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ferent to Carthage as to Rome, and that he had to expect from his government not Phoenician or Libyan conscripts, but at the utmost permission to save his country with his troops in his own way, provided it cost nothing. But he knew himself also, and he knew men. His mercenaries cared nothing for Carthage; but a true general is able to substitute his own person for his country in the affections of his soldiers; and such an one was this young commander."* He established himself in a fortified position on Mount Hercta (M. Pellegrino), overlooking Panormus, permitting his soldiers to bring their wives and children within the fortress. Thence he perpetually annoyed the Roman garrison of that city and the forces blockading Lilybæum; while his cruisers, by ravaging the rich coasts of Italy as far as Cumæ, kept the enemy in alarm at home, and procured him supplies independently of Carthage. Having for three years repulsed all the assaults of the enemy upon the hill of Hercta, he transferred his garrison to the stronger position of Mount Eryx, which he wrested from the Romans, who had held it as a constant menace over the Punic port of Drepanum (B. C. 244). Here he maintained himself, in spite of a defeat he suffered from the consul Fundanius (B.c. 243); but while he was thus preserving Sicily, all was lost by the apathy of the government and the energy of a party among the Romans.

The Senate, indeed, seemed to be paralysed by the want of progress in Sicily, and the insults inflicted on the coasts of Italy. Their continued inaction would soon have permitted Hamilcar to organize his forces for great offensive blows; but irregular patriotism supplied the failures of the state. The united efforts of wealthy citizens fitted out privateers, which retaliated insults on the coast of Africa, and even burnt the ancient city of Hippo. These successes encouraged fresh efforts; and history offers no parallel to the presentation to a government, by means of a private subscription, of a fleet of 200 ships of war, manned by 60,000 sailors (B.C. 242). The effort took Carthage completely by surprise. While the consul Lutatius Catulus swept Hamilcar's cruisers from the sea and blockaded Drepanum and Lilybæum more closely than ever, the Punic government only succeeded by the ensuing spring in sending to sea a fleet inadequately manned and encumbered with supplies for the threatened cities. Their hope of effecting a landing, and then putting their ships into a fit state for action, was doomed to disappointment. Amidst the group of

Mommsen, History of Rome, vol. ii. p. 53.

islands called the gates,* they encountered the Roman fleet under the prætor P. Valerius, Catulus being disabled by a wound The ability of the prætor and the enthusiasm of his sailors might easily have prevailed over an enemy far better equipped; but the Punic fleet was totally unprepared for the encounter; 50 ships were sunk, and 70 were carried by the victors into the port of Lilybæum; and the only resource of the Carthaginians for repairing the disaster was the crucifixion of the admiral whose defeat they had ensured.

With far greater wisdom they gave Hamilcar the sad reward of his seven years' heroic efforts in full powers to treat for peace. That great man knew how to save the honour of his country, while submitting to inevitable necessity. Sicily, practically lost by the event of the last sea-fight, was finally surrendered; but Hamilcar resolutely resisted the demand of Catulus, that he should capitu late at discretion by laying down his arms, and generously refused to surrender the Roman deserters to certain death; so he was suffered to ransom his followers at a moderate rate. The Roman prisoners were given up without ransom; and Carthage engaged to pay a war contribution, which was raised by subsequent negociation to 3200 talents, one-third at once, and the remainder in ten yearly instalments. The penalty of defeat-a penalty assu redly not excessive-being thus confessed, the two republics formed an alliance on equal terms of mutual respect for their independence, territories and sovereign rights, each engaging to form no separate league with the other's allies, nor to meddle with those allies by recruiting or by war. We shall soon see how shamefully these last stipulations-so vital for states constituted like these sovereign republics-were violated by the Romans.

Meanwhile there were not wanting indications of the spirit which had prompted Regulus to demand the complete submission of Carthage, and which foresaw that the contest could only be ended by her political extinction. But the time was not yet come to renew the war with such an object against such a general as Hamilcar. The popular assembly, which at first refused to ratify the treaty, was persuaded to be content for the present with the great gain of Sicily; and a commission was sent to the island with power to settle all details. That the amendment which added the cession of all the islands between Sicily and Italy was a perfidious preparation for the attack soon made upon

* The battle sometimes takes its name from the chief island of the group, Ægusa, the modern Favignana.

