

When these general conceptions are borne in mind it is possible to see the larger significance of the events which took place both in the German Empire and in Austria during 1918. The Russian Revolution and the subsequent anxiety of the Bolshevik Government to make peace, caused less important reactions in German political conditions than might perhaps have been anticipated. The withdrawal from the Entente of the country which had been deemed at one time-not without reason the most formidable enemy of Germany, might have been expected to produce a marked heightening of German ambitions and a hardening of the war sentiment. For the relative moderation which had characterised the war policy and the war aims of the majority in the Reichstag and, though less consistently, even of the Imperial Government, had always been due in the main, not to principle or to sincere reasonableness, but to a sense of expediency. The Government and the moderate parties, upon whose support the Government mainly depended, eschewed the wild talk of the pan-Germans and the annexationists; but it would of course be an error to suppose that they had any scrupulous objections to aggrandisement. There is every reason to believe that the majority of the nation would have been ready enough to accept the fruits of victory, if victory could have been attained; but they possessed a certain sense for reality, and accordingly the predominant section of opinion. had long regarded the schemes of the extreme chauvinists as mere impracticable dreams. Thus it came about that in a formal manner since the peace offer of December, 1916, and informally even before that event, the German Government and the parliamentary majority had been aiming at a peace which should be concluded on the basis of a compromise with their enemies. The Russian peace did, indeed, strengthen somewhat the position of the extreme war party, but the change was not very marked, and was not sufficient to modify in any fundamental manner the political and parliamentary situation which had existed continuously since the summer of 1915.

The

This political situation may be briefly summarised. divisions between the parties formed during the war did not entirely coincide with the party divisions as they existed before the war. On war policy the old parties fell into three larger groups, which may be respectively described as the Chauvinists, the Moderates, and the Internationalists. The Conservatives and the National Liberals formed an extreme Imperialist group, which aimed at a so-called German peace with Annexations, both in the East and in the West. The Central parties in the

Reichstag, together forming a large majority of that House, held to a more moderate policy, and aimed at a peace by compromise which, as described above, was also the official policy of the Imperial Government. These Central Parties consisted of the Catholic Party, the Radicals, and the majority of the Social Democrats. It is possible that the Socialist majority held to this moderate policy from principle, for they had never altogether acquitted the German Government of some responsibility for the war; but in so far as the Clericals and the Radicals were concerned, it is to be feared that their moderation was only grounded in expediency. On the extreme Left of the Reichstag there existed the small party of Internationalists, who consisted merely of the minority of the Socialist Party, led by Herren Haase and Bernstein. This small party had been founded in the summer of 1915 after the great Russian defeats had removed the so-called "Cossack Peril." Although Haase, Bernstein, and their followers held that the Russian despotism had been largely responsible for the war, they were yet fully alive to the aggressive character of the German Government, and they held in particular that even though the German Government might have been justified in their attitude towards Russia and Serbia, yet they had behaved iniquitously in Belgium and towards the Western Powers generally. And the Socialist minority thought that a far more conciliatory policy ought to have been adopted towards Belgium, France, and Great Britain after the summer of 1915, and they had accordingly voted against the War Credits since that time.

The Socialist minority were thus the only real Opposition in the Imperial Parliament. It was they alone who had opposed the war. All the other parties had constantly supported the Government and voted the War Credits, but the distinction between the other two groups, the Chauvinists and the Moderates, ought not to be forgotten, and the difference will be seen to have been of importance as the history of German politics in 1918 comes to be described.

During the year 1917 changes had taken place in the most important appointments in the German Empire. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been Chancellor throughout the war, had resigned in July, and had been succeeded for a short period by Herr Michaelis. And then, in the autumn, the chief political post in the empire had been given to the Prime Minister of Bavaria, Count Hertling, who had once been the leader of the Catholic Party in the Reichstag. This appointment was a complete innovation, for previous Chancellors had always been Prussians and Protestants. Count Hertling, as chief adviser to the King of Prussia, was also formally Prime Minister of that kingdom; but a Prussian statesman, Herr Friedberg, was appointed Deputy-Premier, a post which had not existed in the past. A change had also taken place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Herr Zimmerman, who had been

largely responsible for the disastrous policy which had involved Germany in war with the United States, had resigned; and the post of Foreign Minister was bestowed upon Baron von Kühlmann. The latter statesman had been Councillor of the Embassy in London before the war, and was much abler, though probably no less unscrupulous, than his predecessor. Both Hertling and Kühlmann were closely associated with the moderate foreign policy approved by the majority of the Reichstag. It should be said that this policy had been crystallised in a famous resolution passed by the Lower House on July 19, 1917.

