therance of such solicitation," and "could | due process of law and equal protection of be interpreted only to be the laws clauses of the Federal Constitution, enact a general workmen's compenpreparation [italics counsel's] for an endeavor' or 'attempt' to influence the make it compulsory as to one hazardous sation law applicable to all employees, and juror, but falls far short of an actual employment (coal mining) and elective as to all others, except railway employees engaged in train service, who are excluded. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. a, 5, a; IV. b, 7, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

endeavor to do so."

Counsel enters into quite a discussion, with citation of cases, of the distinction between preparation for an attempt and the attempt itself, and charges that there is a wide difference between them. We think, however, that neither the contention nor the cases are pertinent to the section under review and upon which the indictment was based. The word of the section is "endeavor," and by using it the section got rid of the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word "attempt," and it describes any effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent. Criminality does not get rid of its evil quality by the precautions it takes against consequences, personal or pecuniary. It is a somewhat novel excuse to urge that Russell's action was not criminal because he was cautious enough to consider its cost and be sure of its success. The section, however, is not directed at success in corrupting a juror, but at the "endeavor" to do so. Experimental approaches to the corruption of a juror are the "endeavor" of the section. Guilt is incurred by the trial,-success may aggravate, it is not a condition of it. The indictment charges that defendant knew that William D. Russell was a

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2. The inclusion within the terms of a state workmen's compensation act of all employees of coal mining companies, whether engaged in the hazardous part of the to the due process of law and equal probusiness or not, does not render repugnant tection of the laws clauses of the Federal Constitution the classification made by that act, which makes it compulsory as to all coal mining companies, while as to all other private business enterprises within the state, except railway employees in train service, who are excluded, it is purely optional. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. a, 5, a; IV. b, 7, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.1 Constitutional law-protection of property rights discrimination state

workmen's compensation act. tion Law, which is made compulsory upon 3. The Indiana Workmen's Compensacoal mining companies with respect to all their employees, whether engaged in the hazardous part of the business or not, while as to all other private business enterprises within the state, except railway employees engaged in train service, who are excluded, it is purely optional, does not violate the provisions of the state Bill of Rights, that shall be taken without just compensation, no man's property or particular services nor, except in the case of the state, without compensation first assessed and tendered, and that there shall be no grant of privileges to any citizen or class of citizens that shall not belong to all citizens. [For other cases, see Constitutional IV. a, 5, a; IV. b, 7, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

petit juror, in the discharge of his duty as such juror, and, therefore, an endeavor to corruptly influence him was within the section, though he was not yet selected or sworn. State v. Woodson, 43 [144] La. Ann. 905, 9 So. 903. The court, hence, erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the indictment. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in conform-workmen's compensation and industrial ity with this opinion.


Note.-As to constitutionality of

insurance statutes, generally-see notes to Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162; State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clauson, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466; Jensen v. Southern P. Co. L.R.A.1916A,

LOWER VEIN COAL COMPANY, Appt., 409; and Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal

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of the laws
workmen's compensation act.
1. A state may, consistently with the

Co. L.R.A.1917D, 51.

As to construction and effect of workmen's compensation statutes-see note to Linnane v. Etna Brewing Co. L.R.A. 1917D, 80.

As to validity of class legislation, generally-see notes to State v. Goodwill, 6 L.R.A. 621, and State v. Loomis, 21 L.R.A. 789.

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4. There is something more in a workmen's compensation law than the element of hazard, which gives room for the power of classification that a legislature may exercise in its judgment of what is necessary for the public welfare, and that cannot be pronounced arbitrary because it may be disputed and opposed by argument and opinion of serious strength. [For other

cases, see Constitutional Law,

567; Sperry & H. Co. v. State, 188 Ind.
173, 122 N. E. 584.

If the act is unconstitutional as to
employees, it is unconstitutional as to

Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N.
C. C. A. 927.

A corporation is within the meaning

IV. a, 5, a; IV. b, 7, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. of the provision of the Indiana Bill of


[No. 186.]

Argued January 27, 1921.

ruary 28, 1921.

Rights, prohibiting the general assembly from granting privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens which, Decided Feb- upon the same terms, do not apply equally to all citizens.

Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co.

APPEAL from the District Court of 160 Ind. 338, 61 L.R.A. 154, 98 Am. St.

the United States for the District of Indiana to review a decree which dismissed the bill in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the state Workmen's Compensation Act. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. William H. Thompson and Henry W. Moore argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Samuel D. Miller and Frank C. Dailey, filed a brief for appellant:

A private corporation is protected by the due process of law and equal protection of the law clauses of the 14th Amendment.

Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384.

In order to sustain a classification for legislative purposes, it is necessary: a. That the reason for the classification inhere in the subject-matter.

b. That the classification rest on some basis which is natural and substantial.

c. That the classification treat all brought under its influence alike under the same conditions.

d. That it embrace all within the class to which it is naturally related. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 107, 112, 46 L. ed. 92, 107, 109, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 560, 564, 46 L. ed. 679, 690, 691, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 418, 80 N. E. 529; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 57, L.R.A.1915A, 884, 105 N. E.


Rep. 325, 66 N. E. 895; Inland Steel Co.
V. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 139 Am. St.
Rep. 389, 87 N. E. 229.

The above referred-to section of the
Indiana Constitution renders a law in-
valid if an unreasonable and arbitrary
classification has been made.

Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co. Ind. 1, 87 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 708. supra; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177

The Employers' Liability Acts of Inpreme court of Indiana as applicable diana have been construed by the suonly to the persons engaged in the hazardous business of operating trains, statutes to employees engaged in a nonand it has been held that, to apply such hazardous business, would render them invalid under art. 1, § 23, of the Indiana Constitution.

Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co.
711, 85 N. E. 954; Cleveland, C. C. &
v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.)
St. L. R. Co. v. Foland, 174 Ind. 411,
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 176 Ind.
91 N. E. 594, 92 N. E. 165; Richey v.
542, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 121, 96 N. E. 694.

Said § 18, as amended, is violative of
viding that no man's property shall be
§ 21 of the Indiana Bill of Rights, pro-
the law provides that coal-mining com-
taken without just compensation. Here
panies are required to pay for injuries
negligence, while all other private busi-
sustained by their employees without
not to do so.
ness employers in Indiana may elect
ing of the property of coal-mining com-
This amounts to the tak-
panies without compensation for a public
ployees of coal mines against industrial
purpose; viz., the protection of em-
injuries occasioned without negligence.

Messrs. E. M. White and John A.
Riddle argued the cause, and, with
Messrs. U. S. Lesh, Harold A. Hender-

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son, and Mr. Ele Stansbury, Attorney General of Indiana, filed a brief for appellees:

A legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests of the people as a whole, and the courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was one in the enactment of which it has transcended its power.

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 104, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609.

So long as legislation applies impartially to all the constituents of a class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances, both in privilege conferred and liability imposed, it cannot be said to be violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 293, 42 L. ed. 1042, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594.

The business of coal mining is attended with dangers that render it the proper subject of regulation by the state, in the exercise of the police power.

Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 540, 58 L. ed. 717, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359.

It is the province of state courts to construe and interpret state statutes when called upon to do so, as to whether they violate their state Constitution, and such construction, adopted by the state courts, will be the one adopted by the Federal courts.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 58 L. ed. 229, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Pelten v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 143, 25 L. ed. 901; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers. 201 U. S. 245, 50 L. ed. 744. 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 459.

The police power reserved in the state is as broad and plenary as the taxing power.

Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N. C. C. A. 927; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6.

The supreme court of the state of
Indiana has held the power of taxation
to be inherent in the state, and a legis-
lative power limited only by the pro-
visions of the Indiana state Constitu-
tion itself.

State ex rel. Goodman v. Halter, 149
Ind. 292, 47 N. E. 665, 49 N. E. 7.

It is competent and within the power
of the Indiana legislature, under the
Indiana state Constitution, in the ex-
ercise of police power, to take steps for
the protection of the lives and limbs of
all persons who may be exposed to dan-
gerous agencies in the hands of others,
and to enact classifying legislation on
the basis of peculiar hazards in a given
industry, and the Indiana Employers'
Liability Act (Acts 1893, p. 294) was
upheld because a particular classifica-
tion of the act was made on the basis
of peculiar hazards in railroading, and
because it applied equally to all em-
ployers and employees within the class,
and, hence, violated neither § 23 of the
Indiana Bill of Rights nor the equal pro-
tection clause of the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.

Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Houlihan,
157 Ind. 494, 54 L.R.A. 787, 60 N. E.

The enforcement of regulations enacted in the proper exercise of the police power of the state cannot be resisted as the taking of private property without compensation, in violation of § 21 of the Indiana Bill of Rights.

Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1147, 82 N. E. 792, 14 Ann. Cas. 295; State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, 119 Am. St. Rep. 491, 77 N. E. 1085, 10 Ann. Cas. 899; Levy v. State, 161 Ind. 251, 68 N. E. 172; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74.

No existing state compensation law has ever been declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be in violation of the due process or equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment.

New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. ed. 667, L.R.A.1917D, 1, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, 13 N. C. C. A. 943; Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. ed. 678, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637, 13 N. C. C. A. 959; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N. C. C. A. 927; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. 249 U. S. 152, 63 L. ed. 527, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 227; Employers' Liability Cases (Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer) 250 U. S. 400, 63 L. ed. 1058, 6 A.L.R. 1537, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553.

A liberal construction of statutes and a strict construction of constitutional provisions is a safe and reasonable judicial policy.

Walcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44; Lafay


ette, M. & B. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind., N. E. 421; State v. Lowry, 166 Ind. 372, 185. 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 528, 77 N. E. 728, 9 Ann. Cas. 350.

The Indiana state Constitution is not a grant of power to the legislature, but a limitation of its general power.


Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 395, 21 N. E.

A statute will not be held unconstitutional merely because it is unjust and repugnant to general principles of justice, liberty, or rights not expressed in the Indiana state Constitution.

Praigg v. Western Paving & Supply Co. 143 Ind. 358, 42 N. E. 750; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 33 L.R.A. 313, 44 N. E. 469; Zapf v. State, 145 Ind. 696, 44 N. E. 1119; Grelle v. Wright, 145 Ind. 699, 44 N. E. 1119.

Courts may not declare an act void merely because, in their opinion, it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution.

Horning v. Wendell, 57 Ind. 171; Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225.

The courts will presume in favor of the constitutionality of a law until the contrary clearly appears.

State v. Cooper, 5 Blackf. 258; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326; Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194; Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547; Lucas v. Tippecanoe County, 44 Ind. 524; State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 4 L.R.A. 79, 21 N. E. 252.

In determining whether a statute is constitutional it is the duty of the courts to give such construction to it, if possible, as will uphold the act.

The supreme court of Indiana has held that article 1, § 23, of the Bill of Rights of the Indiana state Constitution, is substantially the same as the privileges and immunities clause of § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in upholding the validity of the Bulk Sales Statute.

Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 10, 97 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 708.

The Indiana legislature has, on many different occasions, exercised its police power by enacting legislation relating solely to the business of coal mining; and, in every instance, such legislation has been upheld when attacked.

State v. Barrett, 172 Ind. 169, 87 N. E. 7; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. ed. 1050, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692; Maule Coal Co. v. Partenheimer, 155 Ind. 100, 55 N. E. 751, 57 N. E. 710; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind. 607, 92 Am. St. Rep. 319, 62 N. E. 492; Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405, L.R.A.1915B, 420, 100 N. E. 563, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 987, 237 U. S. 391, 59 L. ed. 1011, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Warren v. Sohn, 112 Ind. 213, 13 N. E. 863.

The Employers' Liability Act of Indiana (Acts 1911, p. 145), applying only to persons, firms, and corporations employing five or more persons, has been upheld.

Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, v.5 N. C. C. A. 483; Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. v. Weddle, 183 Ind. 305, 108 N. E. 225; Kingan & Co. v. Clements, 184 Ind. 213, 110 N. E. 66.

Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Aker State, 5 Ind. 193; Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 395, 21 N. E. 21.

A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless no doubt exists on the question.

Carey v. Sheets, 60 Ind. 17; Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 18 L.R.A. 567, 579, 32 N. E. 836, 33 N. E. 119; Smith Indianapolis Street R. Co. 158 Ind. 425, 63 N. E. 849.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant, the Lower Vein Coal Comv.pany, is a corporation of the state of Indiana. The Industrial Board of Indiana is a board created by an act of the general assembly of Indiana, approved March 8, 1915, known as "The Indiana The Workmen's Compensation Act." personal appellees are members of the board.

