LABOR ORGANIZATION. a ton, respectively, upon persons manufacInjunction against, see Injunction, 9. turing fish oil, fertilizer, and fish meal, in See also Monopoly. whole or in part, from herring, imposed by the territorial legislature of Alaska, cannot be deemed to be repugnant to the Act of LACHES. To bar action, see Limitation of Ac- Congress of August 24, 1912, § 3, as tions. LAND DEPARTMENT. See Public Lands. LANDLORD AND TENANT. Validity of rent or housing laws, see Housing and rent laws, see Jury. LAW OF THE CASE. See Appeal and Error, 77, 78. LAW OF THE LAND. See Constitutional Law, IV. LEAVE OF COURT. To file bill of review, see Review. LEGISLATURE. Validity of legislation by, generally, see Enactment of statute by, see Statutes. LEVER ACT. Appeal in suit under, see Appeal and Validity of, see Criminal Law, 2, 3. See also Profiteering. LEVY AND SEIZURE. Exempting insurance moneys from LIBERTY. an attempt to modify or repeal the fish laws or 3. The requirement of the Act of August 24, 1912, § 9, that all taxes in Alaska shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, is not violated by treating the making of oil and fertilizer from herring as a different class, for purposes of license taxes, from the making of the same from salmon offal. Alaska Fish Salting & ByProducts Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219, 65: 489 4. The restriction against taxation in excess of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation of property in Alaska, which is made by the Act of August 24, 1912, § 9, does not apply to a license tax upon the manufacture of fish oil, fertilizer, and fish mealfrom herring. Alaska Fish Salting & ByProducts Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219, 65: 489 5. A manufacturer of fish oil, fertilizer, and fish meal from herring may not complain that he is doubly taxed, first by the United States and then by the territory of Alaska, in view of the provisions of the Act of August 24, 1912, § 3, giving the territorial legislature power to impose taxes Federal taxes on business and trade. Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65: 489 219, Guaranty of right to, see Constitution or licenses other than and additional to al Law, IV. LICENSE. As affecting interstate commerce, see Of property rights under streets, see Uniformity in, see Taxes, 2. 1. No grant of a permanent right in a street can be inferred from a mere application by an abutting owner for a permit to erect a building with adjacent vaults under the sidewalk, followed by the construction of such vaults, and their continued use. District of Columbia v. R. P. Andrews Paper Co. 256 U. S. 582, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545, 65: 1103 2. License taxes of $2 a barrel and $2 LIENS. Maritime liens, see Maritime Liens. LIFE INSURANCE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Estoppel by laches, see Estoppel, 5. Disclosure of laches in discovering fraud, see Pleading, 4. 1. Laches in discovering the fraud will prevent the application of the rule that, until the discovery of the fraud, the six years' limitation prescribed by the Act of March 3, 1891, for suits by the United States to vacate and annul patents for public land, does not begin to run against such a suit founded on fraud concealed from the government by the wrongdoers. United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. 255 U. S. 323, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335, 65: 660 2. A direct attack by the United States upon its patent for public land must, under the Act of March 3, 1891, § 8, be begun within five years from the passage of such act. United States v. Coronado Beach Co. 255 U. S. 472, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378, LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS. See Public Improvements. MAHER, JAMES D. 65: 736 Re Matthew Addy S. S. & Commerce Corp. 256 U. S. 417, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508, 65: 1027 5. Fraud in the procurement of the allowance of a final homestead entry and of the issuance of the receiver's receipt does not relieve the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office of their plain duty under the Act of March 3, 1891, § 7, enforceable by mandamus, to pass the entry to patent, where two years have elapsed since the date of the receiver's receipt upon the final entry, and there is no pending contest or protest against the validity of such entry. Payne v. United States ex rel. Newton, 255 U. S. 438, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368, 65: 720 6. The pendency, when mandamus is sought, of a suit in equity brought by the In memoriam, see Appendix, V. ante, United States to cancel for fraud the reP. 1200. MAIL. See Postoffice. MANDAMUS. See also Prohibition, 2, 3, 5. 1. Ordinarily mandamus is not to be used when another statutory method has been provided for reviewing the action below, or to reverse a decision of record. Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. S. 450, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 65: 725 2. Mandamus does not lie to correct the conclusion of the court below in a criminal case that the record need not be corrected to show that, as the result of an agreement between the accused and the district attorney, the case was tried be fore a jury of eleven, since the accused might have saved the point by an exception at the trial, or by a bill of exceptions to the denial of his subsequent motion for correction of the record, setting forth whatever facts or offers of proof were material, and might then have brought a writ of error. Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. S. 450, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 65: 725 3. The failure of a Federal circuit court of appeals in its decree to dispose of one of the claims in suit will not be corrected by mandamus, where the relator failed adequately to call the court's attention to such omission during the term, or to seek relief in the Federal Supreme Court by petition for a writ of certiorari. Re National Park Bank, 256 U. S. 131, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403, 65: 863 4. Mandamus to vacate an order which improperly remanded a cause removed from a state court is not permitted under the Judicial Code, § 28, which provides that, "whenever any cause shall be removed from any state court into any district court of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the state court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." ceiver's receipt issued on a final homestead entry, does not afford a sufficient justification to the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office which will preclude the enforcement of their plain ministerial duty under the Act of March 3, 1891, § 7, to pass the entry to patent, where, when two years had elapsed since the date of the receiver's receipt, there was no pending contest or protest against the validity of such entry. Payne v. United States ex rel. Newton, 255 U. S. 438, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368, 65:720 7. The decision of the Secretary of the Interior that, under the Act of August 18, 1894, directing the reservation of certain public lands from adverse appropriation by settlement or otherwise during a specified period within which a state had the exclusive right to select the lands, selections filed by individuals during that period should not be rejected, but should be held suspended until final adjudication of the rights of the state, is not so clearly erroneous as to be reviewable by writ of mandamus. United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U. S. 343, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131, 65: 295 MARITIME LAW. 1. A maritime lien for the unpaid purchase price of supplies does not arise in favor of the seller merely because the purchaser, who is the owner of a vessel, subsequently appropriates the supplies to her use. Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, 65: 97 2. The scope of the maritime lien was not broadened by the Act of June 23, 1910, § 1, giving a maritime lien upon a vessel for supplies furnished by the seller to the vessel upon the order of the owner, without proof that credit was given to the vessel, but the purpose of the act was first, to do away with the artificial distinction by which a maritime lien was given for supplies furnished to a vessel in a port of a foreign country or state, but was denied where the supplies were furnished in the home port or state, and second, to do away with the doctrine that when the owner of a vessel contracts in person for necessaries, or is present in the port when they are ordered, it is presumed that the materialmen did not intend to rely on the credit of the vessel and that hence no lien arises, and third, to substitute a single Federal statute for the state statutes in so far as they confer liens for repairs, supplies, and other necessaries, Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65: 97 3. The maritime lien is a secret one. It may operate to the prejudice of prior mortgagees or purchasers without notice. It is therefore stricti juris, and will not be extended by construction, analogy, or inference. Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, 65: 97 4. No part of the coal delivered to a corporation owning both factories and a fleet of fishing steamers, in pursuance of a contract to furnish such corporation with its season's supply, and thereafter by such corporation distributed in its discretion to its vessels and factories, can be said to have been furnished by the seller to the vessels upon the order of the owner, within the meaning of the Act of June 23, 1910, § 1, giving a maritime lien upon a vessel for supplies so furnished without proof that credit was given to the vessel, although the use of the greater part of the coal by the vessels of the fleet was a use which was contemplated by the parties at the time of the purchase, and although both parties understood that the law would afford a lien on the vessels for the purchase price. Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, 65: 97 MARSHAL. Return of, see Writ and Process. MASTER AND SERVANT. Validity of Workmen's Compensation Act, see Constitutional Law, 20-24. Liability of municipal corporation for act of employce, see Municipal Corporations, 2. 1. An express messenger in charge of express matter which a railway company was transporting for the express company in an express car furnished by the railway company under a contract which gave the express company the exclusive privilege of conducting an express business, the railway company to provide the motive power and the train operatives, was on the train as an employee not of the railway company, but of the express company, by which he was employed, directed, and paid, and at whose will he was to continue in service or be discharged. Wells; F. & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93, 65: 205 Employers' liability act. Error in instructions, see Appeal and Presumption and burden of proof as to character of employment, see Evidence, 5, 6. See also infra, 11, 12. 