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guent, and an entry and patent of part of the

land subsequent to such acts vested no title in

# £ntee—wheeler v. City of Chicago (C. ..)

An act granting public lands in aid of the construction of a railroad within certain limits on both sides of the road, and which provides that the lands adjacent to the road shall be surveyed after the route is fixed, and shall not be liable to sale, entry, or pre-emption, operates of itself to withdraw such lands from sale, entry, pre-emption, or other disposition. — Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Groeck (C. C.) 609.

Where lands within the place limits of a grant to a railway company have been reserved from sale or entry by the land department to satisfy indemnity claims under a prior grant, such railway company acquires no right to the lands by its grant.—Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Musser Saun#3 Land, Logging & Manuf’g Co. (C. C. A.)

It is within the power and is the duty of the land department to reserve from sale or entry such lands as may be required to satisfy a grant to a railway company, though before such reserVation a second grