yond the state, and also by preventing, tended to influence the retailers to refrain vendees from reselling articles purchased from dealing with the listed wholesalers, from plaintiffs, and negotiating with and it was held that this constituted a plaintiffs for further purchases, by means violation of the Sherman Act. Referring of a boycott of plaintiffs' products and of to this decision, the court said, in Lawlor dealers who handled them, this court held v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 534, 59 L. ed. that there was a conspiracy in restraint 341, 348, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170: "That of trade, actionable under § 7 of the case establishes that, irrespective of com[467] Sherman Act, and in that con- pulsion or even agreement to observe its nection said (p. 293): "The act pro- intimation, the circulation of a list of 'unhibits any combination whatever to fair dealers,' manifestly intended to put secure action which essentially ob- the ban upon those whose names appear structs the free flow of commerce be- therein, among an important body of postween the states, or restricts, in that sible customers combined with a view to regard, the liberty of a trader to en- joint action and in anticipation of such reports, is within the prohibition of the Sherman Act if it is intended to restrain and restrains commerce among the states."

gage in business. The combination

charged falls within the class of restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that the combination imposes.' And when the case came before the court a second time (235 U. S. 522, 534, 59 L. ed. 341, 348, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170), it was held that the use of the primary and secondary boycott, and the circulation of a list of "unfair dealers," intended to influence customers of plaintiffs, and thus subdue the latter to the demands of the defendants, and having the effect of interfering with plaintiffs' interstate trade, was actionable.

In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 58 L. ed. 1490, L.R.A.1915A, 788, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep 951, wholesale dealers were subjected to coercion merely through the circulation among retailers, who were members of the association, of information in the form of a kind of "black list," in

"Sec. 6. That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the Anti-trust Laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the Anti-trust Laws."

"Sec. 20. That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a

It is settled by these decisions that such a restraint produced by peaceable persua sion is as much within the [468] prohibition as one accomplished by force or threats of force; and it is not to be justified by the fact that the participants in the combination or conspiracy may have some object beneficial to themselves or their associates which possibly they might have been at liberty to pursue in the absence of the statute.

Upon the question whether the provisions of the Clayton Act forbade the grant of an injunction under the circumstances of the present case, the circuit court of appeals was divided; the majority holding that under § 20, "perhaps in conjunction with § 6," there could be no injunction. These sections are set forth in the margin.1 Defendants seek to derive from property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.

1

"And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or per sons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other

the granting of injunctions already established and of general application in the equity practice of the courts of the United States. It is but declaratory of the law as

them some [469] authority for their conduct. As to § 6, it seems to us its principal importance in this discussion is for what it does not authorize, and for the limit it sets to the it stood before. The second paragraph immunity conferred. The section assumes the normal objects of a labor organization to be legitimate, and declares that nothing in the Anti-trust Laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of such organizations, or to forbid their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and that such an organization shall not be held in itself--merely because of its existence and operation to be an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate objects, and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined by the Anti

trust Laws.

declares that "no such restraining order or injunction" shall prohibit certain conduct specified,-manifestly still referring to a "case between an employer and employees, . . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment," as designated in the first paragraph. It is very clear that the restriction upon the use of the injunetion is in favor only of those concerned as parties to such a dispute as is described. The words defining the permitted conduct include particular qualifications consistent with the general one respecting the nature of the case and dispute intended; and the concluding words, "nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States," are to be read in the light of the context, and mean only that those acts are not to be so held, when committed by parties concerned in "a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." If the qualifying words are to have any effect, they must operate to confine the restriction upon the granting of injunctions, and also the relaxation [471] of the provisions of the Anti-trust and other laws of the United States, to parties standing in proximate relation to a controversy such as is particularly described.

The principal reliance is upon § 20. This regulates the granting of restraining orders and injunctions by the courts of the United States in a designated class of cases, with respect to (a) the terms and conditions of the relief and the practice to be pursued, and (b) the character of [470] acts that are to be exempt- The majority of the circuit court of ed from the restraint; and in the con- appeals appear to have entertained the cluding words it declares (c) that view that the words "employers and emnone of the acts specified shall be ployees," as used in § 20, should be treated held to be violations of any law of as referring to "the business class or clan the United States. All its provisions to which the parties litigant respectively are subject to a general qualification belong;" and that, as there had been a respecting the nature of the controversy dispute at complainant's factory in and the parties affected. It is to be a "case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment."

