« ForrigeFortsett »
518, 37 L. ed. 259, 263, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S. 456, 461, 32 L. ed. 482, 483, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Garfield v. United States, 211 U. S. 249, 53 L. ed. 168, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541, 23 L. ed. 623, 628; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. ed. 123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271; Ballinger v. United States, 216 U. S. 240, 249, 54 L. ed. 464, 468, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338.
The school grant attaches to the sections specified upon identification thereof by survey, and to the indemnity and lieu lands upon identification thereof by selection.
Ryan v. Central P. R. Co. 99 U. S. 382, 386, 25 L. ed. 305; United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 223 U. S. 565, 570, 56 L. ed. 553, 555, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326; Weyerhaeuser v. Hoyt, 219 U. S. 380, 387, 388, 55 L. ed. 258, 261, 262, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; Daniels v. Wagner, 237 U. S. 547, 557, 558, 560, 561, 59 L. ed. 1102, 1106, 1107, L.R.A.1916A, 1116, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 40; Northern P. R. Co. v. Musser-Sauntry Land Logging & Mfg. Co. 168 U. S. 604, 611, 42 L. ed. 596, 599, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Whittington v. Mississippi, 30 Land Dec. 149; Gaines v. Nicholson, 9 How. 364, 13 L. ed. 176; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 524, 24 L. ed. 441; Natoma Water & Min. Co. v. Bugbee, 96 U. S. 167, 24 L. ed. 621, 13 Mor. Min. Rep. 211; Ivanhoe Min. Co. v. Keystone Consol. Min. Co. 102 U. S. 172, 26 L. ed. 127, 13 Mor. Min. Rep. 204; Hibbard v. Slack, 84 Fed. 574; Sherman v. Buick, 45 Cal. 669; Saunders v. La Purisima Gold Min. Co. 125 Cal. 159, 57 Pac. 656, 20 Mor. Min. Rep. 93; Rice v. California, 24 Land Dec. 14; Leavenworth, L. & R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 740, 23 L. ed. 634, 637; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall. 95, 99, 19 L. ed. 599, 601; Irvin v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 136 U. S. 579, 34 L. ed. 540, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Tubbs v. Wilhoit, 138 U. S. 134, 146, 34 L. ed. 887, 891, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; Re Louisiana, 5 Land Dec. 517; Southern P. R. Co. v. Bell, 183 U. S. 687, 46 L. ed. 389, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Rutherford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196, 204, 4 L. ed. 218, 220; Lessieur v. Price, 12 How. 76, 13 L. ed. 900; Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 559, 15 L. ed. 246; Doe ex dem. Dickins v. Mahana, 21 How. 282, 16 L. ed. 160; Hedrick v. Hughes, 15 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 54; Best v. Polk (Best v. Doe) 18 Wall. 118, 21 L. ed. 808; Deseret Salt Co. v. Tar
pey, 142 U. S. 248, 35 L. ed. 1001, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158; Curtner v. United States, 149 U. S. 675, 37 L. ed. 894, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985, 1041; United States v. Loughrey, 172 U. S. 210, 43 L. ed. 421, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 153; United States v. Williams, 30 Fed. 313; Doll v. Meador, 16 Cal. 295; Bludworth v. Lake, 33 Cal. 261; State v. Tanner, 73 Nev. 104, 102 N. W. 237; 32 Cyc. 869; Re California, 3 Land Dec. 329; Re California, 7 Land Dec. 272; Gregg v. Colorado, 15 Land Dec. 151, 154; Gates v. Robertson, 30 Land Dec. 83.
A perfected lieu selection by a state under its school grant has more than all the attributes of a final entry; it is the state's muniment of title to the selected land, and the muniment of title of the United States to the base land.
