to store his liquors in said rented room, effect, and it is therefore of first imafter the Volstead Act should become portance in the consideration of the case effective, and intended to report the before us. That section declares: same to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as therein required; and that the Deposit Company, moved wholly by the notices and threats of defendant Porter, had notified plaintiff that he must remove his liquors from its warehouse, or that it would remove and deliver them to Porter as outlawed property, to be dealt with under the Volstead Act after it became effective.

Clearly there is like administrative power under the act to so regulate the transfer of such stored liquors from a warehouse to the dwelling of the owner as to prevent their being used to evade the prohibitions of the act, or to substantially interfere with its effective enforcement.

when the 18th Amendment to the Con-¡ no such transfer is in terms provided for stitution of the United States goes into by the act. effect, manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this act and all provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented." It is argued that the declaration herein that no person shall "possess," "transport," or "deliver" intoxicating liquors is applicable to this case, because the warehouse company is not "authorized" by the act to "possess" them, and because they cannot be used, even lawfully, by the plaintiff, unless delivered and taken away from the warehouse.

Thus it is plain that, in the sections of the act relied upon, [94] there is no specific prohibition against the storage of liquors, under the circumstances admitted to exist in this case, and we find no other provisions by which such a custody is rendered unlawful.

The implication from another provision of § 33 than the one quoted above confirms this conclusion. It reads:

"After February 1, 1920, the possession of liquors by any person not legally permitted under this title to possess liquor shall be prima facie evidence that such liquor is kept for the purpose of being sold, bartered, exchanged, given away, furnished, or otherwise disposed of in violation of the provisions of this title."

By the admissions the appellant is lessee of the room in which the liquors are stored, and he "is in the exclusive possession and control of them." Thereby the relation of the warehouse company to the liquors is restricted to the [93] public function of furnishing such police, fire, and other protection to its buildings and their contents as the law or its lease requires on the part of such company, and to allowing the plaintiff to have access to his property in order Assuming that the unexplained presthat he may remove it for an admitted- ence of the liquors in the company's ly lawful purpose. The company could warehouse would give rise to the prenot sell, give away, or otherwise trans- scribed presumption, yet, if that prefer the liquors to anyone other than, in sumption should be rebutted by approthis limited way, to the plaintiff owner. priate testimony (as it is in this case by The purpose of the 18th Amendment admissions) that the liquor to which it and of this act considered, we cannot is applied is not being kept for the purbring ourselves to the conclusion that pose of sale, barter, exchange, furnishsuch a relation to the liquors on the part ing, or otherwise disposing of it in vioof the storage company as is here dis-lation of the provisions of the title, the closed constitutes a possession of them within the meaning of this section of the act.

It is equally clear that to permit the owner to have access to the liquors to take them to his dwelling for lawful use is not a delivery of them within the meaning of this 3d section.

That transportation of the liquors to the home of appellant, under the admitted circumstances, is not such as is prohibited by the section, is too apparent to justify detailed consideration of the many provisions of the act inconsistent with a construction which would render such removal unlawful, and that the act is understood by the officers charged with its execution as permitting such transportation is shown by the provision of the regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, authorizing permits for the transportation of liquors from one permanent residence of an owner to another in case of his removal, although

implication is plain that the possession should be considered not unlawful, even though it be by a person "not legally permitted,"—that is, by a person not holding a technical permit to possess it, such as is provided for in the act.

Without saying that there may not be other cases, the one at bar seems to be fairly within the scope of this obvious implication of § 33.

It may be that the custody of liquors by a warehouse company was thus not declared to be unlawful because the writers of the act did not have such a case in mind; but it was more probably because Congress would not consent to allow lawful possession and use of liquors in dwellings having storage facilities for them, while denying the only possible means of preserving and protecting such liquors to persons with less commodious homes. The Congress was concerned with the great problem of preventing the manufacture [95] and sale

of intoxicating liquors for beverage pur-, die by his own hand, the policy shall be poses in the future, and it seems to have void, and a provision that the policy shall given but slight attention to the con- date of issue, provided the premiums are be incontestable after one year from the sumption of such relatively small amounts of such liquors as might be in [For other cases, see Insurance, XI. d, 2, in duly paid. existence in private ownership, and intended for consumption by the owner, his family or his guests, when the Amendment and the act should take effect.

