Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Birmingham, 211 Fed. 497; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 206 U. S. 496-509, 51 L. ed. 1155-1160, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762-766; Raymond v. Terrebonne, 28 Fed. 773.

The decisions of the supreme court of Iowa, of the Federal courts generally, and of the United States Supreme Court, prior to the making of the contract in question, sustain such contract right.

Des Moines v. Des Moines Waterworks Co. 95 Iowa, 348, 64 N. W. 269; Creston Waterworks Co. v. Creston, 101 Iowa, 687, 70 N. W. 739; Iowa R. & Light Co. v. Jones Auto Co. 182 Iowa, 982, 164 N. W. 780; Tipton v. Tipton Light & Heating Co. 176 Iowa, 224, 157 N. W. 844; Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 56 L. ed. 594, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, 256 Fed. 929; Smittle v. Haag, 140 Iowa, 492, 118 N. W. 869; Thompson v. Mitchell, 133 Iowa, 527, 110 N. W. 901.

Mr. William Chamberlain argued the cause, and, with Messrs. J. R. Lane, E. M. Warner, C. M. Waterman, and Don Barnes, filed a brief for appellant in No. 190:

Regulation of rates as a governmental function, and establishment of rates by contract between the utility and the city, are quite different things.

Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. 1, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 736, 77 C. C. A. 267, 8 Ann. Cas. 614; Noblesville v. Noblesville Gas & Improv. Co. 157 Ind. 162, 60 N. E. 1032; 4 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 1733, p. 178.

Rates fixed by law are always subject to attack if they are so low as to make it impossible for the utility to earn a fair return thereunder upon the fair value of the property it has devoted to the public service.

Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Denver v. Denver Union Water Co. 246 U. S. 178, 62 L. ed. 649, P.U.R.1918C, 640, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 278; Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1134, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1031; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 59 L. ed. 1244, P.U.R.1915D, 577, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 56 L. ed. 594, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389.

Rates established by valid contracts between utilities and cities are not subject to attack even though the rate may fail to yield the utility a return upon its

property. This is because the courts are powerless to relieve persons from the obligations of contracts voluntarily entered into.

Columbus R. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 63 L. ed. 669, 6 A.L.R. 1643, P.U.R.1919D, 239, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349.

Neither is a city permitted to repeal or avoid a rate established by valid contract, even though the rate is yielding more than a fair rate of return upon the property of the utility.

Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S. 519, 48 L. ed. 1103, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756; Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 215 U. S. 417, 54 L. ed. 259, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118.

Iowa cities and towns are empowered to regulate by law, and denied authority to establish by contract.

Woodward v. Iowa R. & Light Co. — Iowa, -, 178 N. W. 549; Williams v. Iowa Falls Electric Co. 185 Iowa, 493, P.U.R. 1919C, 501, 170 N. W. 815; Selkirk v. Sioux City Gas & E. Co. Iowa, -, 176 N. W. 301; Iowa R. & Light Co. v. Jones Auto Co. 182 Iowa, 982, 164 N. W. 780; Tipton v. Tipton Light & Heating Co. 176 Iowa, 224, 157 N. W. 844; Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Iowa, 426, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1025, 138 Am. St. Rep. 299, 120 N. W. 966.

The decision of the supreme court of Iowa, construing the state statutes defining the powers and duties of its municipal corporations, is considered as final by this court.

Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 6 L. ed. 289; Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 410, 28 L. ed. 470, 474, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 311, 42 L. ed. 1047, 1049, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Ennis Waterworks v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 58 L. ed. 1139, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 92, 34 L. ed. 620, 623, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 499, 34 L. ed. 260, 262, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1012; Balkam v. Woodstock Iron Co. 154 U. S. 177, 188, 38 L. ed. 953, 957, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1010; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Brown, 213 U. S. 25, 43, 53 L. ed. 682, 689, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404; Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 815, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100, 112, 57 L. ed. 1410, 1415, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967; Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U. S. 157, 167, 46 L. ed. 1102, 1107, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798; Hartford


F, Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 175 U. S. 91, 100, 44 L. ed. 84, 89, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 374, 37 L. ed. 772, 776, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Memphis Street R. Co. v. Moore, 243 U. S. 299, 300, 61 L. ed. 733, 734, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 441, 30 L. ed. 178, 185, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121.

The Iowa rule is in harmony with decisions of this court.

Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. ed. 176, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 624, 45 L. ed. 702, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490; Knoxville Gas Co. v. Knoxville, P.U.R.1920B, 901, C. C. A., 261 Fed. 283; Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 Ú. S. 587611, 45 L. ed. 679-693, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Danville Water Co. v. Danville City, 180 U. S. 619, 45 L. ed. 696, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co. 191 U. S. 358, 48 L. ed. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241.

