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MOOT CASE.

taining resale prices, may be implied from | v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650, 41 a course of dealing or other circumstances. Sup. Ct. Rep. 610, 65: 1146 Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co. 256 U. S. 2. The sprinkling of the streets to keep 208, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 451, 65: 892 down dust for the purpose of the comfort and health of the general public is a public or governmental act, as contradistinguished from a private or municipal act, which exempts the District of Columbia from liability for injuries caused by one of its employees engaged therein. Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610, 65: 1146

Appellate jurisdiction in, see Appeal
and Error, 23, 44-48, 71, 72.
Costs in, see Appeal and Error, 75.

MORTGAGE.

Property rights of purchaser on foreclosure, see Constitutional Law, 64. Purchase by receiver at foreclosure sale, see Receivers, 1.

A purchaser at a sale of a railroad on foreclosure acquires all the right which the mortgagor had to stop operations when unprofitable, whatever words were used in the foreclosure decree, and, whatever such words, would get no more. Hence, a writ of prohibition excluding from the foreclosure decree words which purported to authorize dismantling the road did not cut down the future purchaser's rights, any more than did the presence of those words enlarge them. Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Commission, 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193, 65: 380

MOTIVE.

Of officials and electors, see Courts, 2,

3.

Burden of proof as to, see Evidence, 8.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Validity of election authorizing acquisi-
tion of street railway and issue of
bonds, see Bonds.
Municipal license tax as affecting inter-

state commerce, see Commerce, 19.
Requiring removal of street railway
tracks from city streets as afford-
ing due process of law, see Consti-
tutional Law, 39-41.
Property rights under city streets, see
Constitutional Law, 44.
Motives of officials and electors, see
Courts, 3.

Federal jurisdiction of suit to enjoin
municipal rate regulation, see
Courts, 19.
Federal courts following state court's
construction of municipal charter
and ordinances, see Courts, 24.
Estoppel to deny extension of street
railway franchise, see Estoppel, 4.
Enjoining removal of railroad from
streets, see Injunction, 1.
Enjoining performance of municipal
contract, see Injunction, 3.
License from, see License, 1.
Power to contract with public service
corporations, see Public Utilities.
Municipal regulation of street railway
rates, see Street Railways, 4-7.

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Constitutional law; sufficiency of statutory
immunity to satisfy constitutional
guaranty against self-incrimina-
tion.
65: 138
Power of municipality to destroy
wooden building within fire limits.
65: 625

Conversion; see Carriers.
Criminal law; see Constitutional Law.
Equity; change or extension of legal reme-
dy pending suit as affecting equity
jurisdiction.
65: 638

Evidence; see Witnesses.
Fires; see Constitutional Law.

1. Municipal corporations, when acting in good faith are not liable for the manner Gasolene; see Commerce. in which they exercise discretionary powers Husband and wife; see Witnesses. of a public or legislative character. Harris Interstate commerce; see Commerce.

Master and servant; trains and train move- | PARTIES.

ments within the meaning of the Federal Safety Appliance acts as contrasted with switching operations. 65: 250 Municipal corporations; street sprinkling as a governmental function,

65: 1146

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Necessity of, to afford due process of
law, see Constitutional Law, 65-67.
Effect of, as estoppel, see Estoppel, 2.
Constructive notice of Indian lease, see
Indians, 13.

NUISANCE.

Enjoining discharge of

sewage into

harbor, see Injunction, 5.

OBITER DICTA.

See Courts, 23.

OBJECTIONS.

Jurisdiction of class suits, see Courts, 11, 12.

Alignment of, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, see Courts, 14.

Who are affected by judgment, see
Judgment, 8-14.

Parties affected by judicial sale, see
Judicial Sale.

Jurisdiction over parties to state bound-
ary suit, see Supreme Court of the
United States.

Suits by or against United States, see
United States, 2-4.

1. Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience are parties so indispensable that a court of equity will not proceed to final decision without them. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U. S. 77, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39,

65: 145

2. Congress acted clearly within its authority in constituting the governor of the Choctaw Nation the representative of the defendants, upon whom notice of the suit, contemplated by the Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 28, 1908, § 27, for the recovery for services rendered and expenses incurred in securing to Mississippi Choctaw Indians rights of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, was to be served in their behalf,

To raise question on appeal, see Appeal and in designating the Attorney General and Error, V.

OFFICERS.

OIL.

Bribery of Federal officers or person
exercising official function,
Bribery.

Of corporation, see Corporations, 1-5.
As to judges, see Judges.
Mandamus to, see Mandamus.

see

Suit against state officer, see States, 8.
Stipulation by state officer, see Stipu-

lation.

