same among the stockholders. Of these Henry Clay Pierce and the Pierce Investment Company received millions in cash and stock, and Clay Arthur Pierce a small amount. In 1914 the case under the Elkins Act was tried. The company was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $14,000, and in the following year the judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 137 C. C. A. 293, 222 Fed. 69. An execution issued thereon to the marshal for that district and was returned nulla bona. Thereafter this bill in equity was brought by the United States in the Federal district court for the eastern district of Missouri against the Waters Pierce Oil Company, the trustees, and these three stockholders, to obtain satisfaction of the judgment out of the money remaining in the hands of the trustees and that received by these stockholders. The district court entered a decree dismissing the bill as against the Waters Pierce Company and the trustees, but granted, as against the stockholders [401] named, the relief prayed by the government. The decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, one judge dissenting. The case is brought here by these defendants, under § 241 of the Judicial Code. Reversal is sought on several grounds. First. The ground for reversal most strongly urged is that the judgment imposing a fine on the Waters Pierce Company is not a debt on which a creditor's bill will lie. The argument is that a judgment for a definite sum of money does not necessarily endow the holder with all the rights of a creditor; that a court will look behind a judgment, and will grant or deny relief according to the nature of the original cause of action, as it did in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370; Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211, and Westmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 49 L. ed. 390, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172, 2 Ann. Cas. 265; and that, since liability for a penalty is criminal in its nature, and not strictly a debt, a creditor's bill cannot be brought upon a judgment for a penalty. It is true that to the liability for penalties imposed by the United States certain incidents of a criminal proceeding attach; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524; United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190, 199, 54 L. ed. 153, 157, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. But the liability is often enforced by civil pro ceedings, and specifically by the action of debt (Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476, 37 L. ed. 1150, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163; see Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch, 336, 340, 2 L. ed. 297, 298); and then certain incidents of civil proceedings attach (Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 53 L. ed. 720, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 739, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 474, 16 Ann. Cas. 960). By S 1041 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. § 1705, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 327), it is provided (in addition to the power existing by general usage to commit a defendant to jail until his fine has been paid, see Ex parte Barclay, 153 Fed. 669) that the judgments for penalties "may be enforced by execution against the property of the defendant in like manner as judgments in civil cases are enforced." The statute applies to all judgments for penalties, whether recovered by civil or criminal proceedings. A judgment creditor's bill is in [402] essence an equitable execution comparable to proceedings supplementary to execution. See Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. ed. 1200. The law which sends a corporation into the world with the capacity to act imposes upon its assets liability for its acts. The corporation cannot disable itself from responding by distributing its property among its stockholders, and leaving remediless those having valid claims. In such a case the claims, after being reduced to judgments, may be satisfied out of the assets in the hands of the stockholders. There is no good reason why the rule should be limited to judgments arising out of civil proceedings. To the contention that the statute has not made this process available for the government in enforcing a penalty, it may be answered, as was done by the King's bench a hundred years ago, in Rex v. Woolf, 2 Barn. & Ald. 609, 611, 106 Eng. Reprint, 488, when it was insisted that a fine due to the Crown was not a judgment debt for which execution could be levied: "... mischievous consequences would ensue to the Crown and the regular administration of justice, from a 1 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17,944; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392, 19 L. ed. 117; Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 502, 57 L. ed. 931, 941, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co. 240 U. S. 166, 60 L. ed. 579, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Johnson v. CanfieldSwigart Co. 292 Ill. 101, 126 N. E. 608; Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9. rant of the government's claim. They were officers of the corporation, and the indictment was pending when the transfer of the assets was made. See Baltimore & O. Teleg. Co. v. Interstate Teleg. Co. supra. delinquent withdrawing all his property, the position of volunteers; and there is from the effect of a judgment; and that not even the excuse that they were ignothe preventing that will not be a mischievous consequence to anyone but himself. Here there is a judgment that the defendant do pay to the King a fine of a certain sum. By that judgment the debt becomes a debt to the King, of record; and it is payable to the King instanter. if we were to say that the Crown shall not be at liberty to issue an immediate execution for its own debt, we should place the Crown in a worse situation than any subject." Second. It is contended that the right to