« ForrigeFortsett »
tages, and such lots as are let off, of which the respective 1824. purchasers are then to be entitled to the receipt of the rents
The King and profits, all outgoings to that time being cleared by the vendor. Upon payment of the remainder of the purchase
INHABITANTS money at the time above mentioned, the vendor shall con- of Woolpit. vey the lots to the respective purchasers, each purchaser to prepare the conveyance to him or her. If any purchaser shall neglect or fail to comply with the above conditions, his or her deposit money shall be actually forfeited to the vendor, who shall be at full liberty to re-sell the lot or lots bought by him or her, either by public auction or private contract, and the deficiency, if any, occasioned by such second sale, together with all expenses, &c. shall be made good by the defaulters at this sale.” Pyman paid the deposit of 71. 12s., and having sigved a written agreement for completing the purchase, which was also signed by the auctioneer, as agent for the vendor, he was let into possession, and continued to receive the rents and profits until July, 1822. Pyman was ready to have paid, and called upon the vendor for the purpose of tendering him the remainder of the purchase money, but some difficulty having arisen as to the title, no conveyance was ever prepared by him. On the 24th July, 1822, Pyman contracted with the pauper to sell him the said premises for 701., and the following memorandum of agreement was drawn up and signed by them :-“ Mr. John Pennell has this day paid Mr. Thomas Pymun the sum of 101. in part of the purchase money for two cottages and gardens at Woolpit, in Suffolk. Mr. Pennell agrees to give Mr. Pyman 41. for this year's rent of the cottages.” No further sum was paid by the pauper, nor was any conveyance executed. On the 28th July, Pennell obtained leave of a tenant of one of the above cottages, to build a house in the corner of the garden. He began to build the house, but never completed it, and never lived on the premises ; but in 1822 put into the house, which had neither doors nor windows, some barrels of beer, which he sold there during the fair at Woolpit. On
1824. the 2d October, 1822, the pauper, who had become embar
rassed in his circumstances, was arrested, and went to The KING
prison. On the 21st of the same month he executed a deed The of assignment of his personal estate to trustees, for the beINHABITANTS of Woolpit. nefit of his creditors, with a covenant to execute a convey
ance of all his real estate, whenever such deed should be tendered to him by his trustees. The deed also contained a covenant, that if there should be any surplus arising from the sale of his estates, real and personal, after the payment of his debts, it should be paid over to the pauper. A short time prior to the 230 December, 1822, the date of the order of removal, the trustees agreed to sell the same premises which the pauper had purchased of Pyman, to Mr. Cobbold, for the sum of 1301., who subsequently paid the purchase 'money, and was let into possession. Soon after the execution of the above-mentioned deed of assignment, the pauper, who, since his arrest, had at intervals been deranged, became a confirmed lunatic, and for some time prior to, and on the esd December, 1822, had been, and was, kept in close custody in the parish, and at the time of the hearing of this appeal was confined in Bedlam. On the 24th July, 1822, when the pauper made the contract with Pyman, he resided with his family in lodgings at Woolpit, and continued there until he went to prison. His wife and family remained in Woolpit up to the time of the execution of the order of removal. The question for the opinion of the Court is, whether the pauper was irremoveable from the parish of Woolpit at the date of the order of removal.
Dover, in support of the order of Sessions. The pauper was irremoveable from the parish of Woolpit, on the general principle that no man in this country can, by the law of the land, be removed from his own. There are two propositions necessary to make out in the present case; first, that the pauper had such an equitable estate that a court of equity would decree a conveyance, and that consequently he
would be irremoveable ; and second, that, assuming him 1824. to have an interest of that description, it was not devested
The KING by the act of his trustees in the subsequent sale to Mr. Cobbold. It is not contended that the pauper gained a set
INHABITANTS tlement in Woolpit by the means stated in the case, but of WooLPIT. merely that he was irremoveable. The first question is; had he an equitable estate in this parish by means of the agreement for the sale of the cottages and gardens, entered into between him and the vendor? According to the rules of equity he clearly had. In Com. Dig. tit. Chancery [4. I. 1.] it is said, “ that if there are articles for a purchase, the vendor stands seised in trust for the purchaser before a conveyance executed." Ca. Ch. 39. 2 P. Wms. 629. Payne v. Meller(a), Seton v. Slade(6), Green v. Smith (c), and Broome v. Monck (d), are authorities for the maxim, that equity looks upon things agreed to be done, as actually performed. The agreement for sale, therefore, between the vendor and the pauper, must, upon this principle, be considered as a thing actually done, although the conveyance had not been executed. It is clear that if the pauper had paid, or offered to pay, the remainder of the purchase money, he would have been entitled to go into equity to have a conveyance decreed.