Federal officers, see United States, 1.
Suit against Federal officer, see United

States, 3.

Return of marshal, see Writ and Proc

ess.

of the United States as their attorney to appear and defend the suit, the government's trusteeship of the funds of these interests in the allotted lands, not making Indians, and its guardianship over their it necessary that the United States be a party to the proceeding. Winton v. Amos, 65: 684 255 U. S. 373, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342,

PATENTS.

Bill in suit to cancel patent, see Pleading, 4.

Implied contract by United States to pay for use of patented invention, see United States, 12, 13.

Invention.

1. The Burchenal patent No. 1,135,351, for a lard-like food product consisting of a vegetable oil partially hydrogenized to a

Oil mining lease by Indian allottee, see homogeneous whitish, yellowish product, Indians, 12, 13.

ORDINANCE OF 1787.

See States, 1.

OVERT ACT.

See Conspiracy.

PARENT AND CHILD.
Leases by parents on behalf of minor
allottees or minor heirs, see In-
dians, 18.

must be deemed void for lack of invention,
since it was previously known that a
vegetable oil could be changed into a semi-
solid homogeneous substance by a process
of hydrogenation arrested before completion.
and that the product might be edible, and
the product of this process was also known
and open to public use. Berlin Mills Co. v.
Procter & G. Co. 254 U. S. 156, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 75,
65: 196

2. The claim of the Henderson patent. No. 959,008, for improvements in scaffold supporting means, discloses no invention,

65: 1162

since the changes therein made in a device v. E. H. Freeman Electric Co. 256 U. S. 668, described in an earlier patent are simply 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 600, mechanical, easy to discern and as easy to make, incidental entirely to the main idea PAWNBROKERS. of the earlier patentee, which was, as declared by him, to provide a scaffold that would "permit of adjustment at any height during the construction of a building or the repairing thereof," one which might "be readily moved from one position to another by the workmen without interfering materially with the work being performed," and one "in which different supports are employed," and "in which the shifting from one set of supports to another set" might "be accomplished without interfering in any degree with the workmen thereon, or their work." New York Scaffolding Co. v. LiebelBinney Constr. Co. 254 U. S. 24, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18,

New York Scaffolding Co. v. Chain 254 U. S. 32, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21, Construction.

65: 112

Belt Co.
65: 116

3. The prior art, the file wrapper, and the second patent, No. 916,812, to the same patentee, require that the expressions "telescopically received" and "telescopically applied," in the fourth claim of the Weber patent No. 743,206, for an improved method of fastening the overlapping cap of an incandescent electric lamp socket to the sleeve, be restricted to a direct longitudinal movement or thrust of the sleeve into the cap. Weber Electric Co. v. E. H. Freeman Electric Co. 256 U. S. 668, 41 Sup. Ct. Ren. 600, 65: 1162 4. The patentee having narrowed his claim against rotary movement in order to obtain patent No. 743.206, for an improved method of fastening the overlapping cap of an incandescent electric lamp socket to the sleeve, may not, by construction or resort to the doctrine of equivalents, give the claim the larger scope which it might have had without the amendments which amount to a disclaimer of rotation as an operative feature of his device. Weber Electric Co. v. E. H. Freeman Electric Co. 256 U. S. 668, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 600, 65: 1162 Infringement.

5. The claim of the Weber patent, No. 743,206, for an improved method of fastening the overlapping cap of an incandescent electric lamp socket to the sleeve, which calls for slits and outwardly extending recesses in the cap, and slits and outward projections of the sleeve to lock by snap action against longitudinal movement upon direct longitudinal thrust of the sleeve into the cap, is not infringed by a device which prevents such longitudinal movement by bayonet slots in the sleeve which lock with studs in the cap by telescopic followed by rotary action, although this device also contains another stud in the cap which locks against rotary movement by snapping into a locking hole in the sleeve, the patent in suit making no suggestion of a lock against rotative movement of the cap and sleeve on each other, and making no disclosure providing for it. Weber Electric Co.

A pawnbroker who stores his pledges in the city of Washington, and uses a Washington office as a collecting center, is doing a pawnbroking business within the District of Columbia, within the purview of the Act of February 4, 1913, forbidding the doing of business as a pawnbroker and charging more than 6 per cent interest without a license, although care is taken to receive all applications for loans, and to make all examinations of pledges, at an office established by him in Virginia, just outside the District of Columbia. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53, 65: 185

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Amendment of, after judgment on ap-
peal, see Appeal and Error, 76.

