CHAP. VII. 1811. 31. speech. oratory-calm, weighty, and argumentative—as well as of his turn of mind, combining in a rare degree the principles of philosophy with the dictates of experience. This is the more remarkable from the contrast which it Reflections exhibits to the views adopted at the same time by the on thi numerous and weighty body who composed the majority of the committee. It embraced all the leading political economists of the day-those whose writings had given the Edinburgh Review its great and deserved celebrity. The report was drawn up by Mr Horner. It had the cordial concurrence of Mr Huskisson, Mr Ricardo, Mr Ponsonby, Mr Tierney, and, except on the one point of resuming cash payments in two years, of Mr Canning. It was supported by the whole strength of the Whig party, united to that body, already respectable from their talents, who might be called the English doctrinaires, who afterwards, under the guidance of Sir Robert Peel, wrought so great a change in the commercial policy of Great Britain. Yet, strange to say, their doctrine was not less at variance with the principles of political economy than the evidence, nearly unanimous, of the whole practical men who were examined on the subject. It set at defiance the general principle that price is regulated by the proportion between supply and demand, and that the interests of commerce will cause an article in request to leave the country where it is cheap, and flow into the country where it is dear; it ignored the evidence of all the practical men, who ascribed the irresistible tendency to gold to go abroad to its being more in request on the Continent than in this country, and consequently bearing a higher price; it repudiated the idea that the unfavourable state of the exchanges indicated an outward tendency in the precious metals greater than the inward demand. Its authors had embraced one dogma to which they ascribed the whole-viz., that the over-issue of notes at home had driven the notes abroad; and they were resolute in their determination to ascribe everything to VOL. I. 2 K VII. 1811. CHAP. that, and that alone. Lord Castlereagh was held up as wedded to the old school, and behind the light of the age, because he refused to adopt this dogma, and in preference supported the simple principle that the coin was sent abroad because it bore a higher price there than it did at home. Which of these two opinions has been confirmed by the event, and is now generally adopted among men? Probably there is no man whose opinion is not warped by party or swayed by interest, who will not admit that Castlereagh was perfectly right, and his opponents entirely in the wrong, on the occasion. In truth, his words descriptive of the effects of the untimely resumption of cash payments have proved prophetic. They have been too fatally realised by the result; and his opinions, original when uttered, but since confirmed by the seal of time, have received that vindication of all others the most decisive. At the time they were uttered they were denounced as paradox; they are now regarded as platitude. 32. But this is not all. Not only has subsequent experiWhat if the ence during the long peace completely established the committee truth of his principles, but the events of the war have adopted. proved not less decisively the vast importance of their report of the had been having been uttered and given effect to by the Legislature at the time they were. The report of the committee, recommending the compulsory resumption of cash payments within two years, was dated 8th June 1810. The final debate on it took place on 15th May 1811. Had the recommendation of the committee been adopted on the first occasion, the crash would have come in England in the first week of June 1812, when Wellington was preparing to cross the Agueda to commence the Salamanca campaign, and Napoleon's forces were all converging towards the Niemen for the invasion of Russia; if on the second, it would have come on the eve of the triumphant march of the English general to Vitoria, immediately after the battle of Lutzen, and on the eve of the armistice of Pleswitz in Germany. We have only to figure the VII. 1811. monetary crises of 1825, 1838, 1847, and 1857, hap- CHAP. pening on any of these occasions, to form a conception of what must have occurred if the recommendation of the Bullion Committee had been carried into effect. Ruin, irrecoverable ruin, to British credit and finances, must have been the result, and with it the destruction of the whole system of European opposition to French domination on the Continent, at the very moment when it had been organised with the fairest prospect of success ! If ever a country was saved by the efforts of individual men, it was by Mr Vansittart and Lord Castlereagh on this occasion. 