McKinney v. Carson, 35 Utah, 180, 99 Pac. 660; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 520, 521, 30 L. ed. 1039, 1048, 1049, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Southern Development Co. v. Enderson, 200 Fed. 277; McCreery v. Haskell, 119 U. S. 327, 331, 30 L. ed. 408, 409, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176; Weyerhaeuser v. Hoyt, 219 U. S. 380, 388, 55 L. ed. 258, 261, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300.
It is contrary to the meaning of the words, "under the direction and subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior," for that officer to exercise his discretion, as distinguished from his judgment, with respect to selections.
Groeck v. Southern P. R. Co. 42 C. C.
A. 114, 102 Fed. 34; Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514, 34 L. ed. 1026, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 457; Johanson v. Washington, 190 U. S. 179, 183, 184, 47 L. ed. 1008, 1010, 1011, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 640, 26 L. ed. 876, 11 Mor. Min. Rep. 673; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 175, 37 L. ed. 127, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271; Catholic Bishop v. Gibbon, 158 U. S. 166, 39 L. ed. 936, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 779; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 478, 43 L. ed. 774, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 488, 44 L. ed. 1161, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 986; Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co. 190 U. S. 309, 47 L. ei. 1070, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; King v. McAndrews, 50 C. A. A. 29, 111 Fed. 863; United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 325, 47 L. ed. 1078, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698; Knight v. United Land Asso. 142 U. S. 177, 178, 181, 35 L. ed. 979981, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; Howe v. Parker, 111 C. C. A. 466, 190 Fed. 757;
Acts of the President under legislation relating exclusively to the administration of national forests do not impair the rights of a state under legislation granting public lands for school purposes.
Leonard v. Lennox, 104 C. C. A. 296, 181 | right to them and select instead other Fed. 766; United States v. George, 228 land of equal acreage. See California U. S. 21, 57 L. ed. 715, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. v. Descret Water, Oil, & Irrig. Co. 243 412. U. S. 415, 61 L. ed. 821, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394. All lieu lands were to be selected "under the direction and subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior." Acts of June 21, 1893, chap. 489, §§ 1, 8, 30 Stat. at L. 484; March 16, 1908, chap. 8, 35 Stat. at L. 44, Comp. Stat. § 4868, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 784; June 20, 1910, chap. 310, §§ 6, 10-12, 36 Stat. at L. 557; February 28, 1891, chap. 384, 26 Stat. at L. 796, Comp. Stat. §§ 4860, 4861, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. pp. 765, 768, amending §§ 2275, 2276, Rev. Stat.
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718, 719, 25 L. ed. 496, 501; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 81 C. C. A. 221, 152 Fed. 41.
The Land Department's ruling that the state substitute other and different base land or suffer rejection of its perfected selection was an affront to the dignity of the state, and an invasion of its rights under its grant.
Re McDonald, 30 Land Dec. 125; Re Coffin, 31 Land Dec. 175; Re California, 7 Land Dec. 270; Re Talbot, 8 Land Dec. 495; State v. Thomas, 35 Land Dec. 173. It would be to penalize the states for delays in the transaction of public business by the Land Department to hold that the elimination from the forest defeated the selection.
Benson Min. & Smelting Co. v. Alta Min. & Smelting Co. 145 U. S. 428, 431, 432, 36 L. ed. 762, 764, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 488.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a suit by the state of New Mexico to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from canceling or annulling a lieu-land selection of that state, under a mistaken conception of their power and duty. A hearing on the bill and answer resulted in a decree for the state, which the court of appeals affirmed (258 Fed. 980), and the defendants appealed to this court.
 There was no controversy or difference in the Land Department about any question of fact, but only in respect of the time as of which the officers were authorized and required to determine the validity of the selection.
