« ForrigeFortsett »
construction or completion of a project for quantities," from a ship channel, which creating a navigable channel in accordance make final the decision of the government with the designs and specifications of a engineer officer in charge as to quality named corporation which had abandoned its and quantity of work, require the contracown effort to obtain the desired channel tors to observe his instructions, and proclearly implies that Congress intended to vide that modifications of the work in give an experimental patented construction character and quality, whether of labor or embodied in such designs and specifications materials, are to be agreed upon in writa fair trial, and justifies the inference of ing, and, unless so agreed upon or exa disposition, but not a contract, to pay pressly required in writing, no claim shall for the use of the patented form of con- be made therefor, such contractors may restruction if it should prove to be valuable. cover from the government for the extra Haupt v. United States, 254 U. S. 272, 41 work (including the loss to them while Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, 65: 266 waiting for the government engineer to lo13. The United States cannot be held cate such work) of excavating limestone liable as upon a quantum meruit to the rock and limestone bedrock in such chanowner of a patent for the use which he nel, pursuant to the order of the governclaims the government made of his inven- ment engineer who, over the contractors' tion in creating a navigable channel, where protest that such materials were not innot only did the construction as ultimately cluded in the contract, and in opposition completed, which produced the desired chan- to their request for the fixing of an extra nel, not embody any of the devices of the price, insisted upon the removal of such patent, but there is nothing from which a materials, stating that if the contractors promise by the government to pay for the did not remove the same they would be use of such devices can reasonably be im- declared in default, that the work would plied. Haupt v. United States, 254 U. S. be taken from them, be done and charged 272, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, 65: 266 to them, and be paid for from the retained percentages for the work already per14. No intention to bind the government formed, and if the percentages were not for any amount in excess of that appropri- sufficient for that purpose they and their ated by Congress for completing an im-bondsmen would be proceeded against, since provement can be deduced from provisions the conduct of such officer was repellent of in a contract for doing the work at unit appeal or of any alternative but submission rates for dredging soft material and for to his orders, with its consequences. United excavating rock that, within the limits of States v. L. P. & J. A. Smith, 256 U. S. 11, available funds, the United States reserves 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413, 65: 808 the right to require the removal of such yardage as will complete the work, be it more or less than the quantities estimated. Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563. 65: 1099 -extra work; loss.
-construction and obligation.
15. If, through mistake of the government's representatives, more work is done and work is continued for a longer period than was contracted for or authorized, the expenses of superintendence incident to the mistake should be borne by the government, and the contractor should not be made to suffer by the depletion of the appropriation. The fund otherwise available for work actually performed should be applied to that purpose. Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563,
65: 1099 16. A government contractor cannot recover damages from the United States, occasioned by delays ordered by the government, where the contract gave large discretion to the United States to suspend performance, or change the work or material. providing for a compensating extension of time for performance, and in addition expressly declared. "No claim shall be made of allowed to the contractor for any damages which may arise out of any delay caused by the United States." Wells Bros. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 83, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, 65: 148
17. Despite provisions in a contract with the United States for excavating "sand, gravel, and boulders, all in unknown
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
Freedom of speech or press in war time, see Constitutional Law, 74.
Trial by court-martial, see Courts-Mar- Property Custodian," to which the amendtial.
