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1920.

[271] MICHAEL MAGUIRE and C. S. find to have been erected in a municipality
within the fire limits theretofore prescribed,
Maguire, Plffs. in Err.,
contrary to valid local regulations duly

V.

TIMOTHY A. REARDON et al., as Com-enacted under the municipal charter, may
missioners, Constituting the Board of
Public Works of the City and County of

San Francisco, et al.

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due process of law destruction of wooden buildings within fire limits.

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1. The demolition and removal of a wooden building which the state courts

Note. As to what constitutes due of law, generally-see notes to process People v. O'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sumption, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436, and Wilson v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865.

On validity of regulations for fire protection other than building regulationssee note to State v. Wittles, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 456.

On liability for damages for destruction of building to prevent spread of fire -see note to Bowditch v. Boston, 25 L. ed. U. S. 980.

Power of municipality to destroy wood-
en building within fire limits.
The power of a municipality to destroy
a wooden building erected in violation
of an ordinance establishing fire limits
seems to be well established. MAGUIRE V.
REARDON, supra; McKibbin v. Ft. Smith,
Miller v. Valparaiso,
35 Ark. 352;
10 Ind. App. 22, 37 N. E. 418; Baum-
gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am.
Rep. 830; Lemmon v. Guthrie Center, 113
Iowa, 36, 86 Am. St. Rep. 361, 84 N. W.
986; Monroe v. Hoffman, 29 La. Ann. 651,
29 Am. Rep. 345; Micks v. Mason, 145
Mich. 212, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 653, 108 N.
W. 707, 9 Ann. Cas. 291; Eichenlaub v.
St. Joseph, 113 Mo. 395, 18 L.R.A. 590,
21 S. W. 8; Griffin v. Gloversville, 67
App. Div. 403, 73 N. Y. Supp. 684; El-
wood v. Mani, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 474; Fields
v. Stokley, 99 Pa. 306, 44 Am. Rep. 109;
Klinger v. Bickel, 117 Pa. 326, .11 Atl.
555; Baxter v. Seattle, 3 Wash. 352, 28
Pac. 537; Davison v. Walla Walla, 52
Wash. 453, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 454, 132 Am.
St. Rep. 983, 100 Pac. 981.

The authorities running back, as they
do, into the early years of the common
law, and extending in an unbroken line
to the present time, prove that not only
may a governmental corporation abate

be ordered by the municipality without
violation of the Federal Constitution.

[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV.
b, 4, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
construc-
Courts
tion of municipal charter and ordi-

nances.

rules of decision

2. The meaning and effect of a munici pal charter and ordinances thereunder are questions of local law, the determination of which by the state courts the Federal Sua nuisance by the destruction of the thing constituting it, but so also may a private individual. It is therefore not the delegation of a new or extraordinary power to authorize municipal corporations to abate a nuisance by removing or destroying the thing which creates it. A man has no right to build a wooden house in a place prohibited by law, and thus endanger the safety of the person or property of others. He has neither a legal nor a moral right to do an illegal act on his own premises which puts in jeopardy the person or property of another. There can be no acquisition of a right by the performance of an illegal act. In removing a building erected in violation of law, and in a situation where it imperils person or property, no private right is invaded, because none could grow out of Baumgartner v. Hasty, the illegal act. The erection and maintenance of a 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am. Rep. 830. wooden building in violation of an ordinance establishing fire limits is a nuiMiller v. Valparaiso, 10 sance per se. v. Hasty, supra. Ind. App. 22, 37 N. E. 418; Baumgartner

The right to tear down or remove the prohibited building is analogous to the Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, right which every individual has to abate a nuisance. This is upon the maxim that "private 113 Mo. 395, 18 L.R.A. 590, 21 S. W. 8. mischief is to be endured rather than a public inconvenience." paraiso, supra.

Miller v. Val

Municipal corporations, pursuant to the powers conferred upon them, may remove or compel the removal of wooden buildings erected in violation of a valid ordinance; not necessarily because the building thus erected is a nuisance, but

because its erection is a violation of the First Nat. Bank v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201, ordinance and in defiance of the law. 13 L.R.A. 481, 28 Am. St. Rep. 185, 28 N. E. 434.