Congress granted to New Mexico for the support of common schools designated sections of land in each township, subject to specified exceptions, with a provision enabling and entitling the state to select other lands in lieu of those excepted, and with a further provision whereby, in the event any of the designated sections, after passing under the grant, should be included within a public reservation, the state was to be entitled to waive its
Some of the tracts in place after passing under the grant were included within a public reservation called the Alamo National Forest. Afterwards, on March 9, 1915, the state filed in the local land office a selection list waiving its right to one of these tracts, and selecting in its stead other land of like area lawfully subject to selection. The list conformed to the directions given by the Secretary of the Interior, and was accompanied by the requisite proofs and the proper fees. Notice of the selection was duly posted and published, proof of publication was submitted, and the publisher's charge was paid. other words, the waiver and selection were regularly presented and all was done by the state that needed to be done by it to perfect the selection. The notice did not bring forth any protest or objection, and in due course the local land officers forwarded the list and supporting proofs and papers to the General  Land Office with a certificate stating that there was no adverse filing, entry, or claim to the land selected, and that the list had been accepted and approved by them. The list remained pending in that office until May 16, 1916, when the Commissioner directed that the selection be canceled solely on the ground that in the meantime, on April 3, 1916, the base tract-the one the right to which was waived-had been eliminated from the reservation by a change in its boundaries. The state appealed to the Secretary of the Interior, and he affirmed the Commissioner's action. Both officers proceeded on the theory that the validity of the selection was to be tested by the conditions existing when they came to examine it, and not by those existing when the state made it,-in other words, they conceived that, although the selection was lawful when made, they could and
should disapprove it and direct its cancelation by reason of the elimination of the base tract from the reservation a year later.
selector is acting within the law, in respect of both the land relinquished and the land selected, and of approving or rejecting the selection accordingly. The The courts below rejected that view, power conferred is "judicial in its naand held that those officers were re-ture," and not only involves the authorquired to give effect to the conditions ity, but implies the duty, "to determine existing when the selection was made, the lawfulness of the selections as of the and that, if it was valid then, they were time when the exertion of the authority not at liberty to disapprove or cancel was invoked by the lawful filing of the it by reason of the subsequent change list of selections." Weyerhaeuser v. in the status of the base tract. In our Hoyt, 219 U. S. 380, 388, 55 L. ed. 258, opinion the courts were right. The pro- 261, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; Daniels v. vision under which the selection was Wagner, 237 U. S. 547, 557, et seq., 59 made was one inviting and proposing an L. ed. 1102, 1106, L.R.A.1916A, 1116, 35 exchange of lands. By it Congress said Sup. Ct. Rep. 740, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 40; in substance to the state: If you will Payne v. Central P. R. Co. supra. This waive or surrender your titled tract in view of it has been enforced where the the reservation, you may select and take Secretary, misconceiving his authority in lieu of it a tract of like area from and the rights of the selector, erroneousthe unappropriated nonmineral public ly declined to approve, and canceled lands outside the reservation. Accept- selections lawfully made. St. Paul & S. ance of such a proposal and compliance C. R. Co. v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 112 with its terms confer a vested right in U. S. 720, 28 L. ed. 872, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. the selected land which the land officers 334; Daniels v. Wagner, 237 U. S. 547, cannot lawfully cancel or disregard. 557, et seq., 59 L. ed. 1102, 1106, L.R.A. In this respect the provision under 1916A, 1116, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740, Ann. which the state proceeded does not dif- Cas. 1917A, 40. And it should be obfer from other land laws which offer a served that this view has been recogconveyance of the title to those who nized and applied by the Land Departaccept and fully comply with their ment, although not  with uniformity. In the case of Re McDonald, 30 Land Dec. 124, which involved a lieuland selection and a state of facts much like those now before us, it was said by the Secretary of the Interior: "When the selection was filed, the land embraced in the accompanying deed of relinquishment and reconveyance within the limits of the forest reserve, and a proper basis for a selection under said act, and the land selected by McDonald in exchange was, according to the records of your [Commissioner's] office, of the character subject to such selection, and free from other claim or appropriation. By his deed of relinquishment and reconveyanace to the United States of his own land situate within the boundaries of the forest reserve, and by his selection of the lieu land, McDonald accepted the standing offer or proposal of the government contained in the Act of June 4, 1897 [30 Stat. at L. 11, chap. 2], and complied with its conditions, thereby converting the mere offer or proposal of the government into a contract fully executed upon his part, and in the execution of which by the government he had a vested right. After McDonald had fully complied with the terms on which the government, by said act, had declared its willingness to be bound, no
