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tention is that the tax imposed denies to | fication must be deducible from the Watson's estate equal protection of the nature of the things classified,-here laws. the right to receive property by devoThe occasion and the purpose of the lution. It is enough, for instance, if statute are shown by the court of ap- the classification is reasonably foundpeals. An owner of investments is not ed in "the purposes and policy of required either to list them for assess- taxation." Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, ment locally under the General Prop- 142 U. S. 339, 354, 35 L. ed. 1035, erty Tax Law, or to present them for 1040, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 810, 12 stamping under the Investment Tax Sup. Ct. Rep. 250; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 Law. Whether the investments of a U. S. 730, 732, 47 L. ed. 669, 672, 23 Sup. resident are taxed during his life de- Ct. Rep. 401; Clement Nat. Bank v. pends either upon his own will or upon Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 136, 137, 58 L. the vigilance and discretion of the local ed. 147, 156, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; Farmassessors. This condition led to loss of ers' & M. Sav. Bank v. Minnesota, 232 revenue by the state, and to inequality U. S. 519, 529, 530, 58 L. ed. 706, 712, in taxation among its citizens. To rem- 713, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354. And what edy both evils this additional transfer classification could be more reasonable tax was imposed upon investments of a than to distinguish, in imposing an indecedent which had wholly escaped tax- heritance or transfer tax, between propation. It is insisted that the tax is dis- erty which had, during the decedent's criminatory because under it other prop- life, borne its fair share of the tax burerty of the same kind, bequeathed to den, and that which had not ?1 persons standing in the same relationship to the decedent, will not be taxed. But the power to classify for purposes of taxation is fully established. The executors admit, as they must, that a classification is reasonable if made with respect to the kind of property transferred; or, to the amount or value of property transferred; or, to the relationship of the transferees; or, to the character of the transferee, for instance, as engaged in charity. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 300, 42 L. ed. 1037, 1045, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87, 50 L. ed. 382, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182. But their list does not exhaust the possibilities of legal classification. See Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477, 484, 53 L. ed. 290, 293, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186; Keeney v. New York, 222 1 Connecticut (Gen. Stat. 1918, § 1190) U. S. 525, 56 L. ed. 299, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) and Louisiana (Const. 1898, arts. 235, 236; 1139, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Maxwell v. Act 45 of 1904) also impose a special inBugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 heritance tax on the transfer of property Sup. Ct. Rep. 2. Compare New York ex which has not borne its share of taxation rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 51 during a period prior to the owner's death. L. ed. 415, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188, 9 Ann. The latter statute has been frequently beCas. 736. Any classification is permis-fore the courts (Levy's Succession, 115 La. 377, 385, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1180, 39 So. 37, sible which has a reasonable relation to 5 Ann. Cas. 871, affirmed in Cahen v. Brewsome permitted end of governmental ac-ster, 203 U. S. 543, 51 L. ed. 310, 27 Sup. tion. It [125] is not necessary, as Ct. Rep. 174, 8 Ann. Cas. 215; Pritchard's the plaintiff in error seems to con- Succession, 118 La. 883, 43 So. 537; Westtend, that the basis of the classi- feldt's Succession, 122 La. 836, 48 So. 287). 65 L. ed. 175

It does not follow, as is also argued, that the act in question imposes a property tax, merely because its existence may induce owners of investments to present them for taxation under the Investment Tax Law. Nor is it to be deemed a law imposing a penalty merely because the decedent's estate may, under it, be required to pay more in taxes than the deceased would have paid if he had presented his property for taxation under the Investment Tax Law. Whether this additional transfer tax would be obnoxious to the 14th Amendment if it could be deemed a property tax or a penalty, we have no occasion to consider.

The judgment of the Surrogate's Court, entered on the remittitur from the Court of Appeals of New York, is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court:

10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Pacific Exp. Co. | 164, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66; Citizens' v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 351, 35 L. ed. Teleph. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 1035, 1039, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 810, 12 328-331, 57 L. ed. 1206, 1212-1214, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250; Adams Exp. Co. v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 833; Miller v. Wilson, 236 Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 228, U. S. 373, 382, 59 L. ed. 628, 631, L.R.A. 41 L. ed. 683, 697, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305; 1915F, 829, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342; Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsyl- Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wisvania, 167 U. S. 461, 464, 42 L. ed. 236, consin, 247 U. S. 132, 139, 62 L. ed. 237, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Magoun v. 1025, 1037, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444; MidIllinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. dleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. 249 283, 295, 42 L. ed. 1037, 1043, 18 Sup. U. S. 152, 157, 63 L. ed. 527, 531, 39 Ct. Rep. 594; Armour Packing Co. v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 227; Maxwell v. Bugbee, Lacy, 200 U. S. 226, 235, 50 L. ed. 451, 250 U. S. 525, 539, 63 L. ed. 1124, 1131, 456, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Michigan C. 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2; Green v. Frazier, R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, 293, 50 253 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 878, 40 Sup. Ct. L. ed. 744, 761, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 459; Rep. 499. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 70, 57 L. ed. 730, 734, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441; Citizens' Teleph. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 57 L. ed. 1206, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 833; Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 143, 58 L. ed. 147, 158, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 204, 215, 58 L. ed. 1276, 1279, 1283, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 859; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 609, 47 L. ed. 323, 327, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111-118, 61 L. ed. 176-187, 37 Sup. Ct. Rp. 58; Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 156, 157, 62 L. ed. 632, 637, 638, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 139, 140, 62 L. ed. 1025, 1037, 1038, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444.