40

The removal of a building erected in

625

preme Court commonly accepts as conclu- for the First Appellate District, Division

sive.

[For other cases, see Courts, VII. c. 3, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 202.]

One, to review a decree which affirmed
a decree of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco, in
that state, in favor of defendants in a
suit to enjoin the destruction and re-

Argued and submitted January 28, 1921. moval of a wooden building within the
Decided February 28, 1921.

IN

IN ERROR to the District Court of Appeal of the State of California in and defiance of law in a place where it endangered surrounding buildings is the exercise of a police power, and not the forfeiture of property. Baumgartner v. Hasty, supra.

It is merely the enforcement of the law against those who defy the law. Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. 326, 11 Atl. 555.

If by the terms of a city ordinance the city is empowered to inflict a fine upon a person erecting wooden buildings within the limits of the city, contrary to the terms of the ordinance, such power is not the only one which the city has, and it is lawful for it to remove such buildings in order to protect the public from the hazardous consequences of a continuance of such combustible matter in a dangerous position. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 28 Am. Dec. 188.

An ordinance making wooden buildings erected within the fire limits nuisances, and enacting that they may be pulled down and abated as such, is within the terms of a charter prohibiting the erection of such buildings within the defined limits. Baxter v. Seattle, 3 Wash. 352, 28 Pac. 537.

So, too, under a city charter giving the mayor and common council "power to abate nuisances, public or private, and to pass all ordinances they might deem necessary for preserving the health, peace, good order and good government of the city, and to enforce all ordinances by them adopted not inconsistent with the laws of this state," an ordinance forbidding the erection of wooden or frame buildings on certain streets, and giving power to the marshal to remove the same, is valid and within the provisions of the charter. Ford v. Thralkill, 84 Ga. 169, 10 S. E. 600.

And a municipal corporation has power to require the removal of a wooden building located within its fire limits when it is damaged by fire to the extent of 30 per cent of its value, under charter authority to make regulations for the prevention of accident by fire, and to prohibit the erection within certain designated limits of buildings whose outer walls are not con

fire limits. Affirmed.

See same case below, 41 Cal. App. 596, 183 Pac. 303.

The facts are stated in the opinion. structed of brick, stone, or iron. Davison v. Walla Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 454, 132 Am. St. Rep. 983, 100 Pac. 981.

But where the charter authorizes the city to ordain and establish such acts, laws, regulations, and ordinances not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the state as shall be needful for the government, order, and welfare of such body, an ordinance of a city establishing fire limits, and declaring wooden buildings erected within such limits to be nuisances, is invalid, no express power being conferred by either the charter or by statute to establish such limits and to declare such buildings nuisances, the clause in the charter not conferring power upon the city to abate and remove nuisances. Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312, 23 Am. Rep. 608.

Statutory provisions giving municipal
corporations power to prescribe fire lim-
its and direct the removal of buildings
therein which may be damaged to a cer-
tain extent should receive a strict con-
struction in favor of the owners of such
buildings. Russell v. Fargo, 28 N. D.
300, 148 N. W. 610.

A city has power to provide by ordi-
nance for the removal of frame buildings
within the fire limits, which, because of
their dilapidated condition, are
a fire
hazard and a nuisance. Defferari v. Gal-
veston, Tex. Civ. App. -, 208 S. W.

188.

-

But where, as to buildings already erected within fire limits, there is granted power, when such buildings shall have experienced damage or decay to a certain extent, to direct that they shall be torn down and removed, the owners of the buildings must be given the first opportunity to remove them. Louisville v. Webster, 108 Ill. 414. The court distinguished between the power to tear down a building and to cause a building to be torn down and removed, stating that the power to direct implies that some person is to be directed to do this, and that the person contemplated was, in its opinion, the owner of the building.

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Mr. J. F. Riley submitted the cause for plaintiffs in error:

The charter provision is not self-executing.

