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FORECLOSURE.

Of lien, see "Mechanics' Liens," § 4.

the purchase-money notes.-Vansickle v. Shenb (Ind. Sup.) 381.

Before suit to set aside conveyance by insolOf mortgage, see "Chattel Mortgages," 86; vent, held unnecessary to take out execution, "Mortgages," § 9.

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

See "Judgment," § 9.

FOREIGN RECEIVERSHIP.

See "Receivers," § 6.

FRANCHISES.

and prove refusal to turn out purchase-money notes.-Vansickle v. Shenk (Ind. Sup.) 381.

See "Carriers."

FREIGHT.

GAMING.

§ 1. Gambling contracts and transactions.

A person can recover his property staked on a wager while still in the hands of the stake

Grant by municipality, see "Municipal Corpora- holder, and before the determination of the tions," § 4.

FRAUD.

See, also, "Fraudulent Conveyances."

§ 1. Deception constituting fraud and liability therefor.

Expressions of opinion by a promoter of a cor; poration as to value of its stock held not ground for an action of deceit by a purchaser from such promoter.-Lynch v. Murphy (Mass.) 623. § 2. Actions.

Good faith in the acquisition of a deed is presumed in the absence of evidence.-Sexson v. Barker (Ill.) 109.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

1. Promises to answer for debt of another.

A verbal guaranty to pay an obligation of a third person, which is not binding on him because of fraud, held not within the statute. Voris v. Star City Building & Loan Ass'n (Ind. App.) 779.

event on which the wager is laid, after notice to and demand on stakeholder. — Taylor v. Moore (Ind. App.) 770.

§ 2. Criminal responsibility.

Under Laws 1895, p. 156, prohibiting the keeping of slot machines, the mere keeping of such machines is an offense without proof of actual use for gambling purposes.-Bobel v. People (Ill.) 322.

An indictment for keeping a slot machine in the words of the statute (Laws 1895, p. 156), held sufficient, without stating money "was then and there staked."-Bobel v. People (Ill.) 322.

GARNISHMENT.

See "Attachment"; "Execution."

GIFTS.

In the absence of proof of actual undue influence, a conveyance by a mother, 91 years of age, to a son who had always lived at home, of her farm, held not to raise the presumption of undue influence, so as to require the deed to

§ 2. Requisites and sufficiency of writ-be set aside.-Slayback v. Witt (Ind. Sup.) 389.

ing.

Record of a board of street commissioners, acting on a subject over which it has power, held a sufficient memorandum. McManus v. City of Boston (Mass.) 607.

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§ 3. Operation and effect of statute. Where a child, in reliance on parol promise of parent to convey land, takes possession, and makes permanent improvements, the contract is taken out of the statute of frauds.-Fouts v. Roof (Ill.) 653.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

By mortgagor of chattels, see "Chattel Mortgages," § 5.

§ 1. Transfers and transactions invalid. Where a mortgage was given to an employé of the creditor, it was held on the evidence that all parties knew of the insolvency, and that the mortgage amounted to a preference.-Saunders v. Russell (Mass.) 463.

§ 2. Remedies of creditors.

Evidence of value of notes given by grantee for property conveyed held inadmissible.-Vansickle v. Shenk (Ind. Sup.) 381.

In action to set aside a deed, evidence of grantor's reputation for honesty is inadmissible.-Vansickle v. Shenk (Ind. Sup.) 381.

Complaint in suit to set aside conveyance held to sufficiently allege the insolvent condition of the grantor.-Vansickle v. Shenk (Ind. Sup.) 381.

Suit to set aside a conveyance by insolvent held an available remedy, though proceedings supplemental to execution would have reached

A delivery of a savings bank deposit book with intent to give donee the deposits, accompanied with appropriate words, held a sufficient delivery without transfer in writing.-Polley v. Hicks (Ohio) 809.

GOOD FAITH.

Of party asking equitable relief, see "Specific
Performance," § 3.
Of purchaser, see "Vendor and Purchaser," § 3.

