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856; Cox v. Wood, 247 U. S. 3, 62 L. ed. 947, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 63 L. ed. 910, 4 A.L.R. 1623, P.U.R. 1919D, 717, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99; Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Houston, 256 Fed. 690; Castle v. Southern R. Co. 112 S. C. 407, 8 A.L.R. 959, 99 S. E. 846; Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U. S. 290, 56 L. ed. 771, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Krichman v. United States, 263 Fed. 538; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 257 Fed. 138; Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 53 L. ed. 480, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Brady v. Chicago & G. W. R. Co. 57 L.R.A. 712, 52 C. C. A. 48, 114 Fed. 100, 11 Am. Neg. Rep. 546; New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L. ed. 220, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 309; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 33 L. ed. 440, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, 60 L. ed. 735, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403, 11 N. C. C. A. 342; 23 R. C. L. 51; Washington, A. & G. R. Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445, 21 L. ed. 675; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Hoechner, 14 C. C. A. 469, 31 U. S. App. 644, 67 Fed. 456; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 39 L. ed. 176, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; Landers v. Felton, 73 Fed. 311; Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 82 Fed. 790; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Burris, 50 C. C. A. 48, 111 Fed. 882; Blevins v. Hines, 264 Fed. 1005.

The acts and omissions complained of in the present case were those of the United States, and not those of the telegraph company; hence the United States is the real party in interest.

L. ed. 954, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 50 L. ed. 935, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 568; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 51 L. ed. 510, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388; Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 58 L. ed. 1506, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 938; Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 62 L. ed. 755, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317; Public Service Comrs. v. New England Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 232 Mass. 465, 4 A.L.R. 1662, P.U.R.1919D, 49, 122 N. E. 567; Macleod v. New England Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 250 U. S. 195, 63 L. ed. 934, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Southwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. State, 75 Okla. 42, P.U.R.1919E, 436, 181 Pac. 487; Railroad Comrs. v. Cumberland Teleph. Co. La., So. (not yet reported); State ex rel. Blaine v. Wisconsin Teleph. Co. 169 Wis. 198, 172 N. W. 225; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345, 2 L. ed. 130; Garland v. Davis, 4 How. 131, 11 L. ed. 907; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 40 L. ed. 599, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; District of Columbia v. Camden Iron Works, 181 U. S. 453, 45 L. ed. 948, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 680.

The United States being the real party in interest, authority to bring and maintain this suit indirectly against the United States must be found in an act of Congress, or it does not exist.

United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 40 L. ed. 599, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 380, 5 L. ed. 257, 261; United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet, 436, 8 L. ed. 1001; United States v. McLemore, 4 How. 286, 11 L. ed. 977; Hill v. United States, 9 How. 386, 13 L. ed. 185; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195, 16 L. Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 63 L. ed. 910, 4 ed. 628; United States V. Eckford A. L. R. 1623, P.U.R.1919D, 717, 39 (United States v. Tillou) 6 Wall. 484, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; North Dakota v. L. ed. 920; Nichols v. United States, 7 North Western Teleph. Exch. Co. U. S. Wall. 122, 19 L. ed. 125; The Siren, 7 Dist. Ct. N. D. Fed. (not yet re- Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 129; The Davis ported); Railroad Comrs. v. Burleson, (United States v. Douglas) 10 Wall. 15, P.U.R.1919E, 465, 255 Fed. 604; Mardis 19 L. ed. 875; United States v. Thompv. Hines, 258 Fed. 945; Hatcher v. Atchi- son, 98 U. S. 486, 25 L. ed. 194; son, T. & S. F. R. Co. 258 Fed. 952; Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, Haubert v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 259 25 L. ed. 209; Finn v. United States, Fed. 361; Canidate v. Western U. Teleg. 123 U. S. 227, 31 L. ed. 128, 8 Sup. Ct. Co. 203 Ala. 675, 85 So. 10; Western U. Rep. 82; United States v. Gleeson, 124 Teleg. Co. v. Wallace, Tex. Civ. App. U. S. 255, 31 L. ed. 421, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235 S. W. 282; Western U. Teleg. Co. | 502; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, v. Glover, 17 Ala. App. 374, 86 So. 154; 37 L. ed. 259, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418, 162 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Davis, 142 Ark. 304, 218 S. W. 833; Mitchell v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 188 Ky. 263, 10 A. L. R. 946, 221 S. W. 547; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 46

U. S. 255, 40 L. ed. 960, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 374, 46 L. ed. 954, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; International Postal Supply Co. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601, 48 L. ed. 1134, 24

V.

Messrs. William M. Silverman and Joseph P. Tolins filed a brief as amiei curiæ:

A contract must be so construed as to give meaning and effect to all its provisions.

Sup. Ct. Rep. 820; Oregon v. Hitchcock,
202 U. S. 60, 50 L. ed. 935, 26 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 568; Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202
U. S. 473, 50 L. ed. 1113, 26 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 667; Kansas v. United States, 204
U. S. 331, 51 L. ed. 510, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.
388; Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70,
53 L. ed. 92, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; New
Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52, 61 L. ed.
588, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Illinois C. R.
Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 245
U. S. 493, 62 L. ed. 425, P.U.R.1918C,
1279, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; Wells v.
Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 62 L. ed. 755, 38
Sup. Ct. Rep. 317; Schillinger v. United |
States, 155 U. S. 162, 39 L. ed. 108, 15 18 L. ed. 137, 142.
Sup. Ct. Rep. 85; United States ex rel.
Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218, 58
L. ed. 191, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84.

The judgment herein is inoperative against the United States, and, if effective at all, is effective against the telegraph company.

Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. 199, 20 L. ed. 134; Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, 25 L. ed. 209; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 40 L. ed. 960, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754; The Davis (United States v. Douglas) 10 Wall. 15, 19 L. ed. 875; Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, 31 L. ed. 128, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. 506; Northern Bank v. Stone, 88 Fed. 413; Railroad Tax Cases, 136 Fed. 233; United States v. Pearson, 231 Fed. 270; Gouge v. Hart, 250 Fed. 802; Jacob Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligott, 259 Fed. 321: Westbrook V. Director General, 263 Fed. 211.

Burdon Cent. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Payne, 167 U. S. 127, 142 L. ed. 105, 110, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 576, 29 L. ed. 940, 943, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 870; United States v. Central P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 235, 241, 30 L. ed. 173, 175, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1038; Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29, 46, 24 L. ed. 54, 56; Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, 73,

When an instrument is capable of two constructions, one working injustice and the other consistent with the right of the case, that one should be favored which standeth with the right.

Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394, 407, 19 L. ed. 757, 761; Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29, 46, 24 L. ed. 54, 56; Binghamton Bridge, supra; Hoffman v. Ætna F. Ins. Co. 32 N. Y. 405, 88 Am. Dec. 337.

The agreement in question is the form provided by the Postmaster General for all wire companies. If a doubt in the construction of its provisions arises, it must be construed strongly against the Postmaster General, for language must be construed most strongly against the party employing it.

Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278, 282, 27 L. ed. 932, 934, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 144, 42 L. ed. 977, 981, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; Orient Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 1 Wall. 456, 468, 17 L. ed. 505, 508.

Mr. Philip H. Arrowsmith argued the cause, and, with Mr. Alva M. Lumpkin, filed a brief for respondent: The contract and order of the Post-brief for the United States. master General should be considered as if they were embodied in the presidential proclamation, and the proclamation be read as if a part of and embodied in the joint resolution.

Solicitor General Frierson filed a

Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 63 L. ed. 910, 4 A. L. R. 1623, P.U.R.1919D, 717, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Houston, 256 Fed. 690. Continuing operation in the usual course, by the same operatives, without change, comprehended the continuation of the right of the public to contract for the transmission and delivery of private messages as theretofore, with the rights as theretofore existing for breach of contract.

