CHAP. V. 1810. The only route open to General Craufurd's division was by a bridge across the stream, which, as it lay upon a level considerably beneath the ground now occupied by the enemy, was unavoidably exposed to a heavy fire from most of their guns. Thither, however, it was necessary to proceed; and thither regiment after regiment was moved, covered in succession by the corps in the rear, and last of all by a body of skirmishers. The French made several brave attempts to force the bridge; they charged towards it repeatedly as our people were descending, and endeavoured to push a body of their cavalry across in our rear; but, the opposite bank rising abruptly, and Wellington being covered both with artillery and infantry, they were on each occasion stopped. At length the firing ceased; and Craufurd, having halted on his new ground till evening, retreated under cover of the darkness to a position within four leagues of Alverca." 1 1 Lond. i. 495, 496; to Henry Wellesley, July 27, 1810; Gur. vi. 288. 10. the combat, Almeida. men. Though the steadiness of the troops engaged in this Results of combat excited the admiration of all who witnessed it, yet and siege of Was it an event much to be regretted, for it cost the lives of 4 officers and 28 men killed, and 25 officers and 218 men wounded—a proportion of 1 to 7, most unusual in modern war,* and which too clearly proved how nobly the British officers had exposed themselves to bring off their It illustrated the wisdom of Wellington's orders not to fight in advance of the Coa, and the great hazard of fighting at all, where it was possible to avoid it, with a river to cross by a single bridge, or a free passage only in the rear. Had the men engaged been less steady, the retreat less orderly, beyond all doubt the greater part of Craufurd's division would have been taken or destroyed. As it was, Wellington deemed the superiority of the enemy in numbers, and especially in cavalry, too decided to hazard a general action, even to save Almeida, and he accordingly resolved to retire to a position of great strength, and more * 1 to 25 is the usual proportion in the British, 1 to 30 in the French, 1 to 35 in the Russian army. V. contracted, on which he had long had his eye, some leagues CHAP. in the rear, with the headquarters at Celorico. Thither, accordingly, the army retreated, without being at all dis- 1810. quieted by the enemy, who, to the great surprise of all in the British army, remained inactive, and to appearance undecided what to do, for several weeks. Almeida, which was uncovered by the retrograde movement, was meanwhile invested, but the active operations of the siege were not commenced. The real reason of this delay, however, is now known. Massena, seeing the strength of the force by which he was to be opposed, was desirous of being reinforced by Reynier's corps from Estremadura, whose place was to be supplied in that province by Mortier's corps from Seville. Joseph and Soult had opposed this, as endangering their recent and important conquests in Andalusia. The dispute was referred to Paris; and the Emperor, seeing that the vital point of the contest lay Napoleon in Portugal, gave his decision in favour of Massena. to Berthier, Reynier's corps accordingly joined Massena, while Mor- 1810; tier's broke up from Seville, and came up to Estremadura Mem. vii. to watch Hill, who was in the neighbourhood of Elvas, i. 503. and threaten the Alentejo.1 May 27, Joseph's 283; Lond. 11. meida. No sooner did Reynier's corps, 16,000 strong, cross the Tagus to join the invading army under Massena, than the Siege and indecision of the French movements ceased. On the 14th fall of Alof August they sat down before Almeida, the reduction of which was a necessary prelude to further operations; and on the 25th, the first batteries were armed, but they were at such a distance as only to reach the outworks of the place. The fortress, which was of great strength, and amply provided, was garrisoned by two regiments of Portuguese militia and one of the line, under Brigadier-General Cox, an officer upon whose steadiness entire reliance could be placed. As it was much stronger than Ciudad Rodrigo, a still more prolonged resistance was anticipated than the gallant one which that comparatively weak fortress had made; and it was on this that Wellington's main reliance VOL. I. 2 A CHAP. V. 1810. was placed, because, if the place could hold out for a few weeks, the heavy rains of autumn would set in, and further movements in the field, on the part of the investing army, would be rendered impossible. To encourage the defence, and, if an opportunity should present itself, either interrupt the siege, or throw in some succour to the beleaguered garrison, he moved forward to the ground he had previously occupied, and approached close to the outposts of the besieging army. But the hopes which he entertained of a prolonged defence were disappointed. On the evening of the 26th, when the enemy were throwing shells, still at very long range, into the fortress, one of them blew up the principal magazine of the place. This was a serious misfortune, for nearly all the guns were blown into the ditch, and great part of the artillerymen killed or wounded; but the garrison might still have prolonged the defence some time longer; and subsequent events showed that, whether it had occurred or not, they would have capitulated, and were already in terms with the French general. No sooner had the explosion taken place, than the whole officers in the place, with the Portuguese second in command at their head, waited on General Cox, and insisted