RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS.

1. The edifice and property of a church, incorporated under Ch. 329 of Laws of 1876, belong to the corporation, and not to the church members," and the same are controlled by the trustees. And in a free church the trustees have control of the seats and may remove therefrom an occupant.Sheldon v. Vail, 525.

2. A person's habit of occupying the same seat in such a church amounts to a license, and he cannot be removed therefrom without being first requested by the trustees to leave the seat -Id.

3. Removals for such a cause are not within the principle of 28 of the Charter of N. Y. City, requiring prior notice.—Id.

4. The Tax Commissioners have no power to suspend a clerk for any cause against the policy of law, such as one which contemplates a quasi compensation to members of | the Legislature for services rendered by them in their legislative capacity.-Alker v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y., 140.

5. Plaintiff was employed as a uniformed member of the New York City Fire Department, viz., as an assistant engineer, and was by order of the Department relieved from duty as such and appointed to another position, as machinist, at a lower salary. It appeared that the places were distinct and had annexed to them duties which could not well be performed by the same person, and that plaintiff performed the duties of machinist and signed a pay-roll for his compensation, in which he was described as such, without protest. Held, That the pay-rolls were evidence against plaintiff; that upon the above facts he must be deemed to have voluntarily vacated the place of engineer, and therefore he was not removed contrary to the provisions of § 77 of the Charter of New York City.-Reilly v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y., 271.

of the offices at all times in person and not by deputy.-Id.

7. Ch. 337, Laws of 1882, gives a Justice of the Peace of the City of Brooklyn the absolute power of removal of his clerk, and upon the exercise of such power the clerkship becomes vacant and the former occupant does not hold over until the appointment of his successor.-Eames v. The City of Brooklyn, 419.

See POLICE, 1.

REPLEVIN.

1. A party having title to lands on which is growing timber and bark, and not being in actual possession, may maintain replevin against a person in possession under a void deed who cuts and carries away such timber and bark. Youmans v. Francisco, 312.

2. In an action to recover possession of personal property, when the answer of one defendant admits plaintiff's title and the testimony shows that the other defendant made no claim to the property, Held, That there was prima facie evidence of title in plaintiff or that he had a right to possession and that a refusal to dismiss was correct.-Dillon v. Cockroft, 367.

See EVIDENCE, 18.

RESCISSION.

See BROKERS, 1; CONTRACT, 17, 21; FRAUD, 7; NEGOTIABLE PAPER, 5.

RESTAURANTS.

See INNKEEPERS.

REVIVOR.

See ABATEMENT.

SALE.

1. The character of a sale is determined by what is said at the time of sale. Declarations of a vendee made after that time are not admissible to affect it.-The Prest., &c. of the D. & H. C. Co. v. Harris, 36.

2. Plaintiff sold and delivered to A. an organ, taking back two notes for the purchase price, and also a paper stating that A. had leased of plaintiff an organ until the notes were paid, and, on payment thereof, the notes to be a receipt in full for the organ. The first note was paid, and the second, which had been assigned by plaintiff, was paid in part, and for the balance the assig nee recovered judgment. Held, That there was an absolute sale and delivery to A., and that a bona fide purchaser from her got good title.-Hintermeister v. Lane, 235.

3. Upon breach of contract of a sale by a vendee the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price at place of delivery. --Crittenden et al. v. Atwood, 392.

4. Where the contract called for delivery within a week's time, Held, That a demand upon the vendee to accept the articles before the week was up was not premature.-Id.

See AGENCY, 2; BANKRUPTCY, 1; CONTRACT, 20, 21; DAMAGES, 5; EVIDENCE, 16, 18; EXECUTION, 1-4, 6-8; EXECUTORS, 12; FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, 1, 2; WAR

RANTY.

SAVINGS BANKS.

See BANKS, 1, 6, 8.

SERVICE.

1. An order for service by publication was granted November 23d; service made out of the State November 25th, and judgment was entered January 20th. Held, That the judgment was premature; that the law requires a full six weeks' publication and not six times in six different weeks; that the service was incomplete until the time for publication had expired and defendant had twenty days thereafter in which to answer. -The Market Nat'l Bk. v. The Pacific Nat'l Bk., 23.

SERVICES.

1. Where a man is engaged for a period of time to perform certain services he is entitled to his salary as long as he is ready to render his services and is not removed, and the refusal to permit him to perform them is equivalent to a performance.-Alker v. | The Mayor, &c., of N. Y., 140.

