Defendants' affidavit discloses no adequate ground for believing that personal feeling existed against any one of them. The indicated prejudice was toward certain malevolents from Germany,-a country then engaged in Hunnish warfare, and notoriously encouraged by many of its natives, who, unhappily, had obtained citizenship here. The words attributed to the judge (I do not credit the affidavit's accuracy) may be fairly construed as showing [43] only deep detestation for all persons of German extraction who were at that time wickedly abusing privileges granted by our indulgent laws. fication of a judge when facts are shown,, honest belief in the disqualifying state such as are here established, seems to me of mind. to be fraught with much danger to the independent discharge of duties by Federal judges, and to open a door to the abuse of the privilege which is intended to be conferred by the statute in question. In my judgment the questions propounded, in the light of the disclosures of this record, should be answered as to the first: That the affidavit of prejudice, when read in the light of the other disclosures in the record, was insufficient to meet the requirements of the act. As to the second: That while the judge might have called upon another judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, he had jurisdiction to pass upon it himself, if he saw fit to do so. As to the third: That the mere filing of the affidavit did not require the judge to proceed no further with the trial of the defendants upon the accusation against them. Of course, no judge should preside if he entertains actual personal prejudice towards any party, and to this obvious disqualification Congress added honestly entertained belief of such prejudice when based upon fairly adequate facts and circumstances. Intense dislike of a class Mr. Justice Pitney concurs in this dis- does not render the judge incapable of sent. [42] Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting: I am unable to follow the reasoning of the opinion approved by the majority, or to feel fairly certain of its scope and consequence. If an admitted anarchist charged with murder should affirm an existing prejudice against himself, and specify that the judge had made certain depreciatory remarks concerning all anarchists, what would be the result? Suppose official stenographic notes or other clear evidence should demonstrate the falsity of an affidavit, would it be necessary for the judge to retire? And what should be done if dreams or visions were the basis of an alleged belief? administering complete justice to one of its members. A public officer who entertained no aversion towards disloyal German immigrants during the late war was simply unfit for his place. And while "an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal," neither is an amorphous dummy, unspotted by human emotions, a becoming receptacle for judicial power. It was not the purpose of Congress to empower an unscrupulous defendant, seeking escape from merited punishment, to remove a judge solely because he had emphatically condemned domestic enemies in time of national danger. The personal concern of the judge in matters of this kind is indeed small, but the concern of the public is very great. In my view the trial judge committed no error when he considered the affidavit, held it insufficient, and refused to retire. The conclusion announced gives effect to the statute which seems unwarranted by its terms and beyond the probable intent of Congress. Bias and prejudice are synonymous words and denote "an [44] ALASKA FISH SALTING & BY opinion or leaning adverse to anything without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge,”—a state of mind. The statute relates only to adverse opinion or leaning towards an individual, and has no application to the appraisement of a class; e. g., revolutionists, assassins, traitors. To claim personal bias, without more, is insufficient. "The facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists" must be set out, and plainly, I think, this must be done in order that the judge or any reviewing tribunal may determine whether they suffice to support | PRODUCTS COMPANY, Plff. in Err., 5. License taxes of $2 a barrel and $2 a ton, respectively, upon persons manufacturing fish oil, fertilizer, and fish meal, in whole or in part, from herring, imposed by the territorial legislature of Alaska, cannot be deemed to be repugnant to the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, § 3, as an attempt to modify or repeal the fish laws of the United States, or the laws of the United States providing for taxes on business or trade, on the theory that Federal statutes imposing a tax on fish oil works and on fertilizer works in general terms (which can hardly be considered fish laws), import a license to a specific kind of works deemed undesirable by the local powers, especially since such section expressly declares that its provisions shall not operate to prevent the territorial legislature from imposing other and additional taxes or licenses. uniformity. [For other cases, see License, II.; Territories. II. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] License territorial tax 6. The requirement of the Act of August 24, 1912, § 9, that all taxes in Alaska shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, is not violated by treating the making of oil and fertilizer from herring as a different class, for purposes of license taxes, from the making of the same from salmon offal. [For other cases, see License, II.; Territories, II. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] License territorial tax restrictions. 7. The restriction against taxation in excess of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation of property in Alaska, which is made by the Act of August 24, 1912, § 9, does not apply to a license tax upon the manufacture of fish oil, fertilizer, and fish meal from herring. 8. A manufacturer of fish oil, fertilizer, and fish meal from herring may not complain that he is doubly taxed, first by the United States and then by the territory of Alaska, in view of the provisions of the Act of August 24, 1912, § 3, giving the territorial legislature power to impose taxes or licenses other than and additional to Federal taxes on business and trade. [For other cases, see License, II.; Territories, II. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 166.] Note. On constitutional equality in the United States in relation to corporate taxation-see note to Bacon v. State Argued January 20 and 21, 1921. Decided Tax Comrs. 60 L.R.A. 321. On taxation of manufacturing corporations in the United States-see note to Williams v. Warren, 64 L.R.A. 33. On construction of statute according to purpose for which it was passed-see note to United States v. Saunders, 22 L. ed. U. S. 736. As to limit of amount of license feessee note to State ex rel. Toi v. French, 30 L.R.A. 415. As to the validity of class legislation, generally-see notes to State v. Goodwill, 6 L.R.A. 621, and State v. Loomis, 21 L.R.A. 789. As to constitutional equality of privileges, immunities, and protection, generally-see note to Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 L.R.A. 579. As to the power of Congress over territories, generally-see note to First Nat. Bank v. Yankton County, 25 L. ed. U. S. 1046. January 31, 1921. N ERROR to the District Court, Division No. 1, of the Territory of Alaska, to review a judgment in favor of defendant in a suit to recover back license taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. R. E. Robertson argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error: The allegations of the complaint must be taken as true because the case was decided upon demurrer. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 234, 49 L. ed. 169, 174, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 103, 47 L. ed. 90, 94, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; St. Louis v. Knapp, S. & Co. Co. 104 U. S. 658, 661, 26 L. ed. 883, 884. The Constitution of the United States is in force and effect in the territory of Alaska, and local legislation in violation, ed. 696, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419, 10 Ann. of the Constitution is void. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 528, 49 L. ed. 862, 867, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 491, 48 L. ed. 1088, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816. It is the duty of the judiciary to consider the real nature and effect of legislation purporting to deprive citizens of rights secured by the fundamental law of the land. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 31 L. ed. 205, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227, 52 L. ed. 1031, 1037, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 344, 45 L. ed. 224, 225, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 59 L. ed. 234, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 105, 43 L. ed. 913, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515, 43 L. ed. 786, 791, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137, 38 L. ed. 385, 389, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 60 L. ed. 691, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 72, 73, 48 L. ed. 342, 346, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208. The Constitution of the United States guarantees citizens the right and privilege to pursue a lawful business, and the tax which may be imposed upon the right to engage in an ordinary, useful, harmless business is not free from judicial control. Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 757, 28 L. ed. 585, 591, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Powell v. Pennsyl. vania, 127 U. S. 678, 685, 32 L. ed. 253, 256, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 594, 61 L. ed. 1336, 1343, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, 37 Sup, Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 81, 46 L. ed. 92, 93, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. Cas. 525; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 390, 42 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31, 28 L. ed. 923, 925, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 428, 46 L. ed. 623, 625, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 468, 45 L. ed. 619, 626, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; House v. Mayes, 219 Ū. S. 270, 281, 55 L. ed. 213, 217, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 608, 47 L. ed. 323, 327, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. ed. 667, L.R.A.1917D, 1, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, 13 N. C. C. A. 943; Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 165, 166, 39 L. ed. 657-659, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 628, 629, 56 L. ed. 1229, 1232, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 153, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 697; Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 636, 58 L. ed. 1129, 1132, L.R.A.1915D, 677, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 420; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 361, 45 L. ed. 224, 233, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 236, 61 L. ed. 685, 696, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N. C. C. A. 927; Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 173, 47 L. ed. 1002, 1005, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 179, 59 L. ed. 900, 904, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Sallsbury v. Equitable Purchasing Co. 177 Ky. 348, L.R.A.1918A, 1114, 197 S. W. 813; Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan. 275; Morton v. Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 50 L.R.A. 485, 36 S. E. 627; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, L.R.A.1918B, 374, 168 Pac. 679. Corporations are citizens within the protection of the 14th Amendment, according them the right and privilege to pursue lawful occupations. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 690, 43 L. ed. 858, 861, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522, 526, 42 L. ed. 819, 841, 842, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 154, 41 L. ed. 667, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 406, 412, 54 L. ed. 536, 540, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; San Mateo County v. Southern P. R. Co. 13 Fed. 151, 7 Sawy. 517; Brushaber v. Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. The territorial legislation and the taxes imposed by it are in violation of the Constitution, because the legislature | has plainly abused its taxing power by exercising it, not for revenue, but for the purpose of destroying rights and privileges accorded to the plaintiff by the Constitution and the Alaska Organic Act. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 563, 46 L. ed. 679, 691, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. Alaska, 149 C. C. A. 262, 236 Fed. 52; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 59, 49 L. ed. 78, 97, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co. 240 U. S. 1, 23, 60 L. ed. 493, 504, L.R.A.1917D, 414, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713. The legislation and the taxes imposed thereunder are unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and prohibitory, and unjustly discriminate against plaintiff and its business, and are in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, because plaintiff is denied the equal protection of the laws, and its property is taken from it without due process of law. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N. C. C. A. 927; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 31, 25 L. ed. 991, 992; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71, 30 L. ed. 578, 579, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 23, 6 L. ed. 28; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243, 16 L. ed. 243; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626, 42 L. ed. 878, 882, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 L. ed. 1336, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 429, 46 L. ed. 623, 626, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Ex parte Hutchison, 137 Fed. 950; Re Yot Sang, 75 Fed. 983; State v. Wright, 53 Or. 344, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 349, 100 Pac. 296; Hager v. Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 195, 129 Am. St. Rep. 238, 107 S. W. 254; State v. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468; Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 55 L.R.A. 589, 86 Am. St. Rep. 306, 61 N. E. 844; Winston v. Beeson, 135 N. C. Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 382, 271, 65 L.R.A. 167, 47 S. E. 457; Ex 60 L. ed. 691, 701, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 2 L.R.A. Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. (N.S.) 588, 82 Pac. 429, 3 Ann. Cas. 400, 417, 54 L. ed. 536, 541, 30 Sup. Ct. 878; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Cotting v. L.R.A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; Scriven v. LeKansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting banon, 99 Kan. 602, L.R.A.1917C, 460, v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 109, 46 L. ed. 162 Pac. 307; Ellis v. Frazier, 38 Or. 92, 108, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Cooley, 462, 53 L.R.A. 454, 63 Pac. 642; OtConst. Lim. 5th ed. 484, 486; State v. tumwa v. Zekind, 95 Iowa, 622, 29 L.R.A. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 47 L.R.A. 369, 59 734, 58 Am. St. Rep. 447, 64 N. W. 646; Pac. 340; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S. C. 62, 117 Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92, 45 L. ed. Am. St. Rep. 885, 55 S. E. 136, 9 Ann. 102, 103, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; State v. Cas. 1003; Colorado Springs v. Siman, Wright, 53 Or. 344, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 349,| 61 Colo. 315, 157 Pac. 194; Re Richard100 Pac. 296; Connolly v. Union Sewer son, 170 Cal. 68, 148 Pac. 213; Moffitt v. Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 562, 563, 46 L. Pueblo, 55 Colo. 112, 133 Pac. 754: Sallsed. 679, 691, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Atchi- bury v. Equitable Purchasing Co. 177 son, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 Ky. 348, L.R.A.1918A, 1114, 197 S. W. U. S. 96, 104, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 Sup. Ct. 813: Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. Alaska, Rep. 609; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 149 C. C. A. 262, 236 Fed. 52; United Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 159, 41 L. ed. 666, States v. McMillan, 165 U. S. 504, 510, 669, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Bell's Gap R. 511, 41 L. ed. 805, 807, 808, 17 Sup. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237, 33 L. ed. 892, 896, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; 194 U. S. 486, 491, 48 L. ed. 1087, 1088, Ct. Rep. 395; Binns v. United States, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370, 373, 30 L. ed. 220, 226, 227, 6 Sup. Ct. 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Simms v. Simms, Rep. 1064; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. 175 U. S. 162, 168, 44 L. ed. 115, 117, 20 S. 27, 31, 28 L. ed. 923, 925, 5 Sup. Ct. Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 Rep. 357; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & U. S. 44, 29 L. ed. 58, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 747; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Mountain | 468, 18 L. ed. 497, 500; Mugler v. Kan sas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 669, 31 L. ed. 205, 210, 213, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273. A classification cannot be sustained which is based upon a police regulation where the object sought to be accomplished is ostensibly the raising of revenue, and to sustain it would be equivalent to declaring it legal upon a basis and for a reason that does not exist in fact. Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 491, 492, 493, 48 L. ed. 1088, 1089, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. Alaska, 149 C. C. A. 262, 236 Fed. 52; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 72, 48 L. ed. 342, 346, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 105, 43 L. ed. 909, 913, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 31 L. ed. 205, 209, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 560, 561, 46 L. ed. 679, 690, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155, 159, 41 L. ed. 666, 668, 669, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 109, 46 L. ed. 92, 108, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 344, 45 L. ed. 224, 226, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 429, 46 L. ed. 623, 625, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547, 548, 53 L. ed. 315, 319, 320, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206. A classification, regardless of whether | reasonable or logical, cannot be sustained where it is made for the purpose of prohibiting a business when there is an absolute want of authority to prohibit that business, and such classification is void. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 138, 38 L. ed. 385, 389, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 383, 60 L. ed. 691, 701, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 109, 110, 44 L. ed. 969, 996, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Const. Law, 12 Am. L. & P. p. 198; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 357, 60 L. ed. 679, 687, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455. The want of power of the territorial legislature to prohibit plaintiff from conducting its lawful business does not interfere with the police power of the territory, because that power must be exercised subservient to the Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 591, 41 L. ed. 832, 836, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547, 548, 53 L. ed. 315, 319, 320, 29 Sup.. Ct. Rep. 206; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. ed. 441, L.R.A.1915C, 960, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 138, 38 L. ed. 385, 389, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 11, 38 L. ed. 331, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 376, 10 L. ed. 997; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. & L. S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 757, 28 L. ed. 585, 590, 591, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 628, 56 L. ed. 1229, 1232, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 153, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 697; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 594, 61 L. ed. 1336, 1343, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; State v. Roberts, 59 N. H. 256, 47 Am. Rep. 199; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, L.R.A.1918B, 374, 168 Pac. 679. A charge imposed for police supervision must bear a relation to the expense of the supervision afforded; otherwise it is not constitutional. Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 164, 47 L. ed. 995, 1000, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 72, 73, 48 L. ed. 342, 346, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298; D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494, 505, 58 L. ed. 698, 702, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377; People use of State Bd. of Health v. Wilson, 249 Ill. 195, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1074, 94 N. E. 141; State v. Moore, 113 N. C. 697, 22 L.R.A. 472, 18 S. E. 342. The territorial legislation and taxes imposed thereby are also contrary to the Alaska Organic Act, because they are not uniform upon the same class of subjects, and are not levied and collected under general laws; the assessments are not according to actual value; in fact, no assessments were made; and the taxes, although levied for territorial purposes, are in excess of 1 per centum per annum of any possible valuation which could be lawfully assessed upon the actual value of the property on which they are levied. Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 65, 49 L. ed. 663, 666, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 645, |