The covered the facts aforesaid, and brought the action to set aside the judgment. No facts are shown, however, that even tend to impute any fraud or misconduct to the appellee in obtaining the judgment. The theory of the complaint in that case was that appellant was prevented from setting up the fraud or collusion between Ray and its trustee as a defense to the action by reason of the negligence or willful failure of the trustee to respond to the summons of the court, and appear in the name and on behalf of the township, and make the defense warranted by the facts pleaded. The court, speaking by Jordan, J., said: "It would seem that appellee commenced his action in the proper court in the usual and ordinary way, by filing a complaint and procuring appellant to be duly notified of the pendency of the action by duly serving the proper process of the court on its trustee. We must at least presume this to be so, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, as the facts disclose that the judgment was taken on the default of appellant. law required the process of the court to issue against the appellant, under the circumstances, as the school township, and to be served, as provided, on its trustee. Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 6027 (Rev. St. 1881, § 4536); City of Huntington v. Day, 55 Ind. 7; Vogel v. Brown Tp., 112 Ind. 299, 14 N. E. 77; Vogel v. Brown School Tp., 112 Ind. 317, 14 N. E. 78. We are therefore bound to presume that the court found that the law in this respect had been complied with before it gave judgment against appellant on default." Again the court said: "Equity, however, will not interpose to relieve a complaining party from a judgment at law on the grounds that he had a valid defense to the action wherein the judgment was rendered, which was not interposed by reason of his own negligence. As a general rule, every person is required to look after his own rights, and to see that they are vindicated in due season, and in a proper manner. Consequently, where a defendant has the proper means of a defense in his power, but neglects or fails to employ such means in a proper tribunal, and suffers a judgment to be rendered against him in a proper tribunal, he is forever precluded. Center Tp. v. Board of Com'rs Marion Co., 110 Ind. 579, 10 N. E. 291, and authorities there cited." A civil or school township is a municipal corporation. It exists only by virtue of statute. It is an impersonal something. It is without knowledge, action, or existence, save in law. It can only act by and through its legal officer and representative, its trustee. It is wholly passive and submissive, and can protect itself only through its proper representative. For all legal purposes and business transactions, the trustee of the township is the representative and agent of the township, and acts for it. In section 486, Freem. Judgm., it is said: "To entitle the party to relief from a judgment or decree, it must be made evident that he had a defense upon the merits, and that such defense has been lost, without such loss being attributable to his own omission, neglect, or default. The loss of a defense, to justify a court of equity in removing a judgment, must be, in all cases, occasioned by fraud, or mistake or accident on the part of the losing party, unmixed with any fault of himself or agent." In the case before us, appellee is a public corporation, capable of acting only by and through its authorized officer or agent. Starry, its trustee, was such officer and agent. As was said in Adams School Tp. v. Irwin, supra: "Appellant is a public corporation, with the power to sue, and subject to be sued, and certainly the rule asserted by the authorities on the question involved is as applicable to a public corporation as it is to a private or to a natural person. Forney, at the time appellee commenced his action to recover on the warrant, was the trustee of this school township; and, although not the township, he was at least its special agent, with limited statutory authority. Notice to him of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided by law, must be deemed notice to the township. When appellee instituted his action on the warrant, and legally notified appellant, through its proper agent, of the fact, he thereby challenged it to respond in like manner as any other defendant would have been required, and assert any defense which it then had to the action. The discharge of this duty rested, under the law, on its trustee. This was in the scope of the power and authority of his agency, and this duty he, with full knowledge of the existing facts, neglected or failed to perform. Consequently the loss of appellant's defense to the cause of action resulted from the negligent act of its own agent, and in no sense from any act or wrong of appellee." In the case from which we have just quoted, appellant contended that its hands, under the circumstances, were tied, and it could do nothing,-in other words, it was helpless,because of the fraudulent acts and conduct of its trustee. The court held that if, in a legal sense, this could be true, it was met with the answer that such condition was occasioned by and attributed to its own agent or representative, and in support of the proposition cited Cicero Tp. v. Picken, 122 Ind. 260, 23 N. E. 763. That was an action upon a township warrant, and after judgment, which was rendered without summons, but where there was appearance of counsel, and judgment by agreement, the township brought an action to set it aside for fraud; showing that it had a good and meritorious defense, in that the obligation sued upon was issued without authority and in violation of law. Among other things, the court said, "If the contention of appellant's counsel can be maintained, judgments rendered against public corporations are of no binding force, and have no validity, if the corporation, as it turns out, could have successfully defended the action on the ground of want of power