See EVIDENCE, 38; MASTER AND SERVANT, 3.

SET-OFF.

See CORPORATIONS, 16; DOWER, 2; EXECUTORS, 31, 32.

SHERIFFS.

1. Under section 3,307 of the Code of Civil Procedure a sheriff who has taken property by virtue of a warrant of attachment is entitled to poundage in case of a subsequent settlement of the plaintiff's claim before any sale of the property by the sheriff.- Woodruff v. The Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 23.

2. A judgment creditor may revoke the authority of his attorney after the issue of an execution by such attorney, and when this is done the sheriff, after notice thereof, can no longer take his instructions from the at

torney, but is obliged to obey his execution, except as otherwise directed by the judgment creditor.--Robinson v. Brennan, 340.

3. Where the sheriff on a sale takes the purchaser's check for the amount of his bid, and puts him in possession of the property, he makes himself liable for the bid.-Id. See EXECUTION, 1.

SLANDER.

1. The complaint alleged that defendant uttered certain defamatory words "on or about certain days of the years 1880 and 1881, at Russell, in the presence of divers good and worthy citizens." Defendant

made affidavit that he had no knowledge, information or belief as to the times or places, or in whose presence plaintiff expected to prove that the words were spoken. Held, A proper case for a bill of particulars.-Gardenier v. Knox, 222.

2. Slanderous words are not actionable unless the charge, if true, will subject the person charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to punishment for an infamous crime, or unless the words spoken tend to prejudice him in his office, profession, trade or business.--Trimmer v. Hiscock, 267.

3. Where it was said of a hotel keeper that "he kept no accommodations, and a person could not get a decent meal or bed if he tried," Held, That the words were actionable per se.-Id.

1.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

Equity will not decree specific performance of a contract to convey real estate on the happening of a certain contingency which is expected to happen shortly, when, in fact, it does not happen for fourteen years, and, meanwhile, the property increases greatly in value, and large sums for taxes and assessments become due.—Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 105.

2. A judgment denying a decree of specific performance, but continuing the action to enable the plaintiff to recover damages, is interlocutory, and the plaintiff cannot be charged with costs.-Id.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. One W., who had a lien on certain property, verbally requested an insurance agent to insure the property and keep the policies alive; and the agent for the first year advanced the premiums himself, and for subsequent years procured the premiums to be advanced by a firm of which he is a partner. Held, That W. was liable for the advances, and that it was not necessary that his agree

ment should be in writing.-Cramer et al. v. Warren, 134.

2. Where one party to a parol agreement has performed his part, the statute of frauds does not apply to allow the other party, who has not performed his part, to keep the fruits of the agreement. -Sherman et al. v. Scott et al., 149.

STAY.

See PRACTICE, 20.

STOCKHOLDERS.

See CORPORATIONS, 3-5, 9-11, 15-20; COSTS, 8; ESTOPPEL, 9.

STREETS.

1. The word track," as used in § 1, Ch. 62, Laws of 1853, signifies the entire road-bed, and not merely the iron or railway.-The Pres., &c., of the D. & H. C. Co. v. The Vil lage of Whitehall et al., 244.

2. The fact that there are within the limits and between the lines of a proposed street or highway switches or other contrivances for passing engines or cars from one line to another will not prevent the laying out of a street or road under Chap. 62, Laws of 1853.-1d.

See EMINENT DOMAIN, 1, 5, 10-12; RAILROADS, 28.

SUBROGATION.

See ATTACHMENT, 16; Mortgage, 15.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

1. Where an affidavit in summary proceedings to remove a tenant described the premises leased as the "south portion" of a certain lot, which was denied by the answer, and the proof showed that it was the north part which was leased, Held, That there was a failure to establish the conventional relation of landlord and tenant and a fatal variance, and plaintiff could not recover possession.Warner v. Henderson, 146.

2. In summary proceedings, a justice of the peace does not lose jurisdiction by delaying his decision for four days after the submission of the case to him.--The People ex rel. White v. Loomis, 152.

See BAR, 2; INJUNCTION, 6; LEASE, 3.

SUNDAY LAW.

See NEGLIGENCE, 7.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. See EXECUTORS, 33.

SURETYSHIP.

1. A surety on a general guardian's bond who was not a party to an accounting between the guardian and ward is entitled to have the judgment rendered against the guardian in such accounting opened, and an opportunity given him to contest the liability of the guardian, when a suit is brought against him on his bond.-Kidder v. Bowne et al., 29. See BOND, 4, 5; MORTGAGE, 15, 21.

