orders." Rule 192 requires that he "must see tion that it finds that the collision was due to the negligence of the train dispatcher." Therefore we feel warranted in saying that the question is an open one in this state up to this time. Hence it is not so surprising that appellant's counsel would try to support the dictum in 78 Ind., supra, by authority from outside of our state. But the one single case cited by them for that purpose is far more against than for their contention. That case, already named above, was by the circuit court of appeals of the United States for the Ninth circuit. That court said: "It is conceded that the train dispatcher, in giving notice of a change in the running of trains, acts for and in behalf of the railroad company. He is in that respect a vice principal, not because of his attitude to other employés as their superior, nor because he has charge of a department, but because of the nature of the duty which he discharges. He is for the time being clothed with the responsibility which rests upon the company to furnish its employés a safe place of operation. The ordinary running of a train is established by a fixed schedule, of which all operatives have notice, and by which their acts must be governed. When occasion arises to disturb the regular schedule. the duty rests upon the company to give timely notice to those that are to be affected thereby. This it is the office of the train dispatcher to do." There must be in all the boundless fields of adjudication on the subject an ominous dearth of authority supporting appellant's contention, or its learned counsel would not have felt constrained to offer for that purpose such authority as that just quoted. In that case, however, it was held that the failure of the operator to whom the train dispatcher transmitted it by wire to deliver the order to the proper train was the negligence of a fellow servant with the engineer on the train to whom the order was addressed by the train dispatcher. But even that holding was by a divided court. On the other point it was unanimous. The holding-citing a long list of cases. Accordingly, of this case on the question as to whether a train dispatcher is a fellow servant with trainmen, or a vice principal, under the facts there disclosed, from the nature of his duties, is strictly in harmony with the numerous cases in this court already cited above, holding that any servant or agent who performs duties owing by the master to his servants is not a fellow servant of such other servants, but acts for and in the place of the master, and as to such acts is a vice principal, regardless of his rank, power, or authority. Let us see, then, what duties are devolved by law on the master in cases of this kind, and with what duties the train dispatcher was charged, and with what power he had been clothed by the master? Rule 190 requires him to "issue orders for the movement of trains in the name of the trainmaster, and must use care in sending telegraphic * Wharton on Negligence (section 233) says: * point along the line by its officers and servants. It knows at all times where its trains are." 281, 57 Fed. 125; Dana v. Railroad Co., 92 N. Y. 639; Railroad Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184. The contrary is held to be the law in Mississippi and in Maryland in a qualified form. So that we are safe in saying that the overwhelming weight of judicial opinion is that a train dispatcher, charged with the duties and clothed with the powers that the one now in question was, is not a fellow servant with trainmen in the employ of the railroad company, but is a vice principal, for whose negligence the company is liable. And, that being in harmony with principles of law long established in this court, we are of opinion that the train dispatcher in this case being charged with the performance of duties the master owed to its other servants, its trainmen, he was not a fellow servant with them, but acted for and in the place of the appellant company, and was a vice principal. The find This knowledge it can only have through its train dispatcher. If there are any duties devolving upon a railroad employé, servant, or agent, from the president down, more sacredly and imperatively due from employer to employés than others, we can think of none more imperative or more sacred than the duty to so order the running of trains in a complicated system of freight and passenger transportation both ways over a single track railroad, as was the case here, with numerous extra trains, as that collisions between opposing trains, entailing such fearful loss of life, limb, and property, may be avoided. No duty that the company can owe to its servants can be higher or more imperative than this; and this was the duty and power that the appellant had delegated to its train dispatcher to do and perform in the name of its superintendent.ing, therefore, in the special verdict, that the Whether the failure to properly discharge this duty was the negligence of the train dispatcher or superintendent can make no difference, because in either case it was a duty the master owed, and hence the failure and neglect was the master's failure and neglect, to the injury of its servant. The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that a train dispatcher who controls and directs the movements of trains, as was the case here, is not a fellow servant of trainmen, but is a vice principal. In very many of the cases cited below the train dispatcher issued the orders in the name of the division superintendent. In addition to the case in 74 Fed., supra, we cite: Railroad Co. v. Barry, 58 Ark. 198, 23 S. W. 1097; McKune v. Railroad Co., 66 Cal. 302, 5 Pac. 482; Darrigan v. Railroad Co., 52 Conn. 285; Railroad Co. v. Young, 26 Ill. App. 115; Railroad Co. v. McLallen, 84 Ill. 109; Railroad Co. v. Kanaley, 39 Kan. 1, 17 Pac. 324; McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399; Lasky v. Railway Co., 83 Me. 461, 22 Atl. 367; Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 513, 44 N. W. 502; Smith v. Railway Co., 92 Mo. 359, 4 S. W. 129; McChesney v. Railroad Co. (Sup.) 21 N. Y. Supp. 207; Hankins v. Railroad Co., 142 N. Y. 416, 37 N. E. 466; Sheehan v. Railroad Co., 91 N. Y. 332; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 628, 11 Atl. 514; Washburn v. Railroad Co., 3 Head, 638; Railway Co. v. Arispe, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 611, 23 S. W. 928, and 24 S. W. 33; Phillips v. Railway Co.. 64 Wis. 475, 25 N. W. 544; Crew v. Railway Co., 20 Fed. 87; Railroad Co. v. Clark, 6 C. C. A. master, the appellant, did the negligent acts, and was guilty of the negligent omissions of duty, was well supported by the evidence. Therefore, even if the decedent's fellow servants in charge of the work train were guilty of negligence in not complying with rule 105 in running the same, the appellant was still liable, because its negligence in sending out the extra freight in violation of its rules was, at least, a joint, concurring, proximate cause with that of those running the work train, in producing the collision and death. It is settled law that the master is liable for the joint negligence of himself and the co-employé of the person injured. Beach, Contrib. Neg. § 304; Railway Co. v. Lang, supra; Rogers v. Leyden, supra; Railway Co. v. Wynant, supra. Therefore there was no error in overruling appellant's motion for Judgment in its favor on the special verdict. The error assigned on the action of the court in overruling the several demurrers to the several paragraphs of the complaint is unavailable, because the demurrer is not in the record. It is not contended, under the assignment that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, that all the paragraphs are bad; and such an assignment is unavailable unless they are all bad. But there is no substantial or tangible objection made in appellant's brief to any of the paragraphs. We conclude that there was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial and rendering judgment on the verdict. The judgment is affirmed. LASH v. AMES. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. June 24, 1898.) TENANCY AT WILL-AT SUFFERANCE-REASONABLE TIME TO REMOVE GOODS-CONVERSION. 1. A sale by the owner terminates a tenancy at will, and makes the tenant a mere tenant at sufferance, not entitled to notice to quit. 2. A tenant by sufferance cannot be sued as a trespasser or for possession until he has been given reasonable time to remove his possessions. 3. Where the facts are not disputed, the question of what is a reasonable time is for the court. 4. A purchaser of a building is entitled to remove the goods of a tenant by sufferance after a reasonable time from giving notice to quit; and where he offered to take them wherever the tenant wished, and, on the tenant's refusal to give any directions in the matter, stored them subject to the tenant's order, and they were afterwards burned, he is not liable for conversion. Report from superior court, Suffolk county; James R. Dunbar, Judge. Action by Augustus G. Lash against Frederick L. Ames for conversion. Judgment for defendant. Charles S. Hamlin and Charles E. Hellier, for plaintiff. J. H. Benton, Jr., for defendant. LATHROP, J. The record in this case is unnecessarily voluminous, consisting, as it does, of an agreed statement of facts, and 40 pages of evidence, with the questions and answers set forth at length, together with certain rulings requested, and those given, the general finding for the defendant, and a brief report of the case to this court. Such a method of presenting a case to us for the determination of the questions of law involved is to be condemned. See Roskee v. Pulp Co., 169 Mass. 528, 48 N. E. 766. The general facts relating to these questions may be briefly stated, thus: In the early part of 1887, Francis H. Lincoln was a trustee, under the will of John Hennessey, of an estate in Boston, which was then occupied by the plaintiff as a tenant at will, he holding over after the expiration of a written lease. The plaintiff's wife, Bridget A. Lash, was a daughter of John Hennessey, and one of the cestuis que trustent. Lincoln, in the last of January or the first of February of that year, was negotiating a sale of the estate to the defendant. Some question arose as to whether Lincoln had power to sell, and he agreed to petition the probate court for leave to sell. On February 9, 1889, Lincoln and the defendant executed an agreement in writing, by the terms of which Lincoln agreed to sell, and the defendant to buy, the estate, the premises to be conveyed on or before March 9th if leave to sell were obtained from the probate court; the price to be paid was $11 per square foot, which included "the amount to be paid to Augustus F. Lash and Bridget A. Lash, the tenants of said premises, for damages to their tenancy." Full possession of the premises was to be delivered to the defendant at the time of the delivery of the deed. On the same day that the agreement was signed. Lincoln notified the plaintiff that he had agreed to sell the premises, and that the plaintiff was to be paid $3,000, from which was to be deducted rent and unpaid taxes. Lincoln and the plaintiff settled upon this basis upon March 9th. The trustee was under no obligation to pay the plaintiff this sum, but it was paid to prevent his making, through his wife or otherwise, opposition to the sale, and thus to enable the trustee to obtain the necessary assent for leave to sell, and pursuant to the agreement of sale. Whether it was paid for any other purpose was in dispute. All the parties interested in the trust estate, including the plaintiff, requested that the prayers of the petition be granted. On March 4th the probate court made a decree allowing the trustee to sell; and the estate was conveyed to the defendant on March 9th, and, in the afternoon of the same day, the defendant's attorney gave a notice in writing to the plaintiff, as follows, omitting the date, address, and the signature: "The premises occupied by you at 149 and 151 Essex street, Boston, have been conveyed to Frederick L. Ames. Please remove your property therefrom, and vacate the premises at once. Mr. Ames desires to tear down the building for purposes of rebuilding upon the estate without delay; and, while he does not wish to incommode you further than is necessary, he must take down the building at once, and you are hereby notified to vacate the premises forthwith." Before the conveyance, the plaintiff had made preparations to move. On February 15, 1889, he had entered into a contract to lease a lot of land, and had bought a building thereon. He was to have room to store his goods as the owner of the building moved his goods out. He began to move his stock in trade, which consisted of old building materials, on March 4th. O1. that day he moved one load, and one or more loads on each of the following days, namely, March 6th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th; but the greater portion of his stock was still remaining in his store on Essex street. On March 13th, the defendant's agents began to take down the building. The plaintiff on the same day wrote to the defendant, asking that this work be suspended, and that he be given further time to remove the property. To this the defendant's attorney replied that the property would be removed the next day to a suitable place of storage, at the plaintiff's risk and expense. On the same day, the defendant's agent also told the plaintiff that, unless the plaintiff desired the property moved to some other place, he would move it the next day to 183 Washington street, but, if the plaintiff desired it moved to any other place, he would so move it. On March 14th, the defendant, with seven men and seven wagons, moved 30 loads of the plaintiff's property, and the plaintiff moved 14 loads, and the building was cleared. There was evidence that the two sets of men did not interfere - with each other, and that the person who had charge in behalf of the defendant told the plaintiff that he would take the goods anywhere he would say. It is stated in the agreed facts that the defendant's agents used proper care, did no unnecessary damage, and used no unnecessary force. On July 15, 1889, the defendant, through his counsel, offered to remove the goods to any place the plaintiff might name, without expense to him. This offer was declined; and in the year 1894, while the property was in the possession of the defendant, it was destroyed by fire, with out fault on the defendant's part. The removal of the goods on March 14, 1889, is the conversion relied on. The plaintiff requested the court to rule as follows: "(1) The plaintiff, upon the conveyance by Lincoln to Ames, became a tenant at sufferance of Ames." This instruction was given. “(2) The plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time, after notice to quit from Ames; and what was a reasonable time is a question for the court." The court refused to give the first part of this request, but ruled that "reasonable time" was a question for the court. "(3) The time which elapsed between the notice from Ames to the plaintiff and the seizure of the plaintiff's stock by Ames was not a reasonable time. (4) The seizure of the plaintiff's goods was unlawful, and was a conversion of the same by the defendant." These instructions the court refused to give. There was also a question of the admissibility of the testimony of the defendant as to certain conversations which the defendant had with Lincoln. 1. The tenancy at will of the plaintiff was terminated by the alienation of the land to the defendant; and he became a mere tenant at sufferance, and was not entitled to notice to quit. Howard v. Merriam, 5 Cush. 563, 574; Benedict v. Morse, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 223. The plaintiff could not, however, be sued as a trespasser, nor legal process be begun against him to recover possession of the land, until he was notified of the sale, and a reasonable opportunity given him to remove his possessions. Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43, 49, 2 Pick. 71, note; Pratt v. Farrar, 10 Allen, 519, 521; Clark v. Wheelock, 99 Mass. 14, 15; Antoni v. Belknap, 102 Mass. 193, 200. But, as was held in Hooton v. Holt, 139 Mass. 54, 29 N. E. 221, a notice calling for immediate possession is sufficient; and if an action is brought under Pub. St. c. 175, without allowing time enough to remove, this is a matter to be shown in defense. Whether the same rule applies where the action is brought, as in this case, by the tenant at sufferance against the landlord, need not be determined. See Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309, and cases cited; Coughlin v. Gray, 131 Mass. 56; Stone v. Lahey, 133 Mass. 426; Twombly v. Monroe, 136 Mass. 464. We are of opinion that, whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time to remove his goods, after a notice to quit from the defendant, a ruling to this effect was not required, as the judge could not have given, as matter of law, the third ruling requested.-that the time which elapsed between the notice from Ames to the plaintiff and the seizure of the plaintiff's stock by Ames was not a reasonable time. Where the facts are not disputed, what is reasonable time is a question for the court. The facts which we have already recited clearly show that the plaintiff had ample time to remove his goods. 2. The fourth ruling requested was properly refused. The defendant was entitled to possession of the building, free from goods; and he was entitled, at least after the lapse of a reasonable time from giving notice, if the plaintiff did not remove them, to put them out himself. He offered to take them where the plaintiff wished, and, as the plaintiff would give no directions in the matter, the goods were stored subject to the plaintiff's order. The case falls within the principle laid down in Shea v. Milford, 145 Mass. 525. 14 N. E. 769. 3. The only remaining question is as to the admissibility of the testimony of the defendant as to certain conversations he had with Lincoln. The defendant testified: "I had several conversations with him [Lincoln], in which he told me that the occupant of the building was the husband of one of the beneficiaries under his trust; and in order to carry through the sale, and get him to vacate the premises, it would be necessary to pay him quite a sum of money. Finally, he told me he had got to pay Lash $3,000 to get out, during the time in which it was necessary to obtain the assent or approval of the probate court, and to prevent his opposing the approval by the court through his wife." To make this evidence admissible, it was necessary to show that Lincoln acted in the matter as the agent of Lash. The latter, when asked, "Then you did authorize Lincoln to deal with the question of when you should get out?" answered, "Certainly; I ordered him to." He further testified that among the controversies was one about the time of moving out, and that "Lincoln consulted with us all through, and we acquiesced in everything." We are of opinion that the judge was warranted in finding that Lincoln acted as the agent of Lash, and that the testimony of the defendant was rightly admitted in evidence. Judgment for the defendant. RHODES et al. v. MISSOURI SAVINGS & LOAN CO. (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 18, 1898.) BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-USURYCOMITY-PUBLIC POLICY. A Missouri building association loaned money in Illinois at a usurious rate, unless governed by Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 632, providing that no interest, premiums, or fines accruing to a building association shall be deemed usurious. Said act further provides (page 630) that the shares of stock in such associations shall be $100 each, payable in periodical installments not to exceed $2 per share. Held, that where the Missouri association was organized under an act authorizing the issuance of full paid-up interest-bearing stock, of the par value of $1,000 per share, to be matured when the dividends and sum invested equaled