Boca & L. R. Co. v. Sierra Valleys R. Co. 2 Cal. App. 546, 84 Pac. 298; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518; McHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20, 45 L.R.A. 737, 47 Pac. 779; Older v. Superior Ct. 157 Cal. 770, 109 Pac. 478; Spinney v. Griffith, 98 Cal. 149, 32 Pac. 974; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 17 Am. Rep. 425.

Fire limits ordinances must be strictly construed.

The notice required by an ordinance establishing fire limits, to authorize the removal of a building in a summary way, is not for the exclusive benefit of the owners of the property, but is a condition precedent, to be strictly performed by the city before it or any of its officers are authorized to meddle with the property. Ward v. Murphysboro, 77 Ill. App. 549. Buildings erected in violation of an ordinance fixing fire limits may be removed summarily and without judicial proceedings. McKibbin v. Ft. Smith, 35 Ark. 352; Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478; King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89; Miller v. Valparaiso, 10 Ind. App. 22, 37 N. E. 418; Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am. Rep. 830; Lemmon v. Guthrie, 113 Iowa, 36, 86 Am. St. Rep. 361, 84 N. W. 986; Micks v. Mason, 145 Mich. 212, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 653, 108 N. W. 707, 9 Ann. Cas. 291; Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo. 395, 18 L.R.A. 590, 21 S. W. 8; Davison v. Walla Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 454, 132 Am. St. Rep. 983, 100 Pac. 981.

There is no more frequent or admittedly proper exercise of the police power than that of the prohibition of the erection of buildings and combustible materials in the populous part of a town; and the only means of making such prohibition effectual is by summary abatement. Every moment's delay in the removal of the nuisance is a constant exposure to danger. Before any judicial inquiry and hearing could be had in the matter, the whole evil sought to be guarded against might be produced. King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89.

Police powers of this character are of a high order, and when a case arises should be speedily exercised. Delays incident to the ordinary processes of law would seriously impair their efficiency. and could not be tolerated. Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo. 395, 18 L.R.A. 590, 21 S. W. 8.

Montgomery v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 84 Ala. 127, 4 So. 626; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. 1106; Morton v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 80, 113 Pac. 7.

The ordinances are discriminatory.

Ex parte Bohen, 115 Cal. 372, 36 L.R.A. 618, 47 Pac. 55; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261; Lakeview v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 6

If public authorities were compelled to give notice and await the action of courts or other bodies, the delay might result in public calamity. The right of self-preservation is one of the first laws of nature, and applies to organized societies as well as to individuals. Miller v. Valparaiso, 10 Ind. App. 22, 37 N. E. 418.

A municipal corporation having statutory authority to fix fire limits and direct the manner of constructing buildings within such limits in respect to protection against fire may, by ordinance, provide for the summary abatement of buildings erected within the fire limits which do not meet the requirements of the ordinance as to fireproof construction. Micks v. Mason, 145 Mich. 212, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 653, 108 N. W. 707, 9 Ann. Cas. 291.

So, too, under an ordinance making it the duty of a chief of police to remove any wooden building erected in violation of an ordinance establishing fire limits, a building so erected may be ordered removed without any prosecution or judicial proceedings of any kind against the owner of the building. McKibbin v. Ft. Smith, 35 Ark. 352.

An ordinance passed pursuant to the powers of a charter establishing a fire district, defining the limits thereof, and prohibiting the erection, enlargement, or elevation of any wooden building of any kind within such district, authorizing the removal thereof, and declaring the same a common nuisance, abatable by any per the fire department, or the fire marshal son or the mayor or the chief engineer of of a city, with the advice of the mayor, after giving reasonable notice, is reasonable and valid, and the court will refuse to grant an injunction staying the Hine v. abatement of such nuisance. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478.

In Aronheimer v. Stokley, 11 Phila. 283, the court refused to restrain the action of the mayor in tearing down the plaintiff's shed and wooden buildings,

L.R.A. 268, 22 N. E. 791; Plymouth v. | Pl. Road Co. 43 Mich. 140, 5 N. W. 275; Schultheis, 135 Ind. 339, 35 N. E. 12; Hutton v. Camden, 39 N. J. L. 122, 23 Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 Am. Rep. 203; Jackson v. Miller, 69 N. U. S. 390, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. J. Eq. 182, 60 Atl. 1019; Morton v. WesRep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Rich- singer, 59 Or. 80, 113 Pac. 7; Northern mond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 13 L.R.A. P. R. Co. v. Spokane, 52 Fed. 428; Re 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180, 28 N. E. 312; Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 58 Am. Rep. 12, South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Railroad 9 Pac. 139. Commission, 171 Fed. 225; Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 242 Fed. 87; State v. Deffes, 45 La. Ann. 658, 12 So. 841; State v. Dubarry, 44 La. Ann. 1117, 11 So. 718; State v. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 15 L.R.A. 423, 28 Am. St. Rep. 715, 14 S. E. 387; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064.

The ordinance under which the board of public works acted takes vested rights without due process of law and without compensation.

Detroit v. Detroit & H. Pl. Road Co. 43 Mich. 140, 5 N. W. 275; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Morton v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 80, 113 Pac. 7; Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 230; Thompson v. San Francisco Super. Ct. 119 Cal. 543, 51 Pac. 863; Re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 58 Am. Rep. 12, 9 Pac. 139.

The ordinances impair obligations of contracts.

Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443; Denver v. Mullen, 7 Colo. 345, 3 Pac. 693; Detroit v. Detroit & H. erected contrary to the provisions of the city ordinance, although there was no statute or ordinance clothing the mayor with power to summarily adjudge such buildings nuisances, and to proceed to abate them by tearing them down.

But where the resolution of a common council requiring its officers to prevent erection of wooden buildings within the fire limits gives no color of authority to destroy buildings for the construction of which a permit was obtained from the council, the city is without authority summarily to destroy a building erected after the passing of the resolution, but before the enactment of any ordinance covering the subject, under an agreement with the council that the building should not be maintained longer than nine months, and that it should be removed at any time upon ten days' notice that the city government required it. Northern P. R. Co. v. Spokane, 52 Fed. 428.

Municipal ordinances establishing fire limits cannot be retroactive and require the removal of existing buildings therein. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 28 Am.

The ordinance is retroactive.

24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 877; Brown v. Hunn, 27 Conn. 332, 71 Am. Dec. 71; Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443; Cleveland v. Lenze, 27 Ohio St. 385; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Freund, Pol. Power, §§ 538, 685; Watertown v. Sawyer, 109 Mass. 320; Jackson v. Miller, 60 N. J. Eq. 182, 60 Atl. 1019; Morton v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 80, 113 Pac. 7; Wayman Invest. Co. v. Wessinger, 13 Cal. App. 108, 108 Pac. 1022; Re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 58 Am. Rep. 12, 9 Pac. 139.

The ordinance is unreasonable.

Freund, Pol. Power, § 63; Jackson v. Miller, 69 N. J. Eq. 182, 60 Atl. 1019; Karaseck v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 50 L.R.A. 345, 61 Pac. 33; Insurance Co. v. Luce, 11 Ohio C. C. 476; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. ed. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138.

Defendants are estopped from destroying or removing the building by their acts in permitting the expenditure of large sums of money, in granting the permit, in levying and collecting taxes on the buildDec. 188; Allison v. Richmond, 51 Mo. App. 133; Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443; Morton v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 80, 113 Pac. 7; Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. 326, 11 Atl. 555.

When the law gives city officials the power to remove a building erected within fire limits, in violation of the statute or ordinance, the power to compel the removal of the building arises solely from the fact that its erection was in violation of the ordinance, and not because it is a nuisance, and the power to abate nuisances does not warrant destruction of valuable property which was lawfully erected, or anything which was erected by lawful authority, and the power to do so, when given by the legislature, is held to be inoperative and void, unless the thing is in fact a nuisance, or was created or erected after the passage of the ordinance, and in defiance of it. This is a distinction between the rights of a city regarding buildings erected before the fire limits were established and those subsequently built. Russell v. Fargo, 28 N. D. 300, 148 N. W. 610.

1920.

Rep. 214.

