3 First Nat. Bk. v. Garlinghouse, 22 Ohio St. 492; Centr. Nat. Bk. t. Pratt, 115 Mass. 546; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29. Contra, First Nat. Bk. v. Lamb, 50 N. Y. 659.

4 Chesapeake Bk. v. First Nat. Bk. 40 Md. 269.

5 U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; 1 Wash. C. C. 4.

6 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 539; Metropolitan Bk. v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; 1 Wash. C. C. 4. On contracts made before its passage as well as after. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 538, overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.

7 Murray v. Hoboken &c. Co. 18 How. 272; Sweatt v. Boston H. & E. R. R. Co. 5 Bank Reg. 249.

8 Dugan v. U. S. 3 Wheat. 179; U. S. v. Bevans, Ibid. 388; The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116; 2 Peters, 439; Osborn v. Bk. of U. S. 9 Wheat. 366; U. S. v. Tingey, 5 Peters, 115.

9 Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 266.

10 U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384; U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 560.

11 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.

12 Bk. of U. S. v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51.

13 Bk. of U. S. v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51.

14 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; Bk. of U. S. v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51.

15 Mulligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13.

16 Hunt v. Paloa, 4 How. 589.

SECTION 9.

Limitation of the powers of Congress.

1. Migration or importation of persons.
2. Habeas corpus not to be suspended.

3. Attainder and ex post facto laws prohibited.
4. Capitation and direct taxes.

5. Taxation on exports.

6. Commercial regulations.

7. Public moneys and accounts.

8. Titles of nobility. Presents, offices, etc.

Sec. 9. 1The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person,

This section has no application to State governments.1 It is a limitation on the powers of the General Government, rather than a grant of power,2 as the possession of this power during a limited time cannot be admitted to apply to the possession of any other power.8 Migration applies to voluntary as well as to involuntary arrivals.4 Passengers can never be subject to State laws until they become a portion of the population of the State.5 DESTY FED. CON.-10.

As to the legislation by Congress after the period designated, see. Exclusive power is vested in Congress since January 1st, 1808.7 See Supplement, post, 302.

1 Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. 499.

2 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 541; 45 Mass. 282; Wilson v. U. S. 1 Brock. 423; Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. 499; U. S. v. Libby, 1 Wood. & M. 235.

3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 230.

4 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 230.

5 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; 45 Mass. 282.

6 U. S. v. Preston, 3 Peters, 65.

7 Savory v. Caroline, 20 Ala. 19.

2 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

The privilege of the writ shall not be suspended, that is, the privilege of having it issued, and the case heard and determined; the writ means, the writ ad subjiciendum.2 It is a writ of right,3 the privilege of having judicial inquiry made into the cause of imprisonment, and a suspension precludes all further proceedings on a writ issued. The privilege of the writ can only be suspended by act of Congress.5 The power is given to Congress to suspend the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion, and Congress is the exclusive judge of when the exigency arises. The President cannot suspend the writ, but may be authorized by act of Congress to do so. A statute authorizing the President to suspend the writ, when in his judgment the public safety requires it, is valid. The Secretary of War has no authority to suspend the privilege of the writ, nor can the commander of a military district.10 There is a distinction between the suspension of the writ and the ipso facto suspension which takes place wherever martial law actually exists. 11 Congress has no power to suspend the issuing of the writ by a State court,12 but it may provide that an officer shall not be liable for an arrest made during the suspension of the privilege of the writ. 18 The suspension of the privilege of the writ is an express permission and direction from Congress to arrest or imprison all persons who may be dangerous to the common weal; 14 it simply denies to one arrested the privilege to obtain his liberty; 15 it does not suspend the duty to issue the writ,16 but upon its return it will be dismissed without inquiry into the validity of the arrest.17 Courts will take judicial notice of the close of the Rebellion, and with

9

it the end of the suspension of the writ. 18 If the term habeas corpus had a well-known meaning, the Convention had reference to that meaning in framing the Constitution.19

1 Macready v. Wilcox, 33 Conn. 321.

2 The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 305; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 29; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Fleming v. Page, 9 How, 615; Cross v. Harrison, 10 How. 189.

3 Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282.

4 Ex parte Fagan, 2 Sprague, 91; Ex parte Dunn, 25 How. Pr. 467. 5 Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; Ex parte Merryman, Taney, 267; 24 Law Rep. 78; Jones v. Seward, 3 Grant, 431; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359. But see McQuillan's Case, 9 Pitts. L. Int. 27; 27 Law Rep. 129; Ex parte Field, 5 Blatchf. 82.

6 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; Ex parte Merryman, Taney, 246; 24 Law Rep. 78; McCall v. McDowell, Deady, 233; 1 Abb. U. S. 212; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 115.

7 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 114.

