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tion that this case is not one arising out of a dispute concerning the conditions of work of one of the parties is, in my opinion, founded upon a misconception of the facts.

Because I have come to the conclusion that both the common law of a state and a statute of the United States declare the right of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of self-interest, I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional or moral sanction to that right. All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights rises duty to the community. The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest, and to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This is the function of the legislature, which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.

[489] A. L. BRACHT, Petitioner,

V.

to sell them, and shipped under an intrastate bill of lading that contained no refersolely by such bill of lading, subject to any ence to diversion or reshipment, is governed applicable rules and regulations prescribed at destination, at a point beyond such by state authority, although, upon arrival initial carrier's own line, the carrier then having possession of the goods forwarded them, upon the shipper's request, made after arrival, to a point in another state, taking up the original bill of lading, and issuing an interstate one, and such initial carrier Carmack Amendment of June 29, 1906, to may not be held liable by virtue of the the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, for damages sustained in the course of transportation beyond the destination originally specified. [For other cases,

see Carriers, II. c; Commerce, I. b; I. c, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.j

[No. 118.]

Argued and submitted December 16, 1920. Decided January 3, 1921.

N WRIT of Certiorari to the Kansas ΟΝ of Missouri to review a judgment which City Court of Appeals of the State reversed a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, in that state, in favor of the shipper in an action against a carrier for damages to a shipment, occurring on a connecting line. Affirmed. See same case below, 200 Mo. App.

SAN ANTONIO & ARANSAS PASS RAIL- 655, 209 S. W. 579. WAY COMPANY.

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Note. As to rights and liabilities of connecting carriers-see notes to Fox v. Boston & M. R. Co. 1 L.R.A. 703; Crossan v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 3 L.R.A. 766; Hill v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 4 L.R.A. 376; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Tisdale, 4 L.R.A. 545; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Payne, 6 L.R.A. 849;. Adams Exp. Co. v. Harris, 7 L.R.A. 214; Miller v. South Carolina R. Co. 9 L.R.A. 833; Browning v. Goodrich Transp. Co. 10 L.R.A. 415, and Roy v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1.

As to liability of connecting carrier for loss beyond own line; construction of Hepburn Act (Carmack Amendment)-see note to Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 56 L. ed. U. S. 516.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. I. N. Watson submitted the cause for petitioner. Messrs. Hal R. Lebrecht and L. A. Laughlin were on the brief:

The shipment involved is only one through shipment.

Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Montgomery & Co. 109 Ga. App. 29, 90 S. E. 740; Trott v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 192 Ill. App. 239; Ruddell v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 175 Ill. App. 456; Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, 56 L. ed. 1004, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Railroad Commission v. Texas & P. R. Co. 229 U. S. 336, 57 L. ed. 1215, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 51 L. ed. 540, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, 58 L. ed. 988, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592: Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371, 60 L. ed. 1050, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665; United States v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 232 Fed. 949; Settle v. BalA.L.R. timore & O. S. W. R. Co. 162 C. C. A. 111, 249 Fed. 913; Keithley v. Lusk, 195 Mo. App. 143, 189 S. W. 621; Updike Grain Co. v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 38 Inters. Com. Rep. 616;

-

Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. McFadden, 232 |
Fed. 1000; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
Ward, 244 U. S. 383, 61 L. ed. 1213, 37
Sup. Ct. Rep. 618; Re Rates on Rail-
road Fuel, 36 Inters. Com. Rep. 8; Kan-
otex Ref. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. 34 I. C. Rep. 271; Memphis Mer-
chants Exch. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 43 I.
C. Rep. 389; Hudson v. Chicago, St. P.
M. & O. R. Co. 226 Fed. 43; Cutting v.
Florida R. & Nav. Co. 3 Inters. Com.
Rep. 665, 46 Fed. 641.

Mr. Samuel Herrick argued the cause, and, with Mr. Robert J. Boyle, filed a brief for respondent:

The shipment over the line of the respondent company was purely an intrastate shipment, which was completed when the car reached Dallas, Texas, and its subsequent interstate shipment to Kansas City, Missouri, was a wholly new and independent matter with which this respondent had no concern.

T.

