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guish between streams held to be floatable under the laws of certain of the states, and navigable waters of the United States, subject to the control of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and, in consequence, adopted an erroneous definition of "navigable waters of the United States."

19 L. ed. 984; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co. 174 U. S. 690, 43 L. ed. 1136, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.

The commerce clause of the Constitution does not apply to a stream which is wholly within the limits of one state, and which does not, by a navigable channel, connect with waters making it available for interstate commerce.

Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 14 L. ed. 545; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391.

Gaston v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14, 5 L.R.A. 392, 25 Am. St. Rep. 848, 10 S. E. 60; Lewis v. Coffee County, 77 Ala. 190, 54 Am. Rep. 55; Duluth Lumber Co. v. St. Louis Boom & Improv. Co. 17 Fed. 419; Heyward v. Farmers' Min. Co. 42 S. C. 138, 28 L.R.A. 42, 46 Am. St. Rep. 702, 19 S. E. 963, 20 S. E. 64; Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 14 L.R.A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276, 50 N. W. 661;tion of the state. Hubbard v. Bell, 54 Ill. 110, 5 Am. Rep. 98; Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 745, 75 N. E. 782.

Wherever, in the course of a stream, it ceases to be a public highway for commerce between states, at that point its national character terminates, and above that it is within the exclusive jurisdic

Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 14 L. ed. 545; The Montello, 20 Wall. 411, 22 L. ed. 391; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co. 174 U. S. 690, 43 L. ed. 1136, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Com. v. King, 150 Mass. 221, 5 L.R.A. 536, 22

The Sanitary District canal is not a waterway of the United States.

The Fox river, referred to in the Montello Case, in its natural condition, and after the settlement of the country, was largely used for commerce. The Des Plaines was not, to any extent whatever.N. E. 905. The physical characteristics of the Fox, as compared with those of the Des Plaines, explain the marked difference in the history of the use of the two streams. The Montello, 20 Wall. 440, 22 L. ed. 394; State ex rel. Deneen v. Economy Light & P. Co. 241 Ill. 290, 89 N. E. 760; | United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co. 174 U. S. 690, 43 L. ed. 1136, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.

The right of Congress to legislate at all arises under the commerce clause of the Constitution, which does not apply to such streams as the Des Plaines. If the Act of 1899 applies to that stream, it is void. The court of appeals erroneously held that the right to so legislate might arise under the war powers of Congress.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 61 L. ed. 746, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380; Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 44 L. ed. 914, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 394; Valentine ex rel. Dudley v. Berrien Springs Water Power Co. 128 Mich. 280, 87 N. W. 370; People ex rel. Deneen v. Economy Light & P. Co. 241 Ill. 290, 89 N. E. 760; Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 745, 75 N. E. 782; Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 14 L.R.A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276, 50 N. W. 661; Kewanee v. Otley, 204 Ill. 402, 68 N. E. 388; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497,

Beidler v. Sanitary Dist. 211 Ill. 629, 67 L.R.A. 820, 71 N. E. 1118; Malony v. Milwaukee, 1 Fed. 611.

The one and only thing on which this action of the United States can be rested is the absence of a formal approval by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War.

Wilson v. Hudson County Water Co. 76 N. J. Eq. 543, 76 Atl. 560; Cobb v. Lincoln Park, 202 Ill. 427, 63 L.R.A. 264, 95 Am. St. Rep. 258, 67 N. E. 5.

In the instant case, the Chief of Engineers and Secretary of War found not merely that the proposed structure would not interfere with commerce, which was all that was required under the Act of 1899, but they found that there was no commerce to be interfered with, and that the Des Plaines river was not navigable.

Wilson v. Hudson County Water Co. 76 N. J. Eq. 543, 76 Atl. 560; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356.

This court has, in effect, intimated that the acts of the War Department, above narrated, should prevent interference with the construction of the dam.

Illinois ex rel. Dunne v. Economy Light & P. Co. 234 U. S. 497, 58 L. ed. 1429, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 973.

The surest test of whether a stream traversing a settled country is navigable

The court of appeals was led into many errors of fact, as to most of which there was no conflict in the evidence. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 168 C. C. A. 138, 256 Fed. 798.

is whether it has been used for purposes | 125 U. S. 1, 31 L. ed. 629, 8 Sup. Ct. of useful commerce. According to this Rep. 811. test, the Des Plaines is not navigable. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 34 L. ed. 819, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210; Gould, Waters, 43; Farnham, Waters, pp. 121, 125; State v. Gilmanton, 14 N. H. 467; Burroughs v. Whitman, 59 Mich. 226, 26 N. W. 491; People ex rel. Dèneen v. Economy Light & P. Co. 241 Ill. 290, 89 N. E. 760, 234 U. S. 520, 58 L. ed. 1438, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 973; Webster v. Harris, 111 Tenn. 668, 59 L.R.A. 324, 69 S.

