same throughout the struggle, and | at the time of the termination of the war, as they were at the commencement of it. At the termination of the war, France was annihilated, blotted out of the map of Europe; the vast power wielded by Bonaparte existed no longer. Let it be admitted that statesmen, in laying their course, are to look at probable events, that their conduct is to be examined with reference to the course of events which in all human probability might have been anticipated-and is there a man in this house, in existence, who can say, that on the 18th day of June, 1812, when the war was declared, it would have been anticipated that Great Britain would, by the circumstance of a general peace, resulting from the overthrow of a power whose basements were supposed to be deeper laid, more ramified and more extended than those of any power ever were before-be placed in the attitude in which she stood in December, 1814? Would any one say that this government could have anticipated such a state of things, and ought to have been governed in its conduct accordingly? Great Britain, Russia, Germany did not expect not a power in Europe believed, as late even as January 1814, that, in the ensuing March, Bonaparte would abdicate and the restoration of the Bourbons would follow. What then was the actual condition of Europe when peace was concluded? A perfect tranquillity reigned throughout; for, as late as the first of March, the idea of Napolean re-appearing in France, was as little entertained, as that of a man's coming from the moon to take upon himself the government of the country. In December 1814, a profound and apparently a permanent peace existed: Great Bri tain was left to dispose of the vast force, the accumulation of twentyfive years, the work of an immense system of finance and protracted war-she was at liberty to employ that undivided force against this country. Under such circumstances, it did not follow, Mr. C. said, according to the rules laid down, either that the war ought not to have been made, or that peace on such terms ought not to have been concluded. What then, Mr. C. asked, were the terms of the peace? The regular opposition in this country-the gentlemen on the other side of the house, had not come out to challenge an investigation of the terms of the peace, although they had several times given a sidewipe at the treaty on occasions with which it had no necessary connection. It had been some times said that we had gained nothing by the war, that the fisheries were lost, &c. How, he asked, did this question of the fisheries really stand? By the first part of the third article of the treaty of 1783, the right was recognized in the people of the United States, to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the gulf of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea, where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time to fish. This right was a necessary incident to our sovereignty, although it is denied to some of the powers of Europe. It was not contested at Ghent; it has never been drawn in question by Great Britain. But by the same third article it was further stipulated, that the inhabitants of the United States shall have "liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island,) | jority of the American commis and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of his Britannic majesty's dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen islands and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors or possessors of the ground." The British commissioners, assuming that these liberties had expired by the war between the two countries, at an early period of the negotiation declared that they would not be revived without an equivalent. Whether the treaty of 1788 does not form an exception to the general rule, according to which treaties are vacated by a war breaking out between the parties, is a question on which he did not mean to express an opinion. The first article of that treaty, by which the king of Great Britain acknowledges the sovereignty of the United States, certainly was not abrogated by the war; that all the other parts of the same instrument, which define the limits, privileges and liberties attaching to that sovereignty were equally unaffected by the war, might be contended for with at least much plausibility. If we determined to offer them the equivalent required, the question was, what should it be? When the British commissioners demanded, in their projet, a renewal to Great Britain of the right to the navigation of the Mississippi, secured by the treaty of 1783, a bare ma sioners offered to renew it, upon the condition that the liberties in question were renewed to us. He was not one of that majority. He would not trouble the committee with his reasons for being opposed to the offer. A majority of his colleagues, actuated he believed by the best motives, made however the offer, and it was refused by the British commissioners. If the British interpretation of the treaty of 1783 be correct, we have lost the liberties in question. What the value of them really is, he had not been able to meet with any two gentlemen who agreed. The great value of the whole mass of our fishery interests, as connected with our navigation and trade, was sufficiently demonstrated by the tonnage employed; but what was the relative importance of these liberties, there was great contrariety of statements. They were liberties