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The state cannot make mandatory | 476; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. that which Congress and the Secretary 424, 56 L. ed. 257, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; of War have left as optional. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310, 61 L. ed. 1160, L.R.A. 1917F, 1184, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833; Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 56 L. ed. 72, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3 N. C. C. A. 822; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 874, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 618, 55 L. ed. 878, 882, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621.

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 617, 10 L. ed. 1060, 1089; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 473, 31 L. ed. 508, 510, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Charleston & W. C. R. Co v. Varnville Furniture Co. 237 U. S. 597, 59 L. ed. 1137, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 333; Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671, 58 L. ed. 1149, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 266, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 138; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439, 446, 448, 59 L. ed. 661, 665, 666, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304; Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 56 L. ed. 237, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160; St. Clair County v. Interstate Sand & Car Trans-ternational bridge is exclusive, and all fer Co. 192 U. S. 454, 468-470, 48 L. ed. 518, 524, 525, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300.

The power of Congress over this in

state legislation concerning it is ineffective except in so far as it has been exThe paramount and exclusive power pressly adopted and validated by Conof Congress in regard to the construc- gress, because the subject-matter intion of bridges over navigable water- volves the external relations of the ways of the United States, which are United States with foreign governboundaries between two states, is well ments. established.

Pennsylvania V. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 421, 15 L. ed. 435; The Clinton Bridge (Gray v. Chicago, I. & N. R. Co.) 10 Wall. 454, 462, 19 L. ed. 969, 971; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411, 32 Fed. 16, appeal dismissed in 140 U. S. 699, 35 L. ed. 603, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028; Decker v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 434, 30 Fed. 723; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 U. S. 532, 38 L. ed. 811, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. 233 U. S. 75, 58 L. ed. 857, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monangahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 26 L. ed. 1143.

There are numerous cases in this court holding that state regulations of the operation of railroads within a state are void when they would result in a burden on interstate commerce.

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. ed. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136, 54 L. ed. 698, 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 802, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep.

United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 290, 48 L. ed. 979, 983, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659, 35 L. ed. 1146, 1149, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 340, 53 L. ed. 1013, 1022, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 493, 494, 48 L. ed. 525, 534, 535, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey (United States v. Lariviere) 93 U. S. 188, 194, 23 L. ed. 846, 847; Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson) 112 U. S. 580, 591, 28 L. ed. 798, 801, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 604-606, 32 L. ed. 1068, 1075, 1076, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 711, 712, 37 L. ed. 905, 912, 913, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 414, 30 L. ed. 425, 426, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 222; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570-574, 10 L. ed. 579, 594-596; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U S. 503, 519, 37 L. ed. 537, 543, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728; United States v. Compagnie Francaise Des Cables Telegraphiques, 77 Fed. 495; People ex rel. Barlow v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 328, 10 Am. Rep. 483; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 482, 31 L. ed. 700, 706, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57, 35 L. ed. 649, 652, 11 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 851; Passenger Cases, 7 How. by the court of appeals, will not avail 283, 12 L. ed. 702. to save this legislation.

The New York Act of 1915 contravenes the treaty entered into by and between the United States and Great Britain, proclaimed May 13, 1910, concerning boundary waters between the United States and Canada.

Henderson v. New York (Henderson v. Wickham) 92 U. S. 259, 273, 23 L. ed. 543, 549; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 421, 15 L. ed. 435; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. 96; Latinette v. St. Louis, 120 C. C. A. 638, 201 Fed. 676; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 414, 30 L. ed. 425, 427, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 222; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 482, 31 L. ed. 700, 706, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; People ex rel. Barlow v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, 10 Am. Rep. 483.

The court of appeals erred in applying to this case the rule applicable to navigable rivers wholly within a single

state.

Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 689, 43 L. ed. 858, 861, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Looney v. Crane Co. 245 U. S. 178, 62 L. ed. 230, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85.