GRAND JURY.

Pub. St. c. 213, § 1, providing for drawing of grand jury a certain time before the first term for each year, held to relate only to criminal terms. Commonwealth V. Krathofski (Mass.) 1040.

Under Pub. St. c. 170, § 18, the board at the drawing of grand jurors, on the state ment of a member that a person drawn had removed from the city, have the right to draw another in his stead, and their decision is final, Krathofski (Mass.) 1010. though erroneous. Commonwealth v.

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entitled to notice of such execution.-Lennox v. § 2. Repair. Murphy (Mass.) 644.

§ 2. Construction and operation.

Guaranty construed, and held, that a stipulation that the firm whose credit was guarantied should purchase a certain amount of goods was not a condition precedent to the enforcement of the guaranty.-Lennox v. Murphy (Mass.) 644. Under a guaranty to secure credit, right to purchase on credit is terminated by insolvency of the purchaser.-Lennox v. Murphy (Mass.) 644.

§ 3. Remedies of creditors.

The holder of a note may recover against a guarantor, although the note was void as against the maker, where such note was purchased in reliance on the guaranty.-Holm v. Jamieson (Ill.) 702.

Where consideration of guaranty was extension of credit for a certain period, a creditor need not await expiration of period before suing on guaranty.-Lennox v. Murphy (Mass.) 644. Agreement extending credit to a firm held a sufficient consideration for a guaranty of the firm's debt.-Lennox v. Murphy (Mass.) 644.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

Evidence held insufficient to show that plaintiff would be injured by the removal of a culvert. -Barnard v. Commissioners of Highways of Nokomis (Ill.) 120.

Removal of a culvert will not be enjoined unsult therefrom.-Barnard v. Commissioners of less it is clearly established that injury will reHighways of Nokomis (Ill.) 120.

8 3. Taxes.

A road tax list need not be signed by all the highway commissioners, the signature of a majority being sufficient.-Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People (Ill.) 1057.

A road tax held not invalidated by failure of the highway overseers to verify the delinquent tax list. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People (III.) 1057.

A road tax held not invalidated by failure of the highway commissioners to apportion the property taxed and the amount of taxes among the different road districts in the town, under Rev. St. c. 121, §§ 83, 84.-Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. People (Ill.) 1057.

§ 4. Regulation and use for travel.

A fine of $25 for obstructing a public highway is not excessive under Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 2043, permitting a fine of not more than $500 and imprisonment therefor.-Hoch v. State (Ind. App.) 93.

Liability of sureties of guardian on additional bond to account on sale of realty cannot be extended, though the guardian commingles such proceeds with money of his ward derived See "Sunday." from other sources, and fails to account.-McWhinney v. Swisher (Ohio) 812.

Liability of sureties on failure of guardian to account for proceeds of real estate sold, commingled with other funds, determined. — McWhinney v. Swisher (Ohio) 812.

HABEAS CORPUS.

A prisoner cannot obtain a writ of habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, since not provided for by Rev. St. 1893, c. 65, § 22.People v. Jonas (Ill.) 1051.

HARMLESS ERROR.

See "Appeal and Error"; "Criminal Law."
In civil actions, see "Appeal and Error," § 24.

HEIRS.

See "Descent and Distribution."

HIGHWAYS.

See, also, "Bridges"; "Municipal Corporations,"
$ 9, 10.
Accidents at railroad crossings, see "Railroads,"
§ 4.

1. Establishment and alteration.
The location of a highway held that fixed by
the proceedings for its establishment, and not as
actually surveyed.-Farrelly v. Town of Kane
(Ill.) 118.

The commissioners, having laid out a road at the point asked for in the petition, have no power to change it.-Farrelly v. Town of Kane (Ill.) 118.

The widening of a highway is a change in its location, within Pub. St. c. 112, § 129, which provides a method for altering the location of a town way at a railroad crossing.-New England R. Co. v. Board of Railroad Com'rs of Massachusetts (Mass.) 549.

