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extended to any class of people, purely N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 as a class, is unconstitutional if the exemption extends to that class under the identical circumstances where other classes are bound by the law.

Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 136, 92 N. W. 306, 96 N. W. 212, 98 N. W. 1075; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431. An injunction should issue under the Clayton Act.

Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 61 L. ed. 1256, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Montgomery v. Pacific Electric R. Co. 169 C. C. A. 398, 258 Fed. 383; United States v. Rintelen, 233 Fed. 793; Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Asso. 236 Fed. 964; Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 151 C. C. A. 578, 238 Fed. 728; United States v. King, 250 Fed. 908, 229 Fed. 275; Stephens v. Ohio State Teleph. Co. 240 Fed. 759; Dowd v. United Mine Workers, 148 C. C. A. 495, 235 Fed. 1.

When a statute not clear on its face is to be interpreted, courts will consult legislative debates, reports, and contemporaneous history for expressions indicating the intentions of the legislative body.

Tap Line Cases (United States v. Louisiana & P. R. Co.) 234 U. S. 27, 58 L. ed. 1195, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741.

The defendants are engaged in a combination and conspiracy to injure the plaintiff's good will, trade, and business, and such a combination is unlawful at common law.

Shine v. Fox Bros. Mfg. Co. 86 C. C. A. 311, 156 Fed. 357; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 6 A.L.R. 901, 124 N. E. 97, 178 App. Div. 270, 165 N. Y. Supp. 469, 89 Misc. 501, 152 N. Y. Supp. 475; Irving v. Joint Dist. Council, U. B. C. J. 180 Fed. 896; Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363; Purvis v. Local Union C. J. 214 Pa. 348, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 642, 112 Am. St. Rep. 757, 63 Atl. 585, 6 Ann. Cas. 275; Purington v. Hinchliff, 219 Ill. 159, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 824, 109 Am. St. Rep. 322, 76 N. E. 47; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, 128 Am. St. Rep. 492, 114 S. W. 997; Moores v. Bricklayers' Union, 23 Ohio L. J. 48, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 665; Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 62 Fed. 818; Toledo, A. A. &

L.R.A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Thomson Mach. Co. v. Brown, 89 N. J. Eq. 326, 104 Atl. 129, 108 Atl. 116; Employing Printers' Club v. Dr. Blosser Co. 122 Ga. 509, 69 L.R.A. 90, 106 Am. St. Rep. 137, 50 S. E. 353, 2 Ann. Cas. 694; Justin Seubert v. Reiff, 98 Misc. 402, 164 N. Y. Supp. 522; Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers Union, 67 Misc. 221, 124 N. Y. Supp. 289; Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778, 104 N. E. 841; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 288, 52 L. ed. 488, 495, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. Cas. 815; Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 64 L.R.A. 260, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341, 69 N. E. 1085; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 42 L.R.A. 407, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421, 77 N. W. 13; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 32 L. ed. 223, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1301; Branson v. Industrial Workers, 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354; Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 12 L.R.A. 193, 45 Fed. 135; Crump v. Com. 84 Va. 941, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, 6 S. E. 620; Ertz v. Produce Exch. 79 Minn. 140, 48 L.R.A. 90, 79 Am. St. Rep. 433, 81 N. W. 737; Evenson v. Spaulding, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 904, 82 C. C. A. 263, 150 Fed. 517; Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 63 L.R.A. 753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477, 97 N. W. 663, 1118, 1 Ann. Cas. 172; Beattie v. Callanan, 82 App. Div. 7, 81 N. Y. Supp. 415; Matthews v. Shankland, 25 Misc. 694, 56 N. Y. Supp. 123; Hopkins x. Oxley Stove Co. 28 C. C. A. 99, 49 U. S. App. 709, 83 Fed. 912; Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. 71; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters & T. Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 19 L.R.A. 408, 39 Am. St. Rep. 421, 26 Atl. 505; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 68 L.R.A. 752, 59 Atl. 721; National Teleph. Co. v. Kent, 156 Fed. 173; Rocky Mt. Bell Teleph. Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. 809; Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1101; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 47, 3 Am. St. Rep. 23, 8 Atl. 890; Baldwin v. Escanaba Liquor Dealers' Asso. 165 Mich. 98, 130 N. W. 214; American Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 748; Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, L.R.A.1917F, 389, 115 N. E. 304; Martin v. McFall,

65 N. J. Eq. 91, 55 Atl. 465; Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. 290, 26 So. 791; Wilson v. Hey, 232 I. 389, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85, 122 Am. St. Rep. 119, 83 N. E. 928, 13 Ann. Cas. 82; Jensen v. Cooks' & W. Union, 39 Wash. 531, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 302, 81 Pac. 1069; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 78 N. E. 753, 7 Ann. Cas. 638; Tunstall v. Stearns Coal Co. 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453, 113 C. C. A. 132, 192 Fed. 808; W. P. Davis Mach. Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329, 84 N. Y. Supp. 837. The question is one calling for independent decision by the Federal courts.

Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 33, 27 L. ed. 365, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 512, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Rocky Mt. Bell Teleph. Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. 809; Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. 71.

The combination unlawfully seeks to prevent truckmen who are common carriers from performing their commonlaw duty of serving those who purchase complainants' presses..

cause, and, with Mr. Frank I. Mulholland, filed a brief for appellees:

The means employed by the defendants to secure an eight-hour day and minimum rate of wage throughout the trade are authorized by the Clayton amendment to the Sherman Anti-trust Law.

Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 342, 61 L. ed. 771, L.R.A.1917E, 938, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 471, 61 L. ed. 1256, 1264, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 661; National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 324, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369; Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 151 C. C. A. 578, 238 Fed. 732.

Irreparable injury to property and property rights is neither alleged nor proved by the appellant.

Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 471, 61 L. ed. 1256, 1264, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718.

There being no proof adduced upon the trial of irreparable injury to property and property rights, only the United States could apply for injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.

Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 61 L. ed. 1256, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Southern Indiana Exp. Co. V. Jackson Architectural Iron Works v. United States Exp. Co. 35 C. C. A. 172, Hurlbut, 158 N. Y. 34, 70 Am. St. Rep. 92 Fed. 1022; Blindell v. Hagan, 54 432, 52 N. E. 665; 10 C. J. 49; Heuman Fed. 40; Mannington v. Hocking Valley v. M. H. Powers Co. 175 App. Div. 627, R. Co. 183 Fed. 140; Metcalf v. Amer162 N. Y. Supp. 590; Pittsburgh, C. &ican School Furniture Co. 108 Fed. 909; St. L. R. Co. v. Morton, 61 Ind. 539, National Fireproofing Co. V. Mason 28 Am. Rep. 682; Toledo, A. A. & N. Builders Asso. 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 148, 94 M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 L.R.A. | C. C. A. 535, 169 Fed. 259; United States 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Michie, Carr. § 381.

The combination unlawfully seeks to induce the complainant's customers to violate their contracts with the complainant.

Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A. 1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U. S. 373, 55 L. ed. 502, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376; Bitterman v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 297 U. S. 205, 52 L. ed. 171, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91, 12 Ann. Cas. 693; Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 2, 38 L. ed. 55, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 126 C. C. A. 277, 209 Fed. 351.

v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 46 L.R.A. 122, 29 C. C. A. 141, 54 U. S. App. 723, 85 Fed. 271; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co. 194 U. S. 48, 48 L. ed. 870, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598.

To render an association or organization unlawful under the Act of July 2, 1890, it must appear that such combination was formed for the purpose of restraining trade or commerce among the several states or foreign nations, or that such restraint unnecessarily resulted from such combination, and thus deprived the public of the benefits which flow from free competition.

United States V. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Whitwell

v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. Mr. Frank X. Sullivan argued the 689, 60 C. C. A. 290, 125 Fed. 454:

agents and representatives of District No. 15 of the International Association of Machinists, and Michael T. Neyland, sued individually and as business agent and representative of Local Lodge No. 328, of

Gibbs v. McNeely, 60 L.R.A. 152, 55,
C. C. A. 70, 118 Fed. 120; Bigelow v.
Calumet & H. Min. Co. 167 Fed. 709;
Bossert v. Duhl, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N.
E. 582, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 661.
There was no interference with inter- the same association. The District
state commerce.

United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 12, 39 L. ed. 325, 329, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 615, 43 L. ed. 305, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 37 L. ed. 419, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542.

Irrespective of the Clayton Act, there were no facts adduced on the trial which would warrant the issuance of an injunction.

Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 661; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 707, 127 Am. St. Rep. 722, 96 Pac. 127; Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 37 L.R.A. 455, 61 Am. St. Rep. 770, 33 Atl. 1; Ames v. Union P. R. Co. 62 Fed. 14; National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 324, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369: State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 107 Am. St. Rep. 28, 58 Atl. 769; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builder's Asso. 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 148, 94 C. C. A. 535, 169 Fed. 263; Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111.

Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:

[461] Council and the Lodge are unincorporated associations having headquarters in New York eity, with numerous members resident in that city and vicinity. There were averments and proof to show that it was impracticable to bring all the members before the court, and that the named defendants properly represented them; and those named were called upon to defend for all, pursuant to Equity Rule 38 (226 U. S. 659, 57 L. ed. 1643, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. xxix.). Other jurisdictional averments need no particular mention. The district court, on final hearing, dismissed the bill (247 Fed. 192); the circuit court of appeals affirmed its decree (164 C. C. A. 562, 252 Fed. 722); and the present appeal was taken.

The jurisdiction of the Federal court was invoked both by reason of diverse citizenship and on the ground that defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to restrain complainant's interstate trade and commerce in printing presses, contrary to the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890 (chap. 617, 26 Stat. at L. 209, Comp. Stat. § 8820, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 644). The suit was begun before, but brought to hearing after, the passage of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914 (chap. 323, 38 Stat. at L. 730, Comp. Stat. § 8835a, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 730). Both parties invoked the provisions of the latter act, and both courts treated them as applicable. Complainant relied also upon the common law; but we shall deal first with the effect of the acts of Congress.

This was a suit in equity brought by appellant in the district court for the southern district of New York for an injunction to restrain a course of conduct carried on by defendants in that district and vicinity in maintaining a boycott against the products of complainant's factory, in furtherance of a conspiracy to The facts of the case and the nature of injure and destroy its good will, trade, the relief prayed are sufficiently set forth and business, especially to obstruct and in the report of the decision of the circuit destroy its interstate trade. There was court of appeals (164 C. C. A. 562, 252 also a prayer for damages, but this has Fed. 722). The case was heard before not been pressed, and calls for no further Circuit Judges Rogers and Hough and mention. Complainant is a Michigan District Judge Learned Hand. Judge corporation, and manufactures printing Rogers, although in the minority, stated presses at a factory in Battle Creek, in the case and the pleadings for the court that state, employing about 200 machin- (pp. 723-727), and delivered an opinion ists in the factory in addition to 50 office for reversal in which he correctly outemployees, traveling salesmen, and expert lined (pp. 734-737) the facts as shown machinists or road men who supervise by the undisputed evidence-defendants the erection of the presses for complainant's customers at their various places of business. The defendants, who were brought into court and answered the bill, are Emil J. Deering and William Bramley, sued individually and as business ized as follows:

having introduced none. Judges Hough and Hand followed with separate opinions for affirmance, not, however, disagreeing with Judge Rogers as to the facts. These may [462] be summarComplainant con

The acts

ducts its business on the "open-shop", part of a country-wide program adopted the International Association, for policy, without discrimination against by men. The the purpose of enforcing a boycott of emeither union or nonunion individual defendants and the local complainant's product. organizations of which they are the braced the following, with others: Warnrepresentatives are affiliated with the ing customers that it would be better for International Association of Machin- them not to purchase, or, having purists, an unincorporated association having chased, not to install, presses made by a membership of more than 60,000, and complainant, and threatening them with are united in a combination, to which the loss should they do so; threatening cusInternational Association also is a party, tomers with sympathetic strikes in other having the object of compelling complain- trades; notifying a trucking company ant to unionize its factory, and enforce usually employed by customers to haul the "closed shop," the eight-hour day, and the presses not to do so, and threatening the union scale of wages, by means of it with trouble if it should; inciting eminterfering with and restraining its inter- ployees of the trucking company, and state trade in the products of the factory. other men employed by customers of comComplainant's principal manufacture is plainant, to strike against their respecnewspaper presses of large size and com- tive employers, in order to interfere with plicated mechanism, varying in weight the hauling and installation of presses, from 10,000 to 100,000 pounds, and re- and thus bring pressure to bear upon the quiring a considerable force of labor and customers; notifying repair shops not to a considerable expenditure of time-a do repair work on Duplex presses; coercweek or more-to handle, haul, and erecting union men by threatening them with them at the point of delivery. These presses are sold throughout the United States and in foreign countries; and, as they are especially designed for the production of daily papers, there is a large market for them in and about the city of New York. They are delivered there in the ordinary course of interstate commerce, the handling, hauling, and installation work at destination being done by . employees of the purchaser, under the supervision of a specially skilled machinist supplied by complainant. The acts complained of and sought to be restrained have nothing to do with the conduct or management of the factory in Michigan, but solely with the installation and operation of the presses by com None of the deplainant's customers. fendants is or ever was an employee of complainant, and complainant at no time has had relations with either of the organizations that they represent. In August, 1913 (eight months before the filing of the bill), the International Association called a strike at complainant's [463] factory in Battle Creek, as a result of which union machinists to the number of about eleven in the and three factory, who supervised the erection of presses in the field, But the left complainant's employ. defection of so small a number did not materially interfere with the operation of the factory, and sales and shipments in interstate commerce continued. The acts complained of made up the details of an elaborate program adopted and carried out by defendants and their organizations in and about the city of New York as

or installing

loss of union cards and with being black-
listed as "scabs" if they assisted in in-
stalling the presses; threatening an
exposition company with a strike if it
permitted complainant's presses to be ex-
hibited; and resorting to a variety of
other modes of preventing the sale of
presses of complainant's manufacture in
or about New York city, and delivery of
them in interstate commerce, such as in-
juring and threatening to injure com-
plainant's customers and prospective cus-
tomers, and persons concerned [464]
in hauling, handling,
the presses. In some cases the threats
were undisguised; in other cases polite
in form, but none the less sinister in
All the judges
purpose and effect.
of the circuit court of appeals con-
curred in the view that defendants'
conduct consisted essentially of efforts to
render it impossible for complainant to
carry on any commerce in printing presses
between Michigan and New York; and
that defendants had agreed to do and were
endeavoring to accomplish the very thing
pronounced unlawful by this court in
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 52 L. ed.
488, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. Cas.
815; 235 U. S. 522, 59 L. ed. 341, 35 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 170. The judges also agreed
that the interference with interstate
commerce was such as ought to be en-
joined, unless the Clayton Act of October
15, 1914, forbade such injunction.

That act was passed after the beginning of the suit, but more than two years before it was brought to hearing. We are clear that the courts below were right in giving effect to it; the real question being,

355

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whether they gave it the proper effect. In so far as the act (a) provided for relief by injunction to private suitors, (b) imposed conditions upon granting such relief under particular circumstances, and (c) otherwise modified the Sherman Act, it was effective from the time of its passage, and applicable to pending suits for injunction. Obviously, this form of relief operates only in futuro, and the right to it must be determined as of the time of the hearing. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 421, 431, 432, 15 L. ed. 435, 437, 438. See also United States v. The Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103, 110, 2 L. ed. 49, 51; Sampeyreac v. United States, 7 Pet. 222, 239, 240, 8 L. ed. 665, 671, 672; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653, 40 L. ed. 293, 294, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Dinsmore v. Southern Exp. Co. 183 U. S. 115, 120, 46 L. ed. 111, 113, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45; Berry v. Davis, 242 U. S. 468, 470, 61 L. ed. 441, 442, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208.

The Clayton Act, in § 1, includes the Sherman Act in a definition of "anti-trust laws," and, in § 16 (38 Stat. at L. 737, chap. 323, Comp. Stat. § 88350, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 745), gives to private parties a right to relief by injunetion in any court of the United States against threatened loss or [465] damage by a violation of the Anti-trust Laws, under the conditions and principles regulating the granting of such relief by courts of equity. Evidently this provision was intended to supplement the Sherman Act, under which some of the Federal courts had held, as this court afterwards held in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 471, 61 L. ed. 1256, 1264, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718, that a private party could not maintain a suit for injunction.

threatened loss is due to a violation of the Sherman Act, as amended by the Clayton Act.

Looking first to the former act, the thing declared illegal by its 1st section (26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647, Comp. Stat. § 8820, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 644) is: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations." The accepted definition of a conspiracy is, a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 203, 37 L. ed. 419, 422, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542. If the purpose be unlawful it may not be carried out even by means that otherwise would be legal; and although [466] the purpose be lawful, it may not be carried out by criminal or unlawful means.

The substance of the matters here complained of is an interference with complainant's interstate trade, intended to have coercive effect upon complainant, and produced by what is commonly known as a "secondary boycott;" that is, a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by peaceful means persuade complainant's customers to refrain ("primary boycott"), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal with it.

As we shall see, the recognized distinetion between a primary and a secondary boycott is material to be considered upon the question of the proper construction of the Clayton Act. But, in determining the right to an injunction under that and the Sherman Act, it is of minor consequence whether either kind of boycott is lawful or unlawful at common law or under the statutes of particular states. Those acts, passed in the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states, are of paramount authority, and their prohibitions must be given full effect irrespective of whether the things prohibited are lawful or unlawful at common law or under local statutes.

That complainant's business of manufacturing printing presses and disposing of them in commerce is a property right, entitled to protection against unlawful injury or interference; that unrestrained access to the channels of interstate commerce is necessary for the successful conduct of the business; that a widespread combination exists, to which defendants and the associations represented by them are parties, to hinder and obstruct complainant's interstate trade and commerce by the means that have been indicated; and that, as a result of it, complainant has sustained substantial dam- In Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 48 age to its interstate trade, and is threat- | L. ed. 488, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. ened with further and irreparable loss and damage in the future,-is proved by clear and undisputed evidence. Hence, the right to an injunction is clear if the

Cas. 815, where there was an effort to compel plaintiffs to unionize their factory by preventing them from manufacturing articles intended for transportation be

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