such evidence and the parochial position which it implies, is obsolete in that it ignores the realities of air transportation under current conditions.

The realities are that the true trip origins and destinations of air passengers using the three Regional airports are so thoroughly commingled that analysts working with the available statistics have, for about a decade, found it very difficult to make any meaningful distinctions between the tributary areas, or hinterlands, of the three area airports. Each airport is obviously more convenient for those who live in its geographical proximity, all other things being equal, but the shifting patterns of traffic indicate that factors other than geographical proximity are often influential in airport selection by travelers to and from the Region. Among the factors which undoubtedly play a part are the pattern of the highway network at any given time, the number and frequency of available schedules offered, the type of aircraft assigned to such schedules, and the traveler's estimate of probable delay or congestion at a specific facility.

Perhaps the most important single factor in determining airport choice is what might be termed the "options available." In other words, the choice by an individual traveler of airport arrival or departure is as much conditioned by the number and distribution of flights scheduled in and out, as it is by the logistics of the trip between airport and true origin or destination on the ground. Where a traveler has a wide choice of schedules, and where ground travel time is a high proportion of total trip time, as between Washington/Baltimore and New York, travelers will choose among airports according to their geographic location within the Region. For hundreds of thousands of air passengers each year, however, such considerations are academic. For them, the choice is effectively made by the availability or non-availability of flight schedules at specific airports. For example, most travelers to and from Houston, Texas will generally use Friendship, because Friendship, among the three regional airports, has the highest quality of service to and from Houston. By the same token, most travelers to and from San Diego, California will use Dulles, because it has more schedules and hence more available seats, on flights to and from San Diego.

It is, moreover, worth noting, from the designation of "Washington/Baltimore" as a single point on the route certificates of several airlines, that the distinction between the two cities is irrelevant for the air transport technology. In addition to passenger convenience, the physical attributes of the airports themselves are significant. It is of course common knowledge that National Airport is operating at practical capacity at the present time, whereas Friendship and to a greater extent, Dulles, have unused capacity. Among the most appealing arguments for a common airport policy in the Region is the prospect it offers for optimum use of this excess capacity in meeting foreseeable increases in air traffic. The latter has, of course, been increasing at exponential rates; i.e., the absolute growth in air passenger travel itself increases from year to year, thus giving rise to important problems of congestion, in the air and on the ground. The conventional response to this situation is to provide more facilities, or further to expand existing ones. It might be well for the Committee to consider, however, whether better use might not be made of the airports we now have, before further investment is made. The cornerstone of improvement in this direction would be, in my judgment, for all three airports to be funded, administered and operated by a single agency pursuant to common policy.

If there is an Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, and a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, both created by interstate compact to which the Federal government is a party on behalf of the District of Columbia, one assumes that a similar compact can be evolved for rational evolution of airport policy in the Region. If this were to be accomplished, flight operations could be distributed among the airports in a manner calculated to exploit their combined capacity, and the interairport competition which has characterized past development could be eliminated, or at least diminished.

With the three airports administered as one, it would be possible to begin to provide for the total system planning heretofore so notably absent. Among the improvements, large and small, which might be envisioned under such circumstances, are the following:

1. Establishment of intermodal transportation terminals at key points throughout the region, each of which would be linked with all three airports, and with Northeast Corridor rail terminals as well, by regularly scheduled vehicles: VSTOL, helicopter, limousine or rapid transit. Some of these terminals might be at entirely new locations, such as Columbia, Maryland. Others should be sited

to take advantage of the existing regional intrastructure. Among the latter possibilities is the fortuitous adjacency of National and Friendship Airports to mainline railroad rights-of-way. One can imagine fast trains linking these airports with a natural hinterland extending from Richmond and Charlottesville on the south to York, Pennsylvania and Wilmington, Delaware on the north. The convenience of such airport feeder trains would be maximized by cross-platform transfers at the airport rail stations between the trains and mobile lounges which would move direct to plane-side. Boat trains have been a prominent feature of European transportation for a hundred years: this suggestion would merely adapt a proven principle to the age of the jumbo jet.