Sardinia seems a too ingenious refinement; but the final position of Rome is accurately expressed by Dr. Mommsen :-"Her acquiescence in a gain far, less than had at first been demanded, and indeed offered, as well as the energetic opposition which the peace encountered in Rome, very clearly indicate the indecisive and superficial character of the victory and of the peace. And, if the Romans were dissatisfied at their victory, the indignation of Hamilcar at the defeat of Carthage-for he himself came out of the war unconquered-gave a pledge of the speedy renewal of the

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While the war thus left behind, as what would be called in current language its moral effects, the proof that Carthage might, and the conviction that she must be conquered, it gave as its present gain the fair island of Sicily, which now entered into its natural union with Italy, while its fertile plains, its mineral and agricultural wealth, its splendid harbours, and its ancient cities, were added to the resources of the Roman empire. This first acquisition beyond the limits of Italy was constituted, with the exception of the eastern part, which formed the kingdom of Hiero, into the first of the Roman provinces (B.c. 241).† It seems a strange contrast to this great success to read of the revolt of Falerii, the Etruscan city which had so long before been taken by Camillus. The war lasted but six days; and the frequent rebellions of the Faliscans were ended by the destruction of their city. The census of the same year gave the result of 251,000 citizens for military service, a number practically the same as it had been five years before. The conclusion of the First Punic War coincides within one year with the epoch in the literary culture of the Romans marked by the first exhibition of tragedy by Livius Andronicus.

The same historian has an admirable discussion of the conduct of the war by the Romans, showing how great were the deficiencies with which they entered upon it, how much they had to learn in its course, and how their success was due to the fact, that their enormous errors were counterbalanced by the still greater errors of their opponents.

+ The acquisition of this province, and soon afterwards of Sardinia, demanded a new system of administration. They seem at first to have been governed, like the several divisions of Italy, by quæstors, as subordinate magistrates, dependent on the consuls. But in a short time they were found to require chief magistrates of their own-those vice-consuls who were called prætors. One of these was sent out annually from Rome to each of the new provinces; and for this purpose the number of prætors was increased from two to four (B. C. 227). The provincial prætor united in himself all the chief military, judicial, and civil functions, except control over the finances, which were managed, as at Rome, by one or more quæstors, directly responsible to the senate. But the quæstor in no way trenched upon the authority of the prætor, in whose household he was regarded as holding the position of a son.

islands called the Eg under the prætor P. Va The ability of the præt easily have prevailed ov Punic fleet was totally were sunk, and 70 we Lilybæum; and the o ing the disaster was they had ensured.

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rom city to city, till Carthage stood alone. population, her lands laid waste on every s outraged and murdered, and the city itself yans. Her own army, commanded by a and indeed offered, as venly marched out of the walls to be defeated.

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the opportunity to perpetrate an act of perfidy ed in all history. In all that directly concerned she took care to make an elaborate show of good g all dealings of Italian mariners with the insuren relaxing the treaty so as to permit Carthage to in Italy. Utica, hard pressed by Hamilcar, apto Rome for aid; but that the refusal was dictated ther than good faith, was soon proved by the very ception of an overture from the mercenaries in Sar› conduct pursued towards the Mamertines of Messana ed in this still more flagrant case; and the long-coveted seagerly accepted (B.c. 238). The Carthaginians, then ery crisis of the Libyan war, were helpless against the but the revolt was no sooner crushed than they sent an to Rome to claim back the province. The recriminatory f wrongs inflicted on Italian traders were not enough to decent veil for the naked assertion of might against right, was enforced by a declaration of war. Carthage, unable to up the challenge, found herself obliged to sue for peace, as e had done the wrong, and finally to purchase it by the payit of 1200 talents for the expenses of Rome's warlike prepa-ons. Corsica, on which the Etruscans had probably no longer old, went with Sardinia as its natural dependency, and both ere erected into the second of the Roman provinces, and placed, ke Sicily, under the government of a prætor (B.c. 237).† For a

* When Hamilcar, however, imprisoned some sea captains whom he caught trafficking with the rebels, the senate obtained their release from the Carthaginian government.

+ The natural characteristics and previous history of these islands are scarcely important enough to demand a place in our narrative. All necessary information will be found in the standard classical dictionaries. The population of both islands

VOL. II.

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