prince regent's 'ministers had been placed in, that he should have given the same advice as to the present state of war. Now that parliament was called upon for its support, he could not, after all the consideration he had been able to give the subject, bring himself to doubt that it was their duty to declare their determined resolution to support the crown to the utmost in the prosecution of the war. But if any hesitation had appeared on the part of the executive government, strong as his impression was, he should not have presumed, upon the imperfect, and perhaps erroneous information which a member of parliament was able to pick up, to advise the government to commence a war which ministers did not think expedient. He expressed some concern that the house were not called upon to consider this subject earlier, for the sake of giving more satisfaction to the country, of connteracting many unfounded opinions, and removing many groundless prejudices. But the deFay had afforded him the opportunity of examining and re-examining opinions, of the correctness of which he had so much reason to doubt, when he found they differed from those of his noble friend-of whose judgment he thought so highly. To give an opinion in favour of a continuance of the calamities of war, was a painful task to any man; but it was some consolation to feel that that was the opinion of a man whose whole public life had expressed a general abhorrence of war, and who thought that in order to be just, a war must not only be necessary, but unavoidable. The first question was, whether we had just grounds to consider ourselves at war. There was a saying of Mr.

Burke, recorded in those volumes in which, if so many things were often applicable, it was because they were founded on the solid principles of truth-that neither a profitable wrong, nor an unprofita. ble

right, were fit objects to be pursued by war. Even though it were demonstrable, that the greatest possible advantage might be derived from the prosecution of war, yet if it could be shown that the war was unjust, the waging such a war was more unprofitable to its interests than any advantage could benefit them. Much had, of necessity, been said respecting the general right of interfering with the government of other nations. In the abstract principle, that no government had a right to interfere with another, every body would agree. The right was unquestionable, like the rights of men in a state of nature; and if any political state could be found in a state of nature, the rights of a state so separated from the other states would be absolute and undeniable; but it was with societies as with individuals, with governments as with men-when they stand in any relation to each other, they must be contented to see their rights regulated with a view to the mutual rights of all. The rights of others in relation to that state were as sacred as the rights of the state itself. He did not ap prehend that this principle would be denied; every page in the history of every country furnished examples of its being acted upon. His noble friend had mentioned two striking instances which had lately occurred. That this principle must not be made the pretext of oppression and injustice, was true of every other ground of war; and there was no legitimate ground of war which might not by abuse

be distorted to the purposes of injustice. There was no country which had not tried the effect of a treaty with Bonaparte-which had not experienced that in restraining his power, or diminishing his aggressions, treaties were of no avail whatever. If the house had not been of this opinion, the moment for them to have declared it was when the Prince Regent's ministers signed the declaration to that effect: they should then have required ministers to have withdrawn such declaration in the name of England. He cordially approved of the declaration: on that foundation France accepted the offers of the allies; and that government-which was originally a military usurpation-had it been the most legitimate in the world, would, by the misconduct of the sovereign, have forfeited its title to its king, and have produced the extreme case of the necessity of driving from the throne the person who had so abused his authority. If France possessed the right of choosing her own government, and had, after so many years of war, by which she had been so great a sufferer, made some sacrifices for the advantages of the restoration of tranquillity, her own limitation of that right could not be doubted: and so the bargain was made at Paris. This would appear the true sense of the treaties, looking on the whole business as one great transaction. In civil transactions, some competent tribunal or jurisdiction was referred to, which prescribed certain forms as necessary to be attended to for the regulation of a contract; which he who did not act upon, neglected at his peril. But in affairs between nations, there was no common authority or tribunal to refer to, or which had authority to prescribe:

and all that could be required was, to impose on both parties the duty of performing what they undertook. The intention to perform the contract must be made known to all parties, and this was the case respecting the exclusion of Bonaparte and his family from the French throne. The question, therefore, was not on the abstract right of interference in the choice of a government for France, but on the right of enforcing a solemn treaty. It mattered not what was the case of right, if it was allowed, as no man denied, that France had the right to conclude lawfully the treaty. That gave to the allies the right of enforcing it. The treaty was made, and it could not be lawful for France to break it. It was founded on certain stipulations: but France breaks it, and retracts from part of the bargain; her obligation was the exclusion of Bonaparte's dynasty. The moment that violation was committed, a just cause of war ensued. Their lordships might, though it was not neces sary, look back to the war of the succession, and the original principle on which that war was founded. The allies, he would not say wisely or not, did relax from the original principle of excluding the Bourbon family from the Spanish throne; but they insisted on the means for preventing the crowns of the two nations being worn by the same person. It might then have depended on the life of a weak and sickly child, whether Philip would not become the rightful heir of France. Had the contemplated event occurred, then France would have desired and attempted the annexation of Spain as a province of France; not as it was afterwards, a virtual province, but an actual added province or kingdom. If the policy, then, was

admitted to be right, what was the inference respecting the present circumstances? The point then was, not the exclusion of all the Bourbons or others from the throne of Spain, "but to prevent Philip V. from wearing the French crown; and we now said, that by the treaty Bonaparte cannot law fully be considered as the emperor of France. This was our ground, and as to the enemy nothing more was necessary. The case was this: he had violated, and the allies claimed the observance of the treaty. It was fitting to show to France that we were justified in those steps which might bring on France all the calamities of war. His opinion was, that there was no option left us; nor any grounds for long deliberation. We were placed by an imperious necessity in a state to do what could not be avoided. The first great point of importance was the observance of the treaty. It was no light matter after twenty-five years of trouble, and even at the close of war, to find in France the prevailing passion which occasioned the early calamities-a passion under the dominion of which, she was preparing to commence a new war. Could France alone have a right to examine, question, or cancel treaties, without assigning any reason why she was not bound by them? If there remained any hope for the maintenance of peace in Europe against such a power as France, it must be grounded upon a determination that she should be bound by the force of her contracts. Europe was not to tolerate her principles of destroying treaties, such as she avowed in the case of the opening of the Scheldt, for instance, some years ago. So now she renounced her contract by one of the most insulting papers

ever known in the annals of diplomacy, called by Caulaincourt, 66 a proposition for peace." which was founded only on this-that France might, at her pleasure, dispense with all compacts. What occasion was there now for the question whether relations should be entered into with France, seeing that she had shown that she would not abide by any treaty? She gloried in violating a treaty. She scattered it to the winds. By twentyfive years of fatal experience, she had taught Europe how she appreciated treaties. Other securities must, therefore, be found for her than those of solemn compacts. To all propositions from Bonaparte there was an insuperable objection. He could offer no security. We had now a duty imposed upon us. He had flagrantly broken his faith; and because he done so, were we to break faith with our allies? If they called on us to enforce an unjust demand, we might reply, that we were no party to the matter. If they called on us to support one, which though just was yet new, we might say, that the interest of the country was to be first considered. But our allies now called upon us only for the observance of a treaty agreed to by all, and we could not consistently set up a plea of our own interest as a reason for not assisting in securing its observance. To refuse to maintain the treaty of Paris, would be conduct towards our allies of a character similar to the bad faith of Bonaparte. There were yet other grounds for deciding on this fearful alternative. He held good faith to our allies to be indispensable; but his real opinion was, that it was essential to the general security of all (he knew not how to made shades of difference,) that the stipulations of