 In the brief for the officers it is frankly and rightly conceded to be well settled that "a claimant to public land who has done all that is required under the law to perfect his claim acquires rights against the government, and that his right to a legal title is to be determined as of that time;" and also that this rule "is based upon the theory that, by virtue of his compliance with the requirements, he has an equitable title to the land; that in equity it is his, and the government holds it in trust for him." See Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How. 314, 333, 13 L. ed. 153; Stark v. Starr, 6 Wall. 402, 417, 418, 18 L. ed. 925, 929, 930; Ard v. Brandon, 156 U. S. 537, 543, 39 L. ed. 534, 526, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406; Payne v. Central P. R. Co. 255 U. S. 228, ante, 598, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 314. But it is said that as the selection is "subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior," no right can become vested, nor equitable title be acquired thereunder unless and until his approval is had; and therefore that the rule just stated is not applicable here. To this we cannot assent. The words relied upon are not peculiar to this land grant, but are found in many others. Their purpose is to cast upon the Secretary the duty of ascertaining whether the
act of either the executive or legislative branch of the government could devest
J. J. BECKHAM, Appt.,
Mississippi Choctaws. (No. 10.)
WILLIAM N. VERNON, Appt.,
him of the right thereby acquired. Your JACK AMOS and Others, Known as the [Commissioner's] office will therefore carefully examine the papers and records pertaining to this selection, and, if it is found to be otherwise free from objection, the fact of the elimination from the boundaries of the forest reserve of the lands in lieu of which the selection is made, after full compliance by the claimant with the Lieu Land Act and regulations, will not prevent approval of the selection."
In California v. Deseret Water, Oil, & Irrig. Co. supra, which involved a like waiver and selection alleged to have been lawfully made and to be awaiting action by the Secretary, the United States, in a brief presented by leave of the court, took the position that, by the waiver, it acquired such an  equitable right in the base tract as prevented a condemnation of the tract as the property of the state. The state court had held the waiver and selection of no effect, and this court reversed that decision.
We conclude that an injunction was rightly awarded, but that it will be better suited to the occasion if it be confined to directing a disposal of the selection in regular course, unaffected by the elimination of the base tract from the reservation. With this modification the decree is affirmed.
JACK AMOS and Others, Known as the
KATIE A. HOWE, Executrix of the Estate of Chester Howe, Deceased, Appt.,
1. The jurisdictional Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, authorizing the court of claims to hear, consider, and adjudicate the claims against the Misservices rendered and expenses incurred in sissippi Choctaws of certain persons for the matter of the claims of the Mississippi Choctaws to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to render judgment thereon on the principle of quantum meruit in such amounts as may appear equitable or justly due therefor, which judgment, if any, shall due such Choctaws by the United States, be paid from any funds now or hereafter and declaring that the lands allotted to the Mississippi Choctaws are subject to a lien to the extent of any judgment so rendered, contemplate, not an action in personam to establish a personal liability against individual Indians or but a suit of an equitable nature against a group of Indians, that class of Mississippi Choctaws who, through successful assertion of the right of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, acquired
JACK AMOS and Others, Known as the allotments of lands in what formerly was Mississippi Choctaws. (No. 6.)
the tribal domain, and a participation in funds held in trust by the United States; a suit having the object of imposing an equitable charge upon their funds and lands
J. S. BOUNDS, Attorney in Fact for T. A. for a reasonable and proportionate con
tribution towards the value of services rendered and expenses incurred by the JACK AMOS and Others, Known as the claimants in securing for said class of Mississippi Choctaws. (No. 7.)