§ 1. Evidence.

HOLIDAYS.

HOMICIDE.

Where deceased was in such a condition for a week as to make several separate statements by her, within that time, dying declarations, they are all admissible in evidence.-Dunn v. People (Ill.) 137.

The fact that a dying declaration has been reduced to writing does not preclude evidence of other unwritten dying declarations.-Dunn v. People (Ill.) 137.

Dying declarations may be impeached by evidence of statements made by deceased after the abortion had been procured, and while not in extremis, which tend to contradict material parts of the dying declarations.-Dunn v. People (Ill.) 137.

A verdict of murder in the second degree held sustained by the evidence.-Lillard v. State (Ind. Sup.) 383.

Evidence as to ownership by decedent of property found on person accused held admissible.-Commonwealth v. Williams (Mass.) 1035. § 2. Trial.

Permitting the jury to take with them to the dence as dying declarations, held an abuse of jury room written statements admitted in evidiscretion.-Dunn v. People (Ill.) 137.

Remarks of the trial court in refusing to admit certain evidence held prejudicial error.Dunn v. People (Ill.) 137.

Instructions given as to what was sufficient to convict defendant of murder in procuring deceased to commit an abortion on herself, held error.-Dunn v. People (Ill.) 137.

Deliberate intent must exist at the moment of killing in order to constitute malicious intent. -Marzen v. People (Ill.) 249.

Under Rev. St. 1874, c. 131, § 4, the act in force at the time of a homicide, requiring the jury to fix the sentence for manslaughter, must apply, though before the trial an act was passed empowering the court to impose sentence in such cases, and leave the term inde terminate.-Johnson v. People (III.) 321.

Where defendant testified that deceased was IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONattempting to throw a stone at him, evidence that deceased did not have a stone was proper rebuttal.-Lillard v. State (Ind. Sup.) 383.

HORSE RAILROADS.

See "Street Railroads."

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See, also, "Divorce"; "Dower"; "Marriage"; "Money Received."

Adultery, see "Adultery."

TRACT.

See "Constitutional Law," § 3.

IMPEACHMENT.

Of witness, see "Witnesses," § 3.

IMPROVEMENTS.

Liens, see "Mechanics' Liens."

On premises demised, see "Landlord and Tenant," § 4.

Rights of survivor, see "Descent and Distribu- Public improvements, see "Municipal Corporation."

§ 1. Mutual rights.

tions," 88 4-7.

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.

Under Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 2660, a conveyance, either directed by the husband alone, or See "Negligence," § 2. by an officer, to satisfy a lien given by the husband, passes only the husband's interests.Frain v. Burgett (Ind. Sup.) 873.

§ 2. Marriage settlements.

An antenuptial contract was construed to bar the right of the wife of her life estate in the husband's lands, and of her right to remain in the mansion house free of rent for one year after the husband's death.-Kennedy v. Kennedy (Ind. Sup.) 756.

INCOMPETENT PERSONS.

See "Insane Persons."

INCUMBRANCES.

On property devised or bequeathed, see "Wills," § 10.

INDEBTEDNESS.

Warranty in the wife's conveyance of separate realty in discharge of the husband's debt is not a contract of suretyship, and hence in- Of testator, see "Wills," § 10. valid.-Nichol v. Hays (Ind. App.) 768.

A discharge of the husband's debt is a consideration for the wife's covenant of warranty in a conveyance of her separate real estate, made for that purpose.-Nichol v. Hays (Ind. App.) 768.

§ 3. Transactions between husband and wife.

Where property held by a husband and wife by entireties is jointly mortgaged, there is a presumption that they are joint principals. Magel v. Milligan (Ind. Sup.) 564.

4. Privileges of coverture. An answer averring that a mortgage, sought to be foreclosed was given by a married woman to secure debts of her husband, held to set out a contract of suretyship, which was a good defense as to her.-Boyd v. Radabaugh (Ind. Sup.) 301.