to be exercised within a foreign jurisdiction, and some of them were liable to be destroyed by the contingency of settle. ment. He did not believe that much importance attached to such liberties. And supposing them to be lost, we are perhaps sufficiently indemnified by the redemption of the British mortgage upon the navigation of the Mississippi. This great stream, on that supposition, is placed where it ought to be, in the same independent condition with the Hudson, or any other river in the United States. If, on the contrary, the opposite construction of the treaty of 1783 be the true one, these liberties remain to us, and the right to the navigation of the Mississippi, as secured to Great Britain by that instrument, continues with her. But, Mr. C. said he was surprised to hear a gentleman from the western country (Mr. Hardin) ex- | claim that we had gained nothing by the war. Great Britain acquired, by the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, the right to trade with the Indians within our territories. It was a right upon which she placed great value, and from the pursuit of which she did not desist without great reluctance. It had been exercised by her agents in a manner to excite the greatest sensibility in the western country. This right was clearly lost by the war; for whatever may be the true opinion as to the treaty of 1783, there can be no doubt that the stipulations of that of 1794 no longer exist. It had been said, that the great object, in the continuation of the war, had been to secure our mariners against impressment, and that peace was made without accomplishing it. With regard to the opposition, he presumed, that they would not urge any such argument. For if their opinion was to be inferred (though he hoped in this case it was not) from that of an influential and distinguished member of the opposition, we had reason to believe that they did not think the British doctrines wrong on this subject. He alluded to a letter said to be written by a gentleman of great consideration, residing in an adjoining state, to a member of this house, in which the writer states that he conceives the British claim to be right, and expresses his hope that the president, however he might kick at it, would be compelled to swallow the bitter pill. If the peace had really given up the American doctrine, it would have been, according to that opinion, merely yielding to the force of the British right. In that view of the subject the error of the administration would have been in contending for too much in behalf of this country; for he presumed there was no doubt that, whether right or wrong, it would be an important principle gained to secure our seamen against British impressment. And he trusted in God that all future administrations would rather err on the side of contending for too much than too little for America. But, Mr. C. was willing to admit that the conduct of the administration ought to be tried by their own opinions, and not those of the opposition. One of the great causes of the war, and of its continuance, was the practice of impressment exercised by Great Britain, and if this claim has been admitted, by necessary implication or express stipulation, the administration has abandoned the rights of our seamen. It was with utter astonishment that he heard that it had been contended in this country, that because our right of exemption from the practice had not been expressly secured in the treaty, it was therefore given up! It was impossible that such an argument could be advanced on the floor-No member who regarded his reputation would, dared, advance such an argument here. Had the war terminated, the practice continuing, he admitted that such might be a fair inference; and on some former occasion he had laid down the principle, which he thought correct, that if the United States did not make peace with Great Britain, the war in Europe continuing, and therefore she continuing the exercise of the practice, without any stipulation to secure us against its effects, the plain inference would be, that we had surrendered the right. But what the fact? At the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace, although he desired to preserve peace between Great Britain and the United States, and to maintain between them that good understanding calculated to promote the interest of each, yet, whenever Great Britain should give satisfactory evidence of her design to apply her doctrine of impressment as heretofore, he was, for one, ready to take up arms again to oppose her. The fact was, that the two nations had been placed in a state of hostility as to a practice grow Great Britain had ceased the practice of impressment; she was not only at peace with all the powers of Europe, but there was every prospect of a permanent and durable peace. The treaty being silent on the subject of impressment, the only plain rational result was, that neither party had conceded its rights, but they were left totally unaffected by it. Mr. C. said he recollected to have heard in the British house of commons, whilst he was in Europe, the very reverse of the doctrine advanced here on this sub-ing out of the war in Europe. The ject. The British ministry were charged by a member of the opposition with having surrendered their right of impressment, and the same course of reasoning was employed to prove it as he understood was employed in this country to prove our acquiescence in that