1824. GORGIER v. cial bond; and we acknowledge ourselves bound to every person who shall for the time being be the holder of one or more of these special bonds, for the punctual payment of the MIEVILLE. principal and interest of each, according to the tenor thereof." The general bond contained other engagements and stipulations, not necessary to set out; and then followed the following certificate, written upon each of the bonds in question: "This is to certify, that the bearer hereof is entitled to the sum of 1007. sterling, part of the loan of 5,000,000%. secured by the above general bond of his Majesty the King of Prussia, and the interest thereon, value having been duly paid to the Prussian government for the same. We, the undersigned, declare this to be a special bond, granted by us in conformity to the engagement of his Majesty the King of Prussia, our most gracious Master, contained in the general bond, of which the above is a copy. Berlin, the 15th of May, 1818. The Royal Ministry for the department of the treasury and state credit. Signed, Friese. Rother. Entered, Berlin, 1818.-fol. 187. Bornerman." It was proved in evidence, that bonds of this description were constantly sold in the money market, and passed from hand to hand like exchequer bills, and were sold at prices varying with the market. On the part of the defendants it was objected, that upon this case there was no question of fact for the jury, but a mere question of law for the Court; namely, whether these bonds, being in their nature such that they in fact passed from hand to hand by delivery, could be followed by the owner into the hands of a bonâ fide holder for a valuable consideration; and it was contended, that they could not, and therefore that the defendants were entitled to a verdict. The learned Judge, however, left it as a question of fact to the jury, whether, at the time when the bonds were pledged to the defendants, they did or did not know that they were not the property of Agassiz & Co.; telling them, he was of opinion, in point of law, that such bonds might be pledged to any person who did not know that the party pledging was not the real owner; and directing them to find their verdict for the plaintiff, or the defendants, according as they had reason to believe that the defendants considered the bonds to be the property of Agassiz & Co. or of some other person. The jury found their verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff having leave to either to enter a verdict, or for a new trial. move, Copley, A. G. in Hilary Term last, moved accordingly, and obtained a rule nisi; against which Scarlett, Marryat, Gurney, and F. Pollock now shewed cause. It is impossible to distinguish these instruments from exchequer bills, the blanks of which are not filled up. They are payable to bearer, and there is nothing on the face of them to shew that they are not the property of the bearer. This case, therefore, is decided by Wookey v. Pole (a), where it was held, that the property in an exchequer bill, the blank in which was not filled up, passed by delivery, like bank notes and bills of exchange indorsed in blank. It has, indeed, been held, that East India bonds are not negotiable instruments like bills of exchange, Glyn v. Baker(b); but they are, in the first instance, made payable to a particular individual by name, and therefore require his indorsement before they can be passed by delivery: and second, in that case, the defendant had what the Court considered equivalent to knowledge that the instruments did not belong to the person from whom he received them. Here the bonds are made payable to bearer, they are the representatives of money, and therefore pass, like bills or notes indorsed in blank, by delivery. The law then is express in favour of the defendants, and the facts are equally so, because the jury have negatived the question of fraud, by finding that the defendants, when they received the bonds, had no knowledge or suspicion that they were 1824. GORGIER v. MIEVILLE. (a) 4 B. & A. 1. (b) 13 East, 509. 1824. GORGIER v. MIEVILLE. the property of any other person than Agassiz & Co. from whom they received them. They also cited Miller v. Race (a), Peacock v. Rhodes (b), Grant v. Vaughan (c), and Collins v. Martin (d). Copley, A. G. and D. F. Jones, contrà. There are some exceptions to the general rule of law, that an agent cannot pledge the property of his principal; and the question is, whether this particular species of property comes within them. Those exceptions were for a long time confined to bills of exchange and bank notes, till, by the case of Wookey v. Pole, they were further extended to exchequer bills. The instruments in question differ in their form and nature equally from all those so excepted. This is the case of an agent pledging a bond belonging to his principal, which by law he cannot do. The exception from the general law applies only to money, or the representatives of money; these bonds are neither the one nor the other. India bonds, it has been settled, and is now admitted, cannot be pledged, and they are, in their form and nature, exceedingly similar to the bonds in question. The right of property in these bonds cannot pass by delivery, unless it carries with it a right of action also; but what right of action has the holder of them? None. They are not payable to any particular person, nor at any specified time or place; no one could possibly sue upon them. [Abbott, C. J. Nor can any one sue upon an exchequer bill.] But the holder may pay it to government, as money, in liquidation of any debt he may owe the Crown. These bonds do not come within the reason of the exception any more than the terms. What is the reason of the exception? Not that money in specie cannot be marked, because, even if it were marked, it could not be recovered from a bonâ fide holder; but that bills and notes are securities for money in general use throughout the country, and form the ordinary (a) 1 Burr. 452. (b) Doug. 633. circulation of it; in a word, the convenience of trade is the reason of the exception. That was the ground of the decision in Wookey v. Pole, but it has no application to the present case. Prussian bonds are not in use here as securities for money, they are not recognized by the government, and have no circulation as such; they are the mere objects of purchase and sale, having no fixed value, but fluctuate in price like any other commodity bought in the market. [Abbott, C. J. Exchequer bills also are the objects of purchase and sale, and fluctuate in price.] Undoubtedly; but they are the representatives of money, and are dealt with accordingly. This case is within the principles laid down by Lord Holt in Ford v. Hopkins (a), where it was held, that trover might be maintained for a lottery ticket, and where his Lordship said, " If bank notes, exchequer notes, or million tickets, or the like, are stolen or lost, the owner has such an interest or property in them, as to bring an action into whatsoever hands they are come; money or cash is not to be distinguished, but these notes or bills are distinguishable, and cannot be reckoned as cash." Upon the broad principle, therefore, that an agent cannot pledge the property of his principal, and that these instruments do not come within any of the exceptions from that general rule of law, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. ABBOTT, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged. Looking at the form of these instruments, it seems to me impossible to distinguish them from those which have been excepted out of the general rule of law, and held to be transferrible by delivery. They are, in substance, acknowledgments, or certificates, that certain sums of money are due to the bearer, with interest thereon, and therefore they are perfectly analogous to bills of exchange indorsed in blank, or to bank notes. I think this is the sound construction of the instruments themselves, and I am (a) 1 Salk. 283. 1824. GORGIER บ. MIEVILLE. 1824. GORGIER v. MIEVILLE. quite satisfied that it will be most for the advantage of the commercial world to put them at once upon this footing. HOLROYD, J. (a).—I am of the same opinion. I think that, according to decided cases, the bearer of these bonds, having become so bonâ fide for a valuable consideration, is the owner of them, and is entitled to dispose of them just the same as of the money which they represent. LITTLEDALE, J.-The case respecting the India bonds stands alone. The defendant there was guilty of mala fides, and the decision of the court was grounded, chiefly, if not entirely, upon that fact. I cannot consider that case as a decision that India bonds are not negotiable instruments; for though Le Blanc, J., certainly intimated a strong opinion to that effect, it may I think be collected from the report that Lord Ellenborough inclined to be of a different opinion. For the reasons already assigned by the court, I am clearly of opinion, in point of law, that these are negotiable instruments, like bills of exchange, and it seems to me that in so deciding, we are attending equally to the policy and the law of the country. (a) Bayley, J., was absent. Rule discharged. Tuesday, Where an at Ex parte DAVEY, Gent., one, &c. F. KELLY applied to the court to re-admit an attorney torney intend- upon the roll, on the usual affidavit. All the formalities ing to apply to be re-admitted on the roll, affixed his notice outside the Court in the morning before the sitting of the court, on the first day of the Term of which notice was intended to be given :-Held that it was a sufficient compliance with the rule, T. 33 G. 3. |