An intention to confiscate private property, even in intoxicating liquors, will not be raised by inference and construction from provisions of law which have ample field for other operation in effecting a purpose clearly indicated and declared.

It results that the decree of the District Court must be reversed.

Mr. Justice McReynolds, concurring: I concur in the judgment of the court, but do not assent to the reasoning ad

Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Life insurance incontestable and suicide clauses - public policy.

3. Incontestable and suicide clauses in policies of life insurance which exclude suicide as a defense when committed, sane or insane, after a period respectively of one and two years from the issuance of the policies, will not be deemed as against public policy unless the state concerned adopts a different view.

[For other cases, see Insurance, XI. d, 2, în Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[Nos. 70 and 71.]

Submitted October 22, 1920. Decided November 15, 1920.

States Circuit Court of Appeals for

vanced to support it. I think the Vol-ON CERTIFICATES from the United stead Act [41 Stat. at L. 305, chap. 83] was properly interpreted by the court the Eighth Circuit presenting questions as to whether an insurance company is below; but to enforce it as thus construed would result in virtual confisca- liable in case of the suicide of the intion of lawfully acquired liquors by pre- sured. Answered in the affirmative. venting or unduly interfering with their The facts are stated in the opinion. consumption by the owner. The 18th Mr. George Lines submitted the cause Amendment gave no such power to Con- for the Northwestern Mutual Life Ingress. Manufacture, sale, and transpor-surance Company. Mr. Sam T. Swantation are the things prohibited,—not personal use.

public policy. 1. Public policy with regard to express undertakings respecting suicide as a defense to suits on policies of life insurance is a

matter for the states to decide.

[For other cases, see Insurance, XI. d, 2, in
Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Life insurance suicide as defense.
2. Suicide of the insured, sane or in-
sane, after the specified time, is no defense
to suits on policies of life insurance which
contain respectively a provision that if,
within two years from the date of the pol-
icy, the insured, while sane or insane, shall

sen was on the brief:

It is undoubtedly the rule of the Federal courts, as assumed in the question certified, that where a policy of life insurance is silent respecting liability of the company in case of suicide by the insured, death of the insured by his own hand, he being sane, is not one of the risks insured against.

Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S.

Note. As to power of legislature to forbid defense of suicide in life insurance-see note to Head Camp, P. J. W. W. v. Sloss, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 831.

As to applicability of incontestable clause in case of suicide-see note to Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy, L.R.A. 1918D, 870.

As to incontestability of life insurance under provisions of the policy or of a statute-see note to Clement v. New York L. Ins. Co. 42 L.R.A. 247.

Generally, on suicide as a defense to suits for life insurance-see notes to

Grand Legion, I. S. K. A. v. Beaty, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1124; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Wiswell, 35 L.R.A. 258; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 21 L. ed. U. S. 236; and Home Ben. Asso. v. Sargent, 35 L. ed. U. S. 1161.

139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300;
Hopkins v. Northwestern Life Assur.
Co. 94 Fed. 729; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v.
Kelly, 52 C. C. A. 154, 114 Fed. 268;
Supreme Council, R. A. v. Wishart, 112
C. C. A. 591, 192 Fed. 453.

So, also, death at the hands of the law, as a punishment for crime, is not one of the risks insured against, whether so stipulated in the policy or not.

Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 362, 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 56 L. ed. 419, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 57, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220. Nor is death at the hands of the beneficiary, assignee, or other person entitled to the proceeds.

Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 997, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877.

Well reasoned decisions of state courts are in harmony with the conclusions reached in the cases above cited.

Supreme Commandery, K. G. R. v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 445, 46 Am. Rep. 332; Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 479; Security L. Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 117 Va. 401, 84 S. E. 656, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1187; Davis v. Supreme Council, R. A. 195 Mass. 402, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 722, 81 N. E. 294, 11 Ann. Cas. 777; Scarborough v. American Nat. Ins. Co. 171 N. C. 353, L.R.A.1918A, 896, 88 S. E. 482, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1181; Hatch v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 120 Mass. 550, 21 Am. Rep. 541; Bloom v. Franklin L. Ins. Co. 97 Ind. 478, 49 Am. Rep. 469; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Munson, Tex. Civ. App. —, 202 S. W. 987.