W. 782.

The navigability of the Des Plaines is not to be determined by its capacity, as changed by the addition of the waters of the Sanitary District.

People ex rel. Deneen v. Economy Light & P. Co. 241 Ill. 290, 89 N. E. 760, 234 U. S. 520, 58 L. ed. 1438, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 973; Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 56 L. ed. 570, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 745, 75 N. E. 782; United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 61 L. ed. 746, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380; Thunder Bay River Boom Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336, 18 Am. Rep. 184; Druley v. Adam, 102 Ill. 177; Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray, 370; Lovingston v. St. Clair County, 64 Ill. 56, 16 Am. Rep. 516; Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Ill. 172.

The attempted use of the river in presettlement days by explorers and traders proved that it was unnavigable. The record in the state case was substantially the same as in the instant case. Such additional use as was shown in this case tended to support the conclusion that the river was non-navigable in the earliest historical times. The fact of navigability is one which should be established once for all, and not be perpetually retried.

Wear v. Kansas, 245 U. S. 154, 62 L. ed. 214, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 586.

The report of the engineers employed by the state of Illinois in connection with the laying out of the Illinois & Michigan canal shows that the Des Plaines was not only not navigable, but could not furnish sufficient water to supply a navigable canal.

People ex rel. Deneen v. Economy Light & P. Co. 241 Ill. 324, 89 N. E. 760, and Illinois ex rel. Dunne v. Economy Light & P. Co. 234 U. S. 497, 58 L. ed. 1429, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 973, indicate that this court did not consider that the Act of March 3, 1899, applied to the Des Plaines river.

Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch,

Special Assistant to the Attorney General Goodwin argued the cause, and, with Solicitor General Frierson, filed a brief for appellee:

Concurrent decisions of the two lower courts on an issue of fact will be accepted by this court unless shown to be clearly erroneous.

Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co. 248 U. S. 139, 63 L. ed. 170, 1 A.L.R. 1522, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53; The Wilderoft, 201 U. S. 378-387, 50 L. ed. 794-796, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467; The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655-658, 42 L. ed. 1181-1185, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 753.

The navigation of the Des Plaines river by the means shown by the evidence in connection with foreign and interstate commerce makes it a navigable water of the United States.

The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Water Comrs. 168 U. S. 349, 359, 42 L. ed. 497, 501, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157; United States v. Chandler Dunbar Water Power Co. 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 1063, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 667; Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523, 527, 13 Am. Rep. 255; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 23, 50 Am. Dec. 641; Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 59 Am. Dec. 209; Morgan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454, 91 Am. Dec. 58.

The fact that navigation may be difficult and at places interrupted does not render a stream unnavigable. The character of a river as a public highway is not determined by the frequency of its use, but by its capacity for being used.

Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 527, 13 Am. Rep. 255.

Nor is it essential that the stream should be capable of being navigated at all seasons of the year.

Morgan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454, 91 Am. Dec. 58; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 23, 50 Am. Dec. 641.

Nor does navigability depend upon the amount of tonnage, depth of water, or capacity for use by modern means of transportation.

The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391; State v. Pacific Guano Co. 22 S. C. 50; Heyward v. Farmers' Min. Co. 42 S. C. 139, 28 L.R.A. 42, 46 Am. St. Rep. 702, 19 S. E. 963, 20 S. E. 64; Burroughs v. Whitman, 59 Mich. 279, 26 N.

Me., serting the navigability of a stream, and from removing or preventing an obstruction to its navigability, without compensation.

W. 491; Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 278, 26 Am. Dec. 525; Lewis v. Coffee County, 77 Ala. 193, 54 Am. Rep. 55. Where a stream is navigable in a state of nature, the power of Congress to protect and promote its navigability cannot be lost or destroyed by nonuse or artificial depletion.

People v. Page, 39 App. Div. 110, 56 N. Y. Supp. 834, 58 N. Y. Supp. 239.

It was within the constitutional power of Congress to enact the provisions of the Acts of 1796 and 1804, for the purpose of regulating interstate commerce by perpetuating the public highways constituted by the navigable streams in the territories.

Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 574, 55 L. ed. 853, 860, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 688; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 38, 58 L. ed. 107, 110, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U. S. 104, 63 L. ed. 148, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46.

The Act of March 3, 1899, is an act for the protection of the navigability of the stream, and prevents impediments to its navigability, even in the absence of actual navigation.

United States v. Rio Grande Dam Irrig. Co. 174 U. S. 690, 43 L. ed. 1136, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; United States v. Chandler Dunbar Water Power Co. 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 1063, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 667.