8 McCall v. McDowell, Deady, 233; 1 Abb. U. S. 212; In re Oliver, 17 Wis. 681.

9 Ex parte Field, 5 Blatchf. 63.

10 Ex parte Field, 5 Blatchf. 63; Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530. 11 In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359.

12 Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238.

13 McCall v, McDowell, Deady, 233; 1 Abb. U. S. 212.

14 McCall v. McDowell, Deady, 233; 1 Abh. U. S. 212.

15 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 115.

16 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 130.

17 Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420; Vallandigham's' Trial, 259; 1 Wall. 243.

18 Cozzens v. Frink, 13 Am. L. R. 700.

19 Calder v. Bull, 3 Wall. 386; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters, 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Peters, 150; U. S. v. Harris, 1 Abb. U. S. 115.

3 No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. It may inflict the punishment absolutely or conditionally.2 If the terms "bill of attainder" and "ex post facto" had a well-known meaning at the time of framing the Constitution, the Convention had reference to that meaning. A constitution requiring expurgation by a provision for a stringent testoath, is a bill of attainder.4 So, a provision in a statute for a stringent test- oath, operating the exclusion from any profession or avocation of life for past conduct, is a punishment for such conduct, and partakes of the nature

of a bill of pains and penalties, and subject to the constitutional inhibition5 as a law excluding from practice attorneys at law who participated in the late Rebellion.6 A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or both. A statute which makes the non-payment of taxes evidence of participation in rebellion and forfeits the land absolutely, is a bill of attainder; but not a statute providing for a forfeiture for a violation of the revenue law; nor a statute imposing a forfeiture of citizenship for continuance of desertion after proclamation and trial by court-martial to enforce the penalty.10 A provision exempting an officer from action for acts done by order of lawful military superiors is not a bill of attainder.11

1 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, Ibid. 333; In re De Giaceno, 12 Blatchf. 401.

2 Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana, 510.

3 U. S. v. Harris, 1 Abb. U. S. 115; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Peters, 150; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters, 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456.

4 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277.

5 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 320; Klueger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257. 6 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.

7 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138.

8 Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 100.

9 U. S. v. A Distillery, 2 Abb. U. S. 192.

10 Gotchens v. Matheson, 40 How. Pr. 97; 58 Barb. 152.

11 Drehman v. Stefle, 8 Wall. 595.

Ex post facto laws. - Every law which makes an act innocent before the law a crime, and punishes, or that aggravates a crime, and makes it greater than it was when committed, or that enhances the punishment, or that provides for less evidence for conviction, is an ex post facto law: so, a statute which attempts to validate a punishment which would otherwise be illegal is an ex post facto law;2 so, a statute excluding a person from the practice of his profession for acts committed prior to the passage thereof is an ex post facto law. But a statute making treasury notes a legal tender is not an ex post facto law; nor a statute which imposes forfeiture of citizenship for continuance of desertion after assurance of pardon; nor a treaty for extradition of criminals, although it provides for crimes antecedently committed. This provision applies only to criminal laws. An act of Congress protecting from civil process persons amenable to prosecution not unconstitutional.8 See Supplement, post, 502.

1 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y.406; Lapeyre v. U. S. 17 Wall. 206; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 563.

2 In re Murphy, 1 Woolw. 141.

3 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Ex parte Law, 35 Ga. 285; Ex parte Baxter, 14 Am. L. Reg. 159.

4 Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

5 Gotchens v. Matheson, 40 How. Pr. 97; 58 Barb. 152.

6 Ex parte De Giacomo, 12 Blatchf. 391.

7 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters. 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333: Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; Society for Prop. of Gosp. v. Whecer, 2 Gall. 105; U. S. v. Hall, 6 Cranch, 171; 2 Wash. C. C. 366; Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 271; U. S. v. Hughes, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 84; Thompson v. Alger, 12 Met. 428; McCormick v. Pickering, 4 N. Y. 276; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Ga. 299; Bridgeport v. Hubbell, 5 Conn. 240.

8 In re Murphy, Woolw. 148.

See Art. I, Sec. 10, (1) and note.

4 No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.

"

A capitation tax is a direct tax,1 "direct taxes comprehending only capitation taxes and taxes on lands, and perhaps taxes on personal property by general valuation and assessment.2 A tax on income is not a capitation or other direct tax.3 A tax on bank circulation is not a direct tax,4 nor a tax on the business of an insurance company,5 nor a tax on carriages kept for private use. Direct taxes must be laid by the rule of apportionment. See Supplement, post, 302.

Hylton v. U. S. 3 Dall. 171.

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; Loughborough v. Blake, 5 *. 317; Hylton v. U. S. 3 Dall. 171.

rk v. Sickel, 14 Int. Rev. Rec. 6; Smedberry v. Bentley, 21 Ibid.

'e Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.

U. S. 3 Dall. 171.

4x Cases, 5 Wall. 471.

. Sec. 2. (3).