C. F. Witherspoon & Sons v. Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. 257 Fed. 758.

Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the

opinion of the court:

The supreme court of South Carolina (— S. C. —, 107 S. E. 516) affirmed a judgment of the trial court against the Western Union Telegraph Company for damages resulting from negligent delay in delivering an intrastate message sent November 17, 1918. Its telegraph system was at that time in the exclusive possession and control of the government, and was being operated by the Postmaster General pursuant to the joint resolution of Congress of July 16. 1918, chap. 154, 40 Stat. at L. 904, and the proclamation of the President of July 22, 1918, 40 Stat. at L. 1807. The state court declared that while the action and the judgment recovered therein

were in form against the Western Union Telegraph Company, yet, in effect, they were against the Postmaster General; that in suing the company the plaintiff had pursued the course directed by the President's proclamation and confirmed by the contract dated October 9, 1918, between the Postmaster General and company, concerning compensation; and that since under this contract the Postmaster General would have to pay any judgment rendered against the company, the entry of judgment would not deprive it of property without due process of law. This court granted a writ of certiorari (253 U. S. 480, 64 L. ed. 1023, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482). Whether the company can be held liable is the only question presented here.

Our decision must depend primarily upon the authority conferred by Congress in the joint resolution which provided:

[664]"That the President, during the continuance of the present war, is authorized and empowered, whenever he shall deem it necessary for the national security or defense, to supervise or to take possession and assume control of any telegraph, telephone, marine cable, or radio system or systems, or any part thereof, and to operate the same in such manner as may be needful or desirable for the duration of the war Provided, That just compensation shall be made for such supervision, possession, control, or operation, to be determined by the President."

Under this resolution the President might, doubtless, have limited his function to mere supervision of the telegraph and telephone systems, leaving them in the possession and under the control of the companies. But the resolution also empowered him "to take possession and assume control" of the systems; and this he did (Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 183, 185, 63 L. ed. 910, 923, 924, 4 A.L.R. 1623, P.U.R.1919D, 717, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507), the proclamation declaring:

clusively be deemed within the possession and control and under the supervision of said Postmaster General without further act or notice."

In conferring upon the President power "to take possession and assume control" of the telegraph systems the resolution adopted language identical with that which had been employed in the Act of August 29, 1916, chap. 418, 39 Stat. at L. 619, 645, pursuant to which the railroads were brought under Federal control. See Missouri P. R. [665] Co. v. Ault, decided June 1, 1921 [256 U. S. 554, ante, 1087, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593]. We held there that the supplementary legislation known as the Federal Control Act did not impose liability upon the company, and that, since the government was operating the property, the railroad company could not be held liable, under the established principles of the common law governing liability. These principles are equally applicable here.

In respect to telegraph systems, there was no supplementary legislation similar to the Federal Control Act; so that the argument mainly relied upon by plaintiff in the Missouri Pacific Case is not made here. But it is contended that the proclamation, the order of the Postmaster General of August 1, 1918, and the contract between him and the company concerning compensation, authorized suit against the company as the operating agent of the government in the same way that the Federal Control Act authorized suit against the Director General. We find in them no basis for such liability. Obviously neither proclamation, order, nor contract could create a liability not authorized by the resolution of Congress on which they rest. Nor did they attempt to do so.

(a) The provision in the proclamation. relied upon to establish the liability is this:

"Until and except so far as said Post

1 This view has been taken also by state courts. Canidate v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 203 Ala. 675, 85 So. 10; Western U. Teleg. "I ... do hereby take possession Co. v. Glover, 17 Ala. App. 374, 86 So. 154; and assume control and supervision of Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Davis, 142 Ark. each and every telegraph and telephone 304, 218 S. W. 833; Mitchell v. Cumberland system, and every part thereof, within Teleph. Co. 188 Ky. 263, 10 A.L.R. 946, the jurisdiction of the United States, in- 221 S. W. 547; Foster v. Western U. Teleg. cluding all equipment thereof and Co. 205 Mo. App. 1, 219 S. W. 107; WestTex. Civ. purtenances thereto whatsoever and all ern U. Teleg. Co. v. Conditt, App. 223 S. W. 234; Western U. Teleg. materials and supplies. Co. v. Robinson, Tex. Civ. App. 225 S. W. 877. See contra, Witherspoon v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 257 Fed. 758; Spring v. American Teleg. & Teleph. Co. 86 W. Va. 192, 10 A.L.R. 951, 103 S. E. 206.