As neither Congress nor the Illinois legislature has consented to or given authority for the building of the dam in question, it is within the inhibition of the

statute.

Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Montgomery v. Portland, 190 U. S. 89, 47 L. ed. 965, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735.

While firmly resting its case on the natural navigability of the stream, the government submits that the increased navigability of the stream, caused by turning in the waters of Lake Michigan, would, had it been unnavigable in a state of nature, bring it directly within the control of Congress and the terms of the Act of March 3, 1899.

Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 1056, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 48 L. ed. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 342, 37 L. ed. 463, 473, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 724, 18 L. ed. 96, 99; Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 41 L. ed. 996, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578.

No action of the War Department could estop the United States from as

Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. V. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251, 59 L. ed. 939, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 551; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 57 L. ed. 1083, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 232; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 400, 51 L. ed. 523, 539, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 56 L. ed. 570, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; United States v. Chandler Dunbar Water Power Co. 229 U. S. 53, 68, 57 L. ed. 1063, 1077, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 667; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 845, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175.

This court has never passed on the merits of the present controversy in any of its phases, but has expressly declined so to do.

Illinois ex rel. Dunne v. Economy Light & P. Co. 234 U. S. 497, 58 L. ed. 1429, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 973.

Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a suit brought by the United States against appellant in the district court for the northern district of Illinois, eastern division, for an injunction to restrain defendant from constructing a dam in the Des Plaines river at a point in Grundy county, Illinois, without the consent of Congress or authority of the legislature of the state, and without approval of the location and plans by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War of the United States. Relief was prayed upon two grounds: (1) That the river bed where the dam was being constructed was the property of the United States; (2) that the Des Plaines river was a navigable waterway of the United States, and the proposed construction of a dam therein was in violation of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1899 (chap. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. at L. 1121, 1151, Comp. Stat. § 9971, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 81). The first ground was overruled by the district court and disregarded by the circuit court of appeals. We need not consider it further. The second ground was sustained by the district court, and its final decree granting an injunction was [116] affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 168 C. C. A. 138, 256 Fed. 792. The present appeal followed.

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Section 7 of Act of September 19, 1890 (chap. 907, 26 Stat. at L. 426, 454), makes it unlawful to build any dam or other structure in any navigable river or other waters of the United States, so as to obstruct or impair navigation, without permission of the Secretary of War. Section 9 of the Act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. at L. 1151, chap. 425), declares: "That it shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any navigable river, or other navigable water of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War: Provided, that such structures may be built under authority of the legislature of a state across rivers and other waterways the navigable portions of which lie wholly within the limits of a single state, provided the location and plans thereof are submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War before construction is commenced

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There is no contention that the consent of Congress for the building of the proposed dam has been obtained, that its construction has been authorized by the legislature of the state of Illinois, or that the location and plans have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War. The substantial defense is that the Des Plaines river, at the site of the proposed dam, which is below the city of Joliet, and just above the point where the Des Plaines joins the Kankakee to form the Illinois river, is not navigable in fact, and not within the description "navigable river, or other navigable water of the United States," as employed in the Act of 1899.

[117] The district court found that there was no evidence of actual navigation within the memory of living men, and that there would be no present interference with navigation by the building of the proposed dam. The circuit court of appeals did not disturb this finding (168 C. C. A. 138, 256 Fed. 792, 798);

But both courts found that in its natural

1675) down to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Details are given in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals, and need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that there was a well-known route by water, called the Chicago-Des Plaines-Illinois route, running up the Chicago river from its mouth on Lake Michigan to a point on the west fork of the south branch; thence westerly by water or portage, according to the season, to Mud lake, about 2 miles; thence to the Des Plaines near Riverside, 2 miles; thence down the Des Plaines to the confluence of that river with the Kankakee, where they form the Illinois river; thence down the Illinois to its junction with the Mississippi. During the period mentioned the fur trade was a leading branch of commerce in the western territory, and it was regularly conducted upon the Des Plaines river. Supplies in large quantity and variety, needed by the early settlers, also were transported over this route between Chicago and St. Louis and other points. Canoes and other boats of various kinds were employed, having light draft, but capable of carrying several tons each, and manned by crews of six or eight men. The route was navigated by the American Fur Company regularly during a period of years down to about 1825, after which it was disused because the trade had receded to interior portions of Illinois that could be reached [118] more conveniently with horses. Later, changes occurred in the river, due to the drainage of a swamp in the region of the portage, the clearing away of forests affecting the rainfall and the distribution of the run-off, and thus shortening the duration of the higher stages of water; the construction (under state authority) of the Illinois and Michigan canal in 1848, and its deepening in 1866 to 1871, which diverted a part of the hill drainage towards the Chicago river; and the construction of the Sanitary and Ship canal in 1892 to 1894.