the full face value, which was not authorized by the local statute, the rule of comity did not apply, and the contract would be held usurious, since the building association provided for by the latter statute is not within the spirit and meaning, but is opposed to the idea of such an association as protected by the local statute. Appeal from appellate court, Fourth district. Bill by the Missouri Savings & Loan Company against T. B. Rhodes and another. From a decision of the appellate court (63 Ill. App. 77) affirming a judgment for complainant, defendants appeal. Reversed. A bill in chancery was filed by appellee in the circuit court of Madison county to foreclose two mortgages given by appellants, T. B. Rhodes and Ellen Rhodes, his wife. Originally one mortgage only existed, which was given to secure an advance of $9,000, and was executed May 3, 1893. Afterwards, on October 17, 1893, a portion of the premises described in this mortgage was released at the request of Rhodes, and an additional mortgage taken on other property to secure the same bond of $9,000. Appellee is a corporation, said to be organized under the laws of the state of Missouri, and having its principal office in the city of St. Louis, where this indebtedness was made payable. The appellants are citizens of the state of Illinois, and the property described in the mortgage is situated in the village of Madison, in the state of Illinois. The bill alleges that said T. B. Rhodes was the owner of ten shares of the capital stock of the complainant, which, at his request, had loaned him the sum of $9,000, secured by a certain lot of ground and improvements thereon; that said T. B. Rhodes, in consideration of such loan, covenanted and agreed to pay the complainant, on or before the 15th day of each month, the sum of 60 cents as a monthly installment on each $100 of stock above named, and also on the same day the sum of $45 as monthly interest on said loan, and also the monthly sum of $45 as premium on said loan, such payments to continue until each full share of said stock should be worth on the books of the complainant the sum of $1,000, according to its bylaws, and that then said sum loaned should be repaid to complainant by the surrender to and cancellation by the complainant of nine shares of stock; that said shares of stock had been and should remain assigned to complainant, as collateral security for the money loaned; that if a foreclosure and sale should be had under said mortgage, and the money realized therefrom, after paying all expenses of foreclosure and sale, be insufficient to discharge the indebtedness of said Rhodes to the complainant, then said shares of stock, or so much thereof as might be necessary, should be applied to the remaining portion of said indebtedness, and revert to said company, and said Rhodes should be allowed for such stock the amount to be paid holders voluntarily withdrawing. Both said mortgages are made exhibits, and attached to the bill, and contain the usual clauses as to payment of taxes, insurance of buildings for the benefit of the mortgagee, and provide that, if default be made in the payment of the monthly installments of dues, interest, premiums, or fines for the space of six months, then the whole of said indebtedness shall become due and payable, and may be recovered by foreclosure. The bill alleges that said Rhodes and wife wholly failed to pay said dues, premium, interest. or fines, or any of them, including the payments due by the terms of said bond since February 15, 1894, but defaulted therein for a term of 12 months, the amount of default being $2,022, by means whereof the whole of said principal sum, $9.000, with the assessments, interest, premium assessments, and fines for said term of default, amounting altogether, less the withdrawal value of said stock, to $9,836.50, had become due and payable to complainant, and said mortgaged premises forfeited, etc. By an amended answer, appellants pleaded usury, and alleged the last mortgage to be void under the statute of this state entitled "An act to regulate foreign building, homestead and loan associations doing business in the state of Illinois," approved June 20, 1893, and in force July 1, 1893, and which imposed certain restrictions upon their privilege to transact business in this state. Upon a hearing, a decree was entered in accordance with the prayer of the bill, finding that there was due complainant the sum of $10,180.60, after allowing the cash or surrender value of the nine shares of stock held by defendant, and pledged by him, as security for his loan, to complainant. The decree also allowed complainant for taxes paid by it on the premises and for attorney's fees provided for in the two mortgages. Upon an appeal to the appellate court for the Fourth district this decree was affirmed, and from that judgment this appeal is prosecuted to this court. T. T. Hinde and C. N. Travous, for appellants. Krome & Terry, for appellee. PHILLIPS, J. (after stating the facts). The principal error assigned by appellants, |