course of the Mississippi, and afterwards by the river Iberville, Lake Ponchartrain, and Maurepas. Besides this, an American agent, Mr. Ellicott, employed to trace the boundary between the king of of Spain and the United States, speaks thus: "It does not appear, by the cession of Louisiana, that we obtain the whole of both sides of the river; for, by consulting No. 5 of the maps, it will be seen that the island of Orleans only extends to the Manshack, and thence, &c. is still held by his Catholic majesty as a part of West Florida." Such are the arguments used by those in favour of the right of Spain, and opposed to the claim of the United States. I now proceed to detail the arguments by which the claim is supported.

1. Nothing can be more flimsy and futile than the last argument, on which the advocates of Spain appear chiefly to rely. The denial of Spain, and the letter of Talleyrand, are brought forward with a kind of triumph, as furnishing something conclusive and unanswerable. Yet, without any great effort of reason, a most satisfactory answer may be given. What is the amount of this denial on the part of Spain, of having ceded any part of ancient Louisiana east of the Mississippi? Nothing more than that she is at issue with the United States who hold the affirmative. This would, indeed, be a strange mode of avoiding an obligation, or rendering a contract null: it would be precisely similar to the case of a party in a law-suit, who should plead as a circumstance to cause the scales to turn in his favour, that he is at variance with his opponent. This is, indeed, too ridiculous to merit a moment's attention. Spain might as well deny

VOL. I.

the having ceded any part of Louisiana; in fact, she has denied it by a formal protest, she afterwards thought proper to withdraw, for which no cause has ever been assigned.

The construction, or interpretation of the treaty, is to be made by an examination of the words in which it is expressed, and not by the subsequent declarations of one of the parties in his own favour. But, it is said, that France had the same understanding of the cession, and that since both the original parties are agreed on this point, the United States have no right to set up a claim in contradiction. What evidence have we to prove that such was the understanding? Is there any document to prove the admissions of France before the acceptance, at the time, or even afterwards, while she continued to be interested? There is none; the only evidence is the letter of M. Talleyrand to the Spanish minister, after Louisiana was ceded to the United States, filled with abuse of the Americans, and evidently written for the purpose of amusing the childish folly of the Spanish government. Was France called upon as an umpire to decide, or as a witness to disclose facts? No; it was either an impertinent interference on her part, or it was a compliance with the request of Spain, in order to obtain other objects, in comparison with which, this diplomatic falsehood was of little consequence.

The situation of France, at that moment, would not permit her to be either an impartial judge, or an unbiassed witness. It was her interest to sooth Spain while she was engaged in schemes of of the grossest fraud, and the small matter of satisfying her with words at the expense of the

S

United States, would form no obstacle to the execution of her plans. Nay, events afterwards proved that she was directly interested as much as Spain in circumscribing the United States, for she entertained, at this very time, designs against Spain and all her possessions; and, foreseeing that she might one day stand in the place of Spain, is it wonderful that she should endeavour to aid her in defrauding the United States? Moreover, how can Spain reconcile the inconsistency of charging the French government, in one breath, with the most shocking frauds in the manner of obtaining Louisiana, the violation of honour and good faith in transferring it to the United States, and the most unparalleled iniquity in her conduct to the Spanish monarchy, and yet, in the next, repeating the mere words of " the artificer of frauds," as worthy of deciding a dispute, in which the difficulty is to ascertain the truth? Here is most certainly a glaring inconsistency, and proves still more the necessity of recurring, not to the words of M. Talleyrand, but to the words of the treaty, or to "circumstances that cannot lie," as the philosopher, Paley, would say.

It is also asked, with an air of triumph, why did not the French commissioner take possession, or at least demand possession of West Florida? It is well known that a disagreement took place between M. Laussat and the Spanish authorities respecting the western boundary. Why was there no difference as to the eastern? All this is easily answered. Louisiana was transferred to the United States by Mr. Laussat, in less than twenty days after it had been delivered to him; and the actual occupancy,

or taking possession, of the different posts situated at some distance from the capital, was left to the Americans. The Opelousas, Attakapas, Washita, were not delivered to M. Laussat any more than Baton Rouge, or Mobile. But it is a well known fact in Louisiana, that the Spaniards, at these last-mentioned posts, had actually prepared to deliver them up, and that their refusal to do so, was an after-thought. It is also equally well known, that the claiming these posts was not an after-thought on the part of the United States, but that the American commissioners, at the moment, protested against the refusal of the Spanish officers and that the first act of congress, as well as that of the executive, relative to the government of Louisiana, (and this probably as a matter of course, and before the refusal was known) treated Mobile and Baton Rouge as within the acquired territory.

That there should have been a difference of opinion respecting the western boundary, is natural enough, when we recollect that Spain and France, from the earliest period of the settlement of Louisiana, disagreed as to the boundary in that quarter; France having uniformly claimed to the Rio del Norte. The silence respecting Baton Rouge and Mobile, rather furnishes a presumption in favour of the United States; for, surely, they cannot be charged with being more ambitious and grasping than France. To France they would not have been refused; it was a thing too well understood to admit of doubt. As respected the United States, it was a differ ent matter. But, granting that M. Laussat neglected his duty, this cannot affect the interests of the United States. It is not pretended

ficient to satisfy the most prejudi- | ced, that if the United States conceived designs of ambition, the same were harboured by France. Indeed, every notice taken in France of the treaty of Ildephonso, interpreted the cession in the whole amplitude ascribed to it now by the United States.

