92 Am. St. Rep. 753, 65 N. E. 258; Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 63 L.R.A. 347, 67 N. E. 83; Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. 21 Pa. 466; Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, I. O. H. 105 Va. 643, 55 S. E. 9; Supreme Conclave, I. O. H. v. Rehan, 119 Md. 92, 46 L,R.A.(N.S.) 308, 85 Atl. 1035, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 58.

The rights of all parties to an insurance contract are determined by the terms of the policy,-express or implied, --and no one can recover thereon except in accordance with the terms of such contract.

Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. ed. 236; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 997, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877; Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 362, 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 56 L. ed. 419, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 57, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Hopkins v. Northwestern Life Assur. Co. 94 Fed. 729, s. c. 40 C. C. A. 1, 99 Fed. 199; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 52 C. C. A. 154, 114 Fed. 268; Schmidt v. Northern Life Asso. 112 Iowa, 44, 51 L.R.A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323, 83 N. W. 800; McDonald v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 178 Iowa, 863, 160 N. W. 289; Pitt v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 100 Mass. 500; Davis v. Supreme Council, R. A. 195 Mass. 402, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 722, 81 N. E. 294, 11 Ann. Cas. 777.

The incontestable clause does not preclude the defense of suicide or self-destruction by the assured, while sane, because as to such risk there is no in

surance contract.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

Supreme Council, R. A. v. Wishart, 112 C. C. A. 591, 192 Fed. 453; North American Union v. Trenner, 138 Ill. App. 586; Bromley v. Washington L. Ins. Co. 122 Ky. 402, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 747, 121 Am. St. Rep. 467, 92 S. W. 17, 12 Ann. Cas. 685; Scarborough v. American Nat. Ins. Co. 171 N. C. 353, L.R.A. 1918A, 896, 88 S. E. 482, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1181; Hall v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 31; Starck v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 134 Pa. 45, 5 L.R.A. 756, 19 Am. St. Rep. 674, 19 Atl. 703; Childress v. Fraternal Union, 113 Tenn. 252, 82 S. W. 832, 3 Ann. Cas. 236; Security L. Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 117 Va. 401, 84 S. E. 656, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1187; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Munson, Tex. Civ. App. 202 S. W. 987.

These are suits upon policies issued to George P. Johnson upon his life, payable in the first case to his wife, in the second to his executors or administrators. The wife and the administrator respectively recovered in the district court, and, the cases having gone to the circuit court of appeals, the latter has certified certain questions to this court. The policy payable to the wife contained a provision that "if within two years from the date hereof, the said insured shall

die in consequence of a [100] duel, or shall, while sane or insane, die by his own hand, then, and in every such case, this policy shall be void." Johnson, the insured, died by his own hand more than two years the date of the policy. The after first question put in the wife's suit is whether the above provision, there being no other in the policy as to suicide, makes the insurance company liable in the event that happened. The second is in substance whether the contract, if construed to make the company liable, is against public policy and void.

The policy payable to the administrator had no provision as to suicide, but did agree that "this contract shall be incontestable after one year from the date of its issue, provided the required premiums are duly paid." Johnson's suicide was more than a year after the date of the policy. The first question propounded is whether the above provision prevents the insurer from denying liability in this case, it not appearing that Johnson was insane when he killed himself. The second is whether such a contract, which makes no exception for death resulting from suicide, is against public policy, and therefore void. There is a third, as to a possible distinction between insurance payable to the wife and that payable to the estate of the insured, which will not need to be discussed.

The public policy with regard to such contracts is a matter for the states to decide. Whitfield v. Etna L. Ins. Co. 205 U. S. 489, 495, 51 L. ed. 895, 898, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578. This case qualifies the statement in Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 154, 42 L. ed. 693, 698, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300, to the effect that insurance on a man's own life, payable to his estate, and expressly covering suicide committed by him when sane, would be against public policy. The point de

Mr. S. F. Prouty submitted the cause cided was only that, when the contract was silent, there was an implied excepfor A. M. Miller. 254 U. S.

tion of such a death. There was evidence, insurance companies now generally isthat the insurance was taken out with sue policies with such a clause. The intent to commit suicide, and it plainly state decisions, so far as we know, appeared [101] that the act was have upheld it. Unless it appears done by the insured for the purpose that the state concerned adopts a difof enabling his estate to pay his ferent attitude, we should uphold it debts. The application, although ex- here. Simpson v. Life Ins. Co. 115 N. cluded below, warranted against sui- C. 393, 20 S. E. 517; Mareck v. Mutual eide within two years, within which Reserve Fund Life Asso. 62 Minn. 39, 54 time the death took place. So that Am. St. Rep. 613, 64 N. W. 68; Goodwin all the circumstances gave moral sup- v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Asso. 97 port to the construction of the policy Iowa, 226, 32 L.R.A. 473, 59 Am. St. Rep. adopted by the court in accordance with 411, 66 N. W. 157; Patterson v. Natural the view that has prevailed in some juris- Premium Mut. L. Ins. Co. 100 Wis. 118, dictions as to the general rule. In Burt 42 L.R.A. 253, 69 Am. St. Rep. 899, 75 v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 362, N. W. 980. 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, it was held that there was a similar tacit exclusion from the risk assumed of the death of the insured by execution for murder, and the same decision was reached in Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 56 L. ed. 419, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 57, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220. But the question here does not concern implied exceptions, it concerns the effect of express undertakings, which, as we have said, depends upon the policy of the state.

We are of opinion that the provision. in the first-mentioned document, avoiding the policy if the insured should die by his own hand within two years from the date, is an inverted expression of the same general intent as that of the clause in the second, making the policy incontestable after one year, and that both equally mean that suicide of the insured, insane or sane, after the specified time, shall not be a defense. It seems to us that that would be the natural interpretation of the words by the people to whom they are addressed, and that the language of each policy makes the company issuing it liable in the event that happened. We answer the first question in each certificate, yes. The other questions are disposed of by our answer to the first.

Answer to question 1 in No. 70, Yes.
Answer to question 1 in No. 71, Yes.

Mr. Justice Day took no part in the decision of these cases.

[103] ANNIE HARRIS et al., Appts.,

The certificates do not disclose in what states these contracts were made, but it is not necessary to postpone our answer on that account. It appears from Whitfield v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. supra, that some legislatures have thought it best to insist that life insurance should cover suicide unless taken out in contemplation of the deed. But the case is much stronger when a considerable time is to elapse before the fact that the death was by the insured's own hand ceases to be a defense. The danger is less sinister and probably a good deal smaller than the danger of murder when the insurance is held by a third person, having no interest in the continuance of the life insured, yet insurance on the life of a third person does not become void by assignment to one who has no interest in the life. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U. S. 149. 56 L. ed. 133, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 642, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1. Lands allotted in the right of a de863. When a clause makes a policy in ceased enrolled member of the Creek Nadisputable after one or two years, the 1901, June 30, 1902, and April 26, 1906, tion, conformably to the Acts of March 1, mere evocation of a possible motive for were received by his heirs as an inheriself-slaughter is at least not more ob- tance, and not as a direct allotment to jectionable than the creation of a possi- them, and such heirs are therefore not govble motive for murder. The object of erned by restrictions on alienation applithe clause is plain and laudable,-to cable to living allottees.

V.

HARRY H. BELL et al.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 103-113.) Indian allotments-deceased allottee

heirs.

Sup. Ct. 1908.]

create an absolute assurance of the ben-[For other cases, see Indians, VIII. in Digest Courts - relation to other departments of government — administrative construction of statute.

efit, [102] as free as may be from any dispute of fact except the fact of death, and as soon as it reasonably can be done. It is said that the

2. The administrative construction of

Argued January 26, 1920. Decided Novem- terms. Especially is this true of these

tion over the persons and property of, by § 19 of that act, prescribing restricminor allottees of the Five Civilized tions against alienation by the allottee. Tribes, with a very marked qualifica- Skelton v. Dill, 235 U. S. 206, 59 L. ed. tion, and that is, "except as otherwise specifically provided by law." The law to which reference is made in the qualification or exception noted means Federal law, and not state law.