SURROGATES.

1. A surrogate has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim of the executor or administrator against the estate or as executor or administrator of another estate. -Neilly v. Neilly et al., 195.

2. A surrogate is disqualified by reason of interest from entertaining probate proceedings where he becomes a debtor to the estate by conversion of its funds.-In re probate will of Hancock, 205.

3. Where the right to a legacy depends upon a question of construction which must be determined before a decree for distribution can be made, the surrogate may, upon a final accounting, where all the parties interested are before the court, determine such construction as incident to his authority to make distribution.—In re accounting of Riggs et al., 394.

She

4. A testator left a sum of money in trust for his daughter, the principal at her death to go to her issue, or, if she died unmarried or without issue, then to her brothers. married, but died without issue. In a proceeding by her administrator to procure an accounting, Held, That the brothers were necessary parties, as they were interested in the determination of the questions involved. -Id.

5. Upon a deficiency of personal assets the heirs are liable for their intestate's debts to the extent of the land descended to them. This liability may be enforced by an action; and the proceeding in the Surrogate's Court to sell such lands is a concurrent remedy to substantially effect the same object.Mead v. Jenkins et al., 420.

6. The three years during which it is provided by statute that no such action shall be brought do not constitute a part of the period of the statute of limitation.-Id.

7. A sale in partition of the lands does not cut off the lien of a creditor of the ancestor, nor is a claim of interest under a tax lease an answer to his application for a sale of the lands to pay his debt.-Id.

8. An omission to appoint a guardian to take care of an infant's interests in a proceeding to probate a will when the infant has been

duly served with citation does not render the decree void, but only voidable at the infant's election.-In re application of Becker, 446.

9. Strong and controlling reasons should be presented to the court for extending the time within which an application to revoke the probate of a will should be made beyond one year after the entry of the decree admitting it to probate, and it is usual for the General Term of the Supreme Court, on an appeal from the decree of the surrogate, to deny such an application, made by a person who was an infant at the time of admitting the will to probate, unless it is made within two years after the infant became of age.— Id.

10. A surrogate has jurisdiction to pass on the validity and interpretation of the various provisions of a will so far as is necessary to make a proper decree of distribition.-In re Verplanck, 463.

See APPEAL, 13; EXECUTORS, 38; WILLS, 30.

TAXATION.

1. The omission, in the assessment rolls of the city of Brooklyn, of the additional oath of the assessors as to the personal examination of every lot within the year, as required by Chap. 384, Laws of 1854, amended by Chap. 63, Laws of 1862, renders the rolls and the sales for taxes there. under wholly void.-Brevoort v. The City of Brooklyn, 66.

2. It cannot be said that a municipal corporation which is interested in a tax sale and entitled to a portion of the proceeds is not competent to make an agreement to refund the purchase money if it shall appear that there was any irregularity in the proceedings prior to the sale.-Id.

3. Under an allegation that defendant expressly made such agreement plaintiff may prove the making thereof in any way.--Id.

4. The complaint in an action to recover such purchase price need not aver that the money paid at the sale was paid into the city treasury for the benefit of the city. It is sufficient that the city was interested in the sale and entitled to a portion of the proceeds.--Id.

5. The Register of Arrears has the right to bid in land for the city at a tax sale and to sell the certificate, and on such sale the city may warrant the validity of the certificate. -Id.

6. The words "manufacturing corporations," as used in § 3, chap. 542, Laws of 1880, relate to all companies, under whatever law incorporated and by whatever general name, whose chief business is the manufacture

and sale of artificial products.-The Nassau Gaslight Co. v. The City of Brooklyn et al.,

118.

7. Where the certificate of incorporation stated the object of the organization to be "of manufacturing and supplying gas." &c., and it was found that the company was engaged in such manufacture and sale, Held, That it was a manufacturing corporation within the meaning of the act.-Id.

8. Under such circumstances the appellate court will not take judicial notice that illuminating gas is not an artificial product but an imprisoned bounty of nature needing only to be set free.-Id.

