518, 37 L. ed. 259, 263, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S. 456, 461, 32 L. ed. 482, 483, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Garfield v. United States, 211 U. S. 249, 53 L. ed. 168, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541, 23 L. ed. 623, 628; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. ed. 123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271; Ballinger v. United States, 216 U. S. 240, 249, 54 L. ed. 464, 468, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338.

The school grant attaches to the sections specified upon identification thereof by survey, and to the indemnity and lieu lands upon identification thereof by selection.

Ryan v. Central P. R. Co. 99 U. S. 382, 386, 25 L. ed. 305; United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 223 U. S. 565, 570, 56 L. ed. 553, 555, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326; Weyerhaeuser v. Hoyt, 219 U. S. 380, 387, 388, 55 L. ed. 258, 261, 262, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; Daniels v. Wagner, 237 U. S. 547, 557, 558, 560, 561, 59 L. ed. 1102, 1106, 1107, L.R.A.1916A, 1116, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 740, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 40; Northern P. R. Co. v. Musser-Sauntry Land Logging & Mfg. Co. 168 U. S. 604, 611, 42 L. ed. 596, 599, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Whittington v. Mississippi, 30 Land Dec. 149; Gaines v. Nicholson, 9 How. 364, 13 L. ed. 176; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 524, 24 L. ed. 441; Natoma Water & Min. Co. v. Bugbee, 96 U. S. 167, 24 L. ed. 621, 13 Mor. Min. Rep. 211; Ivanhoe Min. Co. v. Keystone Consol. Min. Co. 102 U. S. 172, 26 L. ed. 127, 13 Mor. Min. Rep. 204; Hibbard v. Slack, 84 Fed. 574; Sherman v. Buick, 45 Cal. 669; Saunders v. La Purisima Gold Min. Co. 125 Cal. 159, 57 Pac. 656, 20 Mor. Min. Rep. 93; Rice v. California, 24 Land Dec. 14; Leavenworth, L. & R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 740, 23 L. ed. 634, 637; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall. 95, 99, 19 L. ed. 599, 601; Irvin v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 136 U. S. 579, 34 L. ed. 540, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Tubbs v. Wilhoit, 138 U. S. 134, 146, 34 L. ed. 887, 891, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; Re Louisiana, 5 Land Dec. 517; Southern P. R. Co. v. Bell, 183 U. S. 687, 46 L. ed. 389, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Rutherford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196, 204, 4 L. ed. 218, 220; Lessieur v. Price, 12 How. 76, 13 L. ed. 900; Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 559, 15 L. ed. 246; Doe ex dem. Dickins v. Mahana, 21 How. 282, 16 L. ed. 160; Hedrick v. Hughes, 15 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 54; Best v. Polk (Best v. Doe) 18 Wall. 118, 21 L. ed. 808; Deseret Salt Co. v. Tar

pey, 142 U. S. 248, 35 L. ed. 1001, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158; Curtner v. United States, 149 U. S. 675, 37 L. ed. 894, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985, 1041; United States v. Loughrey, 172 U. S. 210, 43 L. ed. 421, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 153; United States v. Williams, 30 Fed. 313; Doll v. Meador, 16 Cal. 295; Bludworth v. Lake, 33 Cal. 261; State v. Tanner, 73 Nev. 104, 102 N. W. 237; 32 Cyc. 869; Re California, 3 Land Dec. 329; Re California, 7 Land Dec. 272; Gregg v. Colorado, 15 Land Dec. 151, 154; Gates v. Robertson, 30 Land Dec. 83.

A perfected lieu selection by a state under its school grant has more than all the attributes of a final entry; it is the state's muniment of title to the selected land, and the muniment of title of the United States to the base land.

McKinney v. Carson, 35 Utah, 180, 99 Pac. 660; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 520, 521, 30 L. ed. 1039, 1048, 1049, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Southern Development Co. v. Enderson, 200 Fed. 277; McCreery v. Haskell, 119 U. S. 327, 331, 30 L. ed. 408, 409, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176; Weyerhaeuser v. Hoyt, 219 U. S. 380, 388, 55 L. ed. 258, 261, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300.

It is contrary to the meaning of the words, "under the direction and subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior," for that officer to exercise his discretion, as distinguished from his judgment, with respect to selections.

Groeck v. Southern P. R. Co. 42 C. C.

A. 114, 102 Fed. 34; Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514, 34 L. ed. 1026, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 457; Johanson v. Washington, 190 U. S. 179, 183, 184, 47 L. ed. 1008, 1010, 1011, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 640, 26 L. ed. 876, 11 Mor. Min. Rep. 673; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 175, 37 L. ed. 127, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271; Catholic Bishop v. Gibbon, 158 U. S. 166, 39 L. ed. 936, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 779; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 478, 43 L. ed. 774, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 488, 44 L. ed. 1161, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 986; Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co. 190 U. S. 309, 47 L. ei. 1070, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; King v. McAndrews, 50 C. A. A. 29, 111 Fed. 863; United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 325, 47 L. ed. 1078, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698; Knight v. United Land Asso. 142 U. S. 177, 178, 181, 35 L. ed. 979981, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; Howe v. Parker, 111 C. C. A. 466, 190 Fed. 757;

Acts of the President under legislation relating exclusively to the administration of national forests do not impair the rights of a state under legislation granting public lands for school purposes.

Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718, 719, 25 L. ed. 496, 501; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 81 C. C. A. 221, 152 Fed. 41.

The Land Department's ruling that the state substitute other and different base land or suffer rejection of its perfected selection was an affront to the dignity of the state, and an invasion of its rights under its grant.