§ 5. Wife's separate estate.

A husband need not join in an oil lease of his wife's lands, since not an incumbrance or conveyance, as contemplated by Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 6961.-Heal v. Niagara Oil Co. (Ind. Sup.) 482.

Under Act March 30, 1871, where a husband has received money, the separate property of the wife, and claims it as his own, the burden is on him to show her express assent.-Yocum v. Allen (Ohio) 909.

6. Actions.

Evidence that defendant, a married woman, gave a note and mortgage to secure moneys advanced to her to pay debts of her husband, held sufficient to sustain a finding that defendant was only a surety.-Boyd v. Radabaugh (Ind. Sup.) 301.

Where assessment is levied on lands owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, and on appeal the husband is released from the assessment, it releases the wife also.-Humberd v. Collings (Ind. App.) 314.

See "Names."

IDEM SONANS.

INDEMNITY.

See, also, "Guaranty"; "Principal and Surety." Where agreement in bond to protect sureties provides for attorney's fees, the sureties can recover on paying any part of the debt secured. -Spencer v. McLean (Ind. App.) 769.

Undertaking to pay obligees a certain share of any debt they may have to pay as sureties is an original promise, and not an undertaking of suretyship.-Spencer v. McLean (Ind. App.) 769.

becoming sureties for procuring loan construed, Bond by stockholders to secure directors for liability.-Spencer v. McLean (Ind. App.) 769. and held to create a several, and not a joint,

Notice of pendency of action to persons claimed to be ultimately liable held insufficient to charge them with the judgment against the person primarily liable.-Consolidated HandMethod Lasting-Mach. Co. v. Bradley (Mass.) 464.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.

See "Master and Servant," § 10.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. See, also, "Intoxicating Liquors," § 1; "Larceny," § 2.

An indictment for keeping a slot machine on a certain day, and at a certain place, held sufficient, without stating it was "then and there" kept.-Bobel v. People (Ill.) 322.

INFANTS.

See, also, "Adoption"; "Parent and Child.”

§ 1. Property and conveyances.
Equity has power to change the character of
a minor's property whenever his interests de-
mand it.-Gorman v. Mullins (Ill.) 222.

Facts held to justify a court of equity in authorizing the conversion of realty devised in

trust to an infant during his minority into in- so jurisdiction to assess the damages thereon. terest-bearing securities. - Gorman v. Mullins-Keith v. Henkleman (Ill.) 692. (III.) 222.

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§ 2. Actions for injunctions.

A court of equity may go behind the parties on the record to determine whether a bill for injunetion is improperly brought.-People v. General Electric Ry. Co. (Ill.) 158.

A bill for injunction, though brought in name of attorney general, will be dismissed if it appears that private, and not public, interests are involved.-People v. General Electric Ry. Co. (Ill.) 158.

A stipulation entered into with the principal' obligor on an injunction bond, which in no way changes the contract, cannot affect the sureties' liability under the bond.-Keith v. Henkleman (Ill.) 692.

Damages may be assessed on an injunction bond under a bill filed previous to the final determination of the suit in which the injunction was issued.-Keith v. Henkleman (Ill.).

692.

Attorneys' fees for defending an injunction suit at the trial on the merits held recoverable in an action on the bond, although the injunction was not the sole object of the suit.-Hyatt v. City of Washington (Ind. App.) 402.

A city is the real party in interest in an action on a bond running to persons designated as its officers.-Hyatt v. City of Washington (Ind.. App.) 402.

§ 5. Wrongful injunction.

When an injunction is dissolved by motion on the face of the bill, attorney's fees necessarily incurred in procuring the dissolution are properly allowed as damages.-Keith v. Henkleman (Ill.) 692.

INSANE PERSONS.

1. Property and conveyances.

The county court has power to disapprove a conservator's sale made subject to its approval, although regularly and fairly conducted, when for best interests of the estate. Jennings v. Dunphy (Ill.) 1045.