2. Alinement of the regional rapid transit system in such a manner as to facilitate interairport transfers of passengers, baggage, mail and cargo, without interposition of redundant effort at some intermediate location, as is now required of all interairport traffic except for the minor fraction benefitting from interairport aviation services. This implies airport rapid transit links fully compatibleindeed, fully integrated-with the systems now being designed for Washington and Baltimore.

Since it seems probable that common prudence will ultimately mandate technical compatibility between the Baltimore and Washington rapid rail networks, so that maximum public benefits may accrue from a single system reaching throughout the duometropolis, uniform and unified planning for airport-city, airport-suburbs and airport to airport services within the total framework of such a system seems an altogether attainable goal. Gathering and distribution of passengers and baggage (possibly also express, freight and mail) directly between aircraft and any point, or selected points on the Washington/Baltimore rapid transit network, without intermediate handling by passengers, would follow naturally.

3. Information on weather conditions, flight arrivals and departures furnished for all three airports by a single nontoll telephone number common to the entire region.

4. Publication of complete flight schedules for all three airports in a single brochure.

Many other similar ideas could be outlined, but these will for the moment suffice to indicate the kinds of improvements which a common airport policy would stimulate.

In conclusion, may I observe that, in my view, the key to a rational airport policy for the National Capital Region is to be found in matters of administration, as well as in our evolving institutions, not in technology. We need not look to science or further technological innovation to afford a substantial measure of relief from present irrationalities. We need only improve the means by which we utilize the technology already at our command.

I appreciate this opportunity to be heard by the Committee. Thank you very much.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE H. F. OBERLANDER, DIRECTOR OF LONG-RANGE PLANNING AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is George H. F. Oberlander. I am the Director of Long Range Planning and Regional Affairs for the National Capital Planning Commission. I appear today on behalf of the Commission to express the Commission's policies and programs regarding air facilities planning in the National Capital Region and to identify some of the potential impact on National Airport with the advent of "stretch" jet aircraft.

COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITY

As you know the Commission was created by the National Capital Planning Act of 1952, as amended, as the central planning agency for the Federal and District of Columbia Governments in the Region to "plan the appropriate and orderly development and redevelopment of the National Capital and the conservation of the important natural and historical features thereof." Under Section 4 of the Planning Act, the Commission is "Charged with the duty of preparing and adopting a comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated plan for the National Capital, which plan shall include the Commission's recommendations or proposals for Federal and District developments or projects in the environs."

Among the matters to be included in the Comprehensive Plan are the Commission's recommendations for transportation and related terminal facilities including airports. The Commission has prepared and-and on the basis of comments received from Federal and District agencies and community groups and individuals-is in the process of modifying and adopting elements of the Comprehensive Plan. The Commission's recommendations for major airport facilities are to be included in the subchapter-currently under preparationentitled "Major Terminals" of the chapter on "Transportation." As a result, this statement reflects only staff analysis, and planning consideration on National Airport and the planning implications of "stretch" jet service.

COMMISSION POLICY-NATIONAL AIRPORT

The Commission has continually urged the Federal Aviation Agency to defer construction of additional passenger and airline facilities and parking structures at Washington National Airport until a long range development plan for the airport has been agreed to. In addition the Commission feels that the National Capital Region is in the best position of any of the metropolitan areas in this country to develop an integrated system of airports required to meet all of the projected future needs of the aviation industry. To this end the Commission has prepared an information report entitled "The Air Revolution and the National Capital Region" to provide the public with background infor mation in this vital area of concern. This report points out that the physical facilities at National Airport are obsolete and may require an estimate of $200 million in improvements, and that Dulles International Airport is threatened by the encroachment of new development. It urges that an Air Facilities Plan for the National Capital Region be prepared as a joint effort of all governmental jurisdictions in the Washington-Baltimore Metropolitan areas.

In earlier testimony on the utilization and future of major airports in the National Capital Region, we pointed out that the problems at National are substantially different from those at Friendship and Dulles, where the concern is with future access and adjacent land use. At National the issues are how this facility fits into a densely developed urban complex and what alternatives are available for its future utilization. In both instances, noise is a primary problem, although air pollution, safety, and ground congestion are prominent.