bring a creditor's bill did not exist, because the judgment against [403] the company was not entered in the trial court until a year after the company had devested itself of the property sought to be reached in this suit; and the government did not become a creditor; at all events, until after its claim for penalties had ripened into a judgment. But when a corporation devests itself of all its assets by distributing them among the stockholders, those having unsatisfied claims against it may follow the assets, although the claims were contested and unliquidated at the time when the assets were distributed. It is true that the bill to reach and apply the assets distributed among the stockholders cannot, as a matter of equity jurisdiction and procedure, be filed until the claim has been reduced to judgment and the execution thereon has been returned unsatisfied (Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & I. Co. 150 U. S. 371, 37 L. ed. 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127); but, as a matter of substantive law, the right to follow the distributed assets (see Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392, 409, 19 L. ed. 117, 120; Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 57 L. ed. 931, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co. 240 U. S. 166, 60 L. ed. 579, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334) applies not only to those who are creditors in the commercial sense, but to all who hold unsatisfied claims. A corporation cannot, by devesting itself of all property, leave remediless the holder of a contingent claim, or the obligee of an executory contract (Baltimore & O. Teleg. Co. v. Interstate Teleg. Co. 4 C. C. A. 184, 8 U. S. App. 340, 54 Fed. 50), or the holder of a claim in tort (Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; Jahn v. Champagne Lumber Co. 157 Fed. 407); and there is no good reason why the United States, with a claim for penalties, should be in a worse plight. Here the stockholders receiving the assets are in a [404] Third. It is contended that the bill should have been dismissed because the execution issued to the marshal for the eastern district of Missouri was not returned unsatisfied until after the commencement of the suit. It has been held that, in litigations between private parties, a creditor's bill cannot be maintained in a Federal court upon judgment recovered in a state other than that in which suit is brought (National Tube Works v. Ballou, 146 U. S. 517, 523, 36 L. ed. 1070, 1072, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165), and that a return unsatisfied of the execution issued on the judgment sued on is held essential to the maintenance of the creditor's suit (Taylor v. Bowker, 111 U. S. 110, 28 L. ed. 368, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397). But this strict rule is not applicable where the United States is the judgment creditor. Under § 986 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. § 1632, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. 230), an execution issued in favor of the United States by any of its courts runs in every part of the United States; just as, under § 985, an execution on a judgment obtained in favor of any party in a district court, where the state is divided into two or more districts, may run and be executed in any part of the state. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 328, 9 L. ed. 1093, 1104. Here the execution issued to the Louisiana marshal had been returned nulla bona before this suit was brought; and it is agreed that when this suit was begun the Waters Pierce Oil Company had no property in Missouri or elsewhere out of which the judgment could be satisfied at law. To hold that, under such circumstances, the suit must fail, because the return of nulla bona was not made by the marshal for the eastern district of Missouri until after the filing of the original bill, would apply a wellsettled rule to a case not within its scope. Fourth. It is contended that the bill should have been dismissed because the government had an adequate remedy by suing the Pierce Oil Corporation, and, indeed, had commenced such a suit. That corporation assumed, as part of the purchase price of the Waters Pierce Oil Company, its "debts, obligations, and liabilities." Before [405] commencing case. In allowing interest from January this suit the government had brought, in 29, 1907, the district court was clearly a Federal district court for Louisiana, a under the misapprehension that that was suit against the Pierce Oil Corporation the date of the judgment, for the decree to subject to the satisfaction of its judg- so recites; whereas, in fact, judgment ment certain parcels of land conveyed to was not entered until March, 1914. But the corporation by the Waters Pierce interest was not even allowable from Oil Company. But in the Louisiana suit that time. At common law judgments the Pierce Oil Corporation denied liabil- do not bear interest; interest rests solely ity, insisting that the government was upon statutory provision. Perkins v. not a creditor of the Waters Pierce Oil Fourniquet, 14 How. 328, 14 L. ed. 441; Company. The United States could not Washington & G. R. Co. v. Harmon have been required to accept in lieu of (Washington & G. R. Co. v. Tobiner) its claim against the judgment debtor 147 U. S. 571, 584, 585, 37 L. ed. 284, even an admitted obligation of the new 289, 290, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557. The only corporation to pay it. The existence of applicable statute of the United States that possible remedy did not bar the is § 966 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. government from following by a cred- Stat. § 1605, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. itor's bill the assets of the corporation p. 604), which provides that "interest into the stockholders' hands. Nor did shall be allowed on all judgments in the suit against the Pierce Oil Corpora- civil causes. . . ." Since the penalty tion amount to an election of remedies was not recovered by civil process, but which should have led the lower courts by judgment in a proceeding initiated to dismiss this bill. The two remedies by a criminal indictment, it obviously were consistent. See Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U. S. 489, 494, 57 L. ed. 608, 610, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387. does not fall within the terms of the statute. Interest, therefore, is allowable only on the judgment from the date when it was entered against the defendants in this case; namely, March 11, 1918. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, as modified, is affirmed. [407] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. MILWAUKEE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, Plff. in Err., Fifth. The contention is faintly made that the decree should be reversed because the district court dismissed the bill as against the Waters Pierce Oil Company, a necessary party; citing Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 603, 610, 37 L. ed. 577, 580, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691. The argument ignores the fact that this judgment, being in favor of the United States, is, under § 986 of the Revised Statutes, effective, and may be made the basis of an execution running in a state and district other than | ALBERT S. BURLESON, Postmaster Gen that in which the judgment was rendered. It was doubtless for this reason that the district judge concluded that it was unnecessary, if not improper, to enter in this suit judgment against Waters Pierce Oil Company. The objection is purely technical. Since it was not set up among the many errors as signed in the court of appeals and in this court, it cannot be availed of here. Sixth. It is urged that the district court erred in allowing interest on the penalty ($14,000) from the date [406] of the indictment, January 29, 1907. This was not assigned as error in the circuit court of appeals, and for this reason that court refused to consider it on a petition for rehearing. In the assignment of errors filed in this court the objection was properly raised. Under Rule 24 of the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit the court may "notice a plain error not assigned or specified, and we think it should have done so in this V. eral of the United States. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 407–438.) Constitutional law - due process of law notice and hearing - revocation of second-class mail privileges. class mail privileges have been revoked for 1. A newspaper publisher whose secondthe publication of articles that offended against the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917. was accorded a hearing which, if fairly conducted, satisfies the requirements of due process of law, where due notice was given of the time and character of the hearing, the publisher was represented thereon by that it desired to say or offer was heard its president, and, so far as appears, all and received. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 764-773, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Postoffice second-class privileges made, satisfactory to him or his authorized, obstruct its recruiting and enlistment serv assistants, that it contains and will continue to contain only mailable matter, and that it will meet the various statutory and other requirements. [For other cases, see Postoffice, V. in Digest second-class privileges revocation by Postmaster General. 3. The power of the Postmaster General to suspend or revoke second-class mail privileges is a necessary incident to his power to grant such privileges. [For other cases, see Postoffice, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Postoffice second-class mail privileges how lost. 4. If a newspaper enjoying second-class mail privileges comes to be so edited that it contains other than mailable matter, it is the plain intention of Congress that it shall no longer be carried as second-class mail. [For other cases, see Postoffice, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Postoffice authority of Postmaster revocation of second-class mail privileges. ice, was conferred upon the Postmaster General, not merely as to a single issue of such paper, but until a proper application and showing shall be made for a renewal of such privilege, by the provision of title 12 of that act, that any newspaper published in violation of any of its terms shall be "nonmailable," and shall not be "conveyed in the mails or delivered from any postoffice or by any letter carrier," when read in connection with the declaration of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 396, that it is the duty of the Postmaster General to superintend regularly all the business of the Postoffice Department, and to execute all laws relating to the postal service, and with the Federal legislation classifying the mails, which deals only with "mailable matter." - freedom of speech due process of law executive revoca G [For other cases, see Postoffice, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law. and press right to jury trial tion of second-class mail privileges. 6. Federal legislation conferring upon the Postmaster General power to revoke 5. Authority to revoke the second-class the second-class mail privilege enjoyed by mail privileges of a newspaper which, con- a newspaper which that official finds, after trary to the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, a hearing fairly conducted, systematically systematically contained false reports and false statements, published with intent to interfere with the success of the military operations of the Federal government, to promote the success of its enemies, and to On validity of legislation directed against social or industrial propaganda deemed to be of a dangerous tendencysee note to State v. Moilen, 1 A.L.R. 336. On constitutional freedom of speech and of the press-see note to Cowan v. Fairbrother, 32 L.R.A. 829. As to constitutional right of trial by jury-see notes to Thompson v. Utah, 42 L. ed. U. S. 1061; Perego v. Dodge, 41 L. ed. U. S. 113; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Shane, 39 L. ed. U. S. 727; Eilenbecker v. District Ct. 33 L. ed. U. S. 801; and Justices of Supreme Ct. v. United States, 19 L. ed. U. S. 658. As to exclusion of seditious matter from the mails under the Espionage Act-see note to Masses Pub. Co. v. Patton, L.R.A. 1918C, 89. On power of courts to interfere with rulings of the Postoffice Departmentsee notes to United States ex rel. Reinach v. Cortelyou, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 166, and National L. Ins. Co. v. National L. Ins. Co. 52 L. ed. U. S. 808. 