V. 3 How. 556, 11 L. ed. 724; United States Rep. 68; Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210, v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55, 61, 17 L. ed. 94, 31 L. ed. 492, 405, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; 96; United States use of Hill v. Ameri- | Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 593, 39 L. ed. can Surety Co. 200 U. S. 197, 50 L. ed. 1092, 1105, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Truax 437, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; United States v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37, 38, 60 L. ed. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 24 131, 133, 134, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. L.R.A. 73, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 443, 7 C. 1917B, 283, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7; Brennan C. A. 15, 19 U. S. App. 36, 58 Fed. 58; v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 742, 9 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 570, L.R.A.(N.S.) 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727, 27 L. ed. 1030, 1035, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65 Atl. 165, 9 Ann. Cas. 698; Barr v. 396; Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 422, 59 L. ed. 295, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119. 30 Atl. 881; Employing Printers Club Federal incorporation of defendant v. Blosser Co. 122 Ga. 509, 69 L.R.A. does not confer jurisdiction. 90, 106 Am. St. Rep. 137, 50 S. E. 353, 2 Ann. Cas. 694; Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 848, 127 Am. St. Rep. 235, 62 S. E. 236; Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1001, 110 Am. St. Rep. 248, 77 N. E. 176; Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 584; Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 756, 53 Atl. 230; Atkins v. W. A. Fletcher Co. 65 N. J. Eq. 658, 55 Atl. 1074; Union P. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 42 L.R.A. 407, 416, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421, 77 N. W. 13; Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, 110 Fed. 698; Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636; Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union, 39 Wash. 531, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 302, 81 Pac. 1069. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61, 3 L. ed. 38; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 294; Bank of United States v. Martin, 5 Pet. 479, 8 L. ed. 198; Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 241 U. S. 295, 60 L. ed. 1010, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 465, 28 L. ed. 482, 488, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 385, 37 L. ed. 209, 212, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Starin v. New York, 115 U. S. 248, 29 L. ed. 388, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Roberts v. Northern P. R. Co. 158 U. S. 1, 22, 39 L. ed. 873, 880, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756; Ex parte Jones, 164 U. S. 692, 41 L. ed. 601, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222; Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 510, 44 L. ed. 864, 866, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 446, 44 L. ed. 1140, 1145, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487, 46 L. ed. 1005, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 783; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 45 L. ed. 84, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17; Continental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 119, 48 L. ed. 119, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Re Dunn, 212 U. S. 374, 53 L. ed. 558, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 56 L. ed. 1205, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Hill, 237 U. S. 208, 59 L. ed. 918, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; Bankers' Mut. Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 192 U. S. 385, 48 L. ed. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325; Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 319, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody, 166 U. S. 606, 41 L. ed. 1132, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 763; Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 8 L. ed. 885; Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278, 27 L. ed. 932, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051. The custom of collecting checks by mail is well recognized. Spear v. United States, 158 C. C. A. 410, 246 Fed. 250. As to what are unlawful combinations, see Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1018, 83 N. E. 940, 13 Ann. Cas. 54; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, ante, 354, 16 A.L.R. 196, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 698, 43 L.R.A. 797, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203, 52 N. E. 924, 54 N. E. 524; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 78 N. E. 753, 7 Ann. Cas. 638; W. & A. Fletcher Co. v. International Asso. N. J. Eq. 55 Atl. 1077. Accumulating checks for the coercive effect of demanding large sums of currency has been condemned by the su If the jurisdiction be upheld, it was error to dismiss the bill on the merits. International News Service v. Asso-preme court of Minnesota. ciated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 235, 63 L. ed. 211, 219, 2 A.L.R. 293, 39 Sup. Ct. Peabody v. Citizens State Bank, 98 Minn. 302, 108 N. W. 272. Motive is sometimes controlling. Coons v. Chrystie, 24 Misc. 296, 53 N. Y. Supp. 668; Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 788, 62 Fed. 803; 22 Cyc. 846, 858 and cases cited. The tendency is away from the doctrine of the cases originating with Allen v. Flood [1918] A. C. 1, 67 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 119, 77 L. T. N. S. 717, 46 Week. Rep. 258, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 285; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 33 L.R.A. 225, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, 35 Atl. 53; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308. One of the first departures from this doctrine was announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011. To say that an act lawful under one set of circumstances is lawful under every conceivable set of circumstances is too broad a generalization. Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92, 8 Am. Dec. 369; Post v. Munn, 4 N. J. L. 61, 7 Am. Dec. 570; Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74; Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 599, 131 Am. St. Rep. 446, 119 N. W. 946, 16 Ann. Cas. 807; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, ante, 354, 16 A.L.R. 196, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172. Private interests may invoke protection from ultra vires acts. Madison v. Madison Gas & E. Co. 129 Wis. 249, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 529, 116 Am. St. Rep. 944, 108 N. W. 65, 9 Ann. Cas. 819; Atty. Gen. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 35 Wis. 429; Hogan v. Nashville Interurban R. Co. 131 Tenn. 244, L.R.A. 1915E, 788, 174 S. W. 1118, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1162; Alpena v. Kelley, 97 Mich. 550, 56 N. W. 941. The right to conduct one's business without wrongful interference is a valuable property right. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 669; Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 63 L.R.A. 753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477, 97 N. W. 663, 1118, 1 Ann. Cas. 172; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 35 L.R.A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 44 N. E. 1077; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 42 L.R.A. 407, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421, 77 N. W. 13; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra. A valid law may be so wrongfully administered as to place illegal burdens and exactions on the individual. Reagan v. Farmers Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 390, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1021, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co. 207 U. S. 20, 52 L. ed. 78, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, 12 Ann. Cas. 757. Clearing houses have been judicially defined. V. National Exch. Bank National Bank, 132 Mass. 149; Philler v. Patterson, 168 Pa. 468, 47 Am. St. Rep. 896, 32 Atl. 26; Crane v. Fourth Street Nat. Bank, 173 Pa. 566, 34 Atl. 296. The purpose and design of the legislature must be considered. United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L. ed. 724. What is within the intention is within the letter. United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 61, 17 L. ed. 96; Atkins v. Fibre Distintegrating Co. 18 Wall. 272, 21 L. ed. 841; Cocciola v. Wood-Dickerson Supply Co. 136 Ala. 537, 33 So. 856; United States use of Hill v. American Surety Co. 200 U. S. 197, 198, 50 L. ed. 437, 439, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168. Legislators must know and contemplate the existing state of the law. Benton v. Willis, 76 Ark. 443, 88 S. W. 1000. ert S. Parker argued the cause and filed Messrs. Hollins N. Randolph and Roba brief for appellees: Plaintiffs' case arose under the laws of the United States because it was brought against the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,-a corporation under the laws of the United States. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823, 825, 6 L. ed. 204, 224, 225; Pacific R. Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 319, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 241 U. S. 295, 306, 60 L. ed. 1010, 1014, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569; Petri v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 142 U. S. 644, 648, 35 L. ed. 1144, 1145, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325; Butler v. National Home, 144 U. S. 64, 36 L. ed. 346, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Northern P. R. Co. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 465, 471, 36 L. ed. 506, 508, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 749; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 601, 36 L. ed. 829, 832, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905; Washing ton & I. R. Co. v. Cœur D'Alene R. & Nav. Co. 160 U. S. 77, 93, 40 L. ed. 346, 352, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Kalinski, 163 U. S. 289, 290, 41 L. ed. 163, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; | Texas & P. R. Co. v. Swearingen, 196 U. S. 51, 53, 49 L. ed. 382, 384, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164, 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 422; Re Dunn, 212 U. S. 374, 383, 384, 53 L. ed. 558, 562, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody, 166 U. S. 606, 41 L. ed. 1132, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 763; Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260, 44 L. ed. 762, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; Ex parte Roe, 234 U. S. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Eastin, 214 U. S. 153, 159, 53 L. ed. 946, 950, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Union Timber Products Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. 252 Fed. 320; Ingram Day Lumber Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. 267 Fed. 283; Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Wilson, 14 C. C. A. 264, 30 U. S. App. 234, 66 Fed. 785; Wood v. Drake, 70| Fed. 881; United States Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, 32 C. C. A. 470, 61 U. S. App. 13, 89 Fed. 769; Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. England, 36 C. C. A. 298, 94 Fed. 369; Union P. R. Co. v. McComb, 1 Fed. 799; Van Brimmer v. Texas & P. R. Co. 190 Fed. 394; Bowers v. First Nat. Bank, 190 Fed. 676; Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 384; Martin v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. 134 Fed. 134; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 21 Okla. 140, 95 Pac. 971; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 582, 25 L.R.A. 54, 26 S. W. 601. Since the Judiciary Acts of 1887 and 1888, this court has more than once squarely upheld the jurisdiction, upon removal, in cases where the defendant was a Federal corporation, and the Federal nature of the controversy inhered solely in the fact of such incorporation. Any statute is to be so construed as to give effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that in able, rational construction given to the acts. 2 Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d ed. p. 376; Peirce v. Van Dusen, 69 L.R.A. 705, 24 C. C. A. 280, 47 U. S. App. 339, 78 Fed. 696; People ex rel. Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 36 L. ed. 227, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 79, 23 L. | ed. 224, 228. Other Federal questions are made by plaintiffs' bill independently of those arising by reason of the source of incorporation. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 822, 6 L. ed. 204, 224; New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 140, 26 L. ed. 96, 98; California Oil & Gas Co. v. Miller, 96 Fed. 16; Northern P. R. Co. v. Soderburg, 188 U. S. 526, 528, 47 L. ed. 575, 580, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Oregon v. Three Sisters Irrig. Co. 158 Fed. 348; Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 215 U. S. 501, 54 L. ed. 300, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184; Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656. There was no error in dismissing the bill for want of equity. Tanenbaum v. New York F. Ins. Exch. 33 Misc. 134, 68 N. Y. Supp. 342; 12 C. J. 540, 585, 630; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 203, 37 L. ed. 419, 422, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542; National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 329, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369; J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550, 98 Pac. 1027, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165; Root v. Rose, 6 N. D. 575, 72 N. W. 1022; Youmans v. Hanna, 35 N. D. 479, 160 N. W. 705, 161 N. W. 797, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 275; Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho, 609, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 681, 123 Pac. 478, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 192; Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Placer Min. Co. 19 Idaho, 384, 114 Pac. 42; McHenry v. Sneer, 56 Iowa, 649, 10 N. W. 234; Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S. E. 459; State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 62 L.R.A. 727, note 9; Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 37 L.R.A. 455, 61 Am. St. Rep. 770, and notes, 33 Atl. 1; In interpreting these several statutes National Fireproofing Co. V. Mason of Congress cutting off from national Builders' Asso. 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 148, 94 banks the right to remove to the United C. C. A. 535, 169 Fed. 259; Allis-ChalStates courts those cases which could mers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 not be removed by a defendant state Fed. 179; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. bank, the intent of Congress must be Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) considered and regarded, and a reason-248, 133 Am. St. Rep. 213, 102 Pac. 459, tent. 2 Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d ed. ¶ 363. 18 Ann. Cas. 346; People v. Willis, 24 Misc. 537, 54 N. Y. Supp. 133; People v. Olson, 39 N. Y. S. R. 295, 15 N. Y. Supp. 779; Payne v. Western & A. R. Co. 13 Lea, 521, 49 Am. Rep. 666; 2 Words & Phrases, p. 1460. The acts of appellee bank, complained of, were entirely within its powers; but even had the same been ultra vires, the appellants could not, at law or in equity, take exceptions thereto under the facts as alleged. Union Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. ed. 188. The construction placed on the law by the officer in charge of its administration should receive due consideration. United States v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, 31 L. ed. 389, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 6 L. ed. 603; United States v. Moore, 95 U. | S. 760, 24 L. ed. 588; Hahn v. United States, 107 U. S. 402, 27 L. ed. 527, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59, 30 L. ed. 559, 561, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; 36 Cyc. 1140. Solicitor General Frierson and Mr. Walter S. Logan filed a brief for the Federal Reserve Board, as amici curiæ: The Federal Reserve Act authorizes Federal reserve banks to collect checks drawn on nonmember as well as on member banks. Federal reserve banks have the power to perform the functions of a clearing house for member banks, and the collection of checks drawn on nonmember banks is one of such functions, according to the usage of clearing houses. Furthermore, Federal reserve banks have express authority to receive deposits of all checks, including nonmember bank checks, which includes the incidental power to collect such checks. Thrall, Clearing House, pp. 3, 4, 1521; Cannon, Clearing-House Practices, chaps. 8, 17; Fiske, Modern Bank, p. 212. One of the purposes which the Federal Reserve Act aims to accomplish is the establishment of a Federal reserve check collection system, affording facilities to member banks for the collection of checks at par without deduction of exchange charges. 55 Congressional Record, 65th Cong. 1st. Sess. pt. 2, pp. 1984, 1988, 1989, 1993, pt. 4, pp. 3528, 3541, 3543, 3606, 3609, 3611-3614, 3618. Federal reserve banks are expressly prohibited from paying exchange or collection charges to member or nonmember banks, but may incur any expense necessary or incidental to the collection of checks which does not involve the payment of such charges. Union Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. ed. 188; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 450, 50 L. ed. 801, 822, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. There is no illegal purpose or malicious intent upon which to base a cause of action for duress, illegal conspiracy, or unfair competition. The methods of collection are legal in and of themselves, and are within the corporate powers of the defendant Federal Reserve Bank, and are in their nature designed to further the lawful purpose of rendering service to member banks and of developing the par collection system. These facts negative the bare allegations that defendants are actuated by an illegal purpose and a malicious intent. Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727, 65 Atl. 165, 9 Ann. Cas. 698; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 78 N. E. 753, 7 Ann. Cas. 638; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011; West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 50 W. Va. 624, 56 L.R.A. 804, 88 Am. St. Rep. 895, 40 S. E. 597; Doremus V. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 43 L.R.A. 797, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203, 52 N. E. 924, 54 N. E. 524; McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, L.R.A.1916D, 391, 181 S. W. 930, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 459; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is a bill in equity, brought by country banks incorporated by the state of Georgia, against the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, incorporated under the laws of the United States, and its officers. It was brought in a state court, but removed to the district court of the United States on the petition of the defendants. A motion to remand was made by the plaintiffs, but was overruled. The allegations of the bill may be summed up in comparatively few words. The plaintiffs are not members of the Federal reserve system, and many of them have too small a capital to permit their joining it,-a capital that could not be increased to the required amount in the thinly populated sections of the country where they operate. An important part of the income of these small institutions is a charge for the services rendered by them in paying checks drawn upon them at a distance, and forwarded, generally by other banks, through the mail. The charge covers the expense incurred by the paying bank and a small profit. The banks in the Federal reserve system are forbidden to make such charges to other banks in the system. Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, chap. 6, § 13, 38 Stat. at L. 263; amended March 3, 1915, chap. 93, 38 Stat. at L. 958; September 7, 1916, chap. 461, 39 Stat. at L. 752; and June 21, 1917, chap. 32, §§ 4, 5, 40 Stat. at L. 234, 235, Comp. Stat. § 9796, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1918, pp. 478, 479. It is alleged that, in pursuance of a policy accepted by the Federal Reserve Board, the defendant bank has determined to use its power to compel the plaintiffs and others in like situation to become members of [356] the defendant, or at least to open a nonmember clearing account with defendant, and thereby, under the defendant's requirements, to make it necessary for the plaintiffs to maintain a much larger reserve than in their present condition they need. This diminution of their lending power, coupled with the loss of the profit caused by the above-mentioned clearing of bank checks and drafts at par, will drive some of the plaintiffs out of business and diminish the income of all. To accomplish the defendants' wish, they intend to accumulate checks upon the country banks until they reach a large amount, and then to cause them to be presented for payment over the counter, or, by other devices detailed, to require payment in cash in such wise as to compel the plaintiffs to maintain so much cash in their vaults as to drive them out of business, or force them, if able, to submit to the defendants' scheme. It is alleged that the proposed conduct will deprive the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, contrary to the 5th Amendment of the Constitution, and that it is ultra vires. The bill seeks an injunction against the defendants' collecting checks except in the usual way. The district court dismissed the bill for want of equity, and its decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals (November 19, 1920). The plaintiffs appealed, setting up want of jurisdiction | in the district court and error in the final decree. We agree with the court below that the removal was proper. The principal defendant was incorporated under the laws of the United States, and that has been established as a ground of jurisdiction since Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204; Pacific R. Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 319, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Re Dunn, 212 U. S. 374, 53 L. ed. 558, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299. We shall say but a word in answer to the appellants' argument that a suit against such a corporation is not a suit arising under those laws, within § 24 of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, chap. 231, 36 Stat. at L. 1087, Comp. Stat. § 991 (2), 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 838. The contrary is [357] established, and the accepted doctrine is intelligible; at least, since it is part of the plaintiffs' case that the defendant bank existed and exists as an entity, capable of committing the wrong alleged, and of being sued. These facts depend upon the laws of the United States. Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 241 U. S. 295, 306, 307, 60 L. ed. 1010, 1014, 1015, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody, 166 U. S. 606, 41 L. ed. 1132, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 763. See further, Smith v. Kansas City Title & T. Co. February 28, 1921 [255 U. S. 180, ante, 577, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243]. A more plausible objection is that by the Judicial Code, § 24, sixteenth, except as therein excepted, national banking associations, for the purposes of suits against them, are to be deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located. But we agree with the court below that the reasons for localizing ordinary commercial banks do not apply to the Federal reserve banks created after the Judicial Code was enacted, and that the phrase, "national banking associations," does not reach forward and include them. That phrase is used to describe the ordi-. nary commercial banks, whereas the others are systematically called "Federal reserve banks." We see no sufficient ground for supposing that Congress meant to open the questions that the other construction would raise. On the merits we are of opinion that the courts below went too far. The question at this stage is not what the plaintiffs may be able to prove, or what may be the reasonable interpretation of the defendants' acts, but whether the plaintiffs have shown a ground for relief if they can prove what they allege. We lay on one side, as not necessary to our decision, the question of the defendants' powers, and, assuming that they act within them, consider only whether the use that, according to the bill, they intend to make of them, will infringe the plaintiffs' rights. The defendants say that the holder of a check has a right to present it to the bank upon which it was drawn, for payment over the counter, and that however many checks [358] he |