2. The next source of argument, is that of circumstance, which speaks for itself, and is beyond the control of the parties. With respect to the intentions of the parties, as inferred from their situations, it will not be pretended that Louisiana was restored to France as a matter of right. Spain was at liberty to cede the whole, or a part, or add to it, or withhold it altogether, as she might think proper. Whether that portion of ancient Louisiana, called West Florida, came into the hands of Spain by conquest, or cession, is entirely immaterial: If she chose to restore it to France she had certainly a right to do so, and the only question is, whether, by a description sufficiently certain, it has been included in the cession. There is nothing more improbable in her cession of Florida, than in that of Louisiana. What was there to prevent her from giving away all her American possessions, if she chose to do so? If she has been duped by Napoleon, or betrayed by her own ministers, that is surely not the fault of those who have become fair and honest purchasers.

But if we permit ourselves to infer the intentions of the parties from their situations, the intention of France cannot be mistaken. It is not to be presumed that Napoleon obtained Louisiana merely with a view of giving it to the United States, as a token of friendship; and if he did intend to take

possession of it, and was actuated by that inordinate ambition ascribed to him by Spain, he would seek to obtain it in the shape and form that would best suit his purpose. A slight knowledge of the country will show, that without the possession of Baton Rouge, and some other heights which command the river, together with the lakes and their shores, Louisiana, so far from facilitating his ambitious projects, would be defenceless: for, all the swampy region below the high ground of Baton Rouge, the last on the river, would be entirely at the mercy of an enemy possessing those points on its margin. Spain has frequently complained of a want of equivalent for the transfer of Louisiana. Has she been aware that this might lead to a suspicion, that her policy to the United States was not very fair or honourable in thus placing a serpent at their feet to sting them to death! In truth, she had, in the cession, another object besides the European equivalent. She trembled for her Mexican provinces, and wished, as she felt herself nearly impotent in Louisiana, to interpose between them and the United States a power that would arrest the progress, and monopolize the attention of the latter. Her disappointment was two-fold when she found that what she had meant as a stumblingblock for the United States, had been converted into a steppingstone, in consequence of their unexpected acquisition of the province.

If Napoleon harboured any designs against the United States, as some very intelligent men have believed, the possession of the heights at Baton Rouge and the lakes, would have been indispensable. It is, therefore, under every

point of view, a fair presumption, that he meant to obtain Louisiana in its most extensive form. To save appearances, and nothing more, was the word retrocede employed, by which Spain restored merely what had belonged to France, instead of making any new formal cession of territory. For the same reason, the word Florida was avoided, and the part of ancient Louisiana, bearing that name, was ceded by a reference to a period of time when it was not so denominated, but was known as Louisiana.

3. We come at last to the grant itself, after having removed the minor obstacles thrown in the way by the ingenuity of the advocates of Spain. It were unnecessary to repeat those established rules founded upon the most obvious good sense which govern in public as well as in private pacts: that all the words of a contract, should be made, if possible, to mean something, that they are to be taken most strongly against the party who is supposed to utter them, and that things are to be considered certain which may be rendered certain. Much weight is attached to the circumstance of the name of Louisiana having been used, and that of Florida omitted; but it will not be pretended that there is such a magic in names, that they can control the most satisfactory description, because it does not comport with them. Rather, the name is totally immaterial, provided the thing itself be sufficiently described.

If this be a mere cession of Louisiana according to the limits contended for by the advocates of Spain, then every other word in the clause would be useless. According to them, the limits of the province were so clearly ascertained, and so firmly established

by France, and as thus established, acceded to by other nations, and among the rest by the United States, that the name alone was sufficiently descriptive of the extent of Louisiana. Then why was any farther description used? Even M. Talleyrand, can define the boundary as he wishes it to be understood, when the United States are to be affected, in ten words! The boundary, he says, is, "the Mississippi to the Iberville, and then the lakes." There is certainly no ambiguity here: but why was it not thus expressed in the treaty of cession? Where was the necessity of referring to a period of time when France was in possession of Louisiana, or to its actual extent in the hands of Spain, or to what it ought to be after subsequent treaties? All this, was not merely superfluous, but much of it absolutely irrelevant, unless it refers to something more than Spain is willing to admit. M. Talleyrand has convicted himself either of a downright falsehood, or of having in the most shameful manner, wrapped his meaning in ambiguous terms. It seems that where he chooses he can explain himself in half a line, in such a manner as to render it impossible for any one to mistake it.

How many different ways could not the grant as contended for on the part of Spain, be so expressed as to preclude the slightest doubt! Indeed the phraseology must either convey a more extensive meaning than Spain is willing to admit, or it must have been used for the sole purpose of producing doubt. The advocates of Spain themselves acknowledge that the expressions are ambiguous; but this, the United States on the contrary have never adroitted; to them, the construction has always appeared