A contract beyond the corporate power of either party is invalid.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 691, 692, 40 L. ed. 849, 856, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 139 U. S. 48-60, 35 L. ed. 64-68, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478; McCormick v. Market Nat. Bank, 165 U. S. 538, 549-551, 41 L. ed. 817, 821, 822, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433; California Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 367, 42 L. ed. 198, 200, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 831; First Nat. Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 369, 370, 43 L. ed. 1007, 1010, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. 450, 490, 46 L. ed. 636, 654, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354, 3 Thomp. Corp. title 20, § 2765, p. 2868.

The company should not be bound beyond the terms of its written proposal. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149, 151, 30 L. ed. 376, 377, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; Tilley v. Cook County (Tilley v. Chicago) 103 U. S. 155, 26 L. ed. 374; Kelley, M. & Co. v. Sibley, 69 C. C. A 674, 137 Fed. 588; Hankins v. Young, 174 Iowa, 389, 156 N. W. 380.

Courts have no power to change a contract, or to make agreements for parties.

Robbins v. Rollins (Robbins v. Clark) 127 U. S. 622, 32 L. ed. 292, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1339; Baltzer v. Raleigh & Air

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Line R. Co. 115 U. S. 634, 29 L. ed. 505, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; Morgan County v. Allen, 103 U. S. 498, 26 L. ed. 498.

Parties making contracts are presumed to have acted with reference to existing law.

Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 11 L. ed. 1141; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 27 L. ed. 648, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236; Bulkley v. United States, 19 Wall. 37, 22 L. ed. 62.

Even in adjudicated cases involving rate ordinances, decrees, either sustaining or denouncing the rate, are always regarded as without prejudice to the continuing rights of the parties to renew the action under changed conditions.

Lincoln Gas & E. L. Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 268, 63 L. ed. 968, 977, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 454; Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1134, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 56 L. ed. 594, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 59 L. ed. 1244, P.U.R.1915D, 577, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Missouri v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 241 U. S. 533, 539, 60 L. ed. 1148, 1154, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715.

No brief was filed for appellees in No. 190.

Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

At the time these suits were begun the appellants were engaged in supplying electricity or gas to the municipal corporations who are the appellees. This service was being rendered by virtue of ordinances conferring franchises to use the city streets during twenty-five years in two of the cases, and twenty years in the other. The ordinances contained a schedule of maximum rates. After they were in effect a few years the three suits which are before us were begun against the cities, with the object of preventing the enforcement [541] of the maximum rates specified in the ordinances, on the ground that such rates were so unreasonably low that their continued enforcement would deprive the corporations of remuneration for the services by them being performed, and in fact, if enforced, would result in the confiscation of their property, in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In the three cases


the court granted a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of the maximum rates, and allowed an order permitting, pending the suits, a higher charge.

The cases were submitted upon the pleadings, and without the taking of testimony upon issues which presented the contention that the ordinances were contracts, and therefore the maximum rates which they fixed were susceptible of continued enforcement against the corporations, although their operation would be confiscatory. In one opinion, applicable to the three cases, the court stated its reasons for maintaining this view, but directed attention to the fact that no proof had been offered concerning the confiscatory character of the rates, and pointing out that, as such subject might become important on appeal, it would be necessary to restore the cases to the docket for proof in that regard unless the situation was edied by agreement between the parremties. Thereupon the pleadings were amended so as to directly present, separately from the other issues in the case, the right of the cities to enforce the ordinance rates in consequence of the contracts, without reference to whether such rates were, in and of themselves, confiscatory. Upon its opinion as to the existence of contracts and the power to make them, as previously stated, the court entered decrees enforcing the ordinance rates which are now before us for review because of the constitutional question involved.

Two propositions are indisputable: (a) That although the governmental agencies having authority to deal with [542] the subject may fix and enforce reasonable rates to be paid public utility corporations for the services by them rendered, that power does not include the right to fix rates which are so low as to be confiscatory of the property of such corporations (Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 442, 47 L. ed. 892, 894, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. S. 1, 17, 53 L. ed. 371, 381, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 41, 53 L. ed. 382, 395, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1134, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 57 L. ed. 1511. 1555, 48 L.R.A. 65 L. ed.