The New York Tax Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 60) provides (art. 1, § 9) that personal property shall be assessed and taxed to the owner at the place where he resides, but exempts (art. 15) from such taxation certain bonds and other obligations, called in the act "investments," on which there has been paid an optional tax at a lower rate, which payment is evidenced by a stamp affixed. The Tax Law also provides (art. 10) for an inheritance or transfer tax which varies, among other things, according to the relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent. By 221b, Laws of 1917, chap. 700, § 2, an additional tax, equal to 5 per cent of the appraised value of the investment, is imposed on the transfer of investments held by the decedent at his death, on which neither the genThe decisions under the 14th Amend-eral property tax nor the stamp tax ment uphold the right of the state thus to classify and tax.

above described has been paid during a fixed period prior thereto, provided that the estate is larger than the exemptions to relatives and charities.

Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237, 33 L. ed. 892, 895, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Merchants' & M. Watson, a resident of New York city, Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. held, at his death in 1917, certain bonds 461, 464, 42 L. ed. 236, 237, 17 Sup. Ct. on which neither the general property Rep. 829; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & tax nor the stamp tax had been paid. Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 295, 42 L. ed. The transfer tax appraiser, appointed by 1037, 1043, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Orient the surrogate's court, reported that there Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 562, 43 was payable by the executors in respect L. ed. 552, 554, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; to those bonds the additional transfer Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. tax prescribed by the Act of 1917. The 594, 606, 33 L. ed. 1025, 1031, 10 Sup. surrogate disallowed the tax on the Ct. Rep. 593; Henderson Bridge Co. v. ground that the statute violated the Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 615, 43 L. ed. state Constitution; and his decision was 823, 831, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553; Mich- affirmed by the appellate [124] diigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, vision of the supreme court (186 App. 293, 302, 50 L. ed. 744, 761, 765, 26 Sup. Div. 48, 174 N. Y. Supp. 19). The Ct. Rep. 459; Lindsley v. Natural Car- court of appeals of New York held bonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 75, 55 L. ed. that the act violated neither the state 369, 376, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. nor the Federal Constitution (226 N. Cas. 1912C, 160; Central Lumber Co. v. Y. 384, 123 N. E. 758); and the case South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed.' comes here on writ of error.

The con

Argued December 16, 1919. Restored to docket for reargument January 26, 1920. Reargued October 11 and 12, 1920. Decided November 22, 1920.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York in and for the County of Albany, entered pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals of that state, which affirmed a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, affirming a judgment of the Trial Term for the recovery of penalties from a bridge company for failure to construct a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians. Affirmed.

See same case below in supreme court, 179 App. Div. 950, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1104; in court of appeals, 223 N. Y. 137, 119 N. E. 351.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Adelbert Moot argued the cause on original argument, and, with Messrs. Henry W. Sprague, William L. Marcy, and Mrs. Helen Z. M. Rodgers, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

This court will determine for itself the validity, nature, and extent of the contracts between the plaintiff in error and the state of New York and Dominion of Canada, respectively.

Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 232, 233, 45 L. ed. 162, 169, 170, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 405, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 502, 42 L. ed. 553, 557, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 590, 52 L. ed. 630, 633, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 202, 58 L. ed. 912, 920, L.R.A.1918E, 882, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282; Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, 249, 61 L. ed. 268, 273, P.U.R. 1917B, 1010, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87.

The highest court in the province of Ontario has held that the Canadian charter, as well as the New York charter, is only permissive, and has refused to require the Bridge Company to construct a bridge for foot passengers and vehicles.

Atty.-Gen. V. International Bridge Co. 6 Ont. App. Rep. 537.

The construction placed upon a foreign act by the courts of its own jurisdiction is conclusive upon our courts, and is, in effect, a part of the foreign law.

Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152,

159, 6 L. ed. 289, 292; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 628, 28 L. ed. 269, 271, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 145 U. S. 263, 284, 36 L. ed.