The power of the courts to declare a statute of the state unconstitutional is a high one, and is never exercised in doubtful cases. To doubt is to resolve in favor of the constitutionality of the law.

This suit was brought by the Coal

Bush v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 476, 22 Company to enjoin the Industrial Board, N. E. 422.

Where two constructions of a state statute are open, that is to be adopted which preserves the constitutionality of

the act.

Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 18 L.R.A. 729, 33

the governor and attorney general of the state, from enforcing in any manner § 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state, as amended by the general assembly in 1919, from asserting that plaintiff is compelled to operate under the Compensation Act,



from hearing any claim for compensa-, a general compensation law, applicable
as to all
tion asserted by any employee of the to all employers within the state, and
plaintiff so long as plaintiff elects not to make it compulsory as to one hazardous
come within the provisions of the act, employment, and elective
from making any award to any injured others (many equally as hazardous) ex-
employee, or his or her dependents, dur- cept railroad employees in train service,
ing such time, and from doing any other to which it does not apply at all." And
act or thing prejudicial to the rights of the insistence is "that such a classifica.
the plaintiff, so long as it elects not to tion rests upon no [147] sound or just
basis," and hence is inimical to the Con-
be bound by the act.
stitution of the United States and that
of Indiana.

The grounds for this relief were set forth in a complaint of considerable length to which the defendants sepaAfter rately and severally answered. trial of the issues thus presented, the district court entered its decree dismissing the bill for want of equity. This appeal was then prosecuted.

The Compensation Act is very long, and declares its purposes to be to promote the prevention of industrial [146] accidents, to cause provision to be made for adequate medical and surgical care for injured employees in the course of their employment; to provide methods of insuring the payment of such compensation; to create an Industrial Board for the administration of the act, and to prescribe the powers and duties of such board; to abolish the State Bureau of Inspection, and provide for the transfer to the Industrial Board certain rights, powers, and duties of the Bureau of Inspection.

The original act, passed in 1915, was elective, and left employer and employee the option of rejecting its terms, with certain exceptions. It was amended in 1917, and railroad employees engaged in train service were exempted from its provisions.

The amendment of 1919 made the act mandatory as to all coal-mining companies of the state and its political divisions, and as to municipal corporations. To all other employers the act remains permissive. They may elect to operate under its provisions. Railroad employees engaged in train service are not within them.

The sole question presented is the
validity of § 18 as amended; that is,
the compulsion of coal companies to the
operation of the act, while to other em-
ployers it is permissive, or does not
The grounds of attack
apply at all.
upon it are that it violates the due proc-
ess clause and the equal protection of
the laws clause of the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States,
and §§ 21 and 23 of the Indiana Bill of
Rights. Specifically, the question is, as
the Coal Company expresses it, "whether
the Indiana general assembly may pass

The principle of law involved and the power of a state to distinguish and classify objects in its legislation have been too often declared, too abundantly and variously illustrated, to need It is that repetition, and we pass immediately to the contention of counsel. the act is addressed to hazardous employments, and where, in employments, that character exists, sameness exists, and a law which ignores such sameness discriminates in its operation, and offends the Constitution of the United States. It may be that the Coal Company does not contend for so broad a principle, but may assert protection by a comparison of its business with other businesses equally hazardous, or even more hazardous than coal mining, and that necessarily the exemption of the taints it with illegal discrimination. To businesses so compared from the law support and justify the comparison, statistics of accidents are given in the complaint, and in the number of accidental injuries coal mines are made to run fifth. Notwithstanding those other companies may go in or out of the lawcoal-mining companies must stay.

The answer replies with counter assertions and statistics, and a detail of the methods of coal mining, and what their methods cause of accidents to the miners, and to these are added, it is said, the risks that come from the generation of noxious and explosive gases. dressed to the conflicting statistics and And there is evidence in the case, adthe conclusions to be deduced from them, which occupies about ninety-three pages of the record. In this evidence occupations and businesses are otherwise. pared with estimates of accidents in fatal and each, and their character, severity, and consequences, There is also testimony of the wages that mine workers get and of their prosperity, and that they have a legal department and paid attorneys. there is averment and testimony [148] of two organizations of mine owners who retain officers and attorneys to defend




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