The agreement operated as a conveyance of a positive interest, and
gave him such a possessory right as would, at least, render him irremoveable. This is a much stronger case than Rex v. Edington (e), and Rex v. Horsley (), in which last case it was held, that a sole next of kin entitled to take out administration to the intestate, had such an equitable interest in a leasehold tenement of the latter, as to confer a settlement and render her irremoveable. The case of Rex v. Stone (g), and Rex v. Staplegrove (h), are also strong authorities to the same effect. All that is necessary to shew here is, that the pauper was not removeable within the spirit
(a) 6 Ves. 349.
(e) 1 East, 288.
1824. of the statute 13 & 14 Car. 2. as a vagrant intruder into a
parish in which he had nothing of his own. If he had any The KING
interest whatever, legal or equitable, he would be irremoveThe INHABITANTS
upon the spirit of that statute, although the interest of Woolpit. would not be sufficient to confer a settlement. This case is
distinguishable from Rer v. Geddington(a), and Rex v. Long Bennington, T.T.57 G.3.(6), because in each of those cases the struggle was not to shew that the paupers were irremoveable, but that they had gained a settlement by reason of the estates then under consideration; and in both, default had been made by the vendees by the non-performance of their respective contracts. Here the only object is to shew that the pauper was irremoveable, and here no default has been made, the agreement never having been vacated. This case is also distinguishable from Rer v. Horndon-on-the-Hill (c), and Rer v. Hugworthingham (d), which were cases of doubtful equity, and where the paupers had merely a personal license, under which no interest passed which was capable of assignment. Then, secondly, assuming that the pauper had such an equitable interest in this parish as to render him irremoveable, the question is, whether bis interest was devested by the act of his trustees in the subsequent sale to Mr. Cobbold. It is clear, that at the date of the order of removal, the pauper himself had done nothing to part with bis interest. He had never executed any conveyance of this estate, nor had any ever been tendered to him for execution. It stands, therefore, that whatever interest he had in the estate, still remaius in him. The trust deed which he executed, contained a covenant that he should execute such a conveyance, when tendered to him, and although that covenant might be enforced in a Court of Equity, still his interest remains unimpeached. The Court below having determined that the pauper was irremoveable, this Court will make every intendment to support that conclusion.
(a) Ante, vol. iji. 403.
(6) Not reported, sed vide Mr. Justice Bayley's statement of the case in Rex v. Geddington, ante, vol. iii. 405. (c) 4 M. & S. 562.
(d) Ante, vol. iii. 16.
Storks and H. Cooper, contra, were stopped by the Court.
BAYLEY, J.-I am of opinion that the order of Ses The King signs must be quashed. After the decision of Rex v. The Geddington, which was founded upon Rer v. Lung Ben- INHABITANTS
of WOOLPIT. nington, it is quite idle to contend that the mere payment of a deposit upon the purchase of an estate of this description, is sufficient to confer such an equitable estate, as will confer a settlement or render the party irremoveable. Those cases have decided that an equitable right is not sufficient to confer a settlement, or make the pauper irremoveable. There must be an equitable estate actually vested to produce these consequences. It is impossible to say that this pauper ever had an equitable estate. He had an equitable right; that is to say, he had a right upon the payment of the remainder of the purchase money, to go into a Court of Equity and call upon the vendor for a conveyance. He had an inchoate equitable right, but clearly had not an equitable estate. It never could be predicated of him, that he had a right to go into a Court of Equity, and demand a conveyance of the estate at all events, and say that he was seised in his demesne as of fee, in Equity.
HOLROYD, J.-I am also of opinion, that so far from the pauper having an equitable estate, he had not even a right to go into a Court of Equity until he had tendered or signified his consent to pay the remainder of the purchase money; and if it was refused on the other side, and he had filed a bill in equity, notwithstanding the refusal, the bill, I should presume, would be dismissed with costs. He had no right to go into equity, unless he had done or offered to do all that was necessary on his part to perfect his title.
LITTLEDALE, J.-I am of the same opinion. He had no right to go into equity, unless he did something else, which he had not done.
Order of Sessions quashed (a).
(a) Vide Rer v. Northweald Bassett, ante, 276.