33. reagh's the battle Ill health prevented Lord Castlereagh from taking a part in the debate on the Peninsular triumphs, and the Lord Castlevote of thanks to Lord Wellington for the campaign of speech on 1810, when several of the Opposition, and in particular of Albuera. Mr Whitbread, so honourably retracted their former strictures on his military conduct. But on 7th June 1811, on occasion of the thanks of Parliament being moved to General Beresford for the victory of Albuera, he said: "Lord Wellington was under the necessity of showing a front to the enemy both at Badajos and Almeida, and it fell to General Beresford to decide whether he should wait for the reinforcements under Wellington, which he knew were approaching, or act with promptitude on the moment, trusting to his own resources. He took the manly and judicious step. A more glorious battle than that which ensued never was fought by the British, as was too fatally proved by the loss, which was as great, considering the numbers engaged, as even in the desperate struggle at Assaye. The intercepted letter of Soult proved how severely he had suffered the British army remained in possession of the field, and was enabled to advance a corps against the retreating enemy. Deeply as every one must lament the heavy loss sustained in this memorable battle, yet we should err if we compared it with the results merely of the battle itself. The true CHAP. VII. 1811. 34. 66 test was to weigh it against the advantages of the whole campaign; and if this was done, it would be found that in no campaign had the sacrifice of human life been so small compared with the results produced by it. Lord Wellington had proved himself to be as sparing of the life of the soldier as he was careful of his health; and, checking his propensity to seek for glory, he bent his whole efforts to economising the existence of those placed under his command. The proportion of loss during the whole Peninsular campaign between the British and French armies, was immeasurably in favour of the former. Glorious as the struggle in Portugal had been, a great feature would be awanting if, after its conclusion, a trial of strength between the rival nations had not taken place upon the frontier. Up to the present moment, France has made but little Concluded. real impression upon Spain. After all her victories, she has never been able to send forward one Spanish regiment to assist in the subjugation of the country. Whatever defects may exist in her military system, we must all recollect that Spain is not divided: she is not conquered. The same peculiarities, it may be defects, in her national character, which render her unmanageable in the hands of her friends, and incapable of efficient military co-operation, render her only the more indomitable towards her enemies. No nation has ever proved more true to herself than Spain, under circumstances the most adverse, has done. What might not be expected from her soldiers if they were taken into British pay, and disciplined by British officers, as the Portuguese have been! That alternative has never yet been presented to them, and it is doubtful whether but for that advantage the Portuguese would have offered the same resistance to the enemy that the Spaniards had done. But I do not wish to draw any invidious comparisons : both nations are fighting for their liberties; they have both displayed great energies; and I will only repeat what has been already said, that this great contest must be run out, and we must do our utmost in it. No man can predict CHAP. VII. the final result; but the best way in which we can discharge our duty to posterity, and that which we owe to the present, is by doing our best, and leaving the rest in the 1811. hands of Providence. No one can doubt that the war as xx. 526, at present maintained is a great burden, but is any man1 Parl. Deb. prepared to say that the time has arrived when it should 527. be abandoned?"1 tress in Lord Castlereagh strongly felt that at this juncture 35. (June 7, 1811) the war had become burdensome; for the Great disfact was, that it had become so to such a degree that even Great Brithe most sanguine were beginning to be inspired with tain at this desponding views in regard to its ultimate result. This arose, not so much from any want of success in the field, or doubts as to our ability to maintain the Peninsular contest and to defend Portugal, as from the exhausting effects of the struggle upon the industry and commerce of the country, and the multitudes of persons who had been reduced to short time, or thrown out of employment altogether, in consequence of the combined effect of Napoleon's Continental System, and the British retaliatory policy of the Orders in Council. It is well known that immediately after entering Berlin, in October 1806, in consequence of the battle of Jena, Napoleon, irritated by the blockades of the harbours in the north of Germany, which Mr Fox had proclaimed without, as he said, any sufficient force at sea to maintain it, issued the famous Berlin Decree, which declared all British goods found anywhere on the Continent, in the territories in alliance with France, or occupied by French armies, liable to confiscation, and ordered them to be instantly committed to the flames; and this was followed next year by a decree in similar, and still more stringent terms, issued from Milan, on the Emperor's return from the Polish war, after the battle of Friedland and treaty of Tilsit. These decrees by no means remained a dead letter. They were instantly acted upon with the utmost rigour in every place subject to the control of the French armies; and as that embraced at that period the time. |