In criminal prosecution, see Indictment
and Information.
Conformity of judgment to pleadings,
see Judgment, 4.

1. The averment of a pleading need tion of the existence of a fact or condition not be so certain that an affirmative allegamust be accompanied by the negation of that which is contradictory to it or inconsistent with it. Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull, 255 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 65: 539

2. Federal jurisdiction of a cause as presenting a Federal question is not supported by allegations in a bill that are much too casual and meager to give serious color to the claim that the cause of action is one arising under the laws of the United States, and where the contention is plainly an afterthought, not in the mind of the author of the bill.

Niles-Bement Pond Co. v. Iron
Moulders Union, 254 U. S. 77, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 39,
65: 145

3. Allegations in the petition in a suit upon a reparation order of the Interstate

Commerce Commission, that the shipper sion will not yield revenue sufficient to re filed its petition with the Commission, imburse the railway company for handling claiming that it had been charged an un- and carrying the classes of property specireasonable rate, that, upon hearing, the fied in the order and provide a fair return Commission entered an order for the pay- on the property used in the service, and that, ment of money as reparation on account of therefore, if the order be enforced, the railunreasonable rates exacted for the trans- way company will be deprived of its propportation of its freight, that the order re-erty without due process of law, are suffiquired payment to be made by a date named, cient to present the issue whether the order that the carriers had refused payment when of the commission was invalid because it demanded, and that the suit was instituted required a service that the rates did not under the Interstate Commerce Act and its compensate, although the answer does not amendments, to which petition copies of the allege that the rates are not compensatory report and order of the Commission were of the cost of the service between the attached, are amply sufficient to meet the stations to which they apply, and fails to statutory requirement that the petition in specify upon what part of the carrier's such a case shall set forth briefly the causes property the rates will not yield a fair for which damages are claimed, and the return. Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull, 255 U. order of the Commission in the premises. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 65: 539 Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co. 256 U. S. 408, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524, POLICE POWER.

65: 1020

See Constitutional Law, V.
PORTO RICO.

Appeal from circuit court of appeals in
case originating in Porto Rican
court, see Appeal and Error, 8.

POSSESSION.

Criminality of conscious and wilful possession, see Counterfeiting. Unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, see Intoxicating Liquors.

POSTMASTER GENERAL.

Grant and revocation of second-class mail privileges, see Postoffice, 1-4.

POSTOFFICE.

Validity of executive revocation of sec

ond-class mail privileges, see Constitutional Law, 47, 67. Requiring chauffeur's license of postoffice employee, see States, 10. Operation of telegraph company by Postmaster General, see Telegraphs, 1-3.

4. The allegations in a bill brought by the United States, long after the event, to cancel patents for coal lands and conveyances by the entrymen because of fraud in the entry and the purchase of the same by persons acting ostensibly for themselves, but really as the representatives of a corporation, and for its sole account and benefit, should not be held, on motion to dismiss, to show such laches on the part of the government in discovering the fraud as to prevent the application of the rule that, until discovery, the six-years' limitation prescribed by the Act of March 3, 1891, does not begin to run, even conceding that the conveyances from the entrymen to the corporation, as alleged. following almost immediately the initiation of the right to purchase, and preceding the patents, the uniformity of the method employed, and the surrounding circumstances, and the facts alleged as to the possession of the land by the corporation at the time of the purchase by the entrymen, and subsequent to their conveyances, the propinquity to the field of operations of the corporation, and its exploitation by the corporation for the purpose of taking coal therefrom, in and of themselves, would, if known, have constituted badges or indications of fraud of 1. Admission to second-class mail privisuch a character as to give notice to the leges is obtained for a publication only by United States, or at least to put it on in- a permit issued by the Postmaster General quiry, where the averments of concealment after a hearing and upon a showing made, and other allegations in the bill are sus- satisfactory to him or his authorized asceptible of the construction that the convey-sistants, that it contains and will continue ances-though not alleged not to have been to contain only mailable matter, and that seasonably recorded-were secret, and that it will meet the various statutory and other the possession of the corporation was clan- requirements. United States ex rel, Mildestine, and that its operations as to the waukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleproperty were of the same character, because son, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 352, not conducted in its own name, but by persons interposed with the very object of concealment. United States v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. 255 U. S. 323, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335, 65: 660 5. Averments in the answer, in a suit to compel a railway company to keep in force certain intrastate freight rates prescribed by the order of a state commission, 3. If a newspaper enjoying second-class which assert that the order of the commis-mail privileges comes to be so edited that

Second class privileges.

Following ruling of postmaster general revoking, see Courts, 5.

