Mr. William J. Conlen argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. No brief was filed for respondents. Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: Consequent on the allowance of a writ of certiorari, the case is here to review the action of the court below in grant Holding that the recital in the bill of ing, in an admiralty case there pending, lading of the intake weights was but a motion for leave to withdraw an ap- prima facie evidence, and that the proof peal made by the respondents, who were there appellants. 167 C. C. A. 440, 256 showed the delivery of all cargo received Fed. 224. The situation thus arose: on board, the court dismissed the libel The schooner John Twohy was char- as to the first claim. As to the second, tered to carry a cargo of bones from however, it found that the damage from Buenos Aires to Philadelphia. The leakage had resulted from unseaworvoyage was made, and, following the dis- thiness and sustained that claim. charge of the cargo, the charterers, who are the petitioners, [78] libeled the vesappeals may be reduced, although the adverse party does not appeal, it decides nothing more, and it is not to be supposed that the court would overrule its previous decisions without saying so, or without referring to them." And in The Ciampa Emilia, 1 C. C. A. 508, 1 U. S. App. 143, 50 Fed. 239, it was held that the court will not take any notice of the contention of a libellant who has not appealed, that certain items of loss were improperly disallowed by the court below. And see The Roarer, 1 Blatchf. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 11,876. But while it has been held that one who has not appealed can be heard only in support of the decree, and therefore can get in the appellate court no more or other relief than it gives, there are many cases which take the contrary view. Thus, the award of the district court in favor of the appellant may be decreased on appeal although the appellee did not appeal. Irvine v. The Hesper, supra. The court stated that when the libellants appealed, they did so in view of the rule, and took the risk of the result of a trial of the case de novo. The whole case was opened by the appeal as much as it would have been if both parties had appealed, or if the appeal had been taken only by the claim ant. So, too, in The San Rafael, 72 C. C. A. 388, 141 Fed. 270, an award made to certain libellants by the district court was increased although such libellants did not appeal, the court holding that the fact that no appeal by them was taken was unimportant, since by their appeal the adverse parties took the risk of the result of a trial of the case de novo. The claimants alone appealed, and, after having twice obtained a continAnd in Munson S. S. Line v. Miramer S. S. Co. 93 C. C. A. 360, 167 Fed. 960, a more favorable decree was entered in favor of the party who did not appeal. So, too, an appeal to a Federal circuit court of appeals from a final decree of a district court in a suit in admiralty brings the case before it for a trial de novo, so that the court may review an interlocutory decree therein which was not appealed from, and allow a recovery against a party who was dismissed by that decree, and may review both interlocutory and final decrees so far as essential to grant relief to a party who has not appealed from either decree. Reid v. Fargo, 241 U. S. 544, 60 L. ed. 1156, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 712. In The Charles Morgan, 115 U. S. 69, 29 L. ed. 316, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1172, it was held that, under the admiralty rules, the circuit court may, in its discretion, permit an amendment of a libel so as to include a claim for damages growing out of the original cause of action and litigated in the court below, but rejected because not specified in the pleading. The court distinguished Houseman v. The North Carolina, 15 Pet. 50, 10 L. ed. 657, which held that a libel could not be amended after an appeal so as to bring in a new claim for damages, as being a decision before the adoption of the admiralty rules. In The Morning Star, 14 Fed. 866, an amendment to the pleadings was permitted which presented the case to the appellate court in a different aspect from that in which it was presented to the lower court, but on the condition that the costs of the district court be paid by the appellant. 1920. DUCHE & SONS v. SCHOONER JOHN TWOHY. uance, moved for leave to withdraw the Coming to consider these contentions, vine v. The Hesper, Mr. Justice Blatch- "It is well settled, however, that an And in the Reid Case this court, although pressed to repudiate the practice, as opposed to the weight of adjudged cases, declined to do so, and reaffirmed the ruling made in Irvine v. The Hesper. In view, therefore, of the settled law as to the effect of appeals in admiralty, we are of opinion that the libellants were justified in regarding the appeal taken by the claimants as securing to libellants the right to be heard in the appellate court without the necessity of perfecting a cross appeal in order to preserve that right. To hold, then, that the appellate court could, nevertheless, without affording the libellants an opportunity to be heard, enter a decree the plain effect of which was to deny one of the two claims for which the libel was brought, and which, in view of the settled effect of the appeal, the libellants could not be presumed to have abandoned, would be to subject them to a wrong without a remedy, even if it did not amount to a denial of due process of law. And this renders it unnecessary to consider the supposed advantages which would arise from the adopting of a new rule, since, if the wisdom of so doing be arguendo conceded, that concession would not justify the misapplication of the existing rule, and the destruction of rights vested in reliance not only upon its existence, but upon the discharge of the duty to enforce and apply it. 515 It follows that the decree of the court, in the Lever Act of August 10, 1917, § 4, below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. as re-enacted in the Act of October 22, 1919, § 2, to punish criminally any person who wilfully makes "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries," violated U. S. Const., 5th and 6th Amendments, which require an ascertainable standard of guilt, fixed by Congress rather than by courts [81] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and juries, and secure to accused persons Plff. in Err., 1. The price at which a commodity is sold is comprehended by the provision of the Lever Act of August 10, 1917, § 4, as re-enacted by the Act of October 22, 1919, § 2, making it unlawful for any person wil fully to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries, or to conspire to exact excessive prices for any necessaries. Price regulation — profiteering - Lever Act excessive prices for necessaries. 2. The exaction of excessive prices upon the sale of necessaries, contrary to the provisions of the Lever Act of August 10, 1917, § 4, as re-enacted in the Act of October 22, 1919, § 2, was, where such sale was subsequent to the latter act, penalized by the provision of the re-enacted section, making violations of any of the provisions of such section punishable by fine or imprisonment, although the section, before its re-enactment, contained no penalty. War effect on constitutional guar anties. 3. The mere existence of a state of war could not suspend or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaranties and limitations of U. S. Const., 5th and 6th Amendments, as to delegating legislative power to courts and juries, penalizing indefinite acts, and depriving citizens of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations against them. [For other cases, see War, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Criminal law inal statute indefiniteness of crimprofiteering delegation of power. Lever 4. Congress, in attempting, as it did Note. On decisions under the Lever Act-see notes to Mossew V. United States, 11 A.L.R. 1265, and Standard Chemicals & M. Corp. v. Waugh Chemical Corp. 14 A.L.R. 1059. On continuance of constitutional guaranties during war or insurrection-see note to West Virginia ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 996. the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations against them. [For other cases, see Criminal Law, I. a; Constitutional Law, III. b, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 324,] Argued October 18 and 19, 1920. Decided February 28, 1921. Both in August, 1917, and in October, 1919, when the acts in question were passed, Congress, in the exercise of its war powers, had full authority to enact all proper legislation to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution of the necessaries of life. Stewart v. Kahn (Stewart v. Bloom) 11 Wall. 493, 506, 20 L. ed. 176, 179; Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 64 L. ed. 260, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. 251 U. S. 146, 64 L. ed. 194, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106. The regulation of the prices of the necessaries of life is a proper governmental function which, when deemed necessary for the prosecution of a war, Congress may exercise. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 124, 24 L. ed. 77, 83; 4 Tucker's Bl. Com. pp. 159, 160; 2 Russell, Crimes, 7th ed. P. 1919; Rex v. Waddington, 1 East, 163, 102 Eng. Reprint, 64; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 140, 36 Am. Dec. 441; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. ed. 757, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 410, 58 L. ed. 1011, 1021, L.R.A.1915C, 1189, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612. 1920. UNITED STATES v. COHEN GROCERY CO. The Act of October, 1919, is not subject to the objection that it is too vague and uncertain. United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 288, 35 L. ed. 190, 193, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 538; Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 434, 60 L. ed. 364, 368, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147; Tozer v. United States, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 245, 52 Fed. 917; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 57 L. ed. 1232, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Cases Arizona Employers' Liability (Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer) 250 U. S. 400, 432, 63 L. ed. 1058, 1071, 6 A.L.R. 1537, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553; United States v. Rosenblum, 264 Fed. 582; United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co. 264 Fed. 691; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 53 L. ed. 417, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 62 L. ed. 763, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323. Messrs. Louis B. Sher and Chester H. Krum argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error: peace. The Constitution is a law for rules and the people equally in war and in It protects all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 121, 18 L. ed. 295. The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of civil institutions adopted for internal government. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629, 4 L. ed. 629, 657; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 1107, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. It is true that private contracts must yield to public welfare when appropriately declared and defined. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp. 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 309, 9 A.L.R. 1420, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117, P.U.R.1919C, 60. And there is no absolute freedom to do as one wills, or to contract as one chooses. Liberty is not mere license. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 567, 55 L. ed. 338, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259. And it is settled that all contracts and property rights are held subject to the fair exercise of the power of the state to prescribe regulations for the general welfare. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558, 58 L. ed. 721, 726, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364. But the right of the United States to penalize merely local contracts in which the government has no concern must de- Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. The phrase imports in general a pub- Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 Laws which create crime ought to be United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. The statute is unjust or unreasonable. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 663, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 53 L. ed. 417, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220. Messrs. William D. Guthrie, Benjamin F. Spellman, and Bernard Hershkopf filed a brief as amici curiæ: The Lever Law violates the 5th and 6th Amendments to the Constitution. United States v. Sharp, Pet. C. C. 122, Fed. Cas. No. 16,264; United States v. 565; United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 220, 23 L. ed. 563, 278, 288, 35 L. ed. 190, 193, 11 Sup. Ct. Indian ston on Crim. Jurisprudence, Chase's ed. Rep. 538; 1 Works of Edward Living1873, pp. 12,170; Macaulay, United States v. Myatt, 264 Fed. 450; Penal Code, 4 Misc. Works at p. 170; Detroit Creamery Co. v. Kinnane, 264 Fed. 845; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 58 L. ed. 1284, tucky, 234 U. S. 634, 58 L. ed. 1510, 34 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 853; Collins v. KenSup. Ct. Rep. 924; Bishop, Statutory United R. Co. v. Dey, 1 L.R.A. 744, 2 Inters. Crimes, 3d ed. § 41; Chicago & N. W. Com. Rep. 325, 35 Fed. 866; States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 264 Fed. 517 223; Lamborn v. McAvoy, 265 Fed. 944; A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co. v. Tedrow, D. C. Col. Lewis, D. J., April 9, 1920; United States v. Bernstein, 267 Fed. 295; United States v. People's Fuel & Feed Co. 271 Fed. 790; United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 242 U. S. 208, 237, 238, 61 L. ed. 251, 267, 268, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 691; Tozer v. United States, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 245, 52 Fed. 917; Hocking Valley R. Co. v. United States, 127 C. C. A. 285, 210 Fed. 543; Czarra v. Medical Supers. 25 App. D. C. 450; United States v. Capital Traction Co. 34 App. D. C. 599, 19 Ann. Cas. 68; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com. 99 Ky. 132, 33 L.R.A. 209, 59 Am. St. Rep. 457, 35 S. W. 129; South Covington & C. Street R. Co. v. Com. 181 Ky. 449, 205 S. W. 603; Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 164; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. People, 77 Ill. 443; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 147, 52 L. ed. 714, 723, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 337, 64 L. ed. 596, 599, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338. The classification contained in §§ 4 and 26 of the Lever Act, as amended, violates the 5th Amendment to the Constitution. United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 683; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; McGhee, Due Process of Law, pp. 60-64, 311; 2 Willoughby, Const. pp. 873, 874; Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co. 240 U. S. 1, 24, 25, 60 L. ed. 493, 504, L.R.A.1917D, 414, 36 Sup. Ct. | Rep. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662, 37 L. ed. 599, 601, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721. The Act of October 22, 1919, is void because there is not any existing war emergency to sustain it as a proper exercise of the war power of Congress. Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U. S. 422, 446, 58 L. ed. 1383, 1393, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 794; Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 486, 58 L. ed. 691, 696, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Serv ice Commission, 225 N. Y. 95, P.U.R. 1919C, 364, 121 N. E. 772; Castle v. Mason, 91 Ohio St. 303, 110 N. E. 463, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 164; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 617, 19 L. ed. 513, 524; Griesedieck Bros. Brewing Co. v. Moore, 262 Fed. 582. Messrs. John A. Marshall, D. N. Straup, Joel F. Nibley, and Thomas Marioneaux also filed a brief as amici curiæ: In the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the same subject or having the same general purposes in view should be read in connection with it. Woods v. Carl, 75 Ark. 328, 87 S. W. 621, 3 Ann. Cas. 423, affirmed in 203 U. S. 358, 51 L. ed. 219, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; 36 Cyc. 1147, 1148. The meaning of doubtful words in one statute may be determined by reference to another in which the same words have been used in a more obvious sense. 36 Cyc. 1147, 1148; Eckerson v. Des Moines, 137 Iowa, 452, 115 N. W. 177. The construction of a statute by the legislature, as indicated by the language of subsequent enactments, is entitled to great weight. 36 Cyc. 1142. The lawmaker is always presumed to know the existent law. 36 Cyc. 1136, 1145; Ensley v. State, 172 Ind. 198, 88 N. E. 62. Rate or charge commonly refers to compensation for services rendered. We speak of the rates or charges of a telephone or telegraph or railroad company for the services they render. We speak of the price, not the rate or charge, at which goods are sold. Barnard v. Morton, 1 Curt. C. C. 404, Fed. Cas. No. 1,006; Green v. Jones, 78 N. C. 268; Alexander v. Morris, 3 Call (Va.) 99; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Hunt, 15 Lea, 261. Laws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid. United States v. Sharp, Pet. C. C. 118, Fed. Cas. No. 16,265. Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628, 33 L. ed. 1080, 1083, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278-288, 35 L. ed. 190–193, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 538; Lamborn v. McAvoy, 265 Fed. 944. Where one part of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, and the language of another part is clear and definite, and is consistent with one of such constructions, and opposed to the other, that construction must be adopted which will render the clauses harmonious. 36 Cyc. 1132. |