1824. SHAW 2. BROOM. plaintiff stood in the same situation as Clifford, without a better title.] Scarlett in support of the rule. The declaration of Clifford, at the period when it was made, was inadmissible. to affect the plaintiff's title. It may have been true, that the bill was originally put into the plaintiff's hands for a special purpose, so as to give him only a qualified title; but still the plaintiff shewed an absolute title to it by proving that there existed a general account between him and Clifford, upon which the latter was debtor to him for more than the amount. Had the declaration been made by Clifford whilst he held the bill, and after it was due, undoubtedly the plaintiff's title might be affected; but the fact proved was, that it was made after it was indorsed to the plaintiff, and whilst it was current. If a person takes a bill after it is due, undoubtedly he takes it with all the defects in the indorser's title; but here the bill was taken whilst it was current, and the declaration that it was an accommodation bill, was not made till afterwards. Such a declaration in that stage of the transaction was inadmissible, because it is a declaration to affect the title of a person who may or may not have given consideration for it. The case of Benson v. Marshal was this: A bill of exchange had been given by the acceptor, for the accommodation of the drawer. Whilst it was in the hands of the latter, he had made a declaration that it was an accommodation bill, and that the acceptor had received no value. Long after it was due, the drawer indorsed the bill to the plaintiff, all accounts between the drawer and acceptor being then closed. Upon which it was contended, that the declaration of the drawer was admissible to affect the plaintiff's title, on the ground that what would be a good defence against the drawer, would be equally a good defence against the indorsee, and for that reason, the declation of the drawer was received. But this case is totally lifferent from that. Clifford indorses the bill to the plain tiff before it is due; the plaintiff is the holder of it when it is due, and the declaration is not made until afterwards. The case cited was that of a declaration of the drawer whilst he held the bill, and after it had become due, which is very different from a declaration, after the drawer has parted with the bill. It is clear, therefore, that Clifford's declaration alone was inadmissible to affect the plaintiff's title. ABBOTT, C. J.-The plaintiff in the outset of the case did not profess to sue in respect of any right or title that Clifford, had in the bill, because, he gave in evidence an account of goods sold and delivered to him to the amount of 247., and also proof of a judgment upon a warrant of attorney, by which it was manifest that Clifford was his debtor to a greater amount than that of the bill. That was the plaintiff's original case; and the object was to shew that, as against Clifford, he had a good title to the bill. It was proved that Clifford had parted with the bill to the plaintiff whilst it was current, and that the declaration, as to its being accommodation paper, was not made until afterwards. The question then is, whether after he has parted with the bill, as a good and valid security, he can, by his own declaration, defeat the title of the person to whom he has so parted with it, or put in jeopardy, or vary the claim of the plaintiff, by saying, that he himself had received it from the acceptor without consideration. According to the case cited (as now explained), it seems that the declaration given in evidence, was that of a man, who, at the time it was made, was holder of the bill, and who had not parted with it until after it was due. In such case, the rule undoubtedly is, that whatever consideration the plaintiff might have given for such a bill, still by law, he could not be in a better situation than the drawer, and must stand or fall by the title of the latter. The facts of this case are, however, entirely different. Upon further consideration, I think I ought not to have received the evidence 1824. SHAW υ. BROOM. 1824. SHAW v. BROOM. of Clifford's declaration, and therefore there must be a new trial. BAYLEY, J.-I think the defendant had not laid a sufficient foundation to let in evidence of Clifford's declaration. If the plaintiff had brought the action as trustee for Clifford, and rested solely on the title of the latter, then the declaration of Clifford would have been admissible; but here the plaintiff rests upon the strength of his own title as against Clifford, and therefore it is not competent to the defendant to give in evidence the declarations of Clifford made after he had parted with, and whilst the bill was current. If the plaintiff insisted upon recovering through Clifford's title, there are cases in which it has been held that such declarations would be admissible, Harrison v. Vallance (a). HOLROYD.