War excess profits tax, see Internal
atory Act of November 4, 1918, added, after the requirements of transfer, the words, "or the same may be seized by the Alien Property Custodian, and all property thus acquired shall be held, administered and disPosed of as elsewhere provided in this act," claim, for a return of the property and for provision being made in § 9 for immediate suit, in which case the property is to be retained in the custody of the Alien Property Custodian, or in the Treasury of the United Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. States, to abide the result. Central Union Ct. Rep. 214,
1. The requisition of a British ship in British waters by the British ment for war use cannot be said to have been invalid for lack of a formal warrant, where, following the usual practice, never disapproved, the requisition order was communicated to the shipowner by a telegram, and the government treated the telegraphic order as effective by using the ship as a war transport for more than six months, and compensating the owner accordingly. Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Corp. 256 U. S. 619, 6. The natural interpretation of the 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612, 65: 1123 provision of the Trading with the Enemy Trading with enemy; enemy property. Act of November 4, 1918, that the sole relief Act of October 6, 1917, as amended by the 2. The Trading with the Enemy Act, and remedy of any person having any claim whether taken as originally enacted on October 6, 1917, or as thereafter amended to any property transferred to the Alien by the Acts of March 28, 1918, November Property Custodian, or required so to be, 4, 1918, July 11, 1919, and June 5, 1920, the terms of the act, is that it refers to the or seized by him, shall be that provided by is strictly a war measure, and finds its sanction in the constitutional provision em- the filing of a claim for a return of the remedies expressly provided by § 9, viz., powering Congress to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make property and the bringing of suit, and that rules concerning captures on land and water. property required to be transferred, and Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup.not that the resort by the Custodian to the property seized, stand on the same footing. Ct. Rep. 293, 3. There can be no doubt that Congress courts instead of to force opens to the perhas power to provide for an immediate son who has declined to obey the order of seizure in war times of property supposed the statute, or who has prevented a seizure, to belong to the enemy, as it could provide a right by implication to delay what the for an attachment or distraint, if adequate statute evidently means to accomplish at once. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, provision is made for a return in case of mistake. As it can authorize a seizure in 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214, 65: 403 Property Custodian under the Trading with 7. A proceeding brought by the Alien the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, § 17, to obtain possession of property as being that 4. A demand by the Alien Property of an alien enemy, gives nothing but the Custodian under the Trading with the preliminary custody, such as would have Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, for the de-been gained by seizure, although the proplivery to him of property to which he is erty is to be conveyed to him, and by the entitled, may be enforced by the Federal amendatory Act of March 28, 1918, he is district courts under § 17 of that act, giv-vested with all the power of a commoning to those courts jurisdiction to make all such orders and decrees as may be
pais, it can authorize one through the help
of a court. Central Union Trust Co. v.
Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214,
and proper to enforce the provisions of the
ing of suit, the property, in case of suit, to be retained in the custody of the Custodian or in the Treasury of the United States, to abide the result. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214,
law trustee in respect of all property other than money which has been or shall be, or which has been or shall be required to be, conveyed to him, and is given the power to sell and manage the same as though he were absolute owner, since this act did not Property Custodian that certain property vides for the immediate filing of a claim repeal § 9 of the earlier act, which prois liable to seizure as being that of an for a return of the property and the bringalien enemy must, whether right or wrong, be deemed conclusive in a possessory action brought by that officer to obtain immediate possession, the President having delegated his authority to him under the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6. 1917, § 5. and the act providing in § 7 c 65: 403 that, "if the President shall so require, any 8. A determination by the Alien Propmoney or other property owing or belonging erty Custodian that certain property is to or held for, by, on account of, or on enemy-owned must be regarded as the act behalf of, or for the benefit of an enemy of the President, within the meaning of or ally of an enemy not holding a license the Trading with the Enemy Act of October granted by the President hereunder, which 6, 1917, in view of the provision of § 5 the President after investigation shall de- of that act, authorizing the President to termine is so owing or so belongs, or is so exercise any of the powers with which he held, shall be conveyed, transferred, as-is invested by that act, respecting the signed, delivered or paid over to the Alien sequestration, custody, and disposal of
enemy property through such officer or tion. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 officers as he shall direct, and of the orders Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 65: 604 of the President, committing to the Alien 13. A corporation not owning or having Property Custodian the administration of any interest in property seized and pro§ 7 c of the act, including the power to posed to be sold as enemy property under determine, after investigation, whether the Trading with the Enemy Act of October property was enemy-owned. Stoehr v. Wal- 6, 1917, is not in a position to criticize lace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, or attack the sale; and a stockholder suing 65: 604 in the right of the corporation is in no better position. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 65: 604 Effect on constitutional guaranties.
9. Congress, in time of war, may authorize and provide for the seizure and sequestration, through executive channels, of property believed to be enemy-owned, if adequate provision be made for a return in case of mistake. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 65: 604 10. Shares of stock standing in the name of one who is neither an enemy nor an ally of an enemy could, consistently with due process of law, be seized and required to be transferred to the Alien Property Custodian in virtue of a determination by that official in an ex parte administrative proceeding that they belonged to an alien enemy, conformably to the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, since such act distinctly reserves to any claimant who is neither an enemy nor an ally of an enemy, a right to assert and establish his claim by a suit in equity, unembarrassed by the precedent executive determination, and provides that, pending the suit, which the claimant may bring as promptly after the seizure as he chooses, the property is to be retained by the Alien Property Custodian to abide the result, and, | WAR DEPARTMENT. if the claimant prevails, is forthwith to be returned to him. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293,
14. The mere existence of a state of war could not suspend or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaranties and limitations of U. S. Const., 5th and 6th Amendments, as to delegating legislative power to courts and juries, penalizing indefinite acts, and depriving citizens of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations against them. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298,
11. No such an interest in shares of stock in a domestic corporation, which were seized by the Alien Property Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as the property of a German corporation, as entitles another domestic corporation in whose name the stock stands to demand that such shares be freed from the seizure, was given to the latter corporation by a pre-war contract between it and the German corporation, where such contract was not prompted by commercial motives, nor based on an estimate of mutual advantages, and was not intended as a genuine transaction, but was made to avoid inconvenience which otherwise might ensue from a state of war; the parties intending to leave the beneficial ownership in the German corporation, and not pass it to the domestic corporation. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 65: 604
12. Treaty provisions which relate only to the rights of merchants of either country, residing in the other when war arises. are inapplicable to a controversy as to whether the beneficial ownership of property seized and proposed to be sold under the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as the property of a German corporation, is in truth in an American corporation under a pre-war contract between such corporation and the German corpora
Tedrow v. A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co.
255 U. S.
255 U. S. 98, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303, 65: 524 Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co. 255 U. S. 102, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304, C. A. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 104, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305, 65: 532 G. S. Willard Co. v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 106, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305, 65: 534 Oglesby Grocery Co. v. United States, 255 U. S. 108, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, 65: 535
Approval of obstruction to navigation, see Commerce, 6-9.
Admiralty jurisdiction over, see Admiralty.
As state boundary, see Boundaries. Taking tide lands by condemnation proceedings, see Eminent Domain. Enjoining discharge of sewage into harbor, see Injunction, 5.
Right to wharf out, see Waters, 4, 10. Navigability.
Federal control of navigable waters and navigation, see Commerce, 4-10. Following decision of state court as to, see Courts, 27.
1. The fact that artificial obstructions in a stream exist, capable of being abated by due exercise of the public authority, does not prevent the stream from being re
garded as navigable in law, if, supposing them to be abated, it be navigable in fact in its natural state. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847
2. The test of navigability of a river is whether it, in its natural state, is used or is capable of being used as a highway for commerce over which trade and travel is or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. Navigability in the sense of the law is not destroyed because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional natural obstructions or portages, nor need the navigation be open at all seasons of the year or at all stages of the water. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847 Relative rights of state and United States.
Federal control of navigable waters and
navigation, see Commerce, 4-10. 3. The right of the United States in the navigable waters within the several states is limited to the control thereof for purposes of navigation; and, subject to that right, each state became, upon its organization as a state, the owner of the navigable waters within its boundary and of the land under the same. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
4. The establishment of pierhead lines by the United States in a navigable waterway did not create any riparian right to wharf out, as against the state. Such lines merely fixed the point beyond which piers might not extend, and the lines so fixed, although acted upon by the erection of piers, could be changed by the United States at any time. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500 Relative rights of public and individual.
Following decision of state court as to riparian rights, see Courts, 28.
5. The state of Washington, being the absolute owner of the tidelands within its boundaries and of the waters over them, is free, in conveying such lands, either to grant with them rights in the adjoining water area, or completely to withhold such rights. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
paired in so doing no right of the upland owners, whose land is thereby separated from all contact with the water. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
8. A conveyance of tidelands from the state of Washington gives the grantee no rights of any sort beyond the boundaries of the grant. A right of access to the navigable channel over intervening land above or below low water must arise from a grant by the owner of the intervening property. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500 9. The rule of the Washington law that upland, tideland, or shore land, in its natural condition, is without appurtenant rights of any sort beyond the boundaries of the property, applies as well when the lands are filled tidelands abutting on a natural waterway deepened and confined. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
10. The clearly defined policy of the state of Washington not to grant riparian rights in navigable waters prevents the Federal courts, in the absence of a decision of the highest state court to the contrary, from inferring an implied grant to the grantees of filled tidelands of a right of access over intervening property to the navigable channel, even conceding the truth of the assumption that such grants were made conformably to a development project, which was an artificial creation; that land was 'artificially made up to a bulkhead; that, at some distance beyond, a navigable channel was artificially created out of an unnavigable stream; that between the bulkhead and the channel are shoals which prevent full use of waterside lots in connection with navigation unless wharves are erected; that when the original grant was made no provision in the law authorized leasing those shoals for docking purposes, but, on the contrary, the whole waterway was reserved by statute forever from sale or lease; and that the plat by reference to which all lots were sold showed a pierhead line at the point of navigable water.. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
11. State officials had no power, under the law of Washington, to establish pierhead lines when platting tidelands. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
6. Under the law of the state of Washington a conveyance by the state of uplands abutting upon a natural navigable waterway grants no right of any kind, either in land below high-water mark, or in, to, or over the water, except the limited preferential right conferred by statute upon the owner of the upland to purchase the shore P. 1199.
WHITE, EDWARD DOUGLASS.
In memoriam, see Appendix, IV. ante,
land if the state concludes to sell the same. Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 255 U. S. 56, WILLS. 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237, 65: 500
7. So complete is the absence of riparian or littoral rights in the owner of lands bordering on navigable waters in the state of Washington that the state may, subject to the superior rights of the United States, wholly divert a navigable stream and sell the river bed, and yet have im
Devise by Indian allottee, see Indians, 11, 20.
Powers given by, see Powers.
1. The rule that excludes the wife of an accused from testifying in his behalf in
the Federal courts applies although her | Classification.
2. An involuntary bankrupt does not, by filing schedules of assets and liabilities without objection, waive his constitutional privilege to refuse to answer questions respecting them that might tend to incriminate and degrade him. Arndstein v. MeCarthy, 254 U. S. 71, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26, 65: 138 Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 379, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136, 65: 314 3. The constitutional protection against self-incrimination was not removed by the provision in § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, that no testimony given by the bankrupt shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding, since this provision could not and would not prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property. Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26, (Annotated) 65: 138
WORDS AND PHRASES.
Maxims, see Maxims. Accrued. Cochran V. United States, 254 U. S. 387, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166, 65:319 United States v. Woodward, 256 U. S. 632, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615, 65: 1131 Adjacent. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114, 65:301 Adverse. United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U. S. 343, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131, 65:295 Adverse claimant. Galbraith v. Vallely, 256 U. S. 46, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 415,
65:823 Any. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 610, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617, 65:1118 Bias. Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230, 65:481 Bolts. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. J. F. Hasty & Sons, 255 U. S. 252, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, 65:614 Bona fide purchaser. Pere Marquette R. Co. v. J. F. French & Co. 254 U. S. 538, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 195, 65:391 Boycott. Duplex Printing Press Co. V. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 65:349 Capital. Merchants Loan & T. Co. V. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386, 65:751 Chemical mixtures. United States Etna Explosives Co. 256 U. S. 402, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513, 65:1013
65 I. ed.
Director General of Railroads v. Viscose Co. 254 U. S. 499. 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151, 65:372 Conspiracy. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 65:349 Creditor. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365, 65: 697 Damnum absque injuria. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 254 U. S. 370, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140, 65:310 Debt. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365, 65: 697 Deliver. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31,
Delivery. Pere Marquette R. Co. v. J. F. French & Co. 254 U. S. 53S, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 195, 65:391 Dope. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. 254 U. S. 143, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113, 65:189 Elections. Newberry V. United States,
256 U. S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 65:913 Endeavor. United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260, 65: 553 End lines. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conkling Min. Co. 256 U. S. 18, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, 65:811 Fugitive from justice. Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222, 65:497 Hoarding. United States V. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 256 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, 65:516 Imposed. Cochran v. United States, 254 U. S. 387, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166, 65:319 Income. Merchants Loan & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386,
Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390, 65: 758 Invested capital. La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528, 65:998 Kept. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31,
Less. Friedman v. United States, 255 U.
S. 468, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380, 65:735 Mailable matter. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 352, 65:704 Mechanical mixtures. United States v. Etna Explosives Co. 256 U. S. 402, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513, Mixture. United States v. Etna Explosives Co. 256 U. S. 402, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513, 65: 1013 Moneyed capital. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Richmond, 256 U. S. 635, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, 65:1135 More. Friedman v. United States, 255 C. S. 468, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380, 65:735 National banking associations. Ameri
can Bank & T. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U. S. 350, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65:983