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damages for injuries resulting from a sidewalk, negligently permitted to remain out of repair. Held, that the principle of Barnes v. District of Columbia applies, notwithstanding the form of the

District government had been changed. In Roth v. District of Columbia, 16 App. D. C. 323; Brown v. District of Columbia, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 98, 29 App. D. C. 273; District of Columbia v. Tyrrell, 41 App. D. C. 463; and Coates v. District of Columbia, 42 App. D. C. 194, freedom of the District of Columbia from liability on account of matters within its governmental powers is recognized.

Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 45 L. ed. 314, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212, is not applicable. The proceeding being in admiralty, rights and liabilities of the parties depended upon the maritime code, and not upon local laws of New York. Here, common-law principles apply. See Southern P. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 61 L. ed. 1086, L.R.A.1918C, 451, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, 14 N. C. C. A. 596.

The certified question must be answered in the affirmative.

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See same case below, 53 Ct. Cl. 107. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Benjamin Carter argued the cause on both original and rearguments, and, with Mr. Frank Carter Pope, filed a brief for appellant:

Section 3477 of the United States Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. § 6383, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 179) is merely for the protection of the government. It seeks to prevent the acquiring by strangers of speculative interests in claims, such as may naturally inspire efforts for their collection, and the imperiling of the government's rights through the need of dealing with several persons instead of one.

Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484, 24 L. ed. 1032; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke dis- States, 109 U. S. 432, 27 L. ed. 988, 3 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229; Bailey v. United

sent.

[655] SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY,

Appt.,

V.

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 655-657.)

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Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 43 L. ed. 749, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434.

Section 3477 does not apply to any transaction or fortuity by which the existence, natural or legal, of one person or legal entity, is terminated and another succeeds to its rights, nor to any transfer of a claim by operation of law. Inheritance of a decedent's estate, an -as-assignment for the benefit of creditors, or other insolvency proceedings, bankruptcy, whether involuntary or voluntary, a receivership or a bequest in a will, are as effectual to transfer a claim against the United States as any other

The prohibition of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, against the transfer or assignment of claims against the United States, does not preclude a recovery by a railway company against the United States for charges for transportation services originally payable to another railway company to whose rights the former company has succeeded through merger or consolidation sanctioned by state laws.

[For other cases, see Claims, I. c, in Digest

Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 62.]

Note. On validity of assignment of claims against United States-see note to Lopez v. United States, 2 L.R.A. 571. On effect of consolidation of corporations, generally-see notes to Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Boney, 3 L.R.A. 435; Shields v. Ohio, 24 L. ed. U. S. 357, and Cantillon v. Dubuque & N. W. R. Co. 5 L.R.A. 726.

claim.

Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392, 24 L. ed. 1065; Butler v. Goreley, 146 U. S. 303, 36 L. ed. 981, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229; Price v. Forrest,

supra.

Assistant Attorney General Davis argued the cause on both original and rearguments, and, with Special Assistant to the Attorney General Wentworth, filed a brief for appellee:

The claim sued upon is void under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477; National Bank v. Downie, 218 U. S. 345, 353, 54 L. ed. 1065, 1068, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, 20 Ann. Cas. 1116; St. Paul & D. R. Co. v.

United States, 112 U. S. 733, 736, 28
L. ed. 861, 862, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366;
Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484, 488, 24
L. ed. 1032, 1034.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant sued in the court of claims to recover balances for transportation services originally payable to the Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company, to whose rights it had succeeded through merger or consolidation. Holding that because of § 3477, Rev. Stat., Comp. Stat. § 6383, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 179 (July 29, 1846, 9 Stat. at L. 41, chap. 66, and February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. at L. 170, chap. 81), appellant could not maintain the action, that court dismissed its petition.

"All trans

con

[656] Section 3477. fers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or ditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment of such claim, or of any part or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof."

any

The Seaboard Air Line Railway was originally chartered under the laws of Virginia; by authorized union with others, it became a consolidated corporation under the laws of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama; and in 1903, under "articles of agreement of merger and consolidation," and the statutes of Georgia and Florida (§ 2173, Code of Ga. 1895; § 2812, Gen. Stat. of Fla.), the Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad, a Florida corporation, was united with it. As agreed and provided by the laws of the two states, the rights, privileges, franchises, and all property, real, personal, and mixed, and all debts on every account, as well as stock subscriptions and other things in action belonging to each of the constituents, were transferred to and vested in the consolidated corporation without further act or deed, "as effectually as they were in the former companies."

Section 3477 has been before this court many times for construction and application. United States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 407, 24 L. ed. 503; Erwin v. United

States, 97 U. S. 392, 24 L. ed. 1065; Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484, 24 L. ed. 1032; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229; St. Paul & D. R. Co. v. United States, 112 U. S. 733, 28 L. ed. 861, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Bailey v. United States, 109 U. S. 432, 27 L. ed. 988, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; Butler v. Goreley, 146 U. S. 303, 36 L. ed. 981, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84; Hager v. Swayne, 149 U. S. 242, 37 L. ed. 719, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 841; Ball v. Halsell, 161 U. S. 72, 40 L. ed. 622, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 43 L. ed. 749, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434.

Goodman v. Niblack, and Price v. For[657] In Erwin v. United States, rest, certain exceptions to the general language of the section were recognized because not within the evil at which the vent frauds upon the Treasury, and the statute aimed. It was intended to premischiefs designed to be remedied "are mainly two: First, the danger that the rights of the government might be embarrassed by having to deal with several persons instead of one, and by the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the original transaction. Second, that by a transfer of such a claim against the government to one or more persons not originally interested in it, the way might be conveniently opened to such improper influences in prosecuting the claim before the departments, the courts, or the Congress, as desperate cases, when the reward is contingent on success, so often suggest."

We cannot believe that Congress intended to discourage, hinder, or obstruct the orderly merger or consolidation of corporations as the various states might authorize for the public interest. There is no probability that the United States could suffer injury in respect of outstanding claims from such union of interests, and certainly the result would not be more deleterious than would follow their passing to heirs, devisees, assignees in bankruptcy, or receivers, all of which changes of ownership have been declared without the ambit of the statute. The same principle which required the exceptions heretofore approved applies here.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded, with direction to afford reasonable opportunity to both sides for taking any additional proof rendered necessary by the withdrawal by the United States of a stipu lation upon which reliance had been placed; and for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

[658] KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAIL | to each other and to the benefit conferred,
WAY COMPANY and the Texarkana & the law cannot stand against the complaint
Fort Smith Railway Company, Plffs. in of one so taxed in fact.
Err.,

V.

ROAD IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NUM-
BER 6 of Little River County, Arkansas.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 658-661.)

Error to state court - error or certiorari.

1. The validity of a state statute under the Federal Constitution having been adequately challenged in the state courts, the case may be brought up to the Federal Supreme Court by writ of error, and certiorari will be denied. Constitutional

law due process law - equal protection of the laws public improvements.

of

[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 292336, 559-581, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law equal protection

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

- public improvements

discrimination against

railway company.

3. A state statute which sanctions assessing a railway company for benefits from a highway improvement upon a theory which, disregarding area and distance from the highway, assumes that 9.7 miles of railway in a purely farming section, treated as an aliquot part of the railway system, will receive benefits amounting to $67,900 from the construction of 11.2 miles of gravel road, while farm lands and town lots are assessed according to area and position, and wholly without regard to their value, the improvements thereon, or their present or prospective use, is invalid as producing a discrimination against the railway comso palpable and arbitrary as to pany amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 292

2. A state legislature may create taxing districts to meet the expense of local improvements, and may fix the basis of taxation without violating U. S. Const. 14th Amend., unless its action is palpably arbitrary or plain abuse; but if, however, the statute providing for the tax is of such a character that there is no reasonable presumption that substantial justice generally will be done, but the probability is that Argued March 16 and 17, 1921. Decided the parties will be taxed disproportionately

Note. As to what constitutes due

process of law, generally-see notes to People v. O'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sumption, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436, and Wilson v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865.

As to constitutional equality of privileges, immunities, and protection, generally-see note to Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 L.R.A. 579.

336, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 205.]

June 6, 1921.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of

the State of Arkansas to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court of Little River County, in that state, upholding certain local improvement assessments against a railway company. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

See same case below, 139 Ark. 424, 215 S. W. 656, 217 S. W. 773.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Samuel W. Moore and James B. McDonough argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Frank H. Moore and A. F. Smith, filed a brief for plaintiffs in er

and

As to who may raise objection that taxation statute contains an unconstitutional discrimination-see note to Pull-ror: man Co. v. Knott, 59 L. ed. U. S. 105. Upon the undisputed evidence, the As to tax or assessment for public improvement on highway-see note to Graham v. Detroit, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 836. On liability of railroad right of way to assessment for local improvementsee notes to Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 28 L.R.A. 249; Heman Constr. Co. v. Wabash R. Co. 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 112, and Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Decatur, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 935.

On necessity of special benefit to sustain assessment for local improvements -see note to Re Madera Irrig. Dist. Bonds, 14 L.R.A. 755, and Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist. L.R.A.1918E, 190.

assessment of $67,900 against the prop-
erty of the plaintiffs in error is palpably
arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable,
void, and denies to the plaintiffs in er-
ror the equal protection of the laws, and
deprives them of their property without
due process of law, contrary to § 1 of
the 14th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.