At the time FAA was considering the introduction of jet service at National, the Commission suggested that a detailed study was needed to determine National's future role as an air terminal in the Region. Among the matters suggested for examination in such a study is the possible phasing out of National, and the conversion of the airport site to other land uses.

As you know, the architectural firm of Vincent Kling and Associates was retained by FAA to prepare alternative master plans for modernization of National. The Commission urged that one of the alternatives for study should be the impact of phasing out National on air traffic in the Region and the land use implications at each of the other airports. The study suggested was intended to be of a cost-benefit nature. Such a study was not included in the alternatives which Kling was instructed by FAA to consider. The Commission feels that any change at National, in physical facilities or in equipment capacity, must be related to policy on the future use of the airport area.

We have identified four alternative possibilities for the future of National. These include:

1. Modernization of the airport.

2. Closing National-with no substitute location.

3. Closing National-with a substitute location.

4. Making National one of a series of Regional Metroports.

I am not here today to discuss these alternatives or others that might be appropriate. Our concern is the piece-meal changes and development of National without an overall air facilities program.

Growth by Accretion

Washington National Airport has grown in the past through administrative policy decisions and apparently will continue to grow in this fashion in the future. This growth has been steadily increasingly ever since the introduction of jets to its present annual volume of 10 million passengers. The terminal has expanded on a piece-meal basis over the last five years by improvements permitted to be installed by the various airlines to meet their needs. The administra

tion decision to permit "stretch jets" is yet another step in National's growth process. Based on FAS projections' ("assuming present flight restrictions") the number of air carrier operations will increase from 222,000 in 1970 to 235,000 in 1980, an increase of only 13,000 operations.

If we assume that each additional operation represents 50 passengers (this is a slight increase in the present loading factor) this would increase National's volume in 1980 by 650,000 passengers or a total volume in 1980 of 10,650,000. However, FAA projects 16 million passengers in 1980. The "stretch jet" addition could add slightly more than two million passengers at National as enumerated in the following section on "Possible Impact". This would result in a 1980 projection of 12 million-plus annual passengers. Still somewhat short of FAA's projection. Not until one uses aircraft with passenger capacities represented by the "Sky-bus" (D.C.-10 and Lockheed L-1011) can the annual passenger projections forecast by FAA be attained at National by 1980, assuming current flight restrictions.

Is the "stretch jet" a fore-runner to the "sky-bus" at National? The "sky-bus," with its carrying capacity (250 passengers), will in our opinion completely overtax the existing terminal. A new terminal may be forced into being. In our judgment the evolutionary process of growth at National Airport will be accelerated with the use of stretch-jets.

Probable Impact

Because of the competitive nature of the air passenger industry, "keeping up with Jones" is a fact of life. With the allowance of the three engine jet at National the serving airlines quickly converted to the use of such equipment. Most of the major airlines are adding the 747 as quickly as they can be certified. If the "stretch jet" is permanently permitted at National it will in all probability become the dominate aircraft, in a relatively short time, serving this facility. What would be the anticipated impact? In terms of aircraft operations, probably little or no noticeable impact. The industry claims that the stretch-jet has about the same operating characteristics as conventional three engine jets. Levels of noise and pollution would not increase substantially without an increase in the hourly flight restrictions now in effect. However, even with this restriction, the increase in passenger volumes can be substantial. During the last calendar quarter (Jan.-March 1970) the average monthly passenger volume at National was 750,000. The average monthly operations amounted to about 17,000 flights. The daily average is about 600 operations. In a matter of a few years, it is not inconceivable that half of these operations could be by stretch-jets. If we further assume that only half of the potential number of additional seats on such aircraft are available to Washington passengers, stretch-jets could increase passenger volumes at National 20-25%. What steps will be taken in the next few years to provide the needed ground support facilities? The existing terminal would need substantial improvement. Would not parking facilities have to be increased up to twenty-five percent more? Can the access roadway capacities be increased? How about taxi and limousine service? A 25% increase in passenger volume, which probably would be somewhat higher at peak hours, seems impossible to be handled at National if this increase occurred over a short period of time.