Mr. Adelbert Moot and Mrs. Helen Z.

M. Rodgers argued the cause on reargument, and, with Messrs. Henry W. Sprague and William L. Marcy, filed a brief for plaintiff in error.

Mr. James S. Y. Ivins argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Ralph A. Kellogg and E. C. Aiken, and Mr. Charles D. Newton, Attorney General of New York, filed a brief for defendant in error:

The unavoidable complement of the rule that a charter and grant of franchises constitute a contract on the part of the state is that the acceptance thereof by the corporation constitutes a contract on the part of the corporation as well,-else there could be no contract at

all.

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 27, 51 L. ed. 933, 945, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 277, 278, 54 L. ed. 472, 478, 479, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U. S. 603, 607, 61 L. ed. 520, 522, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234

With the right reserved to alter, amend, or repeal, all that is left of the

thing, is covered by the 14th Amendment and the similar provision of the state Constitution. To impair under those conditions there must be a taking of what has become vested property.

People v. International Bridge Co. 223 N. Y. 145, 119 N. E. 351; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411, 32 Fed. 9, appeal dismissed in 140 U. S. 699, 35 L. ed. 603, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028; Decker v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 434, 30 Fed. 723; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 37 Fed. 129; Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 475, 26 L. ed. 1143, 1145; Luxton V. North River obligation-of-contract clause, if anyBridge Co. 153 U. S. 532, 38 L. ed. 811, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; Latinette v. St. Louis, 120 C. C. A. 638, 201 Fed. 676; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 342, 37 L. ed. 463, 473, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co. 174 U. S. 690, 43 L. ed. 1136, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 233 U. S. 605, 56 L. ed. 570, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co. 202 Fed. 776; Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683, 27 L. ed. 442, 445, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 41 L. ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 326, 61 L. ed. 746, 752, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380; Hubbard v. Fort, 188 Fed. 997.

The police power of the state, invoked

Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190, 20 L. ed. 550; Miller v. New York, 15 Wall. 478, 21 L. ed. 98; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Sioux City Street R. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98, 34 L. ed. 898, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 226; Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 21 L. ed. 133; Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 55, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 700, 58 L. ed. 1161, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1097, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; Ramapo Water Co. v. New York, 236 U. S. 579, 59 L. ed. 731, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442; Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 54 L. ed. 1163, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep.

437; Fair Haven & W. R. Co. v. New, U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. Haven, 203 U. S. 379, 51 L. ed. 237, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487.

The idea is not uncommon that a state's police power, because of its unfortunate name, is limited to the preservation of the public health, safety, and morals. Nothing could be further from the fact. It extends to all matters affecting the public convenience and general welfare, including commercial prosperity; and the definition of what is a public use in aid of which it may be exercised is precisely as comprehensive as the definition of a public use for which the right to exercise the right of eminent domain may be granted.

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 49 L. ed. 1085, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676, 4 Ann. Cas. 1171; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. 200 U. S. 527, 50 L. ed. 581, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Offield v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 203 U. S. 372, 51 L. ed. 231, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed. 499, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Omaha, _235 U. S. 121, 59 L. ed. 157, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 700, 58 L. ed. 1161, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) | 1097, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. In terstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 55 L. ed. 878, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. ed. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 27 L. ed. 408, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 24 L. ed. 357; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 58 L. ed. 1312, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U. S. 603, 61 L. ed. 520, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Clough, 242 U. | S. 375, 61 L. ed. 374, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206

585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Canada Atlantic Transit Co. v. Chicago, 126 C. C. A. 587, 210 Fed. 7; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 845, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. ed. 472, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. 240 U. S. 30, 60 L. ed. 507, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234.