Gast Realty & Invest. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co. 240 U. S. 55, 60 L. ed. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U. S. 454, 63 L. ed. 1081, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528; Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist. 239 U. S. 478, 60 L. ed. 392, L.R.A.1918E, 190,

36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; St. Louis South-linois C. R. Co. 263 Ill. 589, 105 western R. Co. v. Road Improv. Dist. N. E. 731. Comrs. C. C. A., 265 Fed. 524; Citizens' Sav. L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 455; Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 63 L. ed. 602, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276.

In the earlier cases it was held, as a matter of law, that the right of way of a railroad was incapable of being benefited by local improvements.

Assessments for local improvements in Arkansas can be sustained only when the benefits equal the assessments. The benefits represent the enhancement in value in the property, produced by the construction of the improvement.

Rector v. Board of Improvement, 50 Ark. 116, 6 S. W. 519; Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. 86 Ark. 1, 109 S. W. 526; Board of Improvement v. Pollard, 98 Ark. 543, 136 S. W. 957; Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co. v. Waterworks Improv. Dist. 68 Ark. 376, 59 S. W. 248; Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. McDonough, 119 Ark. 254, 177 S. W. 926; Swepston v. Avery, 118 Ark. 303, 177 S. W. 424; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Red River Levee Dist. 81 Ark. 562, 99 S. W. 843; Coffman v. St. Francis Drainage Dist. 83 Ark. 54, 103 S. W. 179; Moore v. Long Prairie Levee Dist. 98 Ark. 113, 135 S. W. 819; Ahern v. Board of Improv. Dist. 69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. 575; Improvement Dist. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 99 Ark. 508, 139 S. W. 308; Peay v. Little Rock, 32 Ark. 31; James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 202, 4 S. W. 760; Craig v. Russellville Waterworks Improv. Dist. 84 Ark. 390, 105 S. W. 867; Road Improv. Dist. v. Glover, 86 Ark. 231, 110 S. W. 1031.

Erie v. A. Piece of Land, 175 Pa. 523, 34 Atl. 808; Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 33 Pa. 41; Junction R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 424; Allegheny City v. Western Pennsylvania R. Co. 138 Pa. 375, 21 Atl. 763; Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63; Boston v. Boston & A. R. Co. 170 Mass. 95, 49 N. E. 95; Naugatuck R. Co. v. Waterbury, 78 Conn. 193, 61 Atl. 474; Erie R. Co. v. Paterson, 72 N. J. L. 83, 59 Atl. 1031; Detroit G. H. & M. O. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 106 Mich. 13, 28 L.R.A. 793, 58 Am. St. Rep. 466, 63 N. W. 1007; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Jersey City, 81 N. J. L. 290, 80 Atl. 228; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 28 L.R.A. 249, 62 N. W. 417. See also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 197 U. S. 430, 49 L. ed. 819, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; 25 R. C. L. 144; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. ed. 270, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; State, Mangles, Prosecutor, v. Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. 86 Ark. Hudson County, 55 N. J. L. 88, 17 L.R.A. 1, 109 S. W. 526; Union Tank Line Co. 785, 25 Atl. 322; Tobie v. Brown County, v. Wright, supra; Myles Salt Co. v. 20 Kan. 14; Minnesota Rate Cases Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist. 239 U. S. (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 478, 60 L. ed. 392, L.R.A.1918E, 190, L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 3336 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; Gast Realty & InSup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18: vest. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co. 240 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Port. S. 55, 60 L. ed. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. Chester, 149 App. Div. 893, 134 N. Y. 254. Supp. 883; Cache River Drainage Dist. v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 255 Îll. 398, 99 N. E. 635; Kankakee v. Illinois C. R. Co. 263 Ill. 589, 105 N. E. 731; Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 63 L. ed. 602, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276.

The conjectural and possible increases in transporting farm products resulting from the possible and probable clearing up and cultivating of unimproved lands, as a matter of law does not constitute benefits within the meaning of the Arkansas act under discussion.

The plan of assessment was arbitrary, unjust, and confiscatory.

The said assessments, arbitrary, unjust, and unreasonable as they are, con

stitute an unlawful burden on interstate commerce.

Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, supra. Petitioners' property is a right of way, and therefore a mere easement.

Gurdon & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Vaught, 97 Ark. 234, 133 S. W. 1019; Brown v. Young, 69 Iowa, 625, 29 N. W. 941; Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 77 Am. St. Rep. 677, 80 N. W. 360; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 531; Clayton v. Chicago, I. & D. R. Co. 67 Iowa, 238, 25 N. W. 150; Hoffman's Appeal, 118 Pa. 512, 12 Atl. 57.

Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 S. W. 707; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Port Chester, 149 App. Div. 893, The action of the assessors, in in134 N. Y. Supp. 883; Cache River Drain- cluding the improvements on petitioners' age Dist. v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. 255 property, and including the personal Ill. 398, 99 N. E. 635; Kankakee v. Il-property, and taking into consideration

all its intangible values and its use in interstate commerce, necessarily, and as a matter of law, assesses benefits upon petitioners' personal property.

Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Phillips, 111 Iowa, 377, 82 N. W. 787; Chatham County v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 133 N. C. 216, 45 S. E. 566.

The questions involved are grave and important. Can a country highway of this kind be built by local assessments levied upon a mere easement and the use of the same by a railroad company? The contemplated highway is a public highway, built for the use of the county and the public in general.

Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power, § 1865, note 85; Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 106 Mich. 13, 28 L.R.A. 793, 58 Am. St. Rep. 466, 63 N. W. 1007; Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 33 Pa. 43; Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63; Junction R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 424; Mt. Pleasant v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 138 Pa. 365, 11 L.R.A. 520, 20 Atl. 1052; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Ottumwa, 112 Iowa, 300, 51 L.R.A. 763, 83 N. W. 1074; Boston v. Boston & A. R. Co. 170 Mass. 95, 49 N. E. 95; Re Gates, 5 Silv. Sup. Ct. 390, 8 N. Y. Supp. 247; Allegheny City v. Western Pennsylvania R. Co. 138 Pa. 375, 21 Atl. 763; State, New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. Prosecutor, v. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 330.

Mr. John J. DuLaney argued the cause, and, with Mr. A. D. DuLaney, filed a brief for defendant in error:

The Arkansas supreme court has upheld the correctness of using the "benefits" basis of assessment in addition to the instant case.

Patterson v. Road Improv. Dist. 143 Ark. 44, 219 S. W. 341; Wilkinson v. St. Francis Road Improv. Dist. 141 Ark. 164, 216 S. W. 304.

The franchise value and personal property of the railway company were not included in the assessment of benefits by the assessors in this case.

Branson v. Bush, 251 U. S. 184, 64 L. ed. 218, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113.

This court will not review purely state questions which plaintiffs in error seek to bring into this case.

Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Cleveland, 235 U. S. 50, 59 L. ed. 127, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 191, 53 L. ed. 963, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546; Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 50 L. ed. 157, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111

U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Walston v. Nevin, 128 C. S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Lee v. Central of Georgia R. Co. 252 U. S. 109, 64 L. ed. 482, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Withnell v. Ruecking Constr. Co. 249 U. S. 63, 63 L. ed. 479, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 200; Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U. S. 454, 63 L. ed. 1081, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876; King v. Portland, 184 U. S. 61, 46 L. ed. 431, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290; Willoughby v. Chicago, 235 U. S. 45, 59 L. ed. 123, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23; Baltimore Traction Co. v. Baltimore Belt R. Co. 151 U. S. 137, 38 L. ed. 102, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 294; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 50 L. ed. 322, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 625.

Railway property is subject to assessment to help pay cost of constructing a local public improvement where the evidence shows that it will be benefited thereby.

Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Porter, 210 U. S. 178, 52 L. ed. 1012, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 647; Branson v. Bush, supra; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 237, 33 L. ed. 895, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bar49 L. ed. 819, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; ber Asphalt Paving Co. 197 U. S. 430, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 37 L. ed. 132, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Conway County Bridge Dist. 134 Ark. 292, 204 S. W. 630; Oates v. Cypress Creek Drainage Dist. 135 Ark. 152, 205 S. W. 293; Hines v. Road Improv. Dist. 145 Ark. 382, 224 S. W. 817; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Ft. Smith & V. B. Bridge Dist. 113 Ark. 493, 168 S. W. 1066; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Road Improv. Dist. 137 Ark. 587, 209 S. W. 725.

The railway property in this case will be benefited by the construction of the proposed highway as a matter of law.

Bush v. Delta Road Improv. Dist. 141 Ark. 247, 216 S. W. 691; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Conway County Bridge Dist. 142 Ark. 1, 218 S. W. 189; Burr v. Beaver Dam Drainage Dist. 145 Ark. 51, 223 S. W. 362; Alcorn v. Bliss-Cook Oak Co. 133 Ark. 118, 201 S. W. 797; Moore v. Long Prairie Levee Dist. 98 Ark. 113, 135 S. W. 819; Davies v. Chicot County Drainage Dist. 112 Ark. 357, 166 S. W. 170; Hill v. Echols, 140 Ark. 474, 215 S.

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