Re McDonald, 30 Land Dec. 125; Re Coffin, 31 Land Dec. 175; Re California, 7 Land Dec. 270; Re Talbot, 8 Land Dec. 495; State v. Thomas, 35 Land Dec. 173. It would be to penalize the states for delays in the transaction of public business by the Land Department to hold that the elimination from the forest defeated the selection.

Benson Min. & Smelting Co. v. Alta Min. & Smelting Co. 145 U. S. 428, 431, 432, 36 L. ed. 762, 764, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 488.

Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit by the state of New Mexico to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from canceling or annulling a lieu-land selection of that state, under a mistaken conception of their power and duty. A hearing on the bill and answer resulted in a decree for the state, which the court of appeals affirmed (258 Fed. 980), and the defendants appealed to this court.

[369] There was no controversy or difference in the Land Department about any question of fact, but only in respect of the time as of which the officers were authorized and required to determine the validity of the selection.

Congress granted to New Mexico for the support of common schools designated sections of land in each township, subject to specified exceptions, with a provision enabling and entitling the state to select other lands in lieu of those excepted, and with a further provision whereby, in the event any of the designated sections, after passing under the grant, should be included within a public reservation, the state was to be entitled to waive its

In

Some of the tracts in place after passing under the grant were included within a public reservation called the Alamo National Forest. Afterwards, on March 9, 1915, the state filed in the local land office a selection list waiving its right to one of these tracts, and selecting in its stead other land of like area lawfully subject to selection. The list conformed to the directions given by the Secretary of the Interior, and was accompanied by the requisite proofs and the proper fees. Notice of the selection was duly posted and published, proof of publication was submitted, and the publisher's charge was paid. other words, the waiver and selection were regularly presented and all was done by the state that needed to be done by it to perfect the selection. The notice did not bring forth any protest or objection, and in due course the local land officers forwarded the list and supporting proofs and papers to the General [370] Land Office with a certificate stating that there was no adverse filing, entry, or claim to the land selected, and that the list had been accepted and approved by them. The list remained pending in that office until May 16, 1916, when the Commissioner directed that the selection be canceled solely on the ground that in the meantime, on April 3, 1916, the base tract-the one the right to which was waived-had been eliminated from the reservation by a change in its boundaries. The state appealed to the Secretary of the Interior, and he affirmed the Commissioner's action. Both officers proceeded on the theory that the validity of the selection was to be tested by the conditions existing when they came to examine it, and not by those existing when the state made it,-in other words, they conceived that, although the selection was lawful when made, they could and

3. Congress acted clearly within its authority in constituting the governor of the Choctaw Nation the representative of the defendants, upon whom notice of the suit, contemplated by the Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 28, 1908, § 27, for the recovery for services rendered and expenses incurred in securing Mississippi Choctaw Indians rights of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, was to be served in their behalf, and in designating the Attorney General of the United States as their attorney to appear and defend the suit, the government's trusteeship of the funds of these Indians, and its guardianship over their interests in the allotted lands, not making it necessary that the United States be a party to the proceeding.

For other cases, see Parties, II. a, 2, in Digest

Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law -notice and hearing Indians.

due process of law suit against

4. Indians were not deprived of their property without due process of law by the provisions of the Acts of April 26, 1906, S9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, authorizing the court of claims to hear, consider, and adjudicate the claims against the Mississippi Choctaws of certain persons for services rendered and expenses incurred in the matter of the claims of the Mississippi Choctaws to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to render judgment thereon on the such principle of quantum meruit in amounts as may appear equitable or justly due therefor, which judgment, if any, shall be paid from any funds now or hereafter due such Choctaws by the United States, and declaring that the lands allotted to the Mississippi Choctaws are subject to a lien to the extent of any judgment so rendered, and constituting the governor of the Choctaw Nation the representative of the defendants, upon whom notice of the suit was to be served in their behalf, and designating the Attorney General of the United States as their attorney to appear and defend the suit.

[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 696-724, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

liability of trust estate equitable charge for services rendered.

6. For proper professional services rendered and expenses incurred in promoting legislation that has for its object and effect the rescue of substantial property interests for a class of beneficiaries under a trust of a public nature, it is equitable to impose al

7. Professional services before Congress and its committees, individual representatives and Senators, the Dawes Commission, etc., intended to establish the right of the Mississippi Choctaws to participation in the material benefits of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to secure such legislation by Congress as might be needed for the practical attainment of the object sought, though rendered under particular contracts of employment by many individual Mississippi Choctaws, but with the object, incidentally, of benefiting the Mississippi Choctaws as a class, will, whether such contracts be valid or not, support the suit authorized by the Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, to be brought in the court of claims to impose an equitable charge for reimbursement and compensation on the basis of quantum meruit upon the interest of those beneficiaries who received the benefit, provided that the services rendered were substantially instrumental in producing a result beneficial to the class of cestuis que trustent upon whose interests the charge is to be imposed. [For other cases, see Claims, III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.]

Appeal

- re

from court of claims fusal to find wrong reason. 8. If the reasons given by the court of claims for rejecting on the merits certain requests for additional findings which, in its discretion, the court might have rejected, because filed more than the prescribed time after judgment, show that the court to some extent misapprehended the nature of the main issue and the bearing of the requested findings thereon, it cannot be said that, had it not done so, it would have rejected the requests because not filed in due season.

10. A cause will be remanded to the court of claims for additional findings, as requested, where that court refused appropriate requests for additional findings directed to the crucial point in the case, as to which the facts, as found, are inconclusive.

[For other cases, see Appeal and Error, IX. i, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]