7. The conclusion of the Postmaster General that the second-class mail privileges of a newspaper should be revoked, which rests upon his finding, after a hearing fairly conducted, that such newspaper has systematically contained false reports and false interfere with the military operations of statements published with the intent to the Federal government, to promote the success of its enemies, and to obstruct its recruiting and enlistment service, in violation of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, will not be disturbed by the courts unless they are clearly of the opinion that his conclusion is wrong. [For other cases, see Courts, I. e, 4, in Digest who counsels and encourages the violation | Fed. 787, 797; Fourniquet v. Perkins, 7 of the law as it exists. [For other cases, see Constitutional IV. d, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 155.] Law, How. 160, 12 L. ed. 650; American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33. There are two logically different conceptions of the meaning of the right of Argued January 18 and 19, 1921. Decided free speech; one is that free speech shall IN March 7, 1921. N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District, dismissing the petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Postmaster General to restore a newspaper to second-class mail privileges. Affirmed. See same case below, App. D. C. 258 Fed. 282. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry F. Cochems argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Hubert O. Wolfe and Seymour Stedman, filed a brief for plaintiff in error: The courts will review an act of an ad ministrative officer. Hoover v. McChesney, 26 C. C. A. 491, 52 U. S. App. 235, 81 Fed. 472; American School v. MeAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877; Re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 36 L. ed. 93, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 374; Enterprise Saw Asso. v. Zumstein, 15 C. C. A. 153, 37 U. S. App. 71, 67 Fed. 1000; Dauphin v. Key, MeArth. & M. 203; Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623; Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 48 L. ed. 894, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88, 48 L. ed. 888, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Fairfield Floral Co. v. Bradbury, 89 Fed. 393; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 789; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. ed. 123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271. The use of the mails is a valuable right, -a property right. Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. 472; Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581: American School v. MeAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366; Tucker, Const. Law, § 326, p. 669; Ex parte Neill, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 275, 40 Am. St. Rep. 776, 22 S. W. 923. The Postmaster General was without jurisdiction. Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 be permitted only after subjection to a censorship or other preventive or prohibitive preliminary license; the other is, as voiced in our Constitutions and in the Constitutions of all the states, the free enjoyment of the right of free speech and the unlimited right to the use of the printed page, subject only to punishment for the abuse of such right, which abuse is referred to often in the older texts as the "licentiousness of the press." Dicey, Const. p. 259; 2 Story, Const. SS 1293, 1294; see note Vice-President Calhoun to Gov. Hamilton, Aug. 28, 1832; May, Const. History, chap. 10; Cooley, Const. Lim. 604; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877; Re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 36 L. ed. 93, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 374; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 466, 51 L. ed. 882, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 10 Ann. Cas. 689; Com. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 314, 15 Am. Dec. 214. The judicial rule governing the preservation of the constitutional guaranties, and all of them, is entirely unrelated to the circumstance of peace or war; the Constitution contains specific provisions touching the right of habeas corpus, and regarding judicial status in naval or occupied territory or in time of open rebelNeither have any proximate or lion. remote relation to the rights and issues in this proceeding. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281; Re Kemp, 16 Wis. 360. Mr. William H. Lamar and Solicitor General Frierson argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error: Any utterance whose natural effect is to retard or increase the difficulties of the process of raising an army or navy adequate for a successful prosecution of the war would constitute a violation of the Espionage Law. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patton, L.R.A. 1918C, 79, 158 C. C. A. 250, 246 Fed. 24, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 999; Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 63 L. ed. 470, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 63 L. ed. 561, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 63 L. ed. 566, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 63 L. ed. 1173, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255 U. S. |