Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. McFadden, 232 Fed. 1000; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ward, 244 U. S. 383, 61 L. ed. 1213, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 618; Re Rates on Railroad Fuel, 36 Inters. Com. Rep. 8; Kanotex Ref. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 34 I. C. Rep. 271; Memphis Merchants Exch. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 43 I. C. Rep. 389; Hudson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 226 Fed. 43; Cutting v. Florida R. & Nav. Co. 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 665, 46 Fed. 641.

Mr. Samuel Herrick argued the cause, and, with Mr. Robert J. Boyle, filed a brief for respondent:

The shipment over the line of the respondent company was purely an intrastate shipment, which was completed when the car reached Dallas, Texas, and its subsequent interstate shipment to Kansas City, Missouri, was a wholly new and independent matter with which this respondent had no concern.

[ocr errors]

29

v.

T.

Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517-527, L. ed. 715-719, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565, 19 L. ed. 1002; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, 58 L. ed. 988, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Missouri, K. & R. Co. v. Pace, Tex. Civ. App. 184 S. W. 1052; Wien v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 166 App. Div. 766, 152 N. Y. Supp. 154; Kolkmeyer v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 192 Mo. App. 188, 182 S. W. 794; Smith v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 177 Mo. App. 269, 164 S. W. 132; Keithley v. Lusk, 195 Mo. App. 143, 189 S. W. 621: Reynolds v. St. Louis, S. W. R. Co. 195 Mo. App. 215, 190 S. W. 423; Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. 194 Mo. App. 618, 186 S. W. 1118.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

June 10, 1918, the petitioner delivered to respondent Railway Company at Ingleside, Texas, a carload of vegetables consigned to himself at Dallas, Texas, a point off its lines, where he intended to sell them. He accepted a bill of lading upon the face of which was plainly printed "For use only between points within the state of Texas." [490] It contained no reference to a diversion or reshipment; and the record discloses no rule or regulation by the state statutes or authorities on that subject.

The car moved over respondent's road to Waco, and then over the M. K. & T. Railway to Dallas, where it appears to 65 L. ed.

have arrived promptly, with contents in good condition. Upon petitioner's request, made after such arrival, the M. K. & T. Railway forwarded the car to Kansas City over its own lines, took up the original bill of lading and issued an interstate one, acknowledging receipt of the vegetables at Dallas. When the car reached Kansas City the contents were in bad condition, and thereupon petitioner sued respondent as the initial carrier, claiming a right to recover damages under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Com584, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. §§ 8604a, merce Act (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 8604aa, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 499).

The court below held that the provisions in interstate tariffs permitting re consignment or change of destination did not apply; that the carrier only agreed to transport to Dallas, and was not liable for damage sustained beyond that point.

to

Respondent's contract appears to have related only to a movement between Points in the same state. It had no nowould pass beyond the destination specitice or reason to suppose that the freight fied. The original undertaking was an intrastate transaction, subject, of course, any applicable rules and regulations discloses none; and we are unable to say, prescribed by state authority. The record schedules for interstate shipments, or the as matter of Federal law, that the tariff Act, constituted part of the agreement. provisions of the Interstate Commerce The general principles announced in Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 411, 51 L. ed. 540, 545, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360, are applicable. Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, 56 L. ed. 1004, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653, Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. 227 U. S. 111, 57 L. ed. 442, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, and similar cases, are not [491] controlling. They involved controver sies concerning carriage between points in the same state which was really but part of an interstate or foreign movement reasonably to be anticipated by the contracting parties,a recognized step towards a destination outside the state. The distinctions are elucidated in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. Here neither shipper nor respondent had in contemplation any movement beyond the point specified, and the contract between them must be determined from the original bill of lading and the local laws and regulations. Affirmed.

367

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plff. in

Err.,

Ballaine v. Alaska Northern R. Co. 8 A.L.R. 990, 170 C. C. A. 251, 259 Fed. 183; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United JAMES H. STRANG, Henry C. Thomas, States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet

v.

and Leroy W. Walter.

[blocks in formation]

United States who are agents of inspector of Emergency Fleet Corporation financial interest in contracts.

[ocr errors]

2. The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, controlled and managed as it was by its own officers, and appointing its own servants and agents, who became directly responsible to it, must be regarded as an entity separate from the United States, notwithstanding the ownership by the government of all its capital stock, and a person employed by such Fleet Corporation as an inspector is not an agent of the United States, within the meaning of the Criminal Code, § 41, which forbids any person from acting as an officer or agent of the United States in the transaction of business with a business concern

with which he is connected as member, officer, or agent, or in which he has a pecuniary interest.

[For other cases, see United States, III. a; III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 206.]

Argued December 9, 1920. Decided January 3, 1921.

IN IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Dis trict of Florida to review a judgment which sustained a demurrer to an indietment charging a person with having un lawfully acted as an agent of the United States in transacting business for the

Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation with a partnership of which he was a member. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Solicitor General Frierson argued the cause, and, with Special Assistant to the Attorney General Myers, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

The Emergency Fleet Corporation is an agency of the United States.

The Lake Monroe (Re United States) 250 U. S. 246, 63 L. ed. 962, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation has no other capacity than that of government agent.

Corp. 268 Fed. 624.

[blocks in formation]

James H. Strang was not an agent of the United States.

United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343, 9 L. ed. 448; Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172, 4 L. ed. 362; United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 109, Fed. Cas. No. 15,747; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 36 L. ed. 591, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; 2 C. J. pp. 420, 421; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 33 L. ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385-402, 18 L. ed. 830-834; United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 35 L. ed. 190, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep.

538.

James H. Strang was nothing more than an employee of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, acting under E. K. Sharlow, and merely an inspector.

2 C. J. pp. 420, 423; Mechem, Agency, p. 20, note 10, pp. 21, 23, 24, §§ 36, 39; 1 Clark & S. Agency, 8 and notes; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 33 L. ed. 440, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175; New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L. ed. 220, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 309; 1 Clark & S. Agency, p. 10, note 24.

The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation is not the United States, but a corporation.

Bank of United States v. Planters' | transacting business with the Duval Ship Bank, 9 Wheat. 904-908, 6 L. ed. 244, Outfitting Company, a copartnership of 245; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 which he was a member, in that, while an Pet. 318, 7 L. ed. 437; Briscoe v. Bank employee of the Fleet Corporation as an of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 324, 325, 9 inspector, he signed and executed (FebL. ed. 709, 735, 736; Curran v. Arkan-ruary, 1919) three separate orders to the sas, 15 How. 304, 308, 309, 14 L. ed. Outfitting Company for repairs and al705, 707, 708; Union P. R. Co. v. United terations. on the steamship Lone Star. States, 99 U. S. 718, 25 L. ed. 501; Chi- The other defendants are charged with cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa (Chicago, aiding and abetting him. The trial court B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts) 94 U. S. 155, and counsel here have treated the fourth 24 L. ed. 95; Salas v. United States, 148 count as charging all the defendants with C. C. A. 440, 234 Fed. 842; White v. conspiracy to commit the offenses set Nashville & N. R. Co. 7 Heisk. 547; forth in the three preceding counts. Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina R. United States v. Colgate & Co. 250 U. S. Co. 81 Fed. 595; Lord & B. Co. v. Unit- 300, 63 L. ed. 992, 7 A.L.R. 443, 39 Sup. ed States Shipping Bd. Emergency Ct. Rep. 465. Fleet Corp. 265 Fed. 955; Panama R. Co. v. Curran, 168 C. C. A. 114, 256 Fed. 772; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri P. R. Co. 115 U. S. 587, 29 L. ed. 499, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 194; IngramDay Lumber Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. 267 Fed. 283; Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440; Gould Coupler Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. 261 Fed. 716; Perna v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergeney Fleet Corp. 266 Fed. 896; Western & A. R. Co. v. Taylor, 6 Heisk. 415.

[492] Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

The ultimate question for determination is whether the employment of defendant Strang as an inspector by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, without more, made him an agent of the government within the meaning of § 41, Criminal Code.

"Sec. 41. No officer or agent of any corporation, joint stock company, or as sociation, and no member or agent of any firm, or person directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of such corporation, joint stock company, association, or firm, shall be employed or shall act as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business with such corporation, joint stock company, association, or firm. Whoever shall violate the provision of this section shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than two years." [35 Stat. at L. 1097, chap. 321, Comp. Stat. § 10,205, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 607.]

Holding that this employment did not suffice to create the relation alleged, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment. It contains four counts, three of which charge that Strang unlawfully acted as agent of the United States in

Counsel for the government maintain that the Fleet [493] Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the United States, formed only as au arm for executing purely governmental powers and duties vested by Congress in the President, and by him delegated to it; that the acts of the Corporation within its delegated authority are the acts of the United States; that therefore, in placing orders with the Duval Company in behalf of the Fleet Corporation, while performing the duties as inspector, Strang necessarily acted as agent of the United States.

The demurrer was properly sustained. As authorized by the Act of September 7, 1916 [39 Stat. at L. 728, chap. 451, Comp. Stat. § 8146a, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1918, p. 785], the United States Shipping Board caused the Fleet Corporation to be organized (April 16, 1917) under laws of the District of Columbia with $50,000,000 capital stock, all owned by the United States, and it became an operating agency of that Board. Later, the President directed that the Corporation should have and exercise a specified portion of the power and authority in respect of ships granted to him by the Act of June 15, 1917 [40 Stat. at L. 182, chap. 29], and he likewise authorized the Shipping Board to exercise through it another portion of such power and authority. See The Lake Monroe (Re United States) 250 U. S. 246, 252, 63 L. ed. 962, 966, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460. The Corporation was controlled and managed by its own officers, and appointed its own servants and agents, who became directly responsible to it. Notwithstanding all its stock was owned by the United States, it must be regarded as a separate entity. Its inspectors were not appointed by the President, nor by any officer designated by Congress; they were subject to removal by the Corporation only, and could

contract only for it. In such circumstances we think they were not agents of the United States within the true intendment of § 41.

which had previously been sold to the Confederate States under a sale treated by the seller as rescinded before delivery, and who, after a seizure of the cotton by the Federal Treasury agents, agreed with her vendor that the sale should be rescinded because of his prior transactions in connection with the cotton, was not the owner at the time of the seizure, within the meaning of the Judicial Code, § 162, which conferred jurisdiction on the court of claims to hear and determine the claims of those whose propunder the Abandoned and Captured Property was taken subsequent to June 1, 1865, erty Act of March 3, 1863, where the property so taken was sold and the net proceeds placed in the Treasury of the United States, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to return the net proceeds to the owners thereof on the judgment of said court.

Generally agents of a corporation are not agents of the stockholders, and cannot contract for the latter. Apparently this was one reason why Congress authorized organization of the Fleet Corporation. Bank of United [494] States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907, 908, 6 L. ed. 244, 245; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318, 7 L. ed. 437; Brisсое V. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 9 L. ed. 709; Salas v. United States, 148 C. C. A. 440, 234 Fed. 842. The view of Congress is further indicated by the provision in 87, Appropriation Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 345, 384, chap. 79, Comp. Stat. § 251b): "Provided, that the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation shall be considered a government establishment Argued December 10, 1920. for the purposes of this section." Also, by the Act of October 23, 1918 (chap. 194, 40 Stat. at L. 1015, Comp. Stat. §

[For other cases, see Claims, 141-144; Abandoned and Captured Property, IV. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 112.]

uary 3, 1921.

Decided Jan

10,199), which amends § 35, Criminal APPEAL from the Court of Claims to Code, and renders it criminal to defraud or conspire to defraud a corporation in which the United States owns stock. Affirmed.

[blocks in formation]

proceeds abandoned and captured property ownership.

of

1. Only the owner of the property at the time of the seizure is within the protection of the provision of the Judicial Code, § 162, which conferred jurisdiction on the court of claims to hear and determine the

claims of those whose property was taken
subsequent to June 1, 1865, under the
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of
March 3, 1863, where the property so taken
was sold and the net proceeds placed in the
Treasury of the United States, and direct-
ed the Secretary of the Treasury to re-
turn the net proceeds to the owners there
of on the judgment of said court.
[For other cases, see Claims, 141-144; Aban-
doned and Captured Property, IV. in Digest
Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Claims jurisdiction

proceeds of abandoned and captured property who is owner.

2. One who purchased in 1865 cotton

review a judgment which dismissed a petition for the recovery of the proceeds of abandoned and captured property. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles F. Consaul argued the cause, and, with Mr. John S. Blair and Mrs. Ida M. Moyers, filed a brief for appellant.

Assistant Attorney General Davis argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.

Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court:

Essential findings of fact by the court of claims in this case are as follows:

On January 23, 1863, John H. Hamiter, of Arkansas, sold 175 bales of cotton to the government of the Confederate States, and executed and delivered a bill of sale, containing this paragraph:

"The undersigned, having sold to the Confederate States of America, and received the value of same in bonds, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, 175 bales of cotton, marked, numbered, and classed as in the margin, which is now deposited at my plantation, hereby agrees to take due care of said cotton whilst on his plantation, and to deliver the same as (at) his own expense at Conway, on Red river, in the state of Arkansas, to the order of the Secretary of the Treasury, or his agents or their assigns."

The payment in bonds not being made,

"five or six months later" Hamiter noti- | to Mrs. Pillow; and that after she had fied the agent of the government that if failed to secure its release by the United they were not delivered, he would treat States government, she demanded that the sale as rescinded, and, the bonds not Hamiter should refund to her the purThis demand at first being forthcoming, he sold the cotton to chase price. his father, who died not long thereafter. Hamiter refused, but, "upon fear of About two years later, in September, threatened arrest and punishment for his 1865, Hamiter, "as administrator or transactions in connection with the cotother agent of his father's estate," sold ton," he consented, gave his note to Mrs. 70 bales of the cotton to plaintiff's dece- Pillow for the amount of the purchase dent, then Mrs. Trigg (afterwards Mrs. price, and filed a claim for the cotton in Mrs. his own Pillow), and received pay for it. name, which was disallowed. Pillow sent it to the Red river for ship- Thus Hamiter obviously thought the conment to market, where it was seized by tract, in form a sale, had been [497] the United States Treasury agents, under rescinded by mutual consent, and that authority of "An Act to Provide for the Mrs. Pillow was of the same conviction Collection of Abandoned Property," etc., is shown by the fact that when Hamapproved March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. at L. iter's note at six months was not paid, 820, chap. 120, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. she sued him upon it, but "it does not p. 141. It was sold, and [496] for satisfactorily appear what was the rethe proceeds paid into the United sult of the suit." States Treasury Mrs. Pillow, since deceased, instituted this action.

The court of claims dismissed the petition without an opinion, probably because it deemed the showing of title to the cotton by the claimant's decedent so obviously insufficient as not to require discussion.

The natural and impressive inference from these facts is not that Mrs. Pillow obtained from Hamiter a good title to the cotton and a right to the proceeds of it, but that these two persons, parties to the sale, who were fifty years nearer to it than courts can now be placed, and who knew more about it than it is possible now to learn, agreed that it should be rescinded because of the prior "transactions of Hamiter in connection with the cotton;" which must mean that the title which he was able to confer upon Mrs. Pillow was not deemed by her satisfactory, and therefore, by mutual agreement, she released all interest in the cotton and necessarily in the proceeds of it. No rights of third persons being involved, the parties were as comre-petent to rescind the contract of sale as they were to make it, and the finding of fact is that they did so for what Mrs. Pillow obviously thought a sufficient con

The only warrant for such a suit at this late day is found in § 162 of the Judicial Code; and to entitle the claimant to recover, he must prove that his decedent was the owner of the cotton at the time it was seized. Thompson v. United States, 246 U. S. 547, 549, 62 L. ed. 876, 878, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349.

There is no finding by the court of claims that Mrs. Pillow was the owner of the cotton when it was seized, but it is argued that facts are found which quire that conclusion. These are: that Hamiter owned the cotton, that he sold it to Mrs. Pillow, who paid for it, and that after she took possession of it the government seized it. It is argued that these facts show title in her, which was not devested by anything afterwards done by her, and therefore the claim of her representative for the proceeds of the cotton should be allowed.

Other facts found, however, on which we must proceed to judgment, are: that Hamiter sold the cotton to the Confederate States government, and, when it was not paid for, declared the sale void, and then sold it to his father; that afterwards, "as administrator or other agent of his father's estate," he sold it 65 L. ed.

sideration.

We are not concerned with whether Rev. Stat. § 3477, Comp. Stat. § 6383, 2 Fed. Stat. 'Anno. 2d ed. p. 179, prevented the transfer to Hamiter of any rights against the government which The claimMrs. Pillow may have had. ant did not undertake to prove that Hamiter, or anyone else, had a valid claim, but that Mrs. Pillow owned the cotton at the time it was seized; and this, we think, he failed to do, and therefore the judgment of the Court of Claims must be affirmed.

871

« ForrigeFortsett »