The state cannot make mandatory | 476; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. that which Congress and the Secretary 424, 56 L. ed. 257, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; of War have left as optional. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Blackwell, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 244 U. S. 310, 61 L. ed. 1160, L.R.A. 617, 10 L. ed. 1060, 1089; Hall v. De 1917F, 1184, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640; MinCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Smithnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepv. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 473, 31 L. ed. 508, 510, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Charleston & W. C. R. Co V. Varnville Furniture Co. 237 U. S. 597, 59 L. ed. 1137, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 333; Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671, 58 L. ed. 1149, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 266, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 138; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439, 446, 448, 59 L. ed. 661, 665, 666, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304; Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 56 L. ed. 237, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160; St. Clair County v. Interstate Sand & Car Transfer Co. 192 U. S. 454, 468-470, 48 L. ed. 518, 524, 525, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300. The paramount and exclusive power of Congress in regard to the construction of bridges over navigable waterways of the United States, which are boundaries between two states, is well established. Pennsylvania V. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 421, 15 L. ed. 435; The Clinton Bridge (Gray v. Chicago, I. & N. R. Co.) 10 Wall. 454, 462, 19 L. ed. 969, 971; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411, 32 Fed. 16, appeal dismissed in 140 U. S. 699, 35 L. ed. 603, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028; Decker v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 434, 30 Fed. 723; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 U. S. 532, 38 L. ed. 811, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. 233 U. S. 75, 58 L. ed. 857, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monangahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 26 L. ed. 1143. There are numerous cases in this court holding that state regulations of the operation of railroads within a state are void when they would result in a burden on interstate commerce. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. ed. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136, 54 L. ed. 698, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 802, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. ard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed. 1341, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833; Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 56 L. ed. 72, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3 N. C. C. A. 822; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 874, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 618, 55 L. ed. 878, 882, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621. The power of Congress over this international bridge is exclusive, and all state legislation concerning it is ineffective except in so far as it has been expressly adopted and validated by Congress, because the subject-matter involves the external relations of the United States with foreign governments. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 290, 48 L. ed. 979, 983, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659, 35 L. ed. 1146, 1149, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 340, 53 L. ed. 1013, 1022, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 493, 494, 48 L. ed. 525, 534, 535, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey (United States v. Lariviere) 93 U. S. 188, 194, 23 L. ed. 846, 847; Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson) 112 U. S. 580, 591, 28 L. ed. 798, 801, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 604-606, 32 L. ed. 1068, 1075, 1076, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 711, 712, 37 L. ed. 905, 912, 913, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 414, 30 L. ed. 425, 426, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 222; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570-574, 10 L. ed. 579, 594-596; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 519, 37 L. ed. 537, 543, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728; United States v. Compagnie Francaise Des Cables Telegraphiques, 77 Fed. 495; People ex rel. Barlow v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 328, 10 Am. Rep. 483; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 482, 31 L. ed. 700, 706, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57, 35 L. ed. 649, 652, 11 Sup. [141] ROCK ISLAND, ARKANSAS, &, internal revenue tax under the Act of LOUISIANA RAILROAD COMPANY, August 5, 1909, chap. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. at Appt., L. 11, 112, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 260. It is alleged that the claimant was not engaged in or doing business in the year for which the tax was collected, and that therefore it was not due. The court of claims dismissed the petition on the ground that the claimant had not complied with the conditions imposed by statute, and the claimant appealed to this court. The facts are simple. After the tax was assessed, a claim for an abatement was sent to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in July, 1913. On December 18 of the [142] same year the Commissioner rejected the application, whereupon, on December 26, the claimant paid the tax with interest and a penalty. So far as appears there was no protest at the time of payment, Submitted November 8, 1920. Decided No- and it is found that, after it, nothing vember 22, 1920. APPEAL from the Court of Claims to review the dismissal of a petition for the recovery back of an alleged illegal tax. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Thomas P. Littlepage and Sidney F. Taliaferro submitted the cause for appellant: Appellant made a sufficient appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. San Francisco Sav. & L. Soc. v. Cary, 2 Sawy. 333, Fed. Cas. No. 12,317; Schwarzchild & S. Co. v. Rucker, 143 Fed. 656; Weaver v. Ewers, 115 C. C. A. 219, 195 Fed. 247; De Bary v Dunne, 162 Fed. 961. Solicitor General Frierson submitted the cause for appellee. Mr. W. Marvin Smith was on the brief: A claim for abatement of the assessment is not an appeal to the Commissioner for a refund of the taxes, as required by the statute, and its rejection does not entitle the claimant to main tain an action in court. Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122, 130, 19 L. ed. 125, 128; Kings County Sav. Inst. v. Blair, 116 U. S. 200, 205, 29 L. ed. 657, 659, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353; Hastings v. Herold, 184 Fed. 759. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is a claim for a sum paid as an Note. As to when taxes illegally assessed can be recovered back-see note to Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 21 L. ed. U. S. 63. was done to secure repayment of the tax. By Rev. Stat. § 3226, amended by Act of February 27, 1877, chap. 69, § 1, 19 Stat. at L. 248, Comp. Stat. 5949, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1034, no suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been illegally assessed "until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secrectary of the Treasury established in pursuance thereof, and a decision of the Commissioner has been had therein; Provided," etc. Regulations of the Secform to be used in applications for retary established a procedure and a abatement of taxes, and distinct ones for claims for refunding them. The claimant took the first step, but not the last. By Rev. Stat. § 3220, Comp. Stat. § 5944, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1028, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized "on appeal to him made, to remit, refund, and pay back" taxes illegally assessed. It is urged that the "appeal" to him to remit made a second appeal to him to refund an idle act, and satisfied the requirement of § 3226. Decisions to that effect in suits against a collector are cited, the latest being Loomis v. Wattles, C. C. A., 266 Fed. 876. But the words "on appeal to him made" mean, of course, on appeal in respect of the relief sought on appeal,to refund if refunding is what he is asked to do. The words of § 3226 also must be taken to mean an appeal after payment, especially in view of § 3228, requiring claims of this sort to be presented to the Commissioner within two years after the cause of action accrued. So that the question is of reading an implied exception into the rule as expressed, when substantially the same objection to the assessment has been urged at an earlier stage. [143] Men must turn square corners when they deal with the government. If it attaches even purely formal conditions to its consent to be sued, those conditions must be complied with. Lex non præcipit inutilia (Co. Litt. 127b) expresses rather an ideal than an accomplished fact. But in this case we cannot pronounce the second appeal a mere form. On appeal a judge some times concurs in a reversal of his decision below. It is possible, as suggested by the court of claims, that the second appeal may be heard by a different person. At all events, the words are there in the statute and the regulations, and the court is of opinion that they mark the conditions of the claimant's right. See Kings County Sav. Inst. v. Blair, 116 U. S. 200, 29 L. ed. 657, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353. It is unnecessary to consider other objections that the claimant would have to meet before it could recover upon this claim. Judgment affirmed. COCA-COLA COMPANY,1 Petitioner, V. KOKE COMPANY OF AMERICA et al. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 143-147.) Trademark fringement. secondary meaning - in 1. A secondary meaning of a trademark, indicating the owner's product Note. On the effect of deception in a trademark to defeat right of action for its infringement-see notes to Joseph v. Macowsky, 19 L.R.A. 53; Johnson & Johnson v. Seabury & Johnson, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1201; Nelson v. J. H. Winchell & Co. 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151; Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co. 34 L. ed. U. S. 997; and Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co. 47 L. ed. U. S. 282. 1 Substitution of the Coca-Cola Company of Delaware for the Coca-Cola Company of Georgia, and appearance of the Coca-Cola Company of Delaware as the party petitioner herein, filed and entered November 24, 1919, on motion of Mr. F. M. Phelps for the petitioner. 