2. Actions.

An insane defendant should not be defaulted for want of an appearance and answer to the suit.-Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612.

A guardian ad litem should not be appointed in an action against an insane ward until there has been actual service of process on the ward.

When, on a motion to dismiss a bill for injunction, affidavits and documents are submitted-Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612. on both sides, and by agreement the judge visits the premises in question, the court's action in dismissing the bill cannot be considered as based on ex parte affidavits produced in support of the motion.-People v. General Electric Ry. Co. (Ill.) 158.

In bill to restrain collection of taxes levied

by the South Park commissioners, held that they necessary parties.-Knopf v. Chicago Real-Estate Board (Ill.) 658.

were

In a suit against a county clerk to restrain him from extending an illegal tax levied by the park commissioners, the commissioners are necessary parties defendant. - Knopf v. First Nat. Bank (Ill.) 660.

On a bill for injunction, the court will determine whether, in the particular case, the legal remedy is adequate. - Drew v. Incorporated Town of Geneva (Ind. Sup.) 871. § 3. Preliminary and interlocutory injunctions.

On a motion to dissolve an injunction, the court may dismiss the bill for want of equity. -Heinroth v. Kockersperger (Ill.) 171.

Where a motion to dissolve an interlocutory injunction is based solely on the insufficiency of the bill, it will be treated as a demurrer.Smith v. Kochersperger (Ill.) 187.

The names of the sureties need not appear in the body of the bond approved by the court when a restraining order is issued.-Hyatt v. City of Washington (Ind. App.) 402.

§ 4. Liabilities on bonds or undertakings.

A court of equity, having jurisdiction to reform and correct an injunction bond, has al

Where a guardian having notice of the pendency of an action against his insane ward litem should be appointed.-Taylor v. Lovering does not appear and defend, a guardian ad (Mass.) 612.

A petition for a writ of error is properly brought in the name of the ward by his guardian.-Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612.

In the absence of a statute permitting the service of a writ against an insane person who ian instead of on the ward, such a service is is under guardianship to be made on the guardinsufficient.-Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612.

Service of process on insane persons must be in the same manner as on other persons.-Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612.

A guardian should not be made a party to an action against his ward, but should be given notice of the proceedings.-Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612.

The appearance of the guardian in the name of his insane ward, in an action brought against his ward, cures a want of service on the ward. -Taylor v. Lovering (Mass.) 612.

INSOLVENCY.

See, also, "Assignments for Benefit of Creditors"; "Bankruptcy."

Of bank, see "Banks and Banking," § 1.

§ 1. Proceedings for declaration of insolvency and surrender or seizure of property.

A compulsory assignment under an Illinois. decree of a court of equity, presumably having

full jurisdiction of the assignor, held as valid as-Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Dole (Ind. App.) if made voluntarily.-Witters v. Globe Sav. 772. Bank (Mass.) 932.

§ 2. Assignment.

A compulsory assignment under an Illinois decree sustained, as against subsequent attachment in Massachusetts, at the suit of a resident of Vermont.-Witters v. Globe Sav. Bank (Mass.) 932.

A creditor of an insolvent, whose debt is due at the time of the making of a general assignment by the debtor, is entitled to set off such debt against a debt from himself to the insolvent which had not matured at the time of the assignment. In re Hatch (N. Y.) 49.

§ 3. Discharge of insolvent.

Under Pub. St. 1882, c. 157, § 84, providing for discharge of insolvent debtors, the debtor cannot be discharged from liability to account for a trust fund.-Raphael v. Mullen (Mass.)

515.

INSTRUCTIONS.

See "Criminal Law"; "Trial.”

In civil actions, see "Trial," § 4.

An insurance policy is binding when delivered, though it contains conditions not included in the application, unless they are unusual.Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wm. Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co. (Mass.) 516.

The facts concerning the execution of a policy of insurance considered, and held to be a Massachusetts contract.-Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wm. Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co. (Mass.) 516.

Policies of insurance considered, and held to be contracts for specific insurance.-Peabody v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. (Mass.) 526.