The present case falls within that class of cases in which a public service corporation is required to do something in aid of the public interest which will cost it money, with or without adequate compensation therefor; the question of compensation, in this class of cases, being of little more than nominal significance, the expense of carrying such a burden in aid of the public interest being regarded as merely a part of its general cost of doing business, like taxes, coal, or rails, or the liability for injuries to person or property, with or without negligence, and to be considered with these other items in determining whether the general schedules of rates which the corporation is allowed to charge produce the minimum fair return, whenever that question arises. In this class of cases it is universally held that whether there are any earnings at all from the particular investment so required is of little or no consequence. At most the amount of the investment is considered in comparison with the size of the corporation and its total earnings. And, as we have already shown, the investment required must be very great indeed in proportion to total assets before the courts will declare the requirement, if within the limits of a state's police power, to be unconstitutional on that account.

Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1062, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121, 59 L. ed. 157, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. ed. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11

Ann. Cas. 398; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, was authorized as a lawful structure, 233 U. S. 700, 58 L. ed. 1161, 51 L.R.A. subject to the supervision of the Secre(N.S.) 1097, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; Wis-tary of War, and his approval of the consin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 845, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 58 L. ed. 721, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364.

The Federal government previously having approved and authorized the roadway arm upon plaintiff in error's bridge, N. Y. Laws 1915, chap. 666, cannot possibly contravene the foreign and interstate commerce clause of the Constitution.

Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 41 L. ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 27 L. ed. 442, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 848, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Canada Atlantic Transit Co. v. Chicago, 126 C. C. A. 587, 210 Fed. 7.

[128] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

plans. By the New York Act of 1857, "Said bridge may be constructed as well for the passage of persons on foot and in carriages and otherwise as for the passage of railroad trains” (§ 15). And "whenever said bridge shall be complete for the passage of ordinary teams and carriages" the company may erect toll gates, and charge tolls not exceeding certain rates for foot passengers, carriages, etc. The original Canadian act had words similar to those just quoted from [129] § 15, except that it said "shall be constructed" instead of "may be," a fact to which we shall advert again.

Between 1870 and 1874 the bridge was built as required by the charter, with one draw across Black Rock harbor and one across the main channel of the river. It crossed Squaw island on a trestle, afterwards filled in, but was built as a railroad bridge exclusively, without any provision for footpaths or roadways. By the Act of Congress of June 23, 1874, chap. 475, 18 Stat. at L. 275, it was declared a lawful structure and an established post route for the This is a suit brought by the state of mail of the United States. In the year New York to recover penalties from the 1899 a plan for rebuilding the bridge, Bridge Company for failure to place with wings for roadways and footpaths, upon its bridge a roadway for vehicles was approved by the Secretary of War, and a pathway for pedestrians between subject to changes at the expense of the Squaw island, in Niagara river, and the company if the Secretary should deem mainland of New York state, as required them advisable. The rebuilding took by chap. 666 of the Laws of 1915, of the place in 1899-1901, but omitted the state of New York. The defendant set wings, and this modification was assentup that the act was contrary to the Con- ed to by the Secretary of War. stitution of the United States in speci- The Niagara river is navigable at this fied respects, but the plaintiff got judg-point. In pursuance of plans for imment in the supreme court, which was provement adopted by the United States, affirmed by the court of appeals. 223 in 1906 it acquired from the state of N. Y. 137, 119 N. E. 351.

The Bridge Company originally was incorporated by a special charter from the state of New York. Laws 1857, chap. 753. As the bridge was to cross the Niagara river from Buffalo to Canada, a similar corporation was created under the laws of Canada (20 Vict. chap. 227), and subsequently the two corporations were consolidated, pursuant to Laws of New York 1869, chap. 550, and a Canadian Act (32 and 33 Viet. chap. 65), subject to all the duties of each of the consolidated companies. By the Act of Congress of June 30, 1870, chap. 176, 16 Stat. at L. 173, any bridge constructed across the Niagara river in pursuance of the New York Act of 1857, and any acts of the New York legislature then in force, amending the same,

182

New York the land under Black Rock harbor, lying on the New York side of Squaw island, and the adjacent portions of the Erie canal, both being within the limits of the state and crossed by the bridge. Thereafter the improvements were carried out.