practice. The argument was this: the war was made on the professed ground of resistance of the practice of impressment: The peace having been made without a recognition of the right of America, the treaty being silent on the subject, the inference was, that the British authorities had surrendered the right: that they had failed to secure it, and, having done so, had in effect yielded it. The member of the opposition in England was just as wrong as any member of the house would be, who should contend that the right of impressment is surrendered to the British government. The fact was, Mr. C. said, neither party had surrendered its rights; things remain as though the war had never been made--both parties are in possession of all the rights they had anterior to the war. Lest it might be deduced that his sentiments on the subject of impressment had undergone a change, he took the opportunity to say, that war ceasing between Great Britain and the rest of Europe, left England and America engaged in a contest on an aggression which had also practically ceased. The question had then presented itself, whether the United States should be kept in war, to gain an abandonment of what had become a mere abstract principle; or looking at the results, and relying on the good sense and sound discretion of both countries, we should not recommend the termination of the war.-When no practical evil could result from the suspension of hostilities, and there was no more than a possibility of the removal of the practice of impressment, I, as one of the mission, consented with sincere pleasure to the peace, satisfied that we gave up no right, sacrificed no honour, compromitted no important principle. He said, then, applying the rule of the actual state of things, as that by which to judge of the peace, there was nothing in the conditions or terms of the peace that was dishonorable, nothing for reproach, nothing for regret. Gentlemen have complained that we had lost the islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy. Have they examined into that question, and do they know the grounds on which it stands? Prior to the war | appointment of commissioners un we occupied Moose Island, the British Grand Menan. Each party claimed both islands. America, because they are within the limits of the United States, as defined by the treaty of 1783; and Great Britain, because, as she alleges, they were in the exception contained in the second article of that treaty as to islands within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. All the information which he had received concurred in representing Grand Menan as the most valuable island. Does the treaty, in stipulating for an amicable and equitable mode of settling this controversy, yield one foot of the territory of the United States? If our title to Moose Island is drawn in question, that of Great Britain to Grand Menan is equally so. If we may lose the one, she may the other. The treaty, it was true, contained a provision that the party in possession, at the time of its ratification, may hold on until the question of right is decided. The committee would observe that this stipulation, as to possession, was not limited to the moment of the signature, but looked to the period of the ratification of the treaty. The American commissioners had thought they might safely rely on the valour of Massachusetts, or the arms of the United States, to drive the invader from our soil; and had also hoped that we might obtain possession of Grand Menan. It is true they have been disappointed in the successful application of the force of that state and of that of the union. But it is not true that we have parted with the right. It isfair to presume that Great Britain will with good faith, co-operate in carrying the stipulations into effect; and she has in fact already promptly proceeded to the | der the treaty. What have we gained by the war? Mr. C. said he had shown we had lost nothing in rights, territory or honour; nothing for which we ought to have contended, according to the principles of the gentlemen on the other side, or ac cording to our own. Have we gained nothing by the war? Let any man look at the degraded condition of this country before the war. The scorn of the universe, the contempt of ourselves; and tell me if we have gained nothing by the war? What is our present situation? Respectability and character abroad-security and confidence at home. If we have not ob tained in the opinion of some the full measure of retribution, our character and constitution are placed on a solid basis never to be shaken. The glory acquired by our gallant tars-by our Jacksons and our Browns on the land,-is that nothing? True we have had our vicissitudes-that there were humiliating events which the patriot could not review without deep regret. But the great account when it came to be balanced, thank God, would be found vastly in our favour. Is there a man, he asked, who would have obliterated from the proud pages of our history the brilliant achievements of Jackson, Brown, Scott, and the host of heroes on land and sea whom he would not enumerate? Is there a man who could not desire a participation in the national glory acquired by the war?-Yes, national glory, which however the expression may be condemned by some, must be cherished by every genuine patriot. What do I mean by national glory? Glory such as Hull of the Constitution, Jackson, Lawrence, Perry, have acquired. And |