9. Where the description in a tax certificate neither accords with the true description of the premises, nor refers to any deed or map from which the identity of the lands can be ascertained, the assessment and all proceedings thereunder are void.-In re The N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co. v. Cottle et al., 137. 10. A resolution passed by the trustees that a specified sum be raised by tax as an extraordinary expense for the purpose of refunding the several amounts claimed to be illegally paid by a portion of the taxable inhabitants * * * on tax warrant" of the preceding year, substantially complies with the requirements of Chap. 291, Laws of 1870.-Sherman v. The Trustees of Clifton Springs, 188.

11. So long as the assessment roll made by such trustees remains in force no action will lie to recover back a tax, nor to recover damages for the levy and sale of property to pay such tax.-Id.

12. A justice of the peace, in an action before him, has no power to inquire dehors the record as to the legality of claims adjudged to be valid by the trustees of a village and ratified by the electors.-Id.

13. For the purposes of assessment, land includes structures upon land as separable from the ownership of the fee.-The People ex rel. Miller v. The Board of Assessors, 249.

14. The exemption of U. S. bonds from taxation is not confined to the par value, but includes any premium there may be as well. The premium is a part of the bond, and goes with it.-The People ex rel. Leonard et al. v. Comrs. of Taxes, 299.

15. The right of the City Attorney of Poughkeepsie to compensation for conducting tax sales, as provided in § 8, Tit. 5 of the City Charter, as amended in 1876. does not accrue until after advertisement of sale.The People ex rel Goss v. Lee, 449.

16. A description in tax assessment proceedings which gives the premises a front on a

certain street, but no definite courses for the remaining sides, nor any lines by which the lot can be inclosed, nor other means of identification, is insufficient, and the proceedings and tax levied thereon are void. -In re The N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co. v. Cottle et al., 492.

17. Chap. 572, Laws of 1880, in relation to unpaid taxes and assessments in the City of Brooklyn, embraces all unpaid taxes, whether they exceed or are less in the aggregate than the assessed value of the land.-The People ex rel. Farrar et al. v. O'Keefe, 517.

18. The words "original amount," as used in the last clause of § 2, mean the tax itself, and do not include interest accumulated thereon before the passage of the act. -ld.

19. Chap. 90, Laws of 1882, being a remedial statute, its language must be construed as permissive merely and not arbitrary and imperative. If the town neglects or fails to avail itself of the privilege granted the Act of 1857 is still applicable and can be carried into effect. The two statutes are to be construed together so as to give effect to each. The People ex rel. The Board of Supervisors v. Hardenbergh, 538.

20. The words "immediately after the passage of this Act," as used in § 4 of the Act of 1882, refer to a time subsequent to the issuing of the bonds provided for in §§ 1 and 2.-Id.

actually due as an accord and satisfaction; therefore, a tender of less than the amount due upon a mortgage, made to an agent to collect the same, is not sufficient to discharge the mortgage or work a forfeiture of the lien; so held, where the tender was less by one day's interest than the amount actually due.-Rigney v. Robinson, 292.

See EVIDENCE, 12; EXECUTORS, 10.

TITLE.

See EXECUTORS, 12; TRUSTEES, 2, 3.

TOWN BONDS.

1. A town cannot repudiate its bonds and claim the proceeds of them.-The Town of Lyons v. Chamberlin et al., 344.

2. In an action to compel the surrender of town bonds it appeared that such bonds were issued under an agreement that the railroad should be built through a certain section of the town, and that the company became insolvent. The bonding proceedings were held invalid, and it was found that some of the bonds were sold in good faith. Held, That the bonds were valid, and that defendants were liable for such of them as were sold, after being credited with the amounts paid out on account of the railroad.-Id.

TRESPASS.

1. A party cannot maintain an action for a trespass on land for which he had contracted on behalf of his wife, to whom a deed was afterwards given.-Shufelt v. Sweet et al., 1.

2. A party who obstructs a right of way across his lands is estopped from complaining of an entry on his adjoining lands by reason of such obstruction.-Id.

3. To entitle a plaintiff to recover for trespasses committed by cattle which escaped from an adjoining farm he must establish that defendant owned or occupied such farm and owned or had some interest in the cattle. Andrews v. Miles et al., 290.

4. Evidence that defendant had no such ownership, occupancy or interest is competent and admissible under a general denial.-Id.

5. The manner in which the fence was fixed four years before the trespass is not material.-Id.

6. Plaintiff put down an extra main in front of certain premises, at the request of the owner and to supply the houses thereon with gas. The grantees of such premises afterwards agreed to take gas of defendant, but it did not appear that they consented that defendant should use the mains on their premises. Defendant then severed