65: 704

2. The power of the Postmaster General to suspend or revoke second-class mail privileges is a necessary incident to his power to grant such privileges. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 SupCt. Rep. 352,

65: 704

thereto, the Postmaster General may, in his discretion, ascertain the effect of such diversion by a weighing of such mails for such number of successive working days as he may determine, and have the weights stated and verified to him as in other cases, and readjust the compensation on the routes affected accordingly: Provided, That no readjustment shall be made unless the diverted mails equal at least 10 per centum of the average daily weight on any of the routes affected." This is not a recurrence to the quadrennial weighing for ninety days, but a limited investigation for a limited purpose. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 610, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617,

it contains other than mailable matter, it the Act of August 24, 1912, § 4, providing is the plain intention of Congress that it that "when, after a weighing of the mails shall no longer be carried as second-class for the purpose of readjusting the compenmail. United States ex rel. Milwaukee So-sation for their transportation on a railcial Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 road route, mails are diverted therefrom or U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 352, 65: 704 4. Authority to revoke the second-class mail privileges of a newspaper which, contrary to the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, systematically contained false reports and false statements, published with intent to interfere with the success of the military operations of the Federal government, to promote the success of its enemies, and to obstruct its recruiting and enlistment service, was conferred upon the Postmaster General, not merely as to a single issue of such paper, but until a proper application and showing shall be made for a renewal of such privilege, by the provision of title 12 of that act that any newspaper published in violation of any of its terms 65: 1118 shall be "nonmailable," and shall not be 7. The result of the last general weigh"conveyed in the mails or delivered from ing is accepted by the Act of August 24, any postoffice or by any letter carrier," 1912, § 4, as a near enough basis for the 10 when read in connection with the declara-per cent test created by the provisions of tion of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 396, that it is that section that "when, after a weighing of the duty of the Postmaster General to superintend regularly all the business of the Postoffice Department, and to execute all laws relating to the postal service, and with the Federal legislation classifying the mails, which deals only with "mailable matter." United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 352, 65: 704 Compensation for carrying mails. Recovery back of money paid under mistake, see Assumpsit.

the mails for the purpose of readjusting the
compensation for their transportation on
a railroad route, mails are diverted there-
from or thereto, the Postmaster General
may, in his discretion, ascertain the effect
of such diversion by a weighing of such
mails for such number of successive work-
ing days as he may determine, and have the
weights stated and verified to him as in
other cases, and readjust the compensation
on the routes affected accordingly: Provid-
ed, That no readjustment shall be made
unless the diverted mails equal at least 10
per centum of the average daily weight on
any of the routes affected." Missouri, K. &
T. R. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 610,
41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617,
65: 1118

5. An arrangement between the Postmaster General and a railway company whereby compensation for carrying the mails for four years was fixed "unless otherwise ordered" at certain sums, with express notice that the railway company 8. A readjustment in respect of past would be "subject to all the postal laws and services in carrying the mails must be regulations which are now or may become deemed to have been contemplated by the applicable during the term of the service," provision of the Act of August 24, 1912, § is not a contract which could not be affect-4, that "when, after a weighing of the mails ed by the subsequent enactment of the Act for the purpose of readjusting the compenof August 24, 1912, § 4, under which "when, sation for their transportation on a railafter a weighing of the mails for the pur-road route, mails are diverted therefrom or pose of readjusting the compensation for their transportation on a railroad route, mails are diverted therefrom or thereto, the Postmaster General may, in his discretion, ascertain the effect of such diversion by a weighing of such mails for such number of successive working days as he may determine, and have the weights stated and verified to him as in other cases, and readjust the compensation on the routes affected accordingly." and the railway company cannot discontinue an important item of the services upon which the compensation was computed and still demand the same pay. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 610, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, 65: 1118

6. The effect of a diversion of the mails may be ascertained by a weighing of the diverted mails for such number of days as the Postmaster General may direct under

thereto, the Postmaster General may, in his
discretion, ascertain the effect of such di-
version by a weighing of such mails for
such number of successive working days as
he may determine and have the weights
stated and verified to him as in other cases,
and readjust the compensation on the routes
affected accordingly: Provided, That no
readjustment shall be made unless the di-
verted mails equal at least 10 per centum
of the average daily weight on any of the
routes affected," since the act was not ap-
proved until August 24, 1912, and allowed
a readjustment from the first day of the
previous July. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
United States, 256 U. S. 610, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 617,
65: 1118

9. Only where the diverted mails do not equal 10 per cent of the average daily weight upon any, i. e.. some one, of the

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