to enter into the obligation sued on." It seems to us that the reasoning in Adams School Tp. v. Irwin and Cicero Tp. v. Picken, supra, is applicable to the facts in the case before us, and is of controlling force. The appellee here asked to be released from a judgment under a specific statute, on account of its "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." | (The italics are ours.) We must look to the legal as well as to the etymological meaning of these terms, to ascertain if the appellee has brought itself within the protection of the statute. "Mistake," as defined by And. Law Dict. p. 681, is: "Some intentional act or omission or error arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition, or misplaced confidence," or "when a person, under some erroneous conviction of fact or law, does or omits to do an act which but for the erroneous conviction he would not have done or omitted." There are mistakes of fact and of law. A mistake of fact takes place when some fact which really exists is unknown, or some fact is supposed to exist which really does not exist. A mistake of law occurs when a person, having full knowledge of facts, comes to an erroneous conclusion as to their legal effect. Id. "'Surprise' is the act of taking unawares; sudden confusion or perplexity. "Inadvertence' is a lack of heedfulness or attentiveness." Webster. "Excusable neglect' is a compound term. 'Excusable' is where an act is done, or omitted, admitting of an excuse. 'Neglect' is the omission or forbearance to do a thing that can be done, or that is required to be done." And. Law Dict. pp. 429, 703. The question presents itself, can a public corporation-a creature that exists only in law be mistaken, inadvertent, surprised, or excusably neglectful? It cannot think, speak, or act; it can neither impart nor receive information or knowledge; and it cannot, in itself, do or cause to be done, omit or cause to be omitted, any act or thing. Then how can It be mistaken, inadvertent, surprised, or excusably neglectful? Its proper officer, the trustee, who alone is authorized to act for it, might be surprised, etc.; and in such event, it could bring itself within the provisions of the statute by the pleading of the proper facts, and obtain relief from a judgment taken against it on account of its mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. But here appellee's trustee had full knowledge of all the facts leading up to the rendition of the judgment. He knew the conditions and circumstances under which the warrants were issued. He knew that they were without consideration, if that was the fact. He knew that there was a conspiracy between Boyd and himself to defraud and plunder his township, if there was such conspiracy. He knew that the warrants had been assigned to the appellant, for he had paid money upon them while in his hands. He knew that an action was pending against the township to enforce their collection, for he had been duly served with process. He failed to appear, either by counsel or in person, and make a defense which the facts warranted, and purposely and fraudulently suffered judgment by default. We regret that the law will not interpose and relieve appellee from the burden resting upon it by reason of so unjust and inequitable a judgment, but under the authorities we see no escape from it in the remedy here pursued. Counsel for appellant insist that the rule that the negligence of an attorney is the negligence of the client or party to the suit applies here, on the theory that the trustee of the township is the agent of the township, as an attorney is the agent of his client. We are inclined to the view that this insistence is firmly grounded, both in principle, and upon the great weight of authority, and we see no escape from it. That the negligence of an attorney is the negligence of his client, there can be no doubt; and where, by such negligence, injury resulted to the client, the general rule prevails, he has no relief in law. See Brumbaugh v. Stockman, 83 Ind. 583; Center Tp. v. Board, 110 Ind. 579, 10 N. E. 291; Lowe v. Hamilton, 132 Ind. 406, 31 N. E. 1117; Parker v. Bank, 1 Ind. App. 462, 27 N. E. 650; Railroad Co. v. Flinn, 2 Ind. App. 55, 28 N. E. 201; Cresswell v. White, 3 Ind. App. 306, 29 N. E. 612; Heaton v. Peterson, 6 Ind. App. 1, 31 N. E. 1133. We desire to say, before concluding this opinion, that it is regrettable that under the facts in this case the law will not afford to appellee the relief it seeks, and take from it the burden which its trusted officer and agent made it possible to cast upon it. Transactions of this character rest heavily upon the subdivision of the government they immediately affect. The primary remedy, however, for such evils, is in the election of honest and trustworthy officials as representatives of the people, and secondarily in actions upon their official bonds in case they prove recreant to their trusts. The language of the court in Adams School Tp. v. Irwin, supra, is apropos in this connection. They said: "The loss which appellant will sustain if compelled to pay the judgment will be the result, to an extent, at least, of its misfortune in having selected, through its legal voters, a man for its agent or representative who, if the facts alleged are actually true, was recreant to his trust, and one ready and willing, at the instigation of designing men, to perpetrate a criminal wrong." It follows from what we have said, and the authorities cited, that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to appellee's application to set aside the default and judgment, and in vacating the same, and this conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to decide the question presented by sustaining the demurrer to the second and third paragraphs of complaint. The judgment is reversed, with instructions to the court to overrule appellant's demurrer to appellee's application to set aside and vacate the default and judgment, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. TITLE TO OFFICE-CORRUPT PRACTICE AT ELEC. 1. The provisions of the act of April 8, 1896, entitled "An act to prevent corrupt practices at elections" (92 Ohio Laws, 123), which direct the commencement of an action by the prosecuting attorney, at the instance of the attorney general, for the purpose of inquiring into the title to an office of a successful candidate who is charged with acts made unlawful by any law of this state, and which authorize the court, upon finding any of such charges true, to render judgment declaring the election void, the office vacant, and excluding the incumbent therefrom, are not in conflict with the constitution, and are valid. 