But, in spite of these changes, the circuit court of appeals finds (168 C. C. A. 138, 256 Fed. 804) that the Des Plaines river is a continuous stretch of water from Riverside (at the Chicago divide) state the river was navigable in fact, to its mouth; and although there is a and that it was actually used for the rapid, and in places shallow water, with purposes of navigation and trading in boulders and obstructions, yet these the customary way, and with the kinds things do not affect its navigable capacof craft ordinarily in use for that purity; that the same is true of the upper pose on rivers of the United States, part of the Illinois river above the head from early fur-trading days (about of steamboat navigation; and that both

streams are navigable and are within ways." Illinois was set apart and a septhe Act of 1899.

arate territorial government established therein by Act of February 3, 1809 (chap. 13, 2 Stat. at L. 514). By § 2, the government was to be "in all respects similar" to that provided by the Ordinance of 1787 and the Act of August 7, 1789, and the inhabitants were to enjoy all the rights, privileges, and conditions granted by the ordinance. An act to enable the people of Illinois to form a state government, approved April 18, 1818 (chap. 67, 3 Stat. at L. 428), contained a proviso (§ 4, p. 430) that such government should not be repugnant to the Ordinance of 1787. The state Constitution declared its purpose to [120] be consistent with the ordinance, and the resolution of Congress declaring admission of the state into the Union (December 3, 1818, 3 Stat. at L. 536) acknowledged that the Constitution and state government were "in conformity to the principles of the articles of compact" in the Ordinance of 1787.

Since about the year 1835 a number of dams have been built in the Des Plaines, without authority from the United States, and one or more of them still remains; besides, a considerable number of bridges of various kinds span the river. The fact, however, that artificial obstructions exist, capable of being abated by due exercise of the public authority, does not prevent the stream from being regarded as navigable in law, if, supposing them to be abated, it be navigable in fact in its natural state. The authority of Congress to prohibit added obstructions is not taken away by the fact that it has omitted to take action in previous cases. The public interest in navigable streams of this character in Illinois and neighboring states, and the Federal authority over such as are capable of serving commerce among the states, do not arise from custom or implication, [119] but have a very definite origin. By article 4 of the compact in the Ordinance of July 13, 1787, for the government of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, it was declared: "The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and Saint Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other states that may be admitted into the Confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor." 1 Stat. at L. 51, 52, note; U. S. Rev. Stat. 1878 ed. pp. 13, 16. This was under the Confederation; but the first Congress under the new Constitution expressed a design to have it continue in full effect, in the Act of August 7, 1789 (chap. 8, 1 Stat. at L. 50). A purpose to preserve the rights of public highway in the navigable rivers was again manifested in § To the extent that it pertained to in9 of Act of May 18, 1796 (chap. 29, 1 ternal affairs, the Ordinance of 1787Stat. at L. 464, 468, Comp. Stat. §§ 4457, notwithstanding its contractual form— 4918, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 508, 9 was no more than a regulation of terriFed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 12). The tory belonging to the United States, and territory of Indiana (including what is was superseded by the admission of the now Illinois) was set apart and organ-state of Illinois into the Union "on an ized by Act of May 7, 1800, which, in equal footing with the original states in § 2, reiterated that purpose (chap. 41, all respects whatever." Permoli v. New 2 Stat. at L. 58, 59); and in an act pro- Orleans, 3 How. 589, 610, 11 L. ed. 739, viding for the disposal of the public 748; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee (Van lands therein (Act of March 26, 1804, Brocklin v. Anderson) 117 U. S. 151, chap. 35, § 6; 2 Stat. at L. 277, 279, 159, 29 L. ed. 845, 847, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280), it was again declared "that all the 670; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, navigable rivers, creeks, and waters, 217, 61 L. ed. 678, 684, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. within the Indiana territory, shall be 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637, 13 N. C. C. A. deemed to be and remain public high- 1959. But, so far as it established public

There can be no doubt that the waters of the Chicago-Des Plaines-Illinois route "and the carrying places between the same" constituted one of the routes of commerce intended by the ordinance, and the subsequent acts referred to, to be maintained as common highways. It did not make them navigable in law unless they were navigable in fact, but declared the public rights therein so far as they were navigable in fact; and it is curious and interesting that the importance of these inland waterways, and the inappropriateness of the tidal test in defining our navigable waters, were thus recognized by the Congress of the Confederation more than eighty years before this court decided The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, 19 L. ed. 999, 1001, and more than sixty years before The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 455, 13 L. ed. 1058, 1063.

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