2. The right of plaintiff to equitable relief against infringement of his trademark, where that is contested ground of his own fraudulent misrepresentations to the public, must be judged by the facts as they were when the suit was begun, not by the facts of a different condition and an earlier time. [For other cases, see Trademark, IV. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Trademark on the infringement misrepresentation as bar to equitable relief. 3. The right to relief against palpable fraud by imitation of a trademark for a beverage will not be denied ground that the beverage itself had formerly been sold under the false representation that it contained cocaine after that element had been eliminated, where all such deception had ceased before the suit was brought, and the public had been warned by advertising that it must not expect to find that drug in it, merely be cause of the possibility that, here and there, an ignorant person might call for the drink with the hope of incipient co caine intoxication. bar to equitable relief. 4. The continued use of the trademark Coca-Cola and a label containing a picture of coca leaves and cola nuts, in connection with a beverage which originally contained cocaine, but in which coco leaves are now used only after they have been subjected to a drastic process that removes from them every characteristic substance except a little tannin and still less chlorophyl, and whatever of cola nut is employed furnishes but a small part of the caffein that is now the only element having appreciable effect, is not such misrepresentation as debars the owner of the trademark, which has acquired a secondary significance, indicating his product alone, from equitable relief against infringers, where, whatever may have been true of earlier advertising, the public is now told that it must not expect and will not find cocaine, and everything tending to Suggest cocaine effects except the name and eliminated. the picture of the leaves and nuts has been [For other cases, see Trademark, IV. b: Unfair Competition, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Injunction against infringement of trademark - unfair competition. 5. The owner of the trademark CocaCola for a beverage in which caffein is the only element having appreciable effect can claim no personal right to exclude another from using the word "dope" in connection | Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co. 88 with a similar product. [For other cases, see Injunction, I. m, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Injunction against infringement of trademark unfair competition. 6. Injunctive relief to the owner of a trademark does not extend to the product, where that is free to all who can make it if no extrinsic deceiving element is present. [For other cases, see Injunction, I. m, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] See same case below, 167 C. C. A. 214, 255 Fed. 894. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Frederick W. Lehmann argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Harold Hirsch, Frank F. Reed, Edward S. Rogers, and Charles E. Rushmore, filed a brief for petitioner: The addition to coca-cola syrup of caffein derived from sources other than the cola nut did not make the name "coca-cola" a misbranding. Fed. 74; Employing Printers' Club v. Dr. Blosser Co. 122 Ga. 509, 69 L.R.A. 90, 106 Am. St. Rep. 137, 50 S. E. 353, 2 Ann. Cas. 694; Peoria Gas & E. Co. v. Peoria, 200 U. S. 48, 50 L. ed. 365, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Benedictus v. Sullivan, 12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 25; Symonds v. Jones, 82 Me. 302, 8 L.R.A. 570, 17 Am. St. Rep. 485, 19 Atl. 820; Johnson & Johnson v. Seabury & Johnson, 69 N. J. Eq. 696, 61 Atl. 5; W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Turner-Looker Co. 123 C. C. A. 79, 204 Fed. 553; Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Worcester Salt Co. 137 C. C. A. 16, 221 Fed. 66; Troll v. Spencer, 238 Mo. 102, 141 S. W. 855, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 276. The name "coca-cola" is a valid trademark, acquired by priority of adoption and use by petitioner's predecessors, because originally a novel, unusual, and alliterative expression which, by association and extensive use, in fact identifies the product of petitioner exclusively, and because whatever suggestion of ingredients the name conveys is truthful. Re Burroughs, W. & Co. 21 Rep. Pat. Cas. 217, [1904] 1 Ch. 736, 73 L. J. Ch. N. S. 474, 32 Week. Rep. 581, 91 L. T. N. S. 58, 20 Times L. R. 415; Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller-General [1898] A. C. 571, 67 L. J. Ch. N. S. 628, 79 L. T. N. S. 195, 15 Rep. Pat. Cas. 476, 14 Times L. R. 527, 47 Week. Rep. 152; Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co. 138 U. S. 537, 546, 34 L. ed. 997, 1003, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396; Reddaway v. Benham [1896] A. C. 199, 65 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 381, 74 L. T. N. S. 289, 13 Rep. Pat. Cas. 224, 44 Week. Rep. 638, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas. 193; Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co. 179 U. S. 665, 45 L. ed. 365, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 270; French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. 191 U. S. 427, 435, 48 L. ed. 247, 248, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. v. Powell [1897] A. Cocaine was eliminated from the bev- C. 710, 66 L. J. Ch. N. S. 763, 76 L. T. erage and the early claims of medicinal N. S. 792, 14 Rep. Pat. Cas. 720, 727; virtues were abandoned many years be- Montgomery v. Thompson [1891] A. C. fore this suit was instituted. The re- 217, 60 L. J. Ch. N. S. 757, 64 L. T. N. quirement of clean hands as a condi- S. 748, 55 J. P. 756, 6 Rep. Pat. Cas. tion of equitable relief is met in this 404, 8 Rep. Pat. Cas. 365; Wotherspoon case by the conditions as they existed | v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508, 27 L. T. when this suit was brought, and as N. S. 393, 42 L. J. Ch. N. S. 130; Bagthey had been established by the petitioner for many years before. United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co. 231 U. S. 654, 58 L. ed. 419, 34 Sup. Ct. Ren. 222, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 49; Cleveland Stone Co. v. Wallace, 52 Fed. 431; Jacobs v. Beecham, 221 U. S. 263, 55 L. ed. 729, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co. 1 Trade Mark Rep. 215, 233 U. S. 461, 58 L. ed. 1046, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 322. Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Modox Co. 153 Fed. 487; Pillsbury v. PillsburyWashburn Flour Mills Co. 12 C. C. A. 432, 64 Fed. 841, 24 U. S. App. 395; lin v. Cusenier, 221 U. S 580, 55 L. ed. 863, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669; Jacobs v. Beecham, 221 U. S: 263, 55 L. ed. 729, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 254, 24 L. ed. 828, 832; Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 323, 20 L. ed. 581, 583; | Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540, 35 L. ed. Messrs. Richard E. Sloan and Joseph W. Bailey argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Jesse M. Littleton and C. L. Parker, filed a brief for respondents: Plaintiff's use of the words "cocacola" is calculated to deceive purchasers. Colgan v. Danheiser, 35 Fed. 150; Clotworthy v. Schepp, 42 Fed. 62; Brit ish-American Tobacco Co. V. BritishAmerican Cigar Stores Co. 206 Fed. 189; United States v. Coca Cola Co. 241 U. S. 265, 60 L. ed. 995, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 487. Plaintiff's attempt to correct the . false impression produced by its name and labels was futile. Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co. 187 U. S. 517, 47 L. ed. 282, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161. Plaintiff's product was misbranded. United States v. Coca Cola Co. 241 U. S. 265, 283, 60 L. ed. 995, 1004, 36 Mill Co v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 464, 37 Chemical Schmidt v. Brieg, 100 Cal. 672, 22 L.R.A. 790, 35 Pac. 623; Paris Medicine Co. v. W. H. Hill Co. 42 C. C. A. 227, 102 Fed. 148; Computing Scale Co. v. Standard Computing Scale Co. H. Co. v. Warner, 50 C. C. A. 321, 112 55 C. C. A. 459, 118 Fed. 965; Searle & Fed. 674; Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co. v. Maltine Co. 30 App. D. C. 340; Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. App. D. C. 223; John T. Dyer Quarry v. Old Lexington Club Distilling Co. 31 ap-557; Kellogg Toasted Corn Flakes Co. Co. v. Schuylkill Stone Co. 185 Fed. V. Quaker Oats Co. 149 C. C. A. 77, 235 Fed. 657; Coca Cola Co. v. Deacon Nims, Unfair Business Competition & Trademarks, 2d ed. 1917, p. 416; In-Cola Co. v. Nashville Syrup, 200 Fed. Brown Bottling Co. 200 Fed. 105; Coca dependent Baking Powder Co v. Boor- 154. Sup. Ct. Rep. 573, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 487. The goods to which the mark is plied must continue substantially the same. man, 175 Fed. 448; Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co. 135 N. Y. 24, 17 L. R.A. 129, 31 N. E. 990; United States v. 40 Barrels & 20 Kegs of Coca Cola, 191 Fed. 438; Starey v. Chilworth Gunpowder Co. L. R. 24 Q. B. Div. 90, 59 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 13, 62 L. T. N. S. 73, 38 Week. Rep. 204, 17 Cox, C. C. 55, 54 J. P. 436. Parallel cases are: Clotworthy v. Schepp, 42 Fed. 62; Leach v. Scarff, 188 Fed. 446; Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Modox, 152 Fed. 493; Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. Cali. fornia Fig Syrup Co. 187 U. S. 516, 47 L. ed. 282, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161; California Fig Syrup Co. v. Putnam, 66 Fed. 750; California Fig Syrup Co. v. Frederick Stearns & Co. 33 L.R.A. 56. 20 C. C. A. 22, 43 U. S. App. 234, 73 Fed. 814, The words "coca-cola" were not valid trademark. a Amoskeag Mfg. Co. V. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599; Delaware & H. Canal Co. V. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 20 L. ed. 581; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51, 25 L. ed. 993; Brown Chemical As to the character of proof required to establish a secondary meaning of descriptive words, see Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton & Murray, 15 Rep. Pat. Cas. 602; s. c. [1899] A. C. 326, 68 L. J. P. C. N. S. 72, 80 L. T. N. S. 809, 16 Rep. Pat. Cas. 397; Burberry v. J. C. Cording & Co. 26 Rep. Pat. Cas. 700; Bile Bean Mfg. Co. v. Davidson, 23 Rep. Pat. Cas. 732; Fels v. Stephenson Bros. 21 Rep. Pat. Cas. 89; S. Chivers & Sons v. S. Chivers & Co. 17 Rep. Pat. Cas. 421. Plaintiff is not entitled to a monopoly on the popular nicknames of cola beverages. Coca-Cola Co. v. Chero-Cola Co. 10 Trademark Rep. 94; Rumford Chemical Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is a bill in equity brought by the |