A provision that the company, at its option, may cancel the policy on request of assured, is not binding on the company, where the option is not exercised.-Knowlton, Attorney General, v. Bay State Beneficiary Ass'n (Mass.) 929. 5. Premiums.

In action against insurance company to recover premium paid on the ground that the policy was void, held, that the judgment was not supported by the findings.-Metropolitan Life

In criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law," Ins. Co. v. Bowser (Ind. App.) 86. § 3; "Homicide," § 2.

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1. Control and regulation in general. An assessment insurance company cannot insure against disabilities arising from sickness. -Knowlton, Attorney General, v. Bay State Beneficiary Ass'n (Mass.) 929.

A casualty company, which, prior to St. 1890, c. 421, had the right to issue certificates for weekly benefits to members in case of disability not the result of accident, is deprived of that right by the statute.-Knowlton, Attorney General, v. Berkshire Health & Accident Ass'n (Mass.) 930.

§ 2. Insurance companies.

The rights of creditors of an insolvent insurance corporation in process of receivership to share in the assets are fixed as of the date when such proceedings were instituted.-Merrill v. Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Mass.) 519.

§ 6. Cancellation.

Evidence held to show policy canceled before loss.-Faulkner v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co. (Mass.) 529.

§ 7. Avoidance of policy for misrepresentation.

An insurance company issued a policy at double rates on a river steamer on a voyage from Philadelphia to Mexico. Held, that the implied warranty of seaworthiness should not be taken to be broken by the fact that the vessel was not constructed so as to be fit for a sea voyage.-Thebaud v. Great Western Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 284.

8 8. Waiver.

Where company fails to terminate policy for failure to observe condition, the condition is waived. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Dole (Ind. App.) 772.

An agent having general authority to make contracts of insurance held to be able to waive by parol a provision in policy for keeping books in iron safe.-Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Dole (Ind. App.) 772.

A party cannot be held estopped to take advantage of a failure to comply with the terms of an insurance policy, or of a forfeiture of rights thereunder, by mere silence.-McAllaster v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 502.

Under St. 1890, c. 421, § 14, an unexhausted
portion of an emergency fund of an insolvent
benefit insurance company should be applied to
claims where the death happened before the
filing of a bill for the appointment of a re-
ceiver.-Knowlton, Attorney General, v. Massa-89. Extent of loss.
chusetts Ben. Life Ass'n (Mass.) 520.

§ 3. Insurance agents and brokers.
The facts in relation to the acts of brokers
participating in the negotiations for an in-
surance policy considered, and held to show that
they were agents of the insured.-Common-
wealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wm. Knabe & Co.
Mfg. Co. (Mass.) 516.

§ 4. The contract in general.

Negotiations between insurer and insured are merged in the written application for the policy.-Masons' Union Life Ins. Ass'n v. Brockman (Ind. App.) 493.

The rights of beneficiary under a life insurance policy cannot be impaired by statements of insured subsequent to its execution.-Masons' Union Life Ins. Ass'n v. Brockman (Ind. App.) 493.

Policy construed, and held, that insured was only obliged to take inventory at some time within a year from the issuance of the policy, and thereafter to keep the books as provided.

Total destruction of a building, within the meaning of a fire insurance policy insuring against such loss, means the complete destruction of the insured property, so that nothing of value remains. Corbett v. Spring Garden Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 282.

8 10. Notice of loss.

A notice of accident given a month after it occurred held insufficient under the policy, where the only excuse was that unusual business affairs caused it to be forgotten.-Smith & Dove Mfg. Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Mass.) 516. § 11. Adjustment of loss.

A plaintiff in an action on an insurance policy held, upon the evidence as to his silence when notified of defendant's intention to rebuild, not estopped to contend that the option to do so had expired.-McAllaster ▼. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 502.

Under the terms of the standard policy of fire insurance, an insurance company must exer cise its option to repair or rebuild within 30 days after the receipt of the proofs of loss.

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