2. In such action neither party has a right to trial by jury. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error to circuit court, Adams county. Quo warranto by the state, on the relation of C. F. McCoy, prosecuting attorney of Adams county, against John W. Mason, to try his title to the office of probate judge of that county. From a judgment of ouster, defendant brings error. Affirmed. The action below was in quo warranto, brought in the circuit court by C. F. McCoy, prosecuting attorney of Adams county, at the instance of the attorney general of the state, against the plaintiff in error, John W. Mason, for the purpose of inquiring into his title to the office of probate judge of that county, upon divers charges respecting his conduct in procuring an election to said office. A number of the charges were stricken out on motion of defendant. A demurrer to the petition was heard, and overruled. An answer was filed. The cause being ready for trial, a jury was demanded by defendant, which was refused. The cause then proceeded to trial to the court. The court thereupon found as follows: "(1) The court finds that the defendant, John W. Mason, was elected to the office of probate judge for Adams county, Ohio, at the general election held in the said county on the 3d day of November, 1896, and duly commissioned, and is now in possession of said office, exercising the duties and functions pertaining thereto, and is receiving the fees and emoluments connected therewith and belonging thereto. (2) That the relator was duly and legally instructed and required by the attorney general of the state of Ohio in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of an act entitled 'An act to prevent corrupt practices at elections,' passed April 8, 1896 (92 Ohio Laws, 123), to institute said action, and that within ten days after the receipt of said instructions the relator brought said action in accordance with the provisions of said act. (3) That the eleventh, thirteenth, and fifteenth charges preferred against said Mason in said petition are true, and that the other charges against said Mason preferred in said petition are not true. (4) That the defend ant, John W. Mason, on the 9th day of February, 1897, did intrude into and usurp, and does still usurp, the said office of probate judge of said county of Adams. And as conclusions of law from said findings of facts the court does hold that the election of the defendant to said office of probate judge of said county is void, and that he should be ousted and excluded therefrom." The charges found to be true are as follows: "(11) That while said Mason was a candidate, as aforesaid, for said office, he, the said Mason, promised one H. W. Scott, he being then an elector in said county of Adams, that if he, the said Scott, would vote for said Mason for probate judge at said election, and use his influence with one Wm. Jones to induce said Jones to vote for said Mason, he, the said Mason, would appoint said Scott one of the examiners of the treasury of said Adams county, and that such appointment would be worth $5 per day for several days to said Scott. (12) That while said Mason was a candidate, as aforesaid, for said office, he, the said Mason, promised one Robert L. Wilson, through the medium and agency of one Tabitha Lawler, a sister of said Wilson, that if he, the said Wilson, would vote for said Mason for probate judge at said election, he, the said Mason, would appoint said Wilson one of the examiners of the county treasury of said county of Adams. (13) That while said Mason was a candidate, as aforesaid, for said office, he, the said Mason, promised one A. C. Easter, a qualified elector in said county, that if he, the said Easter, would vote for said Mason for probate judge at said election, he, said Mason, would secure for said Easter a seat in the jury of said court, which would be worth $25 to $30 to said Easter. (15) That while said Mason was a candidate, as aforesaid, for said office, he, the said Mason, promised one John Troutman, a legal elector in said county, that if he, the said Troutman, would use his influence, and cause others to vote for said Mason for probate judge of said county at said election, he, said Mason, would cause said Troutman to be placed on the juries in said probate court, which would be worth from $15 to $20 to said Troutman for each winter for three years. And said Mason further promised said Troutman that if he, said Troutman, would vote and work for said Mason for said office at said election, he, the said Mason, would allow said Troutman to rent said Mason's farm." The court thereupon proceded to render judgment as follows: "It is thereupon ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the election of the defendant on the 3d day of November, 1896, to said office of probate judge for Adams county, Ohio, be, and the same is hereby, declared null and void, and that the defendant, John W. Mason, be, and he is hereby, ousted and entirely excluded from exercising and holding said office, and said office of probate judge of said coun ty is hereby declared vacant; and that the relator recover from the defendant his costs herein expended, taxed at $, save and except the costs of witnesses subpoenaed for the exclusive purpose of proving the specifications which were