(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann.
Cas. 1916A, 18; Cedar Rapids Gaslight
Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 56
L. ed. 594, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Des
153, 59 L. ed. 1244, P.U.R.1915D, 577,
Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S.
35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Denver v. Denver
Union Water Co. 246 U. S. 178, 194, 62
L. ed. 649, 662, P.U.R.1918C, 640, 38
Sup. Ct. Rep. 2178); and (b) that where,
however, the public service corporations
and the governmental agencies dealing
with them have power to contract as to
rates, and exert that power by fixing
by contract rates to govern during a
particular time, the enforcement of such
rates is controlled by the obligation re-
sulting from the contract, and therefore
the question of whether such rates are
confiscatory becomes immaterial (Free-
port Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U. S.
587, 593, 45 L. ed. €79, 686, 21 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 493; Detroit v. Detroit City R. Co.
Ct. Rep. 410; Knoxville Water Co. v.
184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 Sup.
Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434, 437, 47 L. ed.
887, 891, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; Cleve-
land v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S.
519, 48 L. ed. 1103, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756;
Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 273, 53 L. ed.
176, 182, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Minneap-
olis v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 215
U. S. 417, 54 L. ed. 259, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep.
118; Columbus R. Power & Light Co. v.
Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 63 L. ed. 669,
6 A.L.R. 1648, P.U.R.1919D, 239,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 349).


volved are conceded to be confiscatory,
It follows that, as the rates here in-
they cannot be enforced unless they are
secured by a contract obligation. The
existence of a binding contract as to the
rates upon which the lower court based
its conclusion is, therefore, the single
issue upon which the controversy de-
pends. Its solution turns, first, upon the
question of the power of the parties to
contract on the subject, and second, if
they had such power, whether they exer-
cised it.

the sake of the argument only, that the
[543] As to the first, assuming, for
public service corporations had the con-
tractual power, the issue is, Had the mu-
nicipal corporations, under the law of
Iowa, such authority?
must have been conferred, if at all, by
Its possession
§ 725 of the Iowa Code of 1897, which
deals with that subject.
came before the supreme court of Iowa
That statute
for consideration in the very recent case
of Woodward v. Iowa R. & Light Co.
Iowa, -, 178 N. W. 549.


That was a

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suit by the town of Woodward to com-, poses,' [and to regulate and fix the rent pel the Light Company to continue to or rates for water, gas, heat, and elecfurnish electric lighting at the rates tric light or power] and these fixed by the ordinance conferring upon powers shall not be abridged by ordithe company its franchise to maintain nance, resolution, or contract.' and operate its plant in the town. The "It will be noted from the foregoing company resisted on the ground that the that the legislative power to fix rates is rates had become confiscatory and were conferred by this section upon the city not enforceable. Testimony offered by council. The legislative power thus conthe company to establish the confisca- ferred is a continuing one, and may not tory character of the rates was objected be abridged or bartered away by conto by the town, which asserted that the tract or otherwise. There was acceptance by the company of the ordi- a time in the history of our legislation nance bound it by contract to furnish when the right of contract as to rates the service at the rates therein pre- was conferred by statute upon the city scribed whether or not they were con- council. By the revision and fiscatory, and that the evidence offered codification of 1897 the right of contract was therefore immaterial. The evidence as to rates for utilities of this character was received, subject to the objection, was entirely eliminated, and the legislaand the court, finding the rates to be tive [545] power to regulate rates was confiscatory, sustained the company's contention and dismissed the bill. Upon appeal by the town, the supreme court, affirming the action of the trial court, said:

"The defendant's franchise in the town of Woodward was granted in June, 1912, by ordinance duly enacted by the city council and duly approved by vote of the electors, as required by § 720 of the Code. Section 6 of the ordinance which granted the franchise specified the rates to be charged by the defendant to consumers. The term of the franchise was twenty-five years. The essence of the plaintiff's contention is that the enactment of this ordinance (including the franchise, and the rates and the approval [544] of the same by the electors), and the practical acceptance of the same by the utility corporation, constituted a contract binding as such both upon the town and upon the utility corporation. The defendant resists this contention and likewise denies that there is any power conferred by statute upon the city council to enter into contract on the subject of rates. The issue at this point is the controlling one in the case. The question thus at issue is answered by § 725 of the Code of 1897, which provides as follows:

"Sec. 725. Regulation of rates and service. They shall have power to require every individual or private corporation operating such works or plant, subject to reasonable rules and regula tions, to furnish any person applying therefor, along the line of its pipes, mains, wires, or other conduits, with gas, water, light, or power and to supply said city or town with water for fire protection, and with gas, water, light, or power for other necessary public pur

conferred upon the city council in all cases. The reason for the change of method is obvious enough. Under the contract method, the rights of the public were often bartered away, either ignorantly or corruptly, and utility corporations became empowered through the contractual obligations to enforce extortionate rates. The net result of the progressive legislation is found in our present § 725, whereby it is forbidden to any existing city council to bind the city to any rate for any future time. The power of regulating the rate is always in the present city council. It must be said, therefore, that the rates fixed by § 6 of the ordinance hereinbefore referred to were not fixed by contract."