699, 706, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 92, 12 Sup Ct. Rep. 844; 2 Wharton, Confl. L. 8 654-A, p. 1409; Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235, 40 L. ed. 133, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 40 L. ed. 95, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139.

though unlimited in its terms, could and A provision in the Canadian act, did only operate on that portion of the bridge within Canadian territory.

Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 227, 228, 21 L. ed. 888, 895; Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 675, 676, 23 L. ed. 761, 762; Chicago & N. W. R Co. v. Auditor General, 53 Mich. 91, 18 N. W. 586.

The New York Act of 1915 impairs the franchises of the Bridge Company by drastically reducing the tolls authorized by the New York and Canadian acts of incorporation.

Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Southampton v. Jessup, 162 N. Y. 126, 56 N. E. 538; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 318, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156, 1 N. C. C. A. 517.

The reserved power to alter, suspend, or repeal corporate charters does not extend to revoking or impairing special franchises acquired by a corporation. This is true, though such franchises be embodied in a special act of incorporation.

People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L.R.A. 255, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684, 18 N. E. 692; Suburban Rapid Transit Co. v. New York, 128 N. Y. 520, 28 N. E. 525; Coney Island, Ft. H. & B. R. Co. v. Kennedy. 15 App. Div. 588. 44 N. Y. Supp. 825: People ex rel. Reynolds v. Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 307, 37 Am. St. Rep. 563, 35 N. E. 485; New York v. Bryan, 196 N. Y. 165, 89 N. E. 467: People ex rel. Third Ave. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 203 N. Y. 308, 96 N. E. 1011; Re Long Sault Development Co. 212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56, 242 U. S. 272, 276, 61 L. ed. 294, 299, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79; WillCOX v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 44, 53 L. ed. 382, 396, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1134, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Owensboro v. Cumber

[126] INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE PANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

COM-ing the construction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians on that part of the bridge within the jurisdiction that the addition to the structure will not yield a reasonable return.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. of the state, where there is nothing to show

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 126-134.)

Constitutional law-impairing contract obligations amending corporate charter.

[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV.
b, 4, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
Commerce international

state control.

bridge

tary of War, and by recognizing as a lawful structure, as it did in the Act of June 23, 1874, the bridge as constructed for railroad of the bridge as to prevent the state, in the purposes only, did not assume such control exercise of its reserved right to amend the bridge company's charter, from requiring the addition of a roadway for vehicles and the bridge within the jurisdiction of the a pathway for pedestrians on that part of

1. Contract obligations of a bridge com- in the Act of June 30, 1870, the building of 3. Congress, by authorizing, as it did pany, specially incorporated by N. Y. Laws a bridge over the Niagara river, under leg1857, chap. 753, to build a railroad bridge islative authority from the state of New over the Niagara river, and later consoli-York, subject to the approval of the Secredated with a similar Canadian corporation, pursuant to New York and Canada statutes, subject to all the duties of each of the consolidated companies, cannot be said to have been impaired unconstitutionally by N. Y. Laws 1915, chap. 666, amending the original charter, in the exercise of the state's reserved power to amend, by requiring the construction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians on that part of the bridge within the jurisdiction of the state, where the Canadian charter, unlike the New York one, made the arrangements for foot passengers and carriages a duty. [For other cases, see Constitutional 1386-1412, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Law,

Constitutional law - due process of law -bridge company roadway for pedestrians and vehicles.

2. The property of a bridge company, specially incorporated by N. Y. Laws 1857, chap. 753, to build a railroad bridge over the Niagara river, and later consolidated with a similar Canadian corporation, pursuant to New York and Canadian statutes, subject to all the duties of each of the consolidated companies, cannot be said to have been taken without due process of law by N. Y. Laws 1915, chap. 666, amending the original charter, in the exercise of the state's reserved power to amend, by requir

Note.-Generally, as to what laws are void as impairing obligation of contracts-see notes to Franklin County Grammar School v. Bailey, 10 L.R.A. 405; Bullard v. Northern P. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 246; Henderson v. Soldiers & S. Monument Comrs. 13 L.R.A. 169; and Fletcher v. Peck, 3 L. ed. U. S. 162.

As to reserved power to alter, amend, or repeal corporate charters-see note to Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co. 26 L. ed. U. S. 961.

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state.

[For other cases, see Commerce, II. c. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Commerce

state control.

international

[blocks in formation]

for a public purpose not connected with the 4. The conveyance to the United States administration of the government of a part the Niagara river, under legislative authorof the land under a bridge constructed over ity from the state of New York, did not affect the authority of the state to require, in the exercise of its reserved right to amend the bridge company's charter, the addition of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians on that part of the For other cases, see Commerce, II. c, in Digest bridge within the jurisdiction of the state.

Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 46.]

folk & W. R. Co. v. Com. 13 L.R.A. 107, and Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. 158.

V.

late commerce-see notes to State ex. On the power of Congress to regurel. Corwin v. Indiana & O. Oil, Gas & Min. Co. 6 L.R.A. 579; Bullard Wilson, 12 L.R.A. 624; Gibbons v. OgNorthern P. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 246; Re den, 6 L. ed. U. S. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; Gloucester FerAs to what constitutes due process of 158; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. ry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. law, generally-see notes to People v. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. ChiO'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sump-cago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 216; and Cleveland, tion, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; L. ed. U. S. 1041. Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436; and Wilson v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865.

On extent and limit of state authority over consolidated interstate corporation-see note to Mackay v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 24 L.R.A. (N.S.)

On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce-see notes to Nor-1 769.

176

T

INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE CO. v. NEW YORK.

Argued December 16, 1919.
docket for reargument January 26, 1920.
Restored to
Reargued October 11 and 12, 1920.
cided November 22, 1920.

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De

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York in and for the County of Albany, entered pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals of that state, which affirmed a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, affirming a judgment of the Trial Term for the recovery of penalties from a bridge company for failure to construct a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians. Affirmed.

See same case below in supreme court, 179 App. Div. 950, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1104; in court of appeals, 223 N. Y. 137, 119

N. E. 351.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Adelbert Moot argued the cause on original argument, and, with Messrs. Henry W. Sprague, William L. Marcy, and Mrs. Helen Z. M. Rodgers, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

This court will determine for itself the validity, nature, and extent of the contracts between the plaintiff in error and the state of New York and Dominion of Canada, respectively.

Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 232, 233, 45 L. ed. 162, 169, 170, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 405, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 502, 42 L. ed. 553, 557, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 590, 52 L. ed. 630, 633, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341; Russell V. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 202, 58 L. ed. 912, 920, L.R.A.1918E, 882, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282; Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, 249, 61 L. ed. 268, 273, P.U.R. 1917B, 1010, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87.

The highest court in the province of Ontario has held that the Canadian charter, as well as the New York charter, is only permissive, and has refused to require the Bridge Company to construct a bridge for foot passengers and vehicles.

Atty. Gen. v.
Co. 6 Ont. App. Rep. 537.

International

Bridge

The construction placed upon a foreign act by the courts of its own jurisdiction is conclusive upon our courts, and is, in effect, a part of the foreign law.

Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152,

65 L. ed.

Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 628, 28 L. ed. 269, 159, 6 L. ed. 289, 292; McDonald v. 271, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 145 U. S. 263, 284, 36 L. ed. Ct. Rep. 844; 2 Wharton, Confl. L. § 699, 706, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 92, 12 Sup. 654-A, p. 1409; Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235, 40 L. ed. 133, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 40 L. ed. 95, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139.

did only operate on that portion of the A provision in the Canadian act, bridge within Canadian territory. though unlimited in its terms, could and

Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 227, Bkg. Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 675, 676, 228, 21 L. ed. 888, 895; Central R. & 23 L. ed. 761, 762; Chicago & N. W. R Co. v. Auditor General, 53 Mich. 91, 18 N. W. 586.

the franchises of the Bridge Company The New York Act of 1915 impairs by drastically reducing the tolls authorized by the New York and Canadian acts of incorporation.

tucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4 Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. KenInters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 sup, 162 N. Y. 126, 56 N. É. 538; Ives Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Southampton v. Jesv. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 318, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156, 1 N. C. C. A. 517.

or repeal corporate charters does not The reserved power to alter, suspend, extend to revoking or impairing special franchises acquired by a corporation. This is true, though such franchises be embodied in a special act of incorporation.

L.R.A. 255, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684, 18 N. People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 2 E. 692; Suburban Rapid Transit Co. v. New York, 128 N. Y. 520, 28 N. E. Kennedy. 15 App. Div. 588. 44 N. Y. 525; Coney Island, Ft. H. & B. R. Co. v. Supp. 825; People ex rel. Reynolds v. Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 307, 37 Am. St. Rep. 563, 35 N. E. 485; New York v. Bryan, rel. Third Ave. R. Co. v. Public Service 196 N. Y. 165, 89 N. E. 467: People ex Commission, 203 N. Y. 308, 96 N. E. 1011; Re Long Sault Development Co. 1915D, 56, 242 U. S. 272, 276, 61 L. 212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849, Ann. Cas. ed. 294, 299, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79; WillS. 19, 44, 53 L. ed. 382, 396, 48 L.R.A. COX v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. Ann. Cas. 1034; Owensboro v. Cumber(N.S.) 1134, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15

12

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