ap

"From and after 12 o'clock midnight on the 31st day of July, 1918, all telegraph and telephone systems included in this order and proclamation shall con

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Sup. Ct. Rep. 820; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 50 L. ed. 935, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 568; Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473, 50 L. ed. 1113, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 667; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 51 L. ed. 510, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388; Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70, 53 L. ed. 92, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52, 61 L. ed. 588, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493, 62 L. ed. 425, P.U.R.1918C, 1279, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 62 L. ed. 755, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 162, 39 L. ed. 108, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85; United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218, 58 L. ed. 191, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84.

The judgment herein is inoperative against the United States, and, if effective at all, is effective against the telegraph company.

Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. 199, 20 L. ed. 134; Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, 25 L. ed. 209; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 40 L. ed. 960, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754; The Davis (United States v. Douglas) 10 Wall. 15, 19 L. ed. 875; Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, 31 L. ed. 128, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. 506; Northern Bank v. Stone, 88 Fed. 413; Railroad Tax Cases, 136 Fed. 233; United States v. Pearson, 231 Fed. 270; Gouge v. Hart, 250 Fed. 802; Jacob Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligott, 259 Fed. 321: Westbrook Director General, 263 Fed. 211. Mr. Philip H. Arrowsmith argued the cause, and, with Mr. Alva M. Lumpkin, filed a brief for respondent:

V.

The contract and order of the Postmaster General should be considered as if they were embodied in the presidential proclamation, and the proclamation be read as if a part of and embodied in the joint resolution.

Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 63 L. ed. 910, 4 A. L. R. 1623, P.U.R.1919D, 717, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Houston, 256 Fed. 690. Continuing operation in the usual course, by the same operatives, without change, comprehended the continuation of the right of the public to contract for the transmission and delivery of private messages as theretofore, with the rights as theretofore existing for breach of contract.

C. F. Witherspoon & Sons v. Postal Teleg. & Cable Co. 257 Fed. 758.

Messrs. William M. Silverman and Joseph P. Tolins filed a brief as amiei curiæ:

A contract must be so construed as to give meaning and effect to all its provisions.

Burdon Cent. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Payne, 167 U. S. 127, 142 L. ed. 105, 110, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 576, 29 L. ed. 940, 943, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 870; United States v. Central P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 235, 241, 30 L. ed. 173, 175, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1038; Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29, 46, 24 L. ed. 54, 56; Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, 73, 18 L. ed. 137, 142.

When an instrument is capable of two constructions, one working injustice and the other consistent with the right of the case, that one should be favored which standeth with the right.

Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394, 407, 19 L. ed. 757, 761; Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29, 46, 24 L. ed. 54, 56; Binghamton Bridge, supra; Hoffman v. Etna F. Ins. Co. 32 N. Y. 405, 88 Am. Dec. 337.

The agreement in question is the form provided by the Postmaster General for all wire companies. If a doubt in the construction of its provisions arises, it must be construed strongly against the Postmaster General, for language must be construed most strongly against the party employing it.

Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278, 282, 27 L. ed. 932, 934, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 144, 42 L. ed. 977, 981, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; Orient Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 1 Wall. 456, 468, 17 L. ed. 505, 508.

Solicitor General Frierson filed a brief for the United States.

Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the

opinion of the court:

The supreme court of South Carolina (S. C., 107 S. E. 516) affirmed a judgment of the trial court against the Western Union Telegraph Company for damages resulting from negligent delay in delivering an intrastate message sent November 17, 1918. Its telegraph sys. tem was at that time in the exclusive possession and control of the government, and was being operated by the Postmaster General pursuant to the joint resolution of Congress of July 16 1918, chap. 154, 40 Stat. at L. 904, and the proclamation of the President of July 22, 1918, 40 Stat. at L. 1807. The state court declared that while the aetion and the judgment recovered therein

were in form against the Western Union, clusively be deemed within the possesTelegraph Company, yet, in effect, they sion and control and under the superviwere against the Postmaster General; sion of said Postmaster General without that in suing the company the plaintiff further act or notice." had pursued the course directed by the President's proclamation and confirmed by the contract dated October 9, 1918, between the Postmaster General and company, concerning compensation; and that since under this contract the Postmaster General would have to pay any judgment rendered against the company, the entry of judgment would not deprive it of property without due process of law. This court granted a writ of certiorari (253 U. S. 480, 64 L. ed. 1023, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482). Whether the company can be held liable is the only question presented here.

Our decision must depend primarily upon the authority conferred by Congress in the joint resolution which provided:

[664]"That the President, during the continuance of the present war, is authorized and empowered, whenever he shall deem it necessary for the national security or defense, to supervise or to take possession and assume control of any telegraph, telephone, marine cable, or radio system or systems, or any part thereof, and to operate the same in such manner as may be needful or desirable for the duration of the war Provided, That just compensation shall be made for such supervision, possession, control, or operation, to be determined by the President."

In conferring upon the President power "to take possession and assume control" of the telegraph systems the resolution adopted language identical with that which had been employed in the Act of August 29, 1916, chap. 418, 39 Stat. at L. 619, 645, pursuant to which the railroads were brought under Federal control. See Missouri P. R. [665] Co. v. Ault, decided June 1, 1921 [256 U. S. 554, ante, 1087, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593]. We held there that the supplementary legislation known as the Federal Control Act did not impose liability upon the company, and that, since the government was operating the property, the railroad company could not be held liable, under the established principles of the common law governing liability. These principles are equally applicable here.

In respect to telegraph systems, there was no supplementary legislation similar to the Federal Control Act; so that the argument mainly relied upon by plaintiff in the Missouri Pacific Case is not made here. But it is contended that the proclamation, the order of the Postmaster General of August 1, 1918, and the contract between him and the company concerning compensation, authorized suit against the company as the operating agent of the government in the same way that the Federal Control Under this resolution the President | Act authorized suit against the Director might, doubtless, have limited his function to mere supervision of the telegraph and telephone systems, leaving them in the possession and under the control of the companies. But the resolution also empowered him "to take possession and assume control" of the systems; and this he did (Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 183, 185, 63 L. ed. 910, 923, 924, 4 A.L.R. 1623, P.U.R.1919D, 717, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507), the proclamation declaring:

"I. . do hereby take possession and assume control and supervision of each and every telegraph and telephone system, and every part thereof, within the jurisdiction of the United States, including all equipment thereof and appurtenances thereto whatsoever and all materials and supplies.

General. We find in them no basis for such liability. Obviously neither proclamation, order, contract could create a liability not authorized by the resolution of Congress on which they rest. Nor did they attempt to do so.

(a) The provision in the proclamation relied upon to establish the liability is this:

"Until and except so far as said Post1 This view has been taken also by state courts. Canidate v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 203 Ala. 675, 85 So. 10; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Glover, 17 Ala. App. 374, 86 So. 154; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Davis, 142 Ark. 304, 218 S. W. 833; Mitchell v. Cumberland Teleph. Co. 188 Ky. 263, 10 A.L.R. 946, 221 S. W. 547; Foster v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 205 Mo. App. 1, 219 S. W. 107; WestTex. Civ. ern U. Teleg. Co. v. Conditt, App. 223 S. W. 234; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Robinson, Tex. Civ. App. -, 225 "From and after 12 o'clock midnights. W. 877. See contra, Witherspoon v. on the 31st day of July, 1918, all tele- Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 257 Fed. 758; graph and telephone systems included in Spring v. American Teleg. & Teleph. Co. 86 this order and proclamation shall con- W. Va. 192, 10 A.L.R. 951, 103 S. E. 206.

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