any time on giving twelve months' notice to that effect in regard to any British Colony, foreign possession, or dependency, as specified in article 4, which may have acceded thereto. The case was argued and submitted at the last term of this court. It was ordered reinstated with notice to the Attorneys General of the United States and of the state of Kansas. The case has been reargued. The Solicitor General presented the views of the State Department of the United States, and submitted a brief in behalf of the government. There are opposing views of the treaty, one taken by the British and the other by the American government. The view of the former being that British subjects, resident of Canada or elsewhere, are entitled to inherit property in any state of the United States, and citizens of the United States are entitled to inherit in Great Britain and its possessions and colonies, provided, as to the latter, that notice has been given under article 4 of the treaty of adhesion to the terms of the convention as to such colonies and possessions. The American contention is stated by the Solicitor General, and appears by a communication from the Secretary of State of October 2, 1920, sent in response to the invitation of the Solicitor General, and now on the files of the Department of Justice. The Secretary of State sets forth that it is the view of this government that British subjects, citizens and residents of Canada, do not inherit in the United States by virtue of the stipulations of the treaty, because, as to the Dominion [439] of Canada, no notice of adhesion to the same has been given, as is required by the stipulations of article 4. It hence appears that the one contention is that the notice required by article 4 has a territorial effect only, and when given brings such territory into the operative force of the treaty as to the property situated therein; the other, that, as to subjects and citizens, the notice is required to bring residents and property within the operative effect of the treaty. Applied to the concrete case, the American contention is that Margaret Ingoldsby was not entitled to inherit in Kansas by the terms of this treaty because notice of adherence for the Dominion of Canada was not given. The communication of the State Department to the Solicitor General shows that the American government is ready, and has expressed its willingness, to take up the matter of extending the treaty provisions to the Dominion of Canada, notwithstanding the fact that the stipulated time for notice has expired. Writers of authority agree that treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writing between individuals, and are to be executed in the utmost good faith, with a view to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties; that all parts of a treaty are to receive a reasonable construction, with a view to giving a fair operation to the whole. 5 Moore, International Law Dig. 249. At the time of the negotiation of the treaty, Great Britain had numerous colonies and possessions, and the United States had recently acquired certain islands beyond the seas. Concerning these the contracting parties made the stipulations contained in article 4, adding the right to give like notice in behalf of any British protectorate, or sphere of influence, or on behalf of the island of Cyprus, by virtue of the Convention of June 4, 1878, between Great Britain and Turkey. As to the islands, beyond [440] the seas, occupied or governed by the United States, they were to come within the terms of the treaty only upon notice to that effect by direction of the treaty-making power of the United States. If the contention of the appellee be correct, it necessarily follows that, as to British possessions, the inhabitants thereof, being British subjects, had nothing to gain by giving notice which article 4 specifically required, for, as to them, their rights had been secured by articles 1 and 2 of the treaty. Applying this construction to the instant case, Canadians, while residents of the Dominion, and citizens of a self-regulating and self-governing community, acquired, by virtue of this treaty, as British subjects, the right to inherit in every state of the American Union, regardless of local laws; this while citizens of the United States acquired no corre sponding right to inherit in the Dominion of Canada until notice be given,—a matter entirely beyond the control of American authority. The American right to inherit in Canada became a matter of grace on the part of the other contracting nation when it saw fit to grant it by signifying its adhesion to the treaty. Such construction is inconsistent with the general purpose and object of such conventions to secure equality in exchange of privileges, and reciprocity in rights granted and secured. Geofry v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 271, 33 L. ed. 642, 646, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295. The fact that Canada, as a self-governing dependency, in the exercise of the legislative power which is hers, has seen fit to adhesion to the treaty necessary in order to bring citizens and property of colonies and possessions within the benefits We are unable to see that the construction of this treaty is aided by the argument of counsel in the supplemental brief of the appellee that Lord Salisbury, for the British government, insisted upon the construction which they contend for in relation to a similar convention with Japan. We find nothing in the archives of the Department of State to show that this insistence was brought forward in the course of negotiations, or in any manner came to the attention of the American representative, Mr. Hay, who negotiated this treaty with Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British representative. give aliens the right to inherit, adds The significance of article 6 is important. In this article provision is made for the right of the United States or the British government to terminate separately the convention by twelve months' notice to that effect in regard to any British colony, foreign possession, or dependency, as specified in article 4, which may have acceded to the convention. This article lends strong support to the argument that only colonies or possessions which accede to the convention are to have the benefit thereof; such rights, recognized as acquired by accession, being subject to termination by the withdrawal provision of article 6. The American government, upon a message from the President, for the purpose of securing the consent of the Senate, as we learn from public documents on file in the State Department, has, with the consent of the Senate, extended the provisions of the Convention of 1899 to Porto Rico, and has so notified the British government. We are advised by the letter of the Secretary of State of October 2, 1920 (on file in the Department of Justice), that this government is ready to take up with the British government the matter of extension of the treaty provisions to Hawaii and the Dominion of Canada. While the question of the construction of treaties is judicial in its nature, and courts, when called upon to act, should be careful to see that international engagements are faithfully kept and observed, the construction placed upon the treaty before us and consistently adhered to by the Executive Department of the government, charged with the supervision of our foreign relations, should be given much weight. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 468, 57 L. ed. 1274, 1283, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 397, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945. See also Castro v. De Uriarte, 16 Fed. 93, 98 (opinion by Judge Addison Brown). Taking the view which we have here exNor are we impressed with the argu- pressed of the [443] real purpose of ment that Canadian citizens, being also the treaty, as evidenced by its terms, British subjects, are entitled to inherit which is strengthened by the practices in Kansas by virtue of the most-favored- of both governments in pursuance of nation clause. That clause has been held it, we reach the conclusion that, for lack in the practice of this country to be one of notice of the adhesion of Canada to not extending rights acquired by treaties containing it because of reciprocal benefits expressly conferred in conventions was not superseded in favor of with other nations, in exchange for rights British subjects resident in Canada, and or privileges given to this government. it determined the right of aliens to This clause cannot overcome the specific inherit lands in that state. provisions of article 4, [442] making| Reversed. the terms of the treaty, the law of Kan sas 1920. DUPLEX PRINTING PRESS COMPANY,, of the United States against threatened loss Appt., 1. In so far as the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, provided for relief by injunction to private suitors, imposed conditions upon granting such relief under otherwise particular circumstances, and modified the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, it was effective from the time of its passage, and applicable to pending suits for injunction not brought to a hearing until after the passage of the Clayton Act. (For other cases, see Injunction, I. d: Mo- 2. Private parties are given, by the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 16, a right to relief by injunction in any court Note. As to remedy by injunction against illegal trusts under modern antitrust laws-see note to Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 715. As to boycott as a weapon in industrial pursuits-see note to Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 6 A.L.R. 909. As to controversy over "open" or "closed" shop as justification for means employed to aid strike-see notes to Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, L.R.A. 1917F, 760; Folsom v. Lewis, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 787; and Reynolds v. Davis, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162. As to lawfulness of a strike or of a threat so to act as to induce a strike when there is no trade dispute between the strikers and their employers-see notes to New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, L.R.A.1916C, 989, and Pickett v. Walsh, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067. As to injunction against strikes-see note to Long Shore Printing & Pub. Co. v. Howell, 28 L.R.A. 464. or damage by a violation of the Federal principles regulating the granting of such unlaw 3. A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means. If the purpose be unlawful, it may not be carried out, even by means that otherwise would be legal; and although the purpose be lawful, it may not be carried out by criminal or unlawful means. Sup. Ct. 1908.] [For other cases, see Conspiracy, I. in Digest Monopoly-combinations in restraint of trade-secondary boycott. 4. A secondary boycott is a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with a person, or to advise or by peaceable means persuade his customers to refrain, but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw their patronage through fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal with him. [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. a, in Di- Monopoly combination 5. A restraint produced by peaceable persuasion is as much within the prohibition of the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, as one accomplished by force or threats of force. [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. a, in Di- 6. A combination in restraint of interstate trade is not to be justified by the fact that the participants in the combination or conspiracy may have some object beneficial to themselves or their associates which possibly they might have been at liberty to pursue in the absence of the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, prohibiting such combinations. gest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. a, in Di- 7. A labor organization, or its memOn right of labor union to notify per-bers, is not exempted from accountability sons not to deal with a certain in- for a combination in restraint of interstate dividual-see notes to Hey v. Wilson, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 707; and American Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 748. And see note to this tase as reported in 16 A.L.R. 196. bid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects. in restraint [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. a, in Dl- [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. a, în Di- 12. Reports of committees of the House of Representatives or of the Senate may be regarded as an exposition of the legis lative intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute is obscure, as may also explanatory statements in the nature of a supplemental report, made by the committee member in charge of a bill in course of passage. For other cases, see Statutes, II. a, in Digest 9. Injunctive relief to a manufacturer against concerted action which members of labor organizations, standing in no employment relation with it, past, present, or prospective, have taken in aid of a strike in its factory in order to compel such manufacturer to unionize its factory, establish the closed shop, the eight-hour day, and the union scale of wages, by interfering with and restraining its interstate trade through coercive pressure upon actual or prospective customers, with the intent and result of causing them to withdraw patron Argued January 22, 1920. Decided January age from such manufacturer for fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal Sup. Ct. 1903.] [No. 45.] 3, 1921. with it, may not be denied on the theory APPEAL from the United States Cir that such relief was forbidden, or that such action-the so-called secondary boycott was legalized by the provisions of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 6, that nothing in the Anti-trust Laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organizations, or to forbid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects, and of § 20 of that act, restricting the granting of injunctions in cases "between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment," and providing that none of the acts specified therein shall be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States. [For other cases, see Injunction, I. d; Mo nopoly, II. a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Monopoly combination in restraint of trade industrial disputes secondary boycott - Clayton Act. 10. The exceptional immunity from the operation of the Federal Anti-trust Laws, granted by the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 20, in cases "between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin an alleged unlawful conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See same case below, 164 C. C. A. 562, 252 Fed. 722. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Daniel Davenport and Walter Gordon Merritt argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant: The right to work or quit work is no more absolute than any other constituwhen exercised for the purpose of intional right, and ceases to be a right juring another, or accomplishing a result contrary to public policy, or restraining trade, contrary to law. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 204, 49 L. ed. 159, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, of cases, under the authority of Bitterman v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 207 U. S. 205, 52 L. ed. 171, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91, 12 Ann. Cas. 693, against parties who induce a breach of contract. 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. | suit could be maintained in this class 1918B, 461; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 61 L. ed. 1256, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 52 L. ed. 488, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. Cas. 815, 235 U. S. 522, 59 L. ed. 341, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48 L. ed. 608, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Asso. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 58 L. ed. 1490, L.R.A.1915A, 788, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 951; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 57 L. ed. 333, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 325, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260, 121 N. W. 395. As a general proposition, even workmen on strike are not employees. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582; Knudson v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636; Union P. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; Iron Molders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co. 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 315, 91 C. C. A. 631, 166 Fed. 48. It would seem that the word "employee" implies the existence of a continuing employment relation. Louisville E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501, 34 L. ed. 1025, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405. If, as stated by this court, not even the recognition of a right by the Constitution can justify its exercise in furtherance of a criminal plot (Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 49 L. ed. 154,, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3) and the constitutional privilege of free speech cannot be used as a defense to an injunction which restrains speech or writing in further ance of an illegal conspiracy (Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 221 U. S. 439, 55 L. ed. 805, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492), then it certainly follows that the recognition of a right by a statute such as the Clayton Act will not justify the exercise of that right in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, which is expressly recognized by the same statute. Vital statutory provisions would be pro tanto repealed by a construction of the Clayton Act which would legalize the acts specified in § 20, even when exercised for purposes forbidden by these enumerated statutes. Strikes could be called to prevent the carriage of a nonunion man to the shop, or nonunion merchandise to the dealer or consumer, and shippers could thereby be discriminated against, in violation of the terms of the Commerce Act. Important cases laying down principles essential for the protection of public interests would be repealed. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 L.R.A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 593, 39 L. ed. 1106, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 52 L. ed. 488, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. Cas. 815; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492. It would be possible to keep proscribed merchandise out of the reach of the consumers, and thereby deprive the public of its right of choice. People v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29, 32 N. E. 1105; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 6 A.L.R. 901, 124 N. E. 97, 89 Misc. 501, 152 N. Y. Supp. 475; People v. Davis, 159 App. Div. 464, 144 N. Y. Supp. 284. The defendants' contention is to the effect that the Clayton Act should be construed to operate pro tanto as an implied repeal of all other constitutional or statutory provisions with which it may, by an extended construction, be made to collide. Such a result conflicts with the well-recognized rule that repeals by implication are not favored. May we not go even further and say that repeals by implication are never to be countenanced when the two laws deal with different subjects? Under any other construction the United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, United States Steel Corporation could 20 L. ed. 153; United States v. Babbit, destroy its competitors by arrangements 1 Black, 55, 17 L. ed. 94; Arthur v. with the union, whereby they would Homer, 96 U. S. 140, 24 L. ed. 812; call a strike on every railroad, in every United States v. Great house, 166 U. S. factory, and on every building where 601, 41 L. ed. 1130, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 701; competitors' products are used, and the United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, whole purpose of the anti-trust legisla- 24 L. ed. 1082. tion would be thus defeated. No civil An exemption from the anti-trust laws |