peared by his gestures to contradict what he had said, but he spoke on the authority of the existing documents. In this manner the negotiation commenced. Our first proposition was one that never was before suggested, with a view to peace or war, or even as a matter of speculation and argument. We demanded a cession of territory, on the ground that it formed the natural limit of Canada. This territory included the whole of the lakes, and a large strip of ground on the other side. It was accompanied with a further con We had concluded peace at Paris; and, long before that event, it appeared not to be doubted, that the result must be favourable to the objects for which we were contending. This country might then have met America with a great artillery of character, and then was the time to have come forward with powerful strength and moderate demands. But, instead of taking any advantage of the situation in which we stood, we sent a paltry force of nine thousand men from Bordeaux, and by an expedient the most preposterous, endeavoured to supply the want of mili-dition, that they should build no tary strength, by the force and magnitude of our diplomatic demands. He would contend that the instructions sent by the American government to its commissioners, were such as to admit of peace. On one branch, it was true, they had no instructions. They were not authorised to cede territory, or to negotiate Indian pacification. They thought it could never have entered the heads of the negotiators at Ghent to have made the first demand, or to have introduced the second, in the way in which it was introduced, under an idea of altering the relations of the Indians towards the American states. This was the undoubted reason why they had no instructions upon these points. There was an extraordinary fact connected with this subject, that was amusing, if one could be amused in contemplating those transactions-that while our negotiations for the peace and independence of the Indian nations were going on, a peace was actually concluded by Mr. Madison with many of them, one of the terms of which was, that theyty which we knew to be necessary should enter again under the protection of the United States. The noble earl opposite, (Liverpool) ap fortresses on the banks of the lakes, nor adopt those measures which were necessary to protect their commerce against the Indians. On the subject of natural limits, he could not help amusing himself with inquiring from whence the doctrine had issued. He remembered it was once introduced by the famous Mr. Anacharsis Clootz, the orator of the human race, who, in a book called "Revolutionary Diplomatics," had described the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Ocean, and the Rhine, as the natural limits of France. He was surprised to find, that after we had conquered the French revolution, and carried our arms into Paris, this doctrine should be revived by a secretary of state, and applied to America. But was this done in the time of our strength? Was the demand insisted on in a command. ing attitude? No such thing; we approached in forma pauperis; we laid the British crown at the foot of the American president, and besought that to us, the weaker party, he would afford that securi to defend us against his pretensions. And what was the security we asked? That he should aban first than would ultimately be insisted on. In conformity with this principle, the commissioners conceived it to be wise and prudent to ask more, in the commencement of the negotiation, than in the latter end they conceived it proper to adhere to. Amongst some negotiators, of remote times, this principle was certainly acted on. And, with reference to their conduct, the negotiation of the present treaty resembled, in a great degree, many of the proceedings he had recently seen Every precedent was adopted, as if it were the offspring of some sacred doctrine and, it was here supposed, that if persons, at a former period, had ultimately taken less than they at first demanded, that, therefore, in all cases, it was proper to ask for more than, if resisted, you would deem it necessary to take. But here he would observe, that insin don all means of defence. Again, when we were asked by the Americans, why did we bring forward this demand at a moment when we professed to be negotiating in the spirit of peace? Our answer was, because your ambition is so unbounded. What could be expected after this? We set up monstrous, egregious, and unreasonable demands, and justified them by the ambition of that party upon whom we made them. When the question was asked, "Is this a sine quâ non?" the answer that followed was, perhaps, the most extraordinary that was ever given by a set of diplomatists- We will not tell you whether it is or notwe have already given you one sine quá non-and, until that is decided, we will not give you any information as to another." But this point, in whatever way considered, whether as a sine quâ non or not, was completely rejected-cerity must, generally, be the bano attempt was ultimately made to insist on it-it formed no part of the present treaty. Now, he would ask, was it necessary to insist on this point? If it was, what security could be found in a treaty which did not contain a word on the subject? The ground on which you called for it was, not your strength, but your weakness. You stated that a mutual possession of the lakes produced additional danger in war, and formed a perpetual source of disagreement in peace, and you insisted on additional security-whether as a sine quâ non or not, the noble marquis did not pretend to say, since it was a matter very difficult to be unravelled. He had, however, been informed, that it never was intended to insist on this proposition, as a sine quâ non-but that it was thought to be a grand display of diplomatic address, to demand more at sis of such conduct-that insincerity was unworthy of all public councils-and he desired to abjure a participation in any such feelings or principles. It was true, indeed, that occasions might occur, in which it was requisite, while treating, to make demands which it was not intended to insist upon; but the circumstances inviting this course were of a peculiar nature, and none but cases of an extraordinary description could call for, or justify it. In the case of Great Britain, he contended, that should have been stated at first, which it was intended to have been abided by at last. If ever there was a case in which the system of making a great demand, and afterwards receding from it, was inapplicable to the circumstances under which it was resorted to, that case was the present. A glorious career of success in war-a long series of ad vantages these might induce a nation to look for a peace corres pondent with the exertions that had been made, and the successes that had been achieved. But even here, it was neither just nor wise, to demand that which, according to the law of nations, it was most improper to seek. It was not right, under any circumstances, to ask for the possession of that, which a state must deem essential to its honour, its security, and its independence. On this principle, he arraigned the demand with respect to the military possession of the lakes, both on the ground of policy and of justice He denied that it was necessary for the security of our possessions to demand such a concession. He thought the effort to obtain this boon was made in a manner that ought to cover with shame those who tolerated it; for the majesty of England was placed, as a suppliant, at the foot of the president of the United States. And, he thought, that those who permitted the demands, generally, ought to be punished, for countenancing a spirit of aggrandizement, against which this country had been so long contending. It was, he conceived, in the highest degree imprudent, impolitic, and unwise, to tell America, at the outset of the negotiations, that if certain points were not conceded to us, there was no security for our dominions, in that quarter of the world. He was astonished that America should have been called upon to submit to the claim that was made; a claim which she could not have recognised, without degrading her national honour, and sacrificing her national interests. No country had a right to make such a demand on another. The next question was, that of the Indian boundary-and here it was necessary to examine on what ground that question rested. By the treaty of 1783, which established the independence of the United States, the line of demarcation, between the territories of the United States, and those of Great Britain, in America, was to be drawn through the centre of the lakes of the woods, and was to be terminated by a line continued from the lakes of the woods to the Mississippi. It so happened, that a line thus drawn, would not have proceeded due west, as was stipulated-but that, to define it, it ought to be drawn almost southeast. But the stipulations of that treaty, thus defining the boundary of the United States, gave to the new government the same right and control over the various places within the stated boundaries, as had before been enjoyed by Great Britain. Within those boundaries many Indian tribes resided; and it was the policy of the United States to encourage amongst them habits of civilization. By the proclamation of his present majesty, issued in 1763, all private individuals were prevented from purchasing any of the lands appropriated to the use of the Indians. But it was provided, that if, under any peculiar circumstances, the Indians themselves were anxious to dispose of those grounds, that they should be purchased for the crown. By the treaty of 1783, the full rights, formerly possessed by the king of Great Britain, over certain parts of the American territory, were fully and completely vested in the government of the United States. How, then, could this government, with any degree of justice, call for a new boundary for the Indians, when, in fact, all power and control respecting them had been long before given up? For he would contend, that all gusted by the demands of our negotiators, the treaty restored things to exactly the same state in which they were before. He had also to notice another most curious intimation on our part. Ministers thought proper to propose, as it seemed to them desirable to maintain the excellent state of society which existed among the Indians, that the Americans should assent, never to purchase any lands of their Indians, while we did the same with regard to ours: that the Indians should only dispose of their lands to a third party. Who was this third party? Was it France? Americans might have been dis All these propositions were said to be grounded on the necessity of checking a spirit of aggrandizement on the part of America: but what were their effects on the public mind when they reached America? It was well known that there prevailed among a numerous party in that country, a strong sentiment that the war with England, if not absolutely unjust in its origin, was at least impolitic and unnecessary. The whole nation had also begun to feel its disastrous effects, and would have hailed with pleasure any really pacific proposals; but when these propositions arrived, their tendency was the very reverse of accelerating a peace. The noble lord had, indeed, blamed the president for giving them publicity during pending negotiations; but the American negotiators declared in their dispatch, that they thought the prospect of peace at an end; and he believed that the noble lord, who was so niggardly in the production of papers, had he been situated as the president was, would immediately have submitted to parliament such claims of an enemy, with those of the arts. The defence set up was, that it was an act of retaliation; but he must condemn the principle. Retaliation was of two kinds-defensive or vindictive. The former might be employed when necessary for self-protection; but the latter went to consider vengeance as a duty: it was to reverse the Christian principle, and substitute instead of it, that you should do unto others as they have done unto you. the view of arousing any flagging | fic purposes, and some of them to spirit of hostility in the country. The effect of the proposals was instantaneous in America; the determination to resist them was unanimous and strong to a degree almost incredible under a government so constituted. They excited a general military spirit; means were adopted for raising an efficient army, and attention had been paid to the formation of a navy on a regular systematic plan, which no man in this country could look forward to but with the deepest regret. If the proposals were urged insincerely, there was no degree of criminality too high which did not attach to ministers: if they were sincere in their apprehensions of American ambition, it remained for them to show how the engagements at last entered into, were either honourable and safe. The noble marquis next adverted to the mode in which the war had been prosecuted. He deeply lamented that it had ever been thought right to conduct the war on a system of predatory incursion. The true way would have been to apply the massy strength of this great naval and military country on some central point, where it might have commanded success, instead of producing more irritation. There was one point which required illustration, and that was the allegation that some of our officers had excited the negro slaves of Virginia to rise upon their masters. Another point was the fatal transaction at Washington. As an attack on the naval arsenal and depot of the enemy, the plan was wise, and conducted with singular ability and vigour; but he never could contemplate, without pain, the destruction of buildings entirely devoted to paciVOL I. But the charge of unbounded ambition was brought against America. This was discoverable, it was said, in her attacking Canada, at the commencement of the war; as if, because she gave it out to be a war for her maritime rights, she was bound to confine it to the ocean, where you were strong, and she was weak. America might think that the best way of conducting a war even for maritime rights, was by attacking Canada, where ministers had confessed that we were weak. But the American government never made Canada a point in the negotiation, and nothing could be drawn from the proclamation of an invading general, which he believed was afterwards disowned by his government. Another charge was, that she manifested an encroaching spirit, against which it was necessary to guard, by her acquisition of Louisiana, an event that took place not less than eleven years ago. That transaction simply originated in this, that in consequence of the transfer of Louisiana to France by the Spanish government, the Americans were dreadfully alarmed lest they should have Bonaparte and the French as a perpetual blister on their backs. Their alarm was not without reason; for no sooner had Bonaparte X |