2. A common carrier by express which neither owns nor operates a railway, but which, under contract with a railway company, conducts an express business over such railway, the railway company furnishing the express car, the motive power, and the train operatives, and the express company paying for this service, is not a "com mon carrier by railroad" within the meaning of the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, and is, therefore, not affected by the provision of § 5 of that act, invalidating any contract whereby a carrier subject to that act exempts itself from any liability under it. Wells, F. & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93, 65: 205 3. A railway employee who is injured by being caught between two cars while employed upon a freight train made up of both interstate cars and freight and intrastate cars and freight was employed in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, so as to exclude the operation of a state workmen's compensation act. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Polk, 256 U. S. 332, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518, 65: 958 4. A person employed as a railway flagman at a public crossing, to signal both intrastate and interstate trains, was, without regard to the character-intrastate or interstate of the particular train which he was flagging when killed, engaged in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, so as to exclude the operation of a state Workmen's Compensation Law. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Di Donato, 256 U. S. 327, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 516, 65: 955 Safety appliances. 5. Necessarily there must be a causal connection between the fact of the carrier's delinquency under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts and the fact of injury to an employee in order to impose a liability on the carrier because of such delinquency. Lang v. New York C. R. Co. 255 U. S. 455. 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381, 65: 729 6. Nothing in the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts gives any warrant for saying that they are intended to provide a place of safety between colliding cars. On the contrary, they affirmatively show that the principal purpose in their enactment was to obviate the neces sity for men going between the ends of the cars. Lang v. New York C. R. Co. 255 U. S. 65: 729 455, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381, 7. A carrier's failure to have the end of a loaded freight car standing on a siding equipped with the coupler and drawbar prescribed by the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, the purpose of which is to obviate the necessity for men to go between the ends of the cars, was not an actionable breach of duty towards a brakeman who was injured in a collision between such car, of whose defects he was aware, and another car on which he was, ployers' Liability Act, of any injury that riding, which the engine had kicked on the he may receive when leaning outside the same siding, although had these appliances been present there would have been sufficient room between the ends of the two cars to prevent the injury, where there was no present intention to disturb, couple, or move the defective car, since the collision was not the proximate result of the defect, but of the brakeman's failure to perform his duty to stop the moving car in time to avoid the collision. Lang v. New York C. R. Co. 255 U. S. 455, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381, 65: 729 8. The requirement of the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, and March 2, 1903, as to the coupling of train brakes so as to be under engine control is not limited to operations on main line tracks. United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 254 U. S. 251, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101, (Annotated) 65: 249 9. A moving locomotive with cars attached is without the requirement of the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, and March 2, 1903, as to the coupling of train brakes so as to be under engine control only when it is not a train as where the operation is that of switching, classifying, and assembling cars within railroad yards for the purpose of making up trains. United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 254 U. S. 251, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101 (Annotated) 65: 249 10. Transfer trains operated by an interstate railway carrier under the yardmaster's orders, and under the single operating rule which requires all trains to move at such speed that they can be stopped at vision, over a terminal railway a part of which is single track, and on which are several grade highway and railway crossings, are subject to the requirement of the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, and March 2, 1903, as to the coupling of train brakes so as to be under engine control, since, even under the inadmissible sug. gestion that the use of the road as part of the main line is essential to the application of this provision, such requirement would be satisfied in a case like the one at bar, where two independent railway companies use the road for freight trains under air control, and the passenger trains of another company cross it. United States v. Northern P. R. Co. 254 U. S. 251, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101, (Annotated) 65: 249 Assumption of risk. cab window by reason of the fact that the end of the arm of a mail crane-a device adopted with the conditions imposed by the Postoffice Department-is, when in use, as near to the train as 14 inches, the farthest point at which a bag can be picked up from a crane being 29 inches, and a less distance than that being essential to insure getting the bag. Southern P. Co. v. Berkshire, 254 U. S. 415, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 162, MAXIMS. 1. Lex 65: 335 non præcipit inutilia. Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55, 65: 188 2. Noscitur a sociis. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 MINES. Sup. Ct. 65: 151 per se. 232, 41 65: 913 Oil and gas mining leases by Indian 1. A price in excess of $20 an acre may be exacted by the Secretary of the Interior for coal lands within 15 miles of a railroad, entered under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2347, by which coal lands are subjected to private entry at "not less than" $10 or $20 an acre, according to distance from a completed railroad. Friedman v. United States, 255 U. S. 468, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380, 65: 735 2. A patent for a lode mining claim which, after reciting the deposit in the General Land Office of field and plat notes of a survey of such claim, which is designated by the Surveyor General as lot No. 689, describes its boundaries as platted as beginning at corner No. 1, a pine post, running thence by a described course 600 feet to corner No. 2, a pine post, thence by a described course 1,500 feet to corner No. 3, thence by a described course 600 feet to corner No. 4, and thence by a described course 1,500 feet to the place of beginning, and which, in granting "said mining premises hereinbefore described," assumes such premises to be the lot designated as lot No. 689, does not represent an adjudication by the Land Department that the claim is 1,500 feet long and 600 feet wide, without regard to the location of the posts and 11. No recovery can be had under the corners 3 and 4, which the field notes showed Federal Employers' Liability Act of April to exist, but which the patent does not 22, 1908, by an employee who was injured mention, and evidence is admissible to show as the result of defects in a claw bar he that there were monuments at corners was using, where such defects were so 3 and 4, and, if established, the monuobvious that an ordinarily prudent employee ments as fixed control the courses and would not have used it. Pryor v. Williams, distances of the patent, and exclude from 254 U. S. 43, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36, 65: 120 the grant land outside the monuments, 12. An experienced railway engineer as though comprehended by the courses and dissumes the risk, under the Federal Em-tances. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Error in instructions, see Appeal and Conkling Min. Co. 255 U. S. 151, 41 Sup. 3. If a lode mining location lies across instead of along the strike of a vein, the side lines become the end lines for the purpose of defining the right of the owner, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2322, to follow a vein apexing within the surface boundaries on its dip downward outside the vertical side lines of such claim. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conkling Min. Co. 256 U. S. 18, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, 65: 811 4. The distance of the discovery shafts from the apex of a vein crossing a location at right angles does not affect the right of the discoverer, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2322, to follow the vein on its dip downward outside the vertical end lines treated as side lines on the theory that if the end lines be taken as the side lines either the vein or discovery was outside the location, with the side lines limited as they should be, where at the time of the location there was no requirement making a discovery shaft essential to a valid location. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conkling Min. Co. 256 U. S. 18, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, 65: 811 4. A labor organization, or its members, is not exempted from accountability for a combination in restraint of interstate trade where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, merely because the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 6, provides that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organizations, or to forbid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 65: 349 5. By no fair or permissible construction can the provision of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 6, that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid MISSISSIPPI. Boundary between Arkansas and Mis the existence and operation of labor or sissippi, see Boundaries. 1. A restraint produced by peaceable persuasion is as much within the prohibition of the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, as one accomplished by force or threats of force. Duple Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 65: 349 2. A combination in restraint of interstate trade is not to be justified by the fact that the participants in the combination or conspiracy may have some object beneficial to themselves or their associates which possibly they might have been at liberty to pursue in the absence of the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, prohibiting such combinations. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 65: 349 ganizations, or to forbid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects, be, taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or as enabling a normal lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined by the anti-trust laws. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 241 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 65: 349 6. A railway company which, in combination with a subsidiary coal company controlled by it through stock ownership and common officers, deliberately enters upon a policy of making extensive purchases of anthracite land tributary to the railway company's lines, for the purpose of controlling the mining, transportation. and sale of coal to be obtained therefrom, and of preventing and suppressing compe- Error in instruction, see Appeal and 7. The essential agreement, combination, or conspiracy to violate the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, by main |