on his instantly surrendering. Cox, like a gallant soldier, refused, adding his resolution, if matters became desperate, to cut his way through the French lines, and join Lord Wellington. The officers remonstrated, and withdrew in sullen discontent; but Cox found, on going out to the troops, that matters Stewart to had become hopeless; for they had already all laid down reagh, Aug. their arms, and not a man would obey his orders. Cox had MS.; Lond. now no alternative but to close with the French general's Wellington offer of a capitulation, and next day he formally surrendered. Massena entered the town immediately, and the Aug 29, treachery was then made manifest.1 The garrison being to General paraded before him, he dismissed the militia to their homes, on a promise they would not serve against the French during the war, and offered the regular soldiers service under the banners of Napoleon. They all accepted 1 Sir Chas. Lord Castle 30, 1810, to Lord Liverpool, 1810, and Hill, Sept. 1, 1810 Gurw. vi. 389-399. V. the offer, and were immediately enrolled in the French CHAP. legions; while the commander of artillery, who informed Massena of the state of the place, was made a colonel by 1810. that general. 12. affairs in the army. The sudden and unexpected fall of Almeida, especially when accompanied by such grave indications of treachery Gloomy on the part of the Portuguese garrison, was a most aspect of serious misfortune, and embarrassed the English general British to a degree which he had never yet experienced since the beginning of the war. Not only was the frontier fortress, on which he had relied to retard the enemy till the autumnal rains set in, lost, and its artillery and provisions, which were very extensive, placed at Massena's disposal, but the circumstances attending the capitulation were such as to shake the confidence hitherto placed in the Portuguese troops. The most desponding views, in consequence, came to pervade the British army, and from it the gloom spread rapidly to the Government and the press at home. The Spanish armies were all defeated and dispersed; a hopeless resistance was only maintained in detached mountains and fortresses, rather from the characteristic obstinacy of the nation than from any expectation of ultimate success. The French armies in the Peninsula amounted to 250,000 men present with the eagles; and of this immense force, one-fourth, or 60,000, were concentrated for the immediate invasion of Portugal. The entire troops at the disposal of Wellington were little more than 50,000, and one-half of these were at a distance, under Leith and Hill, at Thomar and on the Tagus; so that not more than 28,000 could be concentrated in a single field to give battle to the enemy, who could bring at least 60,000 in a mass against him. The disproportion was too great to risk a general battle, unless in a very strong position and under the most favourable circumstances, and amply sufficient to spread the most desponding views as to the ultimate issue of the 516. campaign throughout the Allied army.1 1 Lond. i. CHAP. V. 1810. 13. Political of Welling tion. It added much to the difficulties of Wellington at this critical juncture, that Lord Castlereagh, who hitherto had been his firmest support in the Cabinet, was no longer a member of the Government, in consequence of his unfordifficulties tunate rupture and duel with Mr Canning, already noticed; ton's situa and the General-in-Chief's correspondence was in consequence carried on with Lord Liverpool. It is no impeachment of the firmness and patriotism of that eminent and judicious statesman to say, that he and his colleagues at that time shared those desponding views, and that they had come to regard the attempt to defend Portugal as visionary. Judging by past experience, and at a distance from the scene of action, there can be no doubt that those opinions were well founded, and such as any rational man, forming his judgment upon the information which they possessed, would have adopted. Without, therefore, actually forbidding the attempt to defend Portugal, they contented themselves with throwing all responsibility connected with it on the general, and urging upon him the necessity, as his primary object, of looking to the safety of the British army intrusted to his keeping, and the means of bringing it off safe to England in case of disaster.* The Portuguese Government, at best weak and timorous, was still less to be relied on; and the chief object they seemed to have was, to thwart every proposal for the common cause which came from the English general. In these arduous circumstances, threatened by a powerful enemy double his own strength in front, and with a desponding * "Lord Wellington found himself at this critical juncture beset with many other difficulties besides those which originated in the insufficiency of his own force and the tremendous superiority of the enemy. All responsibility was thrown upon him. The instructions which he received were generally so expressed as to leave him ground for doubt respecting the course which would be most agreeable to his employers; whilst hints are thrown out, that he ought to look above all things to the preservation of the forces intrusted to him. In few words, the Ministers were alarmed at the crisis to which affairs had arrived, and their conduct partook of their fears. Nor was the Government of Portugal to be depended upon; and a thousand impediments were thrown in the way of every useful suggestion, provided it happened to come from the English general or his friends."-LONDONDERRY's Peninsular War, i. 505, 506. |