Mr. S. F. Prouty submitted the cause for Isabel H. Johnson:

There are two elementary principles of law that will assist in interpreting its meaning and force:

1. Insurance policies, being unilateral contracts, will be construed most strictly against the insurer.

2. Where there is an express exclusion of one thing, it expressly includes other things not excepted. This policy clearly excepts the risk of suicide, sane or insane, during two years, and therefore as expressly includes such risk after two years.

Goodwin v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Asso. 97 Iowa, 226, 32 L.R.A. 473, 59 Am. St. Rep. 411, 66 N. W. 157; Supreme Court of Honor v. Updegraff, 68 Kan. 474, 75 Pac. 477, 1 Ann. Cas. 309; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Payne, Tex. Civ. App. —, 32 S. W. 1063; Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 63 L.R.A. 452, 98 Am. St. Rep. 224, 68 N. E. 492; Clement v. New York L. Ins. Co. 101 Tenn. 22, 42 L.R.A. 247, 70 Am. St. Rep. 650, 46 S. W. 561; 4 Cooley, Briefs on Ins. p. 3229, and authorities there cited; Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co. 136 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 408, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; First Nat. Bank v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 95 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563; Moulor v. American L. Ins. Co. 111 U. S. 335, 28. L. ed. 447, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; Wadsworth v. Jewelers & Tradesmen's Co. 132 N. Y. 540, 29 N. E. 1104; Fitch v. American Popular L. Ins. Co. 59 N. Y. 557, 17 Am. Rep. 372.

The risk of suicide is not prohibited by law, as against public policy.

The object and effect of the suicide Simpson v. Life Ins. Co. 115 N. C. clause is to extend during the first two 393, 20 S. E. 517; Steele v. St. Louis years of the policy's life, exclusion of Mut. L. Ins. Co. 3 Mo. App. 207; 2 the risk of suicide to cases where the in- Bacon, Ben. Soc. 694, §§ 340, 340a; sured is insane, as well as to those where Mareck v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life he is sane, at the time of taking his life. Asso. 62 Minn. 39, 54 Am. St. Rep. 613, Amicable Soc. v. Bolland, 4 Bligh, N. 64 N. W. 68; Goodwin v. Provident Sav. R. 194, 5 Eng. Reprint, 70, 2 Dow & C. L.R.A. 473, 59 Am. St. Rep. 411, 66 N. Life Assur. Asso. 97 Iowa, 226, 32 1, 6 Eng. Reprint, 630; Supreme Coun- W. 157; Bates v. United L. Ins. Asso. cil, R. A. v. Wishart, 112 C. C. A. 591, 68 Hun, 144, 22 N. Y. Supp. 626, affirmed 192 Fed. 453; Scarborough v. American without opinion in 142 N. Y. 677, 37 N. Nat. Ins. Co. 171 N. C. 353, L.R.A. E. 824; Fitch v. American Popular L. 1918A, 896, 88 S. E. 482, Ann. Cas. Ins. Co. 59 N. Y. 570, 17 Am. Rep. 372; 1917D, 1181; Collins v. Metropolitan L. Murray v. State Mut. L. Ins. Co. 22 R. Ins. Co. 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 356; American I. 524, 53 L.R.A. 742, 48 Atl. 800; Nat. Ins. Co. v. Munson, Tex. Civ. Wright v. Mutual Ben. Life Asso. 118 App., 202 S. W. 987; Bromley v. N. Y. 237, 6 L.R.A. 731, 16 Am. St. Rep. Washington L. Ins. Co. 122 Ky. 407, 5749, 23 N. E. 186; Kline v. National L.R.A. (N.S.) 747, 121 Am. St. Rep. 467, 92 S. W. 17, 12 Ann. Cas. 685; Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 152-154, 42 L. ed. 697, 698, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300.

Ben. Asso. 111 Ind. 462, 60 Am. Rep. 703, 11 N. E. 620; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Payne, Tex. Civ. App. 32 S. W. 1063; Patterson v. Natural

Premium Mut. L. Ins. Co. 100 Wis. 118, | of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. maxims are adopted by public policy, and have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries.