scrub women, elevator boys, doorkeepers, | official function within the meaning of pages, in short, anyone employed by the statute. We are constrained to the the United States to do anything,-is conclusion that the construction given in included." The government admits that the construction contended for will include the employees suggested by Judge Ward. Indeed, the construction given by the courts below would bring within the statute every employee acting under the Director General in the operation of the railroads. We are unable to accept this construction of a criminal statute. In United States v. Strang, decided at this term, January 3, 1921 [254 U. S. 491, ante, 368, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165], this court held that the Emergency Fleet Corporation, organized by the Shipping Board, and authorized by the President to exercise a portion of the power granted to him under the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 182, chap. 29, Comp. Stat. § 3115ee, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1918, p. 568), [367] was a separate entity from the government, which owned all of its stock, and that an inspector of the Shipping Board was not an agent of the United States within the meaning of § 41 of the Criminal Code (Comp. Stat. § 10,205, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 607), making it an offense for any officer or agent of any corporation, etc., and any member or agent of any firm, or person directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of such corporation, etc., to be employed or to act as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business with such corporation, etc. Subsequently the statute was amended so as to bring the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation within its terms as a governmental establishment, and, later, to make it an offense to defraud or to conspire to defraud any corporation in which the United States owned stock. So, in our view, if § 39 is to include every governmental employee, it must be amended by act of Congress. It is true that in the emergencies of war the government took over the operation of the railroads, and placed them under the control of the President, acting by his chosen Director General, who was given full authority to avail himself of the services of railroad officials, directors, employees, etc., with ample authority over all. But we cannot believe that this action brought every service, however remote from the exertion of official authority, into the exercise of an the courts below, and insisted upon by the government, practically recasts the statute from one embracing officials, and those discharging official functions, into one including every person discharging any sort of duty while the government is in control of the work. The government admits that the statute is ambiguous. While criminal statutes are to be given a reasonable construction, [368] ambiguities are not to be solved so as to embrace offenses not clearly within the law. We are unable to remedy the uncertainties of this statute by attributing to Congress an intention to include a baggage porter with those who discharge official duties in the operation of a railroad controlled by an officer of the government. It follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed. 2. Congress, in proposing an amendment to the Federal Constitution, may, keeping within reasonable limits, fix a definite period for ratification by the states, and could, therefore, validly declare, in the that it should be inoperative unless ratified resolution proposing the 18th Amendment, within seven years. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, I. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Note. On ratification of amendments to the Federal Constitution-see notes to Re Opinion of Justices, 5 A.L.R. 1417, and Hawke v. Smith, 10 A.L.R. 1510. On effect of compliance with prescribed method of amending Constitutions-see note to State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 149. On judicial notice, generally-see note to Olive v. State, 4 L.R.A. 33. Evidence judicial notice ratifica- violating, and under which he was arrested, had not gone into effect at the time of the asserted violation nor at the time of the arrest. 3. The Federal Supreme Court will take judicial notice of the consummation of the ratification of an amendment to the Federal Constitution. amendment The power to amend the Constitution with in Article 5, which reads: [For other cases, see Evidence, I. b, in Digest and the mode of exerting it are dealt Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law when operative. 4. The date of the consummation of the ratification of an amendment to the Federal Constitution, which is, by its own terms, to go into effect one year after being ratified, and not the date of the proclamation of the Secretary of State, is controlling upon the question when such amendment becomes operative. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, I. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 251.] Argued March 22, 1921. Decided May 16, 1921. APPEAL from the District Court of See same case below, 262 Fed. 563. Mr. Levi Cooke argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Theodore A. Bell and George R. Beneman, filed a brief for appellant. Assistant Attorney General Adams argued the cause and filed a brief for pellee. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." It will be seen that this article says nothing about the time within which ratification may be had-neither that it shall be unlimited nor that it shall be fixed by Congress. What, then, is the reasonable inference or implication? Is ap-time, as within a few years, a century, it that ratification may be had at any or even a longer period; or that it must be had within some reasonable period which Congress is left free to define? Neither the debates in the Federal convention which framed the Constitution nor those in the state conventions which ratified it shed any light on the question. Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court: fore twenty-one amendments had been proposed by Congress and seventeen of these had been ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the states,some within a single year after their proposal and all within four years. Each of the remaining four had been ratified in some of the states, but not in a sufficient number.2 Eighty years aft This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 262 Fed. 563. The petitioner was in custody under § 26 of Title 2 of the National Prohibition Act October 28, The proposal for the 18th Amendment 1919, chap. 83, 41 Stat. at L. 305, on a is the [372] first in which a definite pecharge of transporting intoxicating liq-riod for ratification was fixed.1 Theretouor in violation of § 3 of that title, and by his petition sought to be discharged on several grounds, all but two of which were abandoned after the decision in National Prohibition Cases (Rhode Island v. Palmer) 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486. The remaining grounds are, first, that the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, to enforce which Title 2 of the act was adopted, is invalid because the congressional [371] resolution, 40 Stat. at L. 1050, proposing the Amendment, declared that it should be inoperative unless ratified within seven years; and, secondly, that, in any event, the provisions of the act which the petitioner was charged with 1 Some consideration had been given to the subject before, but without any definite action. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2771; 40th Cong. 3d Sess. 912, 1040, 13091314. 22 Watson, Const. pp. 1676-1679; House Doc. 54th Cong. 2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, p. 300. er the partial ratification of one an ef- itself controlling; for with the Constitufort was made to complete its ratifica- tion, as with a statute or other written tion, and the legislature of Ohio passed instrument, what is reasonably implied a joint resolution to that end, after is as much a part of it as what is exwhich the effort was abandoned. Two, pressed.7 An examination of Article 5 after ratification in one less than the re- discloses that it is intended to invest quired number of states, had lain dor- Congress with a wide range of power in mant for a century. The other, pro- proposing amendments. Passing a proposed March 2, 1861, declared: "No vision long since expired, it subjects amendment shall be made to the Con- this power to only two restrictions: one stitution which will authorize or give to that the proposal shall have the approvCongress the power to abolish or inter- al of two thirds of both Houses, and the fere, within any state, with the domestic other excluding any amendment which institutions thereof, including that of will deprive any state, without [374] persons held to labor or service by the its consent, of its equal suffrage in the laws of said state."5 Its principal pur- Senate.9 A further mode of proposalpose was to protect slavery and at the as yet never invoked-is provided, which time of its proposal and partial ratifica- is, that on application of the two thirds tion it was a subject of absorbing in- of the states Congress shall call a conventerest, but after the adoption of the tion for the purpose. When proposed in 13th Amendment it was generally for- either mode, amendments, to be effective, gotten. Whether an amendment [373] | must be ratified by the legislatures, or proposed without fixing any time for by conventions, in three fourths of the ratification, and which after favorable states, "as the one or the other mode action in less than the required number of ratification may be proposed by the of states had lain dormant for many Congress." Thus the people of the years, could be resurrected and its rati- United States, by whom the Constitufication completed, had been mooted on tion was ordained and established, have several occasions, but was still an open made it a condition to amending that question. instrument that the amendment be subthe several states and be ratified in mitted to representative assemblies in three fourths of them. The plain meaning of this is (a) that all amendments must have the sanction of the people of the United States, the original fountain of power, acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that ratification by these assemblies in three fourths of the states shall be taken as a decisive exSup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737; Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 24, 58 L. ed. 101, 106, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; The Pesaro, 255 U. S. 216, ante, 592, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308. These were the circumstances in the light of which Congress, in proposing the 18th Amendment, fixed seven years as the period for ratification. Whether this could be done was questioned at the time and debated at length, but the prevailing view in both Houses was that some limitation was intended and that seven years was a reasonable period." That the Constitution contains no express provision on the subject is not in | 3 House Doc. 54th Cong. 2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, p. 317 (No. 243); Ohio Senate Journal, 1873, pp. 590, 666, 667, 678; Ohio House Journal, 1873, pp. 848, 849. A committee charged with the preliminary consideration of the joint resolution reported that they were divided in opinion on the question of the validity of a ratification after so great a lapse of time. 4 House Doc. 54th Cong. 2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, pp. 300, 320 (No. 295), 329 (No. 399). 5 12 Stat. at L. 251; House Doc. 54th Cong. 2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, pp. 195-197, 363 (No. 931), 369 (No. 1025). 6 Cong. Rec. 65th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 5618-5653, 5658-5661; 2d Sess. pp. 423425, 428, 436, 443-446, 463, 469, 477, 478. 7 United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55, 61, 17 L. ed. 94, 96; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 658, 28 L. ed. 274, 276, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651, 672, 42 L. ed. 614, 621, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; South Carolina v. United States. 199 U. S. 437, 451, 50 L. ed. 261, 265, 26 8 Article 5, as before shown, contained a provision that "no amendment which shall be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article." One of the clauses named covered the migration and importation of slaves and the other deals with direct taxes. 9 When the Federal convention adopted Article 5, a motion to include another restriction forbidding any amendment whereby a state, without its consent, would "be affected in its internal police," was decisively voted down. The vote was: yeas 3-Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware; nays 8-New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia. 5 Elliot, Debates, pp. 551, 552. pression of the people's will and be plemented in enough more states to binding on all.10 make three fourths by representatives of the present or some future generation. To that view few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite untenable. We conclude that the fair inference or implication from Article 5 is that the ratification must be within some reasonable time after the proposal. Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable [376] limits, to fix a definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt. As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions may require;12 and Article 5 is no exception to the rule. Whether a definite period for ratification shall be fixed, so that all may know what it is and speculation on what is a reasonable time may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a matter of detail which Congress may determine as an incident of its power to designate the mode of ratification. It is not questioned that seven years, the period fixed in this instance, was reasonable, if power existed to fix a definite time; nor could it well be questioned considering the periods within which prior amendments were ratified. We do not find anything in the Article which suggests that an amendment, once proposed, is to be open to ratification for all time, or that ratification in some of the states may be separated from that in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that which strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps [375] in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in three fourths of the states, there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which, of course, ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do. These considerations and the general purport and spirit of the Article lead to the conclusion expressed by Judge Jameson11 "that an alteration The provisions of the act which the of the Constitution proposed to-day has petitioner was charged with violating relation to the sentiment and the felt and under which he was arrested (Title needs of to-day, and that, if not rati-2, §§ 3, 26) were by the terms of the act fied early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by Congress." That this is the better conclusion becomes even more manifest when what is comprehended in the other view is considered; for, according to it, four amendments proposed long ago-two in 1789, one in 1810, and one in 1861-are still pending and in a situation where their ratification in some of the states many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively sup 10 See Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, | 324, 325, 4 L. ed. 97, 102; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 402-404, 4 L. ed. 579, 600, 601; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413, 414, 5 L. ed. 257, 293; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 347, 348, 15 L. ed. 401, 407, 408; Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 10 A.L.R. 1504, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Story, Const. 5th ed. §§ 362, 363, 463-465. 11 Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, 4th ed. § 585. (Title 3, § 21) to be in force from and after the date when the 18th Amendment should go into effect, and the latter by its own terms was to go into effect one year after being ratified. Its ratification, of which we take judicial notice, was consummated January 16, 1919.13 That the Secretary of State did not proclaim its ratification until January 29, 1919,14 is not material, for the date of its consummation, and not that on which it is proclaimed, controls. It follows that the provisions of the act with which the petitioner is concerned went into effect January 16, 1920. 12 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 326, 4 L. ed. 97, 102; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L. ed. 579, 601. 13 Sen. Doc. No. 169, 66th Cong. 2d Sess.; Ark. Gen. Acts 1919, p. 512; Ark. House Journal, 1919, p. 10; Ark. Sen. Journal, 1919, p. 16; Wyo. Sen. Journal, 1919, pp. 26, 27; Wyo. House Journal, 1919, pp. 27, 28; Mo. Sen. Journal, 1919, pp. 17, 18; Mo. House Journal, 1919, p. 40. 14 40 Stat. at L. 1941. May 16, 1921. [377] His alleged offense and his ar- Argued January 6 and 7, 1921. Decided rest were on the following day; so his claim that those provisions had not gone into effect at the time is not well grounded. Final order affirmed. LA BELLE IRON WORKS, Appt., V. UNITED STATES. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 377-395.) Internal revenue - war excess profits tax invested capital. 1. Neither the increased value of the ore lands of a corporation, though the result of an extensive exploration and develop ment work, nor the surrender of old stock in the corporation in exchange for new issues, based on such increased values, can be regarded as within the provision of the Act of October 3, 1917, § 207a, by which invested capital is defined for the purpose of computing the war excess profits tax imposed by that act, as "actual cash paid in," or "the actual cash value of tangible property paid in, other than cash, for stock or shares in such corporation," or "paid-in or earned surplus and undivided profits." [For other cases, see Internal Revenue. III. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Internal revenue uniformity. 2. The only rule of uniformity prescribed by the Federal Constitution with respect to duties, imposts, and excises laid by Congress is the territorial uniformity which U. S. Const., art. 1, § 8, requires. [For other cases, see Internal Revenue, I. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law - due process of law Federal war excess profits tax discrimination invested capital. 3. Defining invested capital according to the original cost of the property, to the exclusion of present higher values, as is done by the Act of October 3, 1917, § 207a, for the purpose of computing the war excess profits tax imposed upon corporations by that act, except that the tangible property paid in prior to January 1, 1914, may be taken at its actual cash value on that date, but in no case exceeding the prior value of the original stock or shares specifically issued for it, and provided that intangible property purchased bona fide prior to March 3, 1917, shall be included in invested capital at a value not to exceed the actual cash value at the time of purchase, does not make the act productive of such baseless and arbitrary discrimination as to render the tax invalid under the due process of law clause of the 5th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. b, 6, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 453.] APPEAL from the Court of Claims to review the dismissal of a petition claiming a refund of money alleged to have been erroneously assessed and exacted as a war excess profits tax. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles McCamic argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Edward B. Burling and James Morgan Clarke, filed a brief for appellant: Statutes imposing taxes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer; the language employed is to be given its ordinary meaning. Such statutes are to be construed according to the spirit rather than the letter, when the letter would make them palpably unjust. Construed according to these rules the invested capital of La Belle Company should include all its outstanding stock where that is represented by property of an actual cash value not less than the par value of the outstanding stock. L. ed. 211, 213, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53; Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 62 Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 414, 58 L. ed. 285, 291, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. The ordinary meaning of the words "paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits" includes appreciation in value. Bennett, Corporation Accounting, 1917, § 291, p. 334; Dickinson, Accounting Practice & Procedure, 1917, p. 62; Hatfield, Modern Accounting, 1916, p. 237; Bentley, Science of Accounts, 1913, § 36, p. 24; 22 Greendlinger, Financial & Business Statements, 1917, pp. 195, 196; Year Book, American Public Accountants, 1911, p. 124; 2 Association of Machen, Corp. pp. 1092, 1095; 1 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. 2d ed. p. 412; Thomp. Corp. 2d ed. § 5307; 2 Cooley, Corp. 7th ed. § 536; Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 40 N. J. Eq. 114, 3 Atl. 162; Williams v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 93 N. Y. 162; People ex rel. Manhattan F. Ins. Co. v. Tax & A. Comrs. 76 N. Y. 74; People ex rel. Manhattan R. Co. v. Barker, 165 N. Y. 305, 59 N. E. 151; McGinnis v. O'Connor, 111 Md. 695, 72 Atl. 614; Mangham v. State, 11 Ga. App. 440, 75 S. E. 508; Hutchinson v. Curtiss, 45 Misc. 484, 92 N. Y. Supp. 70; Simcoke v. Sayre, 148 Iowa, 132, 126 N. W. 816; Anderson v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 C. C. A. 202, 241 Fed. 326; Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co. 184 N. Y. 257, 3 |