JOHN LONDON, Appt.,
Indians a beneficial participation in the trust estate.
[For other cases, see Claims, III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.]
Indians Federal control.
2. Congress has plenary authority over JACK AMOS and Others, Known as the the Indians and all their tribal relations, Mississippi Choctaws. (No. 8.)
and full power to legislate concerning their tribal property. The guardianship arises from their condition of tutelage or de
WALTER S. FIELD and Madison M. Lind- pendency, and it rests with Congress to de
termine when the relationship shall cease, the mere grant of rights of citizenship not being sufficient to terminate it.
JACK AMOS and Others, Known as the [For other cases, see Indians, II. in Digest Mississippi Choctaws. (No. 9.)
Sup. Ct. 1908.]
3. Congress acted clearly within its authority in constituting the governor of the Choctaw Nation the representative of the defendants, upon whom notice of the suit, contemplated by the Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 28, 1908, § 27, for the recovery for services rendered and expenses incurred in securing Mississippi Choctaw Indians rights of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, was to be served in their behalf, and in designating the Attorney General of the United States as their attorney to appear and defend the suit, the government's trusteeship of the funds of these Indians, and its guardianship over their interests in the allotted lands, not making it necessary that the United States be a party to the proceeding.
For other cases, see Parties, II. a, 2, in Digest
Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law -notice and hearing Indians.
due process of law suit against
4. Indians were not deprived of their property without due process of law by the provisions of the Acts of April 26, 1906, S9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, authorizing the court of claims to hear, consider, and adjudicate the claims against the Mississippi Choctaws of certain persons for services rendered and expenses incurred in the matter of the claims of the Mississippi Choctaws to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to render judgment thereon on the such principle of quantum meruit in amounts as may appear equitable or justly due therefor, which judgment, if any, shall be paid from any funds now or hereafter due such Choctaws by the United States, and declaring that the lands allotted to the Mississippi Choctaws are subject to a lien to the extent of any judgment so rendered, and constituting the governor of the Choctaw Nation the representative of the defendants, upon whom notice of the suit was to be served in their behalf, and designating the Attorney General of the United States as their attorney to appear and defend the suit.
[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 696-724, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
liability of trust estate equitable charge for services rendered.
6. For proper professional services rendered and expenses incurred in promoting legislation that has for its object and effect the rescue of substantial property interests for a class of beneficiaries under a trust of a public nature, it is equitable to impose al
7. Professional services before Congress and its committees, individual representatives and Senators, the Dawes Commission, etc., intended to establish the right of the Mississippi Choctaws to participation in the material benefits of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to secure such legislation by Congress as might be needed for the practical attainment of the object sought, though rendered under particular contracts of employment by many individual Mississippi Choctaws, but with the object, incidentally, of benefiting the Mississippi Choctaws as a class, will, whether such contracts be valid or not, support the suit authorized by the Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, to be brought in the court of claims to impose an equitable charge for reimbursement and compensation on the basis of quantum meruit upon the interest of those beneficiaries who received the benefit, provided that the services rendered were substantially instrumental in producing a result beneficial to the class of cestuis que trustent upon whose interests the charge is to be imposed. [For other cases, see Claims, III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.]
from court of claims fusal to find wrong reason. 8. If the reasons given by the court of claims for rejecting on the merits certain requests for additional findings which, in its discretion, the court might have rejected, because filed more than the prescribed time after judgment, show that the court to some extent misapprehended the nature of the main issue and the bearing of the requested findings thereon, it cannot be said that, had it not done so, it would have rejected the requests because not filed in due season.
10. A cause will be remanded to the court of claims for additional findings, as requested, where that court refused appropriate requests for additional findings directed to the crucial point in the case, as to which the facts, as found, are inconclusive.
[For other cases, see Appeal and Error, IX. i, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]