་་་

Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517-527, 29 L. ed. 715-719, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565, 19 L. ed. 1002; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, 58 L. ed. 988, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Missouri, K. & R. Co. v. Pace, Tex. Civ. App. 184 S. W. 1052; Wien v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 166 App. Div. 766, 152 N. Y. Supp. 154; Kolkmeyer v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 192 Mo. App. 188, 182 S. W. 794; Smith v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 177 Mo. App. 269, 164 S. W. 132; Keithley v. Lusk, 195 Mo. App. 143, 189 S. W. 621: Reynolds v. St. Louis, S. W. R. Co. 195 Mo. App. 215, 190 S. W. 423; Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. 194 Mo. App. 618, 186 S. W. 1118.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

June 10, 1918, the petitioner delivered to respondent Railway Company at Ingleside, Texas, a carload of vegetables consigned to himself at Dallas, Texas, a point off its lines, where he intended to sell them. He accepted a bill of lading upon the face of which was plainly printed "For use only between points within the state of Texas." [490] It contained no reference to a diversion or reshipment; and the record discloses no rule or regulation by the state statutes or authorities on that subject.

The car moved over respondent's road to Waco, and then over the M. K. & T. Railway to Dallas, where it appears to

have arrived promptly, with contents in good condition. Upon petitioner's request, made after such arrival, the M. K. & T. Railway forwarded the car to Kansas City over its own lines, took up the original bill of lading and issued an interstate one, acknowledging receipt of the vegetables at Dallas. When the car reached Kansas City the contents were in bad condition, and thereupon petitioner sued respondent as the initial carrier, claiming a right to recover damages under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. §§ 8604a, 8604aa, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 499).

a

The court below held that the provisions in interstate tariffs permitting re not apply; that the carrier only agreed consignment or change of destination did to transport to Dallas, and was not liable for damage sustained beyond that point. Respondent's contract appears to have related only to movement between tice or reason to suppose that the freight points in the same state. It had no nowould pass beyond the destination specified. The original undertaking was an intrastate transaction, subject, of course, to any applicable rules and regulations prescribed by state authority. The record discloses none; and we are unable to say, schedules for interstate shipments, or the as matter of Federal law, that the tariff provisions of the Interstate Commerce The general principles announced in Gulf, Act, constituted part of the agreement. C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 411, 51 L. ed. 540, 545, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360, are applicable. Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, 56 L. ed. 1004, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653, Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. 227 U. S. 111, 57 L. ed. 442, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, and similar cases, are not [491] controlling. They involved controversies concerning carriage between points in the same state which was really but part of an interstate or foreign movement reasonably to be anticipated by the contracting parties,a recognized step towards a destination outside the state. The distinctions are elucidated in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. Here neither shipper nor respondent had in contemplation any movement beyond the point specified, and the contract between them must be determined from the original bill of lading and the local laws and regulations. Affirmed.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plff. in

Err.,

Ballaine v. Alaska Northern R. Co. 8 A.L.R. 990, 170 C. C. A. 251, 259 Fed. 183; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United JAMES H. STRANG, Henry C. Thomas, States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet

v.

and Leroy W. Walter.

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United States who are agents of inspector of Emergency Fleet Corporation financial interest in contracts.

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2. The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, controlled and managed as it was by its own officers, and appointing its own servants and agents, who became directly responsible to it, must be regarded as an entity separate from the United States, notwithstanding the ownership by the government of all its capital stock, and a person employed by such Fleet Corporation as an inspector is not an agent of the United States, within the meaning of the Criminal Code, § 41, which forbids any person from acting as an officer or agent of the United States in the transaction of business with a business concern

with which he is connected as member, officer, or agent, or in which he has a pecuniary interest.

[For other cases, see United States, III. a; III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 206.]

Argued December 9, 1920. Decided January 3, 1921.

IN IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Dis trict of Florida to review a judgment which sustained a demurrer to an indietment charging a person with having un lawfully acted as an agent of the United States in transacting business for the

Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation with a partnership of which he was a member. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Solicitor General Frierson argued the cause, and, with Special Assistant to the Attorney General Myers, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

The Emergency Fleet Corporation is an agency of the United States.

The Lake Monroe (Re United States) 250 U. S. 246, 63 L. ed. 962, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation has no other capacity than that of government agent.

Corp. 268 Fed. 624.

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James H. Strang was not an agent of the United States.

United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343, 9 L. ed. 448; Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172, 4 L. ed. 362; United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 109, Fed. Cas. No. 15,747; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 36 L. ed. 591, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; 2 C. J. pp. 420, 421; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 33 L. ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385-402, 18 L. ed. 830-834; United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 35 L. ed. 190, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep.

538.

James H. Strang was nothing more than an employee of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, acting under E. K. Sharlow, and merely an inspector.

2 C. J. pp. 420, 423; Mechem, Agency, p. 20, note 10, pp. 21, 23, 24, §§ 36, 39; 1 Clark & S. Agency, 8 and notes; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 33 L. ed. 440, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175; New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L. ed. 220, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 309; 1 Clark & S. Agency, p. 10, note 24.

The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation is not the United States, but a corporation.

transacting business with the Duval Ship Outfitting Company, a copartnership of which he was a member, in that, while an employee of the Fleet Corporation as an inspector, he signed and executed (FebOutfitting Company for repairs and alterations on the steamship Lone Star. The other defendants are charged with aiding and abetting him. The trial court and counsel here have treated the fourth count as charging all the defendants with conspiracy to commit the offenses set forth in the three preceding counts. United States v. Colgate & Co. 250 U. S. 300, 63 L. ed. 992, 7 A.L.R. 443, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465.

Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904-908, 6 L. ed. 244, 245; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318, 7 L. ed. 437; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 324, 325, 9 L. ed. 709, 735, 736; Curran v. Arkan-ruary, 1919) three separate orders to the sas, 15 How. 304, 308, 309, 14 L. ed. 705, 707, 708; Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 718, 25 L. ed. 501; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa (Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts) 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 95; Salas v. United States, 148 C. C. A. 440, 234 Fed. 842; White v. Nashville & N. R. Co. 7 Heisk. 547; Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina R. Co. 81 Fed. 595; Lord & B. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. 265 Fed. 955; Panama R. Counsel for the government maintain Co. v. Curran, 168 C. C. A. 114, 256 that the Fleet [493] Corporation is Fed. 772; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. an agency or instrumentality of the Missouri P. R. Co. 115 U. S. 587, 29 United States, formed only as an L. ed. 499, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 194; Ingram- arm for executing purely governmenDay Lumber Co. v. United States Ship- tal powers and duties vested by Conping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. 267 gress in the President, and by him Fed. 283; Commonwealth Finance Corp. delegated to it; that the acts of the v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440; Gould Coupler Corporation within its delegated authorCo. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emer-ity are the acts of the United States; that gency Fleet Corp. 261 Fed. 716; Perna v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergeney Fleet Corp. 266 Fed. 896; Western & A. R. Co. v. Taylor, 6 Heisk. 415.

[492] Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

The ultimate question for determination is whether the employment of defendant Strang as an inspector by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, without more, made him an agent of the government within the meaning of § 41, Criminal Code.

"Sec. 41. No officer or agent of any corporation, joint stock company, or as sociation, and no member or agent of any firm, or person directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of such corporation, joint stock company, association, or firm, shall be employed or shall act as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business with such corporation, joint stock company, association, or firm. Whoever shall violate the provision of this section shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than two years." [35 Stat. at L. 1097, chap. 321, Comp. Stat. § 10,205, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 607.]

Holding that this employment did not suffice to create the relation alleged, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment. It contains four counts, three of which charge that Strang unlawfully acted as agent of the United States in

therefore, in placing orders with the Duval Company in behalf of the Fleet Corporation, while performing the duties. as inspector, Strang necessarily acted as agent of the United States.

The demurrer was properly sustained. As authorized by the Act of September 7, 1916 [39 Stat. at L. 728, chap. 451, Comp. Stat. § 8146a, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1918, p. 785], the United States Shipping Board caused the Fleet Corporation to be organized (April 16, 1917) under laws of the District of Columbia with $50,000,000 capital stock, all owned by the United States, and it became an operating agency of that Board. Later, the President directed that the Corporation should have and exercise a specified portion of the power and authority in respect of ships granted to him by the Act of June 15, 1917 [40 Stat. at L. 182, chap. 29], and he likewise authorized the Shipping Board to exercise through it another portion of such power and authority. See The Lake Monroe (Re United States) 250 U. S. 246, 252, 63 L. ed. 962, 966, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460. The Corporation was controlled and managed by its own officers, and appointed its own servants and agents, who became directly responsible to it. Notwithstanding all its stock was owned by the United States, it must be regarded as a separate entity. Its inspectors were not appointed by the President, nor by any officer designated by Congress; they were subject to removal by the Corporation only, and could

contract only for it. In such circum-, stances we think they were not agents of the United States within the true intendment of § 41.

which had previously been sold to the Confederate States under a sale treated by the seller as rescinded before delivery, and who, after a seizure of the cotton by the Federal Treasury agents, agreed with her vendor that the sale should be rescinded because of his prior transactions in connection with the cotton, was not the owner at the time of the seizure, within the meaning of the Judicial Code, § 162, which conferred jurisdiction on the court of claims to hear and determine the claims of those whose propunder the Abandoned and Captured Property was taken subsequent to June 1, 1865,

Generally agents of a corporation are not agents of the stockholders, and cannot contract for the latter. Apparently this was one reason why Congress author ized organization of the Fleet Corporation. Bank of United [494] States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907, 908, 6 L. ed. 244, 245; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318, 7 L. ed. 437; Bris-erty Act of March 3, 1863, where the propcoe V. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 9 L. ed. 709; Salas v. United States, 148 C. C. A. 440, 234 Fed. 842. The view of Congress is further indicated by the provision in § 7, Appropriation Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 345, 384, chap. 79, Comp. Stat. § 251b): "Provided, that the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation shall be considered a government establishment Argued December 10, 1920. for the purposes of this section." Also, by the Act of October 23, 1918 (chap. 194, 40 Stat. at L. 1015, Comp. Stat. §

10,199), which amends § 35, Criminal

erty so taken was sold and the net proceeds placed in the Treasury of the United States, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to return the net proceeds to the owners thereof on the judgment of said court.

[For other cases, see Claims, 141-144; Abandoned and Captured Property, IV. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 112.]

uary 3, 1921.

Decided Jan

review a judgment which dismissed

APPEAL from the Court of Claims to Code, and renders it criminal to defraud a petition for the recovery of the proor conspire to defraud a corporation in which the United States owns stock. Affirmed.

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1. Only the owner of the property at the time of the seizure is within the protection of the provision of the Judicial Code, § 162, which conferred jurisdiction on the court of claims to hear and determine the

claims of those whose property was taken
subsequent to June 1, 1865, under the
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of
March 3, 1863, where the property so taken
was sold and the net proceeds placed in the
Treasury of the United States, and direct-
ed the Secretary of the Treasury to re-
turn the net proceeds to the owners there
of on the judgment of said court.
[For other cases, see Claims, 141-144; Aban-
doned and Captured Property, IV. in Digest
Sup. Ct. 1908.]
jurisdiction proceeds of
abandoned and captured property
who is owner.

Claims

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2. One who purchased in 1865 cotton

ceeds of abandoned and captured property. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles F. Consaul argued the cause, and, with Mr. John S. Blair and Mrs. Ida M. Moyers, filed a brief for appellant.

Assistant Attorney General Davis argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.

Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court:

Essential findings of fact by the court of claims in this case are as follows:

On January 23, 1863, John H. Hamiter, of Arkansas, sold 175 bales of cotton to the government of the Confederate States, and executed and delivered a bill of sale, containing this paragraph:

"The undersigned, having sold to the Confederate States of America, and received the value of same in bonds, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, 175 bales of cotton, marked, numbered, and classed as in the margin, which is now deposited at my plantation, hereby whilst on his plantation, and to deliver agrees to take due care of said cotton the same as (at) his own expense at Conway, on Red river, in the state of Arkansas, to the order of the Secretary of the Treasury, or his agents or their as signs."

The payment in bonds not being made,

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