stricken out by the court on motion of defendant, and which said costs should be, and hereby are, adjudged against the relator taxed at $ ." To all of which the defendant excepted, and, his motion for a new trial being overruled, he brings the case here, asking a reversal. Bowman & Bowman, F. D. Bayless, A. Z. Blair, and W. C. Coryell, for plaintiff in error. Keifer & Keifer, C. F. McCoy, and G. Bambach & Son, for defendant in error. SPEAR, C. J. (after stating the facts). The action in the circuit court was brought under favor of the act of April 8, 1896, entitled "An act to prevent corrupt practices at elections" (92 Ohio Laws, 123). Section 7 of that act gives the right to any elector entitled to vote at any election (save for members of congress or the general assembly) to present in writing to the attorney general an application setting forth, among other charges, the doing by a person elected to office at such election of any act or acts declared unlawful by any law of this state for the purpose of promoting his election, and thereupon it becomes the duty of the attorney general to direct the prosecuting attorney of the proper county to bring an action to have the office declared vacant, such action to "be deemed to be and conducted according to the rules prescribed by law for an action against the usurper of an office"; and, if any of the charges are sustained, judgment shall be rendered declaring void the election, declaring such office vacant, and ousting the defendant. The petition charged, among other things, a violation by the defendant of that part of section 32 of the election law of April 18, 1892 (89 Ohio Laws, 451), which provides that: "Whoever, directly or indirectly by himself or through any other person, either gives, offers or procures or promises to procure, or endeavors to procure, any office, place or employment, to, or for any elector, or to or for any other person, in order to induce any elector to register or refrain from registering, for any election, or to vote or refrain from voting at any election, or to vote or refrain from voting at such election for any particular person or persons, or question or proposition," shall be punished by fine, or imprisonment in the penitentiary, or both. The demurrer to the petition raises the question of the constitutionality of that part of section 7 of the act of April 8, 1896, heretofore recited, and the refusal of a jury by the trial court raises the question whether or not, in such an action, the defendant is entitled to trial by jury. Other provisions of the statute are attacked as unconstitutional. But those questions are not raised by this record, and it is not necessary for us to inquire beyond the questions actually involved. 1. The constitutionality of the act. It is assailed as repugnant to the constitution, in that it undertakes to declare a citizen ineligible to office for criminal acts of his without a conviction of such crime. Section 4 of article 5 is cited. That section provides that "the general assembly shall have power to exclude from the privilege of voting, or being eligible to office, any person convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime." The contention is that this section is a grant of power to the general assembly; that a grant of power to deprive a citizen of part of his political rights, on conviction of certain crimes, necessarily denies the power to do so without conviction, or for different crimes; and that the case comes within the rule, as given in Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 78, "that when the constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised, or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition or to extend the penalty to other cases." The rule seems to have met with general acceptance. Its application in the present case would appear to depend upon whether the section quoted is a grant of power or a limitation upon power otherwise granted. To determine this, we should look at other provisions of the constitution, to ascertain where, by its terms, power to punish crimes, to direct the conduct of elections, to prescribe qualifications for voting and for taking office, is lodged. Clearly, in the nature of things, such power cannot belong either to the executive or judicial departments. It belongs naturally to the legislative. It is a part of the legislative power, and we find that by section 5 of article 2 this power is vested in the general assembly in as ample terms as could be chosen to express it. "In creating a legislative department, and conferring upon it the legislative power, the people must be understood to have conferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exercised by the sovereign power of the country, subject only to such restrictions as they may have seen fit to impose. A * The legislative department is not made a special agency for the exercise of specifically defined powers, but is intrusted with the general authority to make laws at discretion." Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 104. And says Denio, J., in People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532: "The people, in framing the constitution, committed to the legislature the whole lawmaking power of the state, which they did not expressly withhold. Plenary power in the legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule. prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception." And by Scott, J., in Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 591, 592: "This grant of power is general in its terms, not special. It embraces all such legislative power as the people of the state could, under the federal constitution, confer,-the whole 'legislative power of the state.' The limitations upon the exercise of the power thus broadly conferred are special, and are to be found in other parts of Therefore, the same Instrument. when the power of the general assembly to enact such a law [the soldiers' voting act] is drawn in question, the proper inquiry is whether such an exercise of legislative power is clearly prohibited by the constitution. The grant of power being general, the question is as to the existence of a limitation arising from special prohibition." "Such prohibition must either be found in express terms, or be clearly inferable by necessary implication from the language of the instrument, when fairly construed according to its manifest spirit and meaning,"-citing Baker v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 542, where it is said by Gholson, J.: "It will be observed that the provision is not that the legislative power, as conferred in the constitution, shall be vested in the general assembly, but that the legislative power of this state shall be vested. That includes all legis lative power which the object and purposes of the state government may require, and we must look to other provisions of the constitution to see how far, and to what extent, legislative discretion is qualified or restricted,"citing, also, State v. Dudley, 1 Ohio St. 437, and Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607. It follows from this that, without question, ample power to legislate upon all the subjects hereinbefore enumerated is conferred upon the general assembly. The right to vote and to hold office is not of necessity connected with citizenship. Neither is it a natural right, such as the right to personal security, personal liberty, or the right to acquire and enjoy property. It is within the power of the people to give or refuse, restrict and regulate, the franchise; and, when conferred, it is not a natural right, but may be taken away by the power that gave it. McCrary, Elect. §§ 3, 4. That is, the right depends upon the law of the land, and, except where restrained by the constitution, the power of the general assembly over it is unlimited. And belonging to this general subject is the subject of elections. No subject comes more certainly within legislative power than does this. In the very nature of things, it must be So. But the general duty is especially devolved on the general assembly by the constitution. The time for the election of legislative, executive, and judicial officers having been designated, and provision having been made that all elections shall be by ballot, by section 1 of article 10 the duty is enjoined upon that body to provide by law for the election of county and township officers, and by section 27 of article 2 it is provided that "the election of all officers not otherwise provided for by the constitution 車 shall be made in such manner as may be directed by law." It thus appears that the whole subject of elections, save so far as it is in distinct terms, or by clear implication, controlled by the constitution, is devolved upon the general assembly, and that the power of that body over it is untrammeled, and that the details, as they relate to the manner or mode of holding elec * tions, are expressly referred to legislative discretion. From a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution referred to, we are led to the conclusion that, while the question may not be free from doubt, the better view is that section 4 of article 5 is not in itself a grant of power, but a limitation upon power otherwise generally granted; and that this conclusion is in no way affected by section 5 of article 2. That is, had these sections not been adopted, the general assembly, by force of the general grant of legislative power, could have provided a permanent disqualification from voting and from holding office for causes or offenses other than those enumerated in the sections above cited. This conclusion leads to the further conclusion that the rule given by Cooley, cited by counsel and hereinbefore quoted, does not control the case, but that other rules of construction, equally reasonable and equally well recognized, which are given by the same author, are more in point. One is that, "when a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins a duty, it also gives by implication every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other." And, akin to this, "where power is granted in general terms, the power is to be construed as co-extensive with the terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible (expressly or by implication) from the context." It would obviously follow that where, by one section, a general, unlimited power is given, and that is abridged by another section of the same instrument, the limitation is not to be held more comprehensive than its terms clearly import. And, to justify the claim that the limitation of the constitution inhibits the attempted exercise of the power in the particular case by the general assembly, it should be shown that the objects contemplated by the constitutional provision and the statutes are substantially identical. Such, we think, is not the case here. The object of section 4 is to authorize the general assembly to award a punishment upon conviction of infamous crime, which will permanently exclude the criminal from voting and from holding office, and the effect of the statute enacted by virtue of that section is to accomplish that object. The corrupt practices act does not undertake to authorize this. It does not provide any disability as to voting, nor does it render the person offending permanently ineligible to office. Comparing the two provisions by their operation and effect, the operation and effect of the constitutional provision, carried into legislation, are to punish for infamous crime committed anywhere, at any time, with reference to any subject-matter, and to permanently disqualify from voting at any election and from holding any office; while the operation and effect of the provision of the statute are simply and only to disqualify from a particular office in the interest of pure elections, where the person claiming the office has violated the terms of the statute under which and by virtue of which he claims to |