On January 24 Count Hertling delivered a speech to the main committee of the Reichstag, in which he surveyed the whole field of foreign policy, and in particular replied to the Fourteen Points of proposed peace terms, which had recently been laid down by President Wilson. The Chancellor began by referring to the negotiations then proceeding at BrestLitovsk, and stated that the discussions with the representatives of Ukrainia were proceeding very favourably. He then referred to the fact that the Western Powers had refused to participate in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk; but he passed on to examine Mr. Lloyd George's speech of January 5, and President Wilson's message to Congress of January 6. Mr. Lloyd George, he said, was less offensive in his language than he had previously been; but it was quite a mistake to suppose that the AustroGerman Alliance had other than defensive aims. Mr. Lloyd George had, moreover, misrepresented the history of AlsaceLorraine. Alsace-Lorraine had been historically German territory, and the Treaty of 1871 had in reality merely involved what is now called dis-annexation. The speaker called Thomas Carlyle as witness for this theory, Carlyle having written on this point, "I know of no natural law, and of no Heaven-sent decree, on the strength of which France, alone among the dwellers of the earth, should not be obliged to return a portion of stolen territories, when the owners from whom they were wrested, have a favourable opportunity to get them back."

The Count then passed on to consider Dr. Wilson's speech at much greater length, and he dealt seriatim with the Presi dent's Fourteen Points.1

I. No secret international agreements. This point was approved by the Chancellor. II. The freedom of the seas. On this point also the Chancellor said that Germany was in agreement with the United States. III. The question of an economic war. The idea of an economic war, after the war, was also condemned by Count Hertling. IV. Limitation of armaments. The Chancellor said that the German Government were prepared to discuss this matter, which would indeed be of the first importance after the conclusion of hostilities, if only on account of the financial condition of all the European Powers. V. The

1 See the "United States."

colonial questions. On this point the speaker's remarks were quite non-committal. VI. The evacuation of Russian territory. In regard to this matter the Chancellor declined to admit that the Western Powers had any kind of right to interfere. VII. The question of Belgium. On this point, probably the most important of all, Count Hertling said, "As far as the Belgian question is concerned, it has been declared repeatedly by my predecessors in office that at no time during the war has the forcible annexation of Belgium by the German Empire formed a point in the programme of German policy." But he said the Belgian question would nevertheless have to form part of the general discussion of peace terms, and, in particular, it could not be discussed apart from the principle of the integrity of the territory of the Central Powers. VIII. The evacuation of France. The speaker said that there had never been any intention to annex these parts of France. But he declared again that the Germans would never allow themselves to be robbed of Alsace-Lorraine, and he reminded the house that 87 per cent. of the people of those provinces spoke German as their mother tongue. IX., X., XI. The nationalities of Austria-Hungary and the Balkan questions. Since these questions primarily concerned the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Chancellor left the reply to these points to his Austro-Hungarian colleague. XII. The Turkish Empire. Germany, said the Chancellor, would loyally support the just rights of its Turkish ally. XIII. Poland. Since it was the Central Powers which had liberated Poland from Russia, it must be the Central Powers and Poland, herself, which would decide the future of that country. XIV. The League of Nations. The Chancellor expressed general sympathy with this idea.

He then ended his speech by stating once more that the German Government were ready for a peace of reconciliation, but that this peace must be founded upon a recognition of the integrity of the German Empire.

This speech by Count Hertling was well received by the greater part of the German press, but the Pan-German organs regarded the tone of the speech as too conciliatory towards the Entente, and criticised him severely on that ground. The PanGermans were still more hostile to the speech delivered on the same day by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin.

On January 25 Baron von Kühlmann delivered a speech before the main committee of the Reichstag which covered a wide ground. He began by referring to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, and he complained of the obstruction of the Russian delegates to a satisfactory settlement of the question of Russia's western border States. Baron Kühlmann argued that a duly authorised national assembly was equally as competent as, or more competent than, a plebiscite, to exercise the right of self-determination. The speaker then referred to Finland and