In 1907 the Secretary of War gave notice to the company that the bridge over Black Rock harbor and Erie canal obstructed navigation, and that changes were required. The company submitted plans again, showing in dotted lines wings for roadways and footpaths, noting that they were not to be put in at present, but that provision was made in the design for their future construction. The plans were approved, and the bridge was built without the wings, the completion being reported by his resi

dent representative to the Secretary of

War.

By chap. 666 of the Laws of New York for 1915, the charter [130] of the company was amended so as to require the construction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians upon the draw across Black Rock harbor, the company being allowed to charge tolls not exceeding specified sums. The company failed to comply with the requirement, and the time limit had expired before this suit was brought to recover penalties imposed by the act. It is found that the construction was necessary for the public interest and convenience; that the cost of the changes is insignificant in comparison with the assets and net earnings of the company, and that it does not appear that the investment would not yield a reasonable return.

It is argued that, the Canadian act governing only the Canadian side, its adoption by New York carried the obligation no farther. But it appears to us that it would be quibbling with the rational understanding of the duty assumed to say that the company could have supposed that it had a contract or property right to confine its building of the footpath and carriageway to the Canada side of the boundary line.

The New York legislature of course confined its command to the half of the bridge within its jurisdiction. It may be presumed that, if that command is obeyed, either Canada or the company will see the propriety of carrying the way and path across to the other shore. At all events, the power of New York to insist upon its rights is not limited by speculation upon that point. As we agree with the court of appeals that this amendment to the charter was within the power reserved to the state, the objection under the contract clause of the Constitution of course must fail, and, it would seem, that under the 14th Amendment also. But, as to the latter, we may add, as the court of appeals added, that there is nothing to show that the addition to the structure will not yield a reasonable return, if that be essential, in view of the charter. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. ed. 472, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U. S. 603, 61 L. ed. 520, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234.

The first objections to the new requirement made by the state are that it impairs the obligation of the contract in the original charter and takes the company's property without due process of law. The argument is based partly upon a reduction of the tolls from those mentioned in the charter of 1857, made by the Act of 1915. Concerning this it is enough to say that the objection is premature. The clause relating to the construction of the roadway and pathway is distinct from and independent of that which fixes the maximum rates to be charged. The latter might be invalid and the former good. If the rates are too low, they can be changed at any time. The only question now before us is whether the additions shall be built. As to that, it would be going very far in the way of limiting the reserved right to amend such charters, if it should be held that the state had not power to require what originally was contemplated in permissive words as part of the scheme. But, however that might be, the New York act authorizing consolidation subjected this consolidated corporation to the duties of the Canadian as well as of the New York charter, and the Canadian act made the arrangement for foot passengers and carriages a duty. The words that we have quoted plainly impose one. The [131] opinion in Atty. Gen. v. International of New York. Bridge Co. 6 Ont. App. Rep. 537, 543, implies that they do so by speaking of the abandonment of a portion of the work as probably an abuse of the act of Parliament, and the same is clearly stated in Canada Southern R. Co. v. International Bridge Co. L. R. 8 App. Cas. 723, 729.

The only argument that impresses us, and the one that was most pressed, is that this is an international bridge, and that Congress has assumed such control of it as to exclude any intermeddling by the state. It is said that [132] the bridge as constructed was and is devoted wholly to international commerce, and that when Congress authorized it in that form in 1874, that authority must be regarded as the charter under which it was maintained. Without repeating the considerations urged in support of this conclusion we will state the reasons that prevail with us. The part of the structure with which we are concerned is within the territorial jurisdiction of the state There was no exercise of the power of eminent domain by the United States. The state was the source of every title to that land, and, apart from the special purposes to which it might be destined, of every right to use it. Any structure upon it, considered merely as a structure, is erected by the authority of New York. The nature and

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