-Under the circumstances of this case, I think the evidence was not receivable, the declaration of Clifford having been made after he had parted with the bill, and before it was due. LITTLEDALE, J.-I am of the same opinion. Rule absolute. (a) 7 J. B. Moore, 304. 1 Bing. 45. S. C. See Hart v. Horn, 2 Campb. 92. 10 East, 395; and 7 T. R. 663. Saturday, trates first took the exa The KING 7. KIDD Y. Where magis- THIS was a motion for a mandamus to magistrates, to set out the evidence taken by them in support of a convicmination of tion on the game trespass act. On shewing cause, one witnesses, not on oath, in objection taken to the mode of proceeding by the justices was, that they had first taken the examination of the witand afterwards swore them to the truth of their evidence, the Court expressed its disapprobation of the practice. support of a conviction, nesses, in support of the conviction, and then administered the oath to the truth of their statements respectively. 1824. The KING Ο. The COURT observed, that this was a very irregular and KIDDY. improper practice in criminal cases. ARBOTT, C. J.-Magistrates should understand that the oath is to be administered to the witness before he is examined, and not afterwards. BAYLEY, J.-The answer of the witness is to be taken under the sanction of an oath. Swearing him after his examination is taken, is a very incorrect mode of proceeding, and it is hoped will be discontinued. f As the matter was afterwards settled, nothing came of the motion for a mandamus. Adam was for the crown; and Chitty for the defence. The KING v. The LICENSING JUSTICES of the WARD of FARRINGDON WITHOUT. Saturday July 3. command H. COOPER had in Easter Term obtained a rule nisi Mandamus for a mandamus to the licensing Alderman of the ward of refused, to Farringdon Without, commanding him to hear the appli- justices to recation of A. B. for a license for Joe's Coffee House, Fleet hear an appliStreet, suggesting by affidavit, that the Alderman had re- ale house lifused to hear the application. Hutchinson now shewed cause on an affidavit that the application had been heard and refused, on the ground that the Alderman had no authority, under the circumstances to grant a license. Cooper admitted that the application had been heard, but refused under a mistaken view of the statute and cation for an cense, which they had refused, though it was suggested that their refusal pro ceeded from a mistaken view of their jurisdiction. 1824. The KING v. The LICENS ING MAGIS the object of this motion was to have the application reconsidered upon more mature deliberation. Per Curiam. It being conceded, that the magistrates TRATES of the have heard and determined upon this application for a WARD Of license, which is a matter peculiarly for their consideration, we cannot grant a mandamus to them to re-hear what they have already determined. FARRINGDON Rule discharged, but without costs. Saturday, ney's bill for the statutes WILSON, Gent. one &c. v. GUTTERIDGE. On a The Court has THIS was an action for an attorney's bill of costs. authority to refer an attor- former day a rule nisi was granted for referring the bill to the Master for taxation, and on shewing cause now, the question was, whether certain items in the bill drew after them the rest, so as to render the bill liable to taxation. The items, which it was contended subjected the bill to taxation, were for attending the defendant and drawing a referred to the warrant of attorney, which, however, was never ingrossed or executed. The other items of the bill were clearly not within the statutes 2 Geo. 2. c. 23. s. 23. & 30 Geo. 2. c. 19. c. 19. An attorney's bill Master where one of the items was for drawing a warrant of attorney, which had never been executed. s. 75. W. E. Taunton shewed cause. This case does not come within the words or the spirit of the statute, inasmuch as drawing a warrant of attorney which was never executed,' cannot be considered as a proceeding "at law or in equity." It must be something done under the authority of the Court, in order to render the items charged taxable. Had the warrant of attorney been ingrossed and executed, there are cases which say that an item in an attorney's bill in that respect, would be sufficient to enable the Court to refer the whole bill for taxation. But no case has gone the length of holding that the mere preparation or drawing of a warrant |