Will the potential increase anticipated by the stretch-jet at National adversely affect the growth and use of both the Dulles and the Friendship International Airports? During the period that the stretch jet would be pressed in service at National (1971-1975), FAA projects an average annual passenger increase at all three airports serving Washington at about 1.6 million passengers. Based on the earlier assumptions regarding stretch jets at National they could provide service for over 2 million passengers annually.

Operations Increase

There is every likelihood that the stretch-jet could pressure a relaxation of the existing hourly flight restrictions at National. A recent report by CAA on the impact of the wide-body jet (747 and the "sky-bus") came to the following conclusions which might well apply, in a more limited way, to the stretch jet. ". . . The introduction of larger wide-bodied jets will initially relieve congestion at major hubs because of the need for fewer peak frequencies in long

1 Washington National and Dulles International Airport Forecasts, Fiscal Year 19701981, FAA, Nov. 1969.

2 Impact of New Large Jets on the Air Transportation System, 1970-1973, CAA, Nov. 1969.

haul markets as a result of the quantum increases in the capacity of the larger jets. However, this relief may only be temporary. The attainment of break-even loads on the wide-bodied jets in the long-haul portion of the trip may precipitate a sharp increase in the number of "feeder" flights into these major hubs. This situation will be further aggravated as the supply of new wide-bodied jets becomes more abundant.

"With respect to terminal congestion, which is the direct result of traffic growth and not of equipment types, the integration of these aircraft may cause some shifting of terminal congestion to more accentuated peak hours. The peaking is due to the quantum increase in available capacity and accompanying traffic at peak hours resulting from the substitution of wide-bodied jets at prime time for smaller present-day jets. We believe that these developments will contribute to terminal congestion despite the fact that the industry is taking positive steps to alleviate this problem.'

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Adequate Planning and National's Future Role

The National Capital Planning Commission has been concerned for some time about National's role in the National Caiptal Region transportation system. The air passenger forecasts, by FAA for the next 10 years, indicate that the Washington/Baltimore Bi-region will almost triple the 1969 volumes. (14.6 million to 40.7 million.) The general aviation activities are projected to double during this same period. The impact of this increase on the ground transportation facilities, the air terminals themselves, and on the deterioration of the quality of the environment adjacent to the airports must be carefully examined. This assessment of the "air revolution" can only be undertaken by a detailed analysis of the nature of "Air Facility System" needed in the future to adequately meet the needs of the air industry in the Nation's Capital.

The Commission has spear-headed the efforts to institute a major study of an integrated air facilities system. A Study Committee composed of representatives from FAA, Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, Baltimore Regional Planning Council, Maryland Department of State Planning, State Aviation Commission of Maryland, Virginia Division of State Planning, Virginia Division of Aeronautics and the Commission has been meeting for over a year. This Committee has developed a tentative scope of work for such a study. (The Scope of Work is transmitted for your review and information.) At the present time the Committee is developing the procedures for undertaking such a study. Every attempt is being made to provide the widest possible participation of all interested parties within the Washington/Baltimore Bi-region. To assist in financing such a project this Commission has included a request for $100,000 in its FY '71 Budget. The need for such a study was more fully developed by the Commission in its Informational Series Report mentioned earlier.

One of the real concerns of the Commission is that growth by accretion at National has proceeded for a number of years. Until a detailed study of air facility needs in the Washington/Baltimore Bi-region is undertaken no reasonable assessment of National's future role can be made except on an ad hoc basis. This is hardly an acceptable procedure for such a major terminal facility.

It is strongly suggested that a moratorium be placed on any expansion, in service and facilities, at National until an Air Facilities Study for the Washington/ Baltimore Bi-region is available to provide guidance for any improvements at the Washington National Airport.

Hon. JOSEPH D. TYDINGS,

U.S. Senator,

THE WOMEN'S DEMOCRATIC CLUB,

New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Severna Park, Md., April 17, 1970.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: The Women's Democratic Club of Prince George's County, at their April 10th meeting, voted unanimously to take the following position regarding the area airports: Prince George's County residents find Friendship Airport and Dulles Airport just as necessary and convenient, and perhaps more so, than Washington National Airport.

Some of our reasons for this preference are as follows:

1. Because of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway which leads to Friendship, and the Washington Beltway which leads to Dulles, Prince George's

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