Truskett v. Closser, 236 U. S. 223, L. ed. 549, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385.

The general statutes of the state of Oklahoma did not preclude the exercise of the power of Congress, as exhibited in the Act of May 27, 1908.

Ibid.; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578.

Restricted lands of living minors cannot be sold by order of court, or otherwise.

198, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60; Mullen v. United States, 224 U. S. 448, 56 L. ed. 834, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; Talley v. Burgess, 246 U. S. 104, 62 L. ed. 600, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287.

By 5 of the Act of April 26, 1906, and § 32 of the Act of June 25, 1910, Congress declared there was no distinction between inherited lands and lands allotted in the name of deceased Creek citizens.

Shulthis v. McDougal, 95 C. C. A. 615, 170 Fed. 529; Perryman v. Woodward, 238 U. S. 148, 59 L. ed. 1242, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 830.

The approval of the deed executed by the appellant Annie Harris to Laura A. McGinnis by the Secretary of the Interior on the 6th day of July, 1910, operated to remove all restrictions and make the deed valid.

Okla Oil Co. v. Bartlett, 149 C. C. A. 540, 236 Fed. 488; Parker v. Richard, 250 U. S. 235, 63 L. ed. 954, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442; Marcy v. Seminole County, 45 Okla. 1, 144 Pac. 611; United Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U. S. 310, States v. Hinkle, C. C. A., 261 36 L. ed. 716, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; LyFed. 518; United States v. Nice, 241 U. kins v. McGrath, 184 U. S. 169, 46 L. ed. S. 591, 60 L. ed. 1192, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 450; Anchor Oil 696; Heckman v. United States, 224 U. Co. v. Gray, 168 C. C. A. 361, 257 Fed. S. 413, 56 L. ed. 820, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. | 277; United States v. Knight, 124 C. C. 424; Gannon v. Johnston, 243 U. S. 108, A. 211, 206 Fed. 145; Scioto Oil Co. v. 61 L. ed. 622, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; O'Hern, Okla. 169 Pac. 483. Bowling v. United States, 233 U. S. 528, Under the Act of May 27, 1998, in58 L. ed. 1080, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659;terests of full-blood Creek Indian miTalley v. Burgess, 246 U. S. 104, 62 L. ed. 600, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287. Solicitor General King and Assistant General Attorney Nebeker also filed a brief for appellants:

The legislative intent is plain and the language is without ambiguity; there- | fore, the statute is not open to construction.

United States v. First Nat. Bank, 234 U. S. 245, 258, 58 L. ed. 1298, 1303, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 307, 308, 60 L. ed. 297, 299, 300, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 645; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485-490, 61 L. ed. 442, 452-455, L.R.A.1917F, 502, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168.

Mr. William M. Matthews argued the cause, and, with Mr. George S. Ramsey, filed a brief for appellees:

nors in inherited lands can be sold through the county courts of Oklahoma having jurisdiction of their estates, and approval of guardian's deeds by those

courts renders them valid.

Chupco v. Chapman, 76 Okla. 201, 170 Pac. 259.

Specific legislation relating to a particular class is not affected by general legislation in regard to many classes or subjects unless it clearly appears that the general provisions are so repugnant to the special that the legislators must be presumed to have intended thereby to modify or repeal it. The special and general legislation must stand and be read together, the former governing as to the particular class and the latter as to the general law upon other subjects

or classes.

South Carolina v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, 21 L. ed. 650; Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. 422, 59 L. ed. 295, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Morrison v. Burnette, 83 C. C. A.

Where a Creek Indian citizen dies before receiving his allotment, and thereafter a certificate and patent are issued in his name, such allotment, so 391, 154 Fed. 617. far as restrictions are concerned, is governed by § 22 of the Act of Congress of April 26, 1906, prescribing restrictions on inherited lands, and not

It was not intended by the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908, to prohibit the sale of inherited lands owned by minors enrolled as full bloods.

Chupco v. Chapman, 76 Okla. 201, 287). Section 19 of that act materially 170 Pac. 259; Crowe v. Hardridge, Okla. 175 Pac. 115.