The first paragraph merely puts into statutory form familiar restrictions upon moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States."

Michigan concerning the conditions of employment there, a dispute created, it is said, if it did not exist before, by the act of the Machinists' Union in calling a strike at the factory,-§ 20 operated to permit members of the Machinists' Union elsewhere, some 60,000 in number,—although standing in no relation of employment under complainant, past, present, or prospective, to make that dispute their own, and proceed to instigate sympathetic strikes, picketing, and boycotting against employers wholly unconnected with complainant's factory, and having relations with complainant only in the way of purchasing its product in the ordinary course of interstate commerce, and this where there was no dispute between such em

ployers and their employees respecting virtually repeal by implication the proterms or conditions of employment.

hibition of the Sherman Act, so far as labor organizations are concerned, notwithstanding repeals by implication are not favored; and in effect, as [473] was noted in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 303, 304, 52 L. ed. 488, 503, 504, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. Cas. 813, would confer upon voluntary associations of individuals formed within the states a control over commerce among the states that is denied to the governments of the states themselves.

We deem this construction altogether inadmissible. Section 20 must be given full effect according to its terms as an expression of the purpose of Congress; but it must be borne in mind that the section imposes an exceptional and extraordinary restriction upon the equity powers of the courts of the United States, and upon the general operation of the Anti-trust Laws, -a restriction in the nature of a special privilege or immunity to a particular class, with corresponding detriment to the The qualifying effect of the words general public; and it would violate rules descriptive of the nature of the dispute of statutory construction having general and the parties concerned is further application and far-reaching importance borne out by the phrases defining the conto enlarge that special privilege by re- duct that is not to be subjected to insorting to a loose construction of [472] junction or treated as a violation of the the section, not to speak of ignoring laws of the United States; that is to say: or slighting the qualifying words that (a) "Terminating any relation of employare found in it. Full and fair effect ment, . . or persuading others by will be given to every word if the peaceful means so to do;" (b) “attendexceptional privilege be confined-as ing at any place where any such person the natural meaning of the words con- or persons may lawfully be, for the purfines it to those who are proximate- pose of peacefully obtaining or comly and substantially concerned as par- municating information, or from peaceties to an actual dispute respecting the fully persuading any person to work or to terms or conditions of their own employ- abstain from working;" (c) "ceasing to ment, past, present, or prospective. The patronize or to employ any party to such extensive construction adopted by the dispute, or . . . recommending, advismajority of the court below virtually ing, or persuading others by peaceful and ignores the effect of the qualifying words. lawful means so to do;" (d) "paying or Congress had in mind particular indus- giving to, or withholding from, any pertrial controversies, not a general class war. son engaged in such dispute, any strike "Terms or conditions of employment" are benefits ;" (e) "doing any act or the only grounds of dispute recognized as thing which might lawfully be done in the adequate to bring into play the exemp- absence of such dispute by any party tions; and it would do violence to the thereto." The emphasis placed on the guarded language employed were the ex-words "lawful" and "lawfully," "peaceemption extended beyond the parties ful" and "peacefully," and the references affected in a proximate and substantial, to the dispute and the parties to it, strongnot merely a sentimental or sympathetic, ly rebut a legislative intent to confer a sense by the cause of dispute.

general immunity for conduct violative of Nor can § 20 be regarded as bringing the Anti-trust Laws, or otherwise unlawin all members of a labor organization as ful. The subject of the boycott is dealt parties to a "dispute concerning terms or with specifically in the "ceasing to patronconditions of employment" which proxi- ize" provision, and by the clear force of mately affects only a few of them, with the the language employed the exemption is result of conferring upon any and all limited to pressure exerted upon a "party members, no matter how many thousands to such dispute" by means of "peaceful there may be, nor how remote from the and lawful" influence upon neutrals. actual conflict--those exemptions which There is nothing here to justify defendCongress in terms conferred only upon ants or the organizations they represent parties to the dispute. That would en- in using either threats or persuasion to large by construction the provisions of § bring about strikes or a cessation of work 20, which contain no mention of labor [474] on the part of employees of organizations, so as to produce an incon- complainant's customers or prospecsistency with § 6, which deals specifically tive customers, or of the trucking comwith the subject and must be deemed to pany employed by the customers, with express the measure and limit of the im- the object of compelling such customunity intended by Congress to be inci- mers to withdraw or refrain from dent to mere membership in such an commercial relations with complainorganization. At the same time it would ant, and of thereby constraining com

plainant to yield the matter in dispute. v. United States, 194 [475] U. S. To instigate a sympathetic strike in aid of 486, 495, 48 L. ed. 1087, 1090, 24 a secondary boycott cannot be deemed Sup. Ct. Rep. 816. And this has been "peaceful and lawful" persuasion. In extended to include explanatory stateessence it is a threat to inflict damage upon the immediate employer, between whom and his employees no dispute exists, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan to inflict damage upon another employer who is in dispute with his employees.

Reaching the conclusion, as we do, that complainant has a clear right to an injunction under the Sherman Act, as amended by the Clayton Act, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether a like result would follow under the common law or local statutes; there being no suggestion that relief thereunder could be broader than that to which complainant is entitled under the acts of Congress.

was under consideration when the bill public [478] upon whom the cost must was framed, and the section as re- ultimately fall, and whose vital interest ported was carefully prepared with the in unobstructed commerce constituted settled purpose of excluding the sec- the prime and paramount concern of ondary boycott, and confining boycot- Congress in enacting the Anti-trust ting to the parties to the dispute, allow Laws, of which the section under coning parties to cease to patronize and to sideration forms, after all, a part. ask others to cease [477] to patronize a party to the dispute; it was the opinion of the committee that it did not legalize the secondary boycott; it was not their purpose to authorize such a boycott; not a member of the committee would vote to do so; clarifying amendment was unnecessary; the section as reported expressed the real purpose so well that it could not be tortured into a meaning authorizing the secondary boycott. This was the final word of the House committee on the subject, and was uttered under such circumstances and with such impressive emphasis that it is not going too far to say that, except for this exposition of the meaning of the section, it would not have been enacted in the form in which it was reported. In substantially that form it be came law; and since, in our opinion, its proper construction is entirely in accord with its purpose as thus declared, little need be added.

The extreme and harmful consequences of the construction adopted in the court below are not to be ignored. The present case furnishes an apt and convincing example. An ordinary controversy in a manufacturing establishment, said to concern the terms or conditions of employment there, has been held a sufficient occasion for imposing a general embargo upon the products of the establishment and a nation-wide blockade of the channels of interstate commerce against them, carried out by inciting sympathetic strikes and a secondary boycott against complainant's customers, to the great and incalculable damage of many innocent people far remote from any connection with or control over the original and actual dispute, people constituting, indeed, the general I think, by about 243 to 16, and the question of the secondary boycott was not raised then, because we understood so clearly it did not refer to or authorize the secondary boycott.

(Page 9658.)

There should be an injunction against defendants and the associations represented by them, and all members of those associations, restraining them, according to the prayer of the bill, from interfering or attempting to interfere with the sale, transportation, or delivery in interstate commerce of any printing press or presses manufactured by complainant, or the transportation, carting, installation, use, operation, exhibition, display, or repairing of any such press or presses, or the performance of any contract or contracts made by complainant respecting the sale, transportation, delivery, or installation of any such press or presses, by causing or threatening to cause loss, damage, trouble, or inconvenience to any person, firm, or corporation concerned in the purchase, transportation, carting, installation, use, operation, exhibition, display, or repairing of any such press or presses, or the performance of any such contract or contracts; and also and especially from using any force, threats, command, direction, or even persuasion with the object or having the effect of causing any person or persons to decline employment, cease employment, or not seek employment, or to refrain from work or cease working under any person, firm, or corporation being a purchaser or prospective purchaser of any to the dispute, that is not a secondary boycott, and you cannot possibly make it mean a secondary boycott. Therefore this section does not authorize the secondary boycott.

I say again—and I speak for, I believe, practically every member of the Judiciary Mr. Webb: Mr. Chairman, I should vote Committee-that if this section did legalize for the amendment offered by the gentle the secondary boycott, there would not be man from Minnesota [Mr. Volstead] if I a man vote for it. It is not the purpose were not perfectly satisfied that it is taken care of in this section. The language the of the committee to authorize it, and I do gentleman reads does not authorize the not think any person in this House wants We confine the boycotting to the secondary boycott, and he could not torture to do it. it into any such meaning. While it does parties to the dispute, allowing parties to authorize persons to cease to patronize the cease to patronize that party, and to ask party to the dispute, and to recommend to others to cease to patronize the party to the others to cease to patronize that same party dispute.