Indeed, the doctrine thus expounded was but a reiteration of the rule of the Iowa law laid down in previous cases. Tipton v. Tipton Light & Heating Co. 176 Iowa, 224, 157 N. W. 844; Iowa Railway & Light Co. v. Jones Auto Co. 182 Iowa, 982, 164 N. W. 780; Williams v. Iowa Falls Electric Co. 185 Iowa, 493, P.U.R.1919C, 501, 170 N. W. 815. And again, more recently, in Ottumwa R. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa, Iowa, 178 N. W. 905, the court, referring to the Woodward Case and to the doctrine therein announced, based upon the significance of § 725 of the Code of 1897, thus restated its former conclusion on that subject:

"That statute in positive terms for1 The words in brackets are found in the visions quoted by the court, although, as section, but are not embraced in the proshown by the language of the court as to the rate provision, they were early taken into view and applied in construing the statute.

Decrees reversed and causes remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

bids any abridgment of the right to reg-, 1057, P.U.R. 1919E, 178, 39 Sup. Ct. ulate and fix charges of service corpo- Rep. 526. rations named in the statute, either by ordinance, resolution, or contract. No one would now contend, in the teeth of the statute prohibition, that there can be a valid contract fixing permanent rates. As to corporations named in that statute, we have held repeatedly that [547] CITY OF SAN ANTONIO et al., there can be no contracting that rates fixed for service shall not be changed.




(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 547-558.)

See Tipton v. Tipton Light & Heating SAN ANTONIO PUBLIC SERVICE COMCo. supra; Selkirk v. Sioux City Gas & E. Co. Iowa,, 176 N. W. 301. And see San Antonio Public Service Co. v. San Antonio (D. C.) 257 Fed. 467. To like [546] effect is Iowa R. & Light Co. v. Jones Auto Co. 182 Iowa, 982, 164 N. W. 780. And in the last case it is held that the fixing of maximum rates in a franchise ordinance is therefore not a contract that such rates may not be changed before the time stated in such ordinance has lapsed, and that approval by the electors of rates in the franchise is merely an approval of the rates fixed by the franchise, as rates temporarily settled, with the understanding that the same might be changed either upward or downward."

Injunction against municipal rate
regulation Federal jurisdiction.
1. A Federal district court has juris-
diction to enjoin a municipal corporation
from enforcing a 5 cents fare provision of
a street railway franchise ordinance, on
rate was not secured to the municipality
the ground that the right to enforce such
by contract, and that such enforcement
was beyond the power of the municipality
because, the rate being admittedly confisca
tory, to enforce it would violate the 14th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
[For other cases, see Courts, I. b, 2: Injunc-
Street railways

tion, I. g, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.]
rates - municipal

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[For other cases, see Street Railways, I.; Constitutional Law, 608-628, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1903.]

Street railways
could not, after the adoption of Tex. Const.
3. A municipal corporation in Texas
1876, § 17, which provides that no irrevo-
cable or uncontrollable grant of special

rates municipal confiscation.

Note. On the power of a municipality, apart from contract, to regulate the rates to be charged by public service corporations-see notes to Bluefield Waterworks & Improv. Co. v. Bluefield, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 759, and St. Marys v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 43 L.R.A.(N.S.)

The total want of power of the munici- 2. The right of a municipality to reg palities here in question to contractulate street railway fares gives no power for rates, which is thus established, and whatever to violate U. S. Const., 14th the state public policy upon which the Amend., by enforcing a confiscatory rate. prohibition against the existence of such authority rests, absolutely exclude the existence of the right to enforce, as the result of the obligation of a contract, the concededly confiscatory rates which are involved, and therefore conclusively demonstrate the error committed below in enforcing such rates upon the theory of the existence of contract. And, indeed, the necessity for this conclusion becomes doubly manifest when it is borne in mind that the right here asserted to contract in derogation of the state law and of the rule of public policy announced by the court of last resort of the state is urged by 994. municipal corporations whose every On right to reduce rates of public power depends upon the state law. Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 241, 43 L. ed. 679, 683, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Street R. Co. 196 U. S. 539, 548, 49 L. ed. 591, 595, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327; Braxton County Ct. v. West Virginia, 208 U. S. 192, 52 L. ed. 450, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Englewood v. Denver & S. P. R. Co. 248 U. S. 294, 296, 63 L. ed. 253, 254, P.U.R.1919B, 638, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. 250 U. S. 394, 399, 63 L. ed. 1054,

service corporations fixed by franchise or charter-see note to Benwood v. Public Service Commission, L.R.A.1915C, 261.

On returns to which public service corporations are entitled-see note to Bellamy v. Missouri & N. A. R. Co. L.R.A.1915A, 5.

On right of public service corporations to judicial relief from contract rates which have become inadequate see notes to Columbus R. P. & Light Co. v. Columbus, 6 A.L.R. 1659, and Lenawee County Gas & E. Co. v. Adrian, 10 A.L.R. 1335.

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