Statutes must be given effect, if possible.

ing for eleven years, in acquiescing for | 164 U. S. 650, 41 L. ed. 586, 17 Sup. Ct.
eleven years in the maintenance of the
building before attempting its removal or
demolition, and in themselves erecting,
subsequent to the erection of the building
in question, buildings of like construction
in the same district, and in maintaining
said buildings while attempting to de-
molish the one in suit.

Athens v. Georgia R. Co. 72 Ga. 800; Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co. 71 Ga. 106; Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373, 35 Pac. 1002; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. 124 Cal. 368, 57 Pac. 571; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Joliet, 79 Ill. 25; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 Ill. 67. Plaintiffs have clean hands.

2 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d
ed. p. 927, § 498; Kaiser Land & Fruit
Co. v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 341;
Warren County v. Nall, 78 Miss. 726, 29
So. 755; Black, Interpretation of Laws,
2d ed. p. 132; Hilburn v. St. Paul M.
& M. R. Co. 23 Mont. 229, 58 Pac. 551,
811; State ex rel. Kettle River Quarries
Co. v. Duis, 17 N. D. 319, 116 N. W. 751;
Slocum v. Neptune Twp. 68 N. J. L. 595,
53 Atl. 301; Hettel v. First Judicial Dist.
Ct. 30 Nev. 382, 133 Am. St. Rep. 731,
96 Pac. 1062; State ex rel. Kaufman v.
Martin, 31 Nev. 493, 103 Pac. 840; The
Emily, 9 Wheat. 381, 6 L. ed. 116.

The term "fire limits" has come to have
a well-settled meaning. It means a dis-
trict within which the erection of wooden
2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. § 727, pp.
buildings is prohibited.

Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. p. 5; Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121; People ex rel. Favington v. Mensching, 187 N. Y. 8, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.)1103, 1104; 3 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 625, 79 N. E. 884, 10 Ann. Cas. 101; Re Rohrer, 10 L.R.A. 444, 43 Fed. 556.

Mr. Maurice T. Dooling, Jr., argued the cause, and, with Mr. George Lull, filed a brief for defendants in error:

The state court has settled the construction of the ordinances and charter provision involved herein. This court, on writ of error to the state court, will not review the construction of state laws by the state court.

Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 48 L. ed. 133, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53; Lomhard v. West Chicago Park, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. ed. 731, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Marshall v. Ladd, 131 U. S. lxxxix, and 19 L. ed. 153; Harrison v. Myer, 92 U. S. 111, 23 L. ed. 606; Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191, 56 L. ed. 159, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 592, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42; Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447, 49 L. ed. 546, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; The Winnebago V. De Laney (Iroquois Transp. Co. Forge & Iron Co.) 205 U. S. 354, 51 L. ed. 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509; Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U. S. 531, 51 L. ed. 305, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167; Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361, 48 L. ed. 1018, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673; Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U. S. 319, 63 L. ed. 266, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 59 L. ed. 1400, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 892; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Osborne v. Florida,

948, p. 2061; Freund, Pol. Power, §§ 33, 141, pp. 29, 131; Micks v. Mason, 9 Ann. Cas. 292, note; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 396 et seq.

"Frame" and "wooden" are synonymous when applied to a building.

19 Cyc. 1450; Olmstead v. People, 41 MurphysColo. 32, 91 Pac. 1113; Ward v. boro, 77 Ill. App. 549.

Every presumption is indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a state law, and this court will resolve every doubt in favor of its constitutionality.

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 53 L. ed. 923, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 54 L. ed. 515, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301.

The ordinances attacked are not shown to be unreasonably discriminatory.

Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 78, 79, 55 L. ed. 369, 377, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Canepa v. Birmingham, 92 Ala. 358, 9 So. 180; Kaufman v. Stein, 138 Ind. 49, 46 Am. St. Rep. 368, 37 N. E. 333; Hubbard v. Medford, 20 Or. 315, 25 Pac. 640; Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 12 L.R.A. 150, 25 Pac. 337; Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478; Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass. 372; Alexander v. Greenville, 54 Miss. 659; Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493; Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am. Rep. 830; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 28 Am. Dec. 188; Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo. 395, 18 L.R.A. 590, 21 S. W. 8; Laurel Hill

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