I. That the note therein mentioned was extorted and obtained from him by threats of personal violence, and was executed by him under compulsion of fear that said threats would be carried out and performed. II. That the said note was executed by the said defendant without any consideration therefor. (Verification.)1 Joseph Story, Attorney for Defendant. b. To Defendant's Relative. Form No. 8094.2. (Caption as in Form No. 8087.) And the defendant comes and denies each and every allegation in the plaintiff's writ and declaration, and further answering says that the said note is wholly without consideration on her part and was given for the debt and obligation of her husband, Benjamin Snow, and that her signature to said note was obtained under duress, threats and intimidation, and that said note is null and void so far as her signature is concerned. And further answering she says that her signature to said note was obtained under duress, threats, and the fear that her refusal to sign said note would result in great personal injury to or the death of her said husband Benjamin Snow, and she further says that the plaintiff well knew3 that she was the wife of said Benjamin Snow, that said note was without consideration on her part, and that the defendant did not sign said note voluntarily, but under duress, threats and intimidation. By her attorneys, Norcross & Hartwell. intimidation, and overbearing persistency, and that the defendant feared the execution of the threats. Murdock v. Lewis, 26 Mo. App. 234. 1. For the form of verification in a particular jurisdiction consult the title VERIFICATIONS. 2. This answer is copied from the 276 records in Fairbanks V. Snow, 145 Mass. 153. 3. Notice to Indorsee of Negotiable Paper. The maker's plea of duress is not sufficient as against the indorsee unless it alleges notice to him. McClintick v. Johnston, 1 McLean (U. S.) 414. Volume 7. EASEMENTS. See the title ELEVATED RAILROADS; EMINENT DOMAIN. EAVESDROPPING. BY JOSEPH R. LONG. I. AT COMMON LAW, 277. I. AT COMMON LAW.1 Form No. 8095. (Precedent in State v. Pennington, 3 Head (Tenn.) 299.)o [State of Tennessee, February Term, A. D. 1859. Scott County. The grand jurors of the state of Tennessee, duly elected, impaneled, sworn and charged to inquire in and for the body of the county aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid present: That Fielding Pennington, late of the county of Scott, on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine, at the county of Scott aforesaid, ]3 unlawfully and stealthily did approach and come near to the room where the jurors aforesaid were then and there assembled for the purpose of considering and transacting such business as was properly before them as jurors, as aforesaid; the said jurors then and there being convened and assembled, as a grand jury for the county of Scott, he, the said defendant, then and there being, as aforesaid, did unlawfully, for the purpose of listening to and overhearing what was then and there said and done, did then and there unlawfully and stealthily eavesdrop, and listen to the proceedings in the room aforesaid, and was then and there guilty of the crime of eavesdropping, to the evil example [of all others in like case. offending and against the peace and dignity of the state. Daniel Webster, Attorney General. ]3 1. Eavesdropping is indictable at common law. 4 Bl. Comm. 168; 1 Bish. Cr. L. 1122; State v. Williams, 2 Overt. (Tenn.) 108; State v. Pennington, 3 Head (Tenn.) 119. For form of an indictment see 2 Bish. Cr. Proc., § 312. 2. This indictment was quashed by the circuit court and the state appealed. The supreme court reversed the judg ment quashing this presentment and remanded the case for trial, saying: "The indictment was drawn up in haste, and if not void, it is certainly without form. Yet, it is easy to see from it what is the charge to be answered, and it is set forth with reasonable certainty." 3. The words and figures enclosed by [] will not be found in the reported II. UNDER STATUTES.1 Form No. 8096.2 Supreme Court, County of Suffolk. The People of the State of New York against John Doe. The grand jury of the county of Suffolk, by this indictment, accuse John Doe of the crime of eavesdropping, committed as follows: The said John Doe, on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, at the town of Babylon, county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and secretly loiter about a certain dwelling-house (or other building) there situate, the property of one Richard Roe, with intent to overhear discourse therein, and to repeat and publish the same to vex, annoy and injure the said Richard Roe (or certain persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown) Daniel Webster, EJECTMENT. BY B. A. MILBURN. I. COMPLAINT, DECLARATION OR PETITION, 281. b. Two Demises, 286. (2) Two Ousters, 287. c. Bill in King's Name, 287. 2. In Trespass Without Fictions, 289. 3. Simplified Forms Under Statutes, 291. 4. With Respect to Parties and Subject Matter, 307. (1) In General, 307. (2) To Recover Land Fraudulently Conveyed, 308. b. By Religious Society, 309. c. By Tenants in Common, 310. (1) Against Strangers, 310. d. Several Distinct Parcels of Land, 312. e. Dower, 312. f. Land Subject to Easement, 313. g. Land Taken for Railroad, 314. II. AMENDED COMPLAINT OR DECLARATION, 316. III. SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, 317. IV. NOTICES GIVEN AT INSTITUTION OF ACTION, 319. 1. From Casual Ejector to Tenant in Actual Possession, 319. 2. From Plaintiff to Defendant, 321. 3. From Defendant to His Landlord, 321. V. WRIT OR SUMMONS, 322. 1. In General, 322. 2. The Return, 323. a. In General, 323. b. With Affidavit of Service, 323. VI. ADMISSION OF LANDLORD OR WARRANTOR AS PARTY DEFENDANT, 324. 1. The Motion, 325. a. In General, 325. b. After Judgment by Default Against Tenant, 325. 2. The Rule, 326. VII. UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY DEFENDANT BEFORE ANSWERING, 327. VIII. ANSWER OR PLEA, 328. 1. In Abatement, 330. 2. Not Guilty, 331. a. General Issue, 331. b. With Confession of Fictions, 331. (1) By Tenant Defending for Whole, 332. a. With Respect to Quantity of Land, 336. (2) Portion of Premises, 337. b. With Respect to the Status of the Title, 338. (3) Denial that Plaintiffs are Trustees of Religious 4. Denial of Plaintiff's Right to Possession, 340. a. In General, 341. b. Under Patent or Grant, 341. 6. Defendant's Tenancy Under Another, 343. 7. Adverse Possession, 343 8. Denial of Wrongful Entry, 345. 9. Denial of Defendant's Possession, 345. b. Of Portion of Premises, 346. 10. Occupancy by One Defendant in Severalty, 346. 11. Disclaimer, 347. 12. Denial that Plaintiff has been Damaged, 347. 13. Set-off or Counterclaim for Improvements, 347. 14. Offer by Railroad Company to Pay Compensation for Land Taken, 348. 15. Failure of Plaintiff to Pay Costs of Previous Action, 349. 16. Equitable Defenses, 349. a. Agreement with Plaintiff and Performance of Con ditions, 349. b. Right of Defendant to Conveyance of Title, 350. c. Plaintiff's Acquiescence in Defendant's Possession and Improvements, 355: d. Attack Upon Sheriff's Sale for Fraud, 357. 17. Plea Puis Darrein Continuance, 359. IX. APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT DEMISE, 360. |