XX. LECT. powers have no necessary proportion to each other. The representative faculty has, by philosophers, been distinguished into the Productive or Creative, and into the Reproductive, Imagination. I shall hereafter show you that this distinction is untenable. V. The Thus under the general cognitive faculty, we have a fourth special faculty discriminated, the Representative Faculty,-Phantasy, or Imagination. In the fifth place, all the faculties we have conFaculty,sidered are only subsidiary. They acquire, preserve, Comparison. call out, and hold up, the materials, for the use of a Analysis and Syn higher faculty which operates upon these materials, and which we may call the Elaborative or Discursive Faculty. This faculty has only one operation, it only compares, it is Comparison, the Faculty of Relations. It may startle you to hear that the highest function of mind is nothing higher than comparison, but, in the end, I am confident of convincing you of the paradox. Under comparison, I include the conditions, and the result, of comparison. In order to compare, the mind must divide or separate, and conjoin or compose. Analysis and synthesis are, therefore, the conditions of comparison. Again, the result of comparison is either the affirmation of one thing of another, or the negation of one thing of another. If the mind. affirm one thing of another, it conjoins them, and is thus again synthesis. If it deny one thing of another, Conception it disjoins them, and is thus again analysis. Generisation. alisation, which is the result of synthesis and analysis, is thus an act of comparison, and is properly denomiJudgment. nated Conception. Judgment is only the comparison Reasoning. of two terms or notions directly together; Reasoning, only the comparison of two terms or notions with each other through a third. Conception or General thesis. or General XX. isation, Judgment and Reasoning, are thus only various LECT. applications of comparison, and not even entitled to the distinction of separate faculties. Under the general cognitive faculty, there is thus discriminated a fifth special faculty, in the Elaborative Faculty, or Comparison. This is Thought, strictly so called; it corresponds to the Alávoia of the Greek, to the Discursus of the Latin, to the Verstand of the German philosophy; and its laws are the object of Logic. Regulative Reason or Sense. But in the sixth and last place, the mind is not vi. The altogether indebted to experience for the whole appa- Faculty, ratus of its knowledge,-its knowledge is not all adven-Common titious. What we know by experience, without experience we should not have known; and as all our experience is contingent, all the knowledge derived from experience is contingent also. But there are cognitions in the mind which are not contingent,-which are necessary, which we cannot but think,-which thought supposes as its fundamental condition. These cognitions, therefore, are not mere generalisations from experience. But if not derived from experience, they must be native to the mind; unless, on an alternative that we need not at present contemplate, we suppose with Plato, St Austin, Cousin, and other philosophers, that Reason, or more properly Intellect, is impersonal, and that we are conscious of these necessary cognitions in the divine mind. These native,-these necessary cognitions, are the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations, and which afford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge. These necessary laws, or primary conditions, of intelligence, are phænomena of a similar character; and we must, therefore, generalise or collect them into a class; and on the power pos XX. LECT. sessed by the mind of manifesting these phænomena we may bestow the name of the Regulative Faculty. This faculty corresponds in some measure to what, in the Aristotelic philosophy, was called Noûs,—voûs (intellectus, mens), when strictly employed, being a term, in that philosophy, for the place of principles, the locus principiorum. It is analogous, likewise, to the term Reason, as occasionally used by some of the older English philosophers, and to the Vernunft (reason) in the philosophy of Kant, Jacobi, and others of the recent German metaphysicians, and from them adopted into France and England. It is also nearly convertible with what I conceive to be Reid's, and certainly Stewart's, notion of Common Sense. This, the last general faculty which I would distinguish under the Cognitive Faculty, is thus what I would call the Regulative or Legislative,-its synonyms being Noûs, Intellect, or Common Sense. The term plicable to Reason or Sense. You will observe that the term faculty can be approperly ap- plied to the class of phænomena here collected under one name, only in a very different signification from Common what it bears when applied to the preceding powers. For vous, intelligence or common sense, meaning merely the complement of the fundamental principles or laws of thought, is not properly a faculty, that is, it is not an active power at all. As it is, however, not a capacity, it is not easy to see by what other word it can be denoted. These con stitute the damental Such are the six special Faculties of Cognition ;-1o, whole fun- The Acquisitive or Presentative or Receptive Faculty, faculties of divided into Perception and Self-Consciousness; 2°, The Conservative or Retentive Faculty, Memory; 3°, The Reproductive or Revocative Faculty, subdivided into Suggestion and Reminiscence; 4°, The Represen cognition. XX. tative Faculty or Imagination; 5°, The Elaborative LECT. Faculty or Comparison, Faculty of Relations; and, 6°, The Regulative or Legislative Faculty, Intellect or Intelligence Proper, Common Sense. Besides these faculties, there are, I conceive, no others; and, in the sequel, I shall endeavour to show you, that while these are attributes of mind not to be confounded, not to be analysed into each other, the other faculties which have been devised by philosophers are either factitious and imaginary, or easily reducible to these. The following is a tabular view of the distribution Tabular of the Special Faculties of Knowledge view of the Faculties of Knowledge. VOL. II. B tion. XXI. LECTURE XXI. THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY.-I. PERCEPTION.-REID'S LECT. HAVING concluded the consideration of Consciousness as the common condition of the mental phænomena, Recapitula and of those more general phænomena which pertain to consciousness as regarded in this universal relation; I proceeded, in our last Lecture, to the discussion of consciousness viewed in its more particular modifications,—that is, to the discussion of the Special Powers, -the Special Faculties and Capacities of Mind. And having called to your recollection the primary distribution of the mental phænomena into three great classes, the phænomena included under our general faculty of Knowledge, or Thought, the phænomena included under our general capacity of Feeling, or of Pleasure and Pain, and the phænomena included under our general power of Conation, that is, of Will and Desire; I passed on to the consideration of the first of these classes, that is, the phænomena of Knowledge. These phænomena are, in strictest propriety, mere modifications of consciousness, being consciousness only in different relations; and consciousness may, therefore, be regarded as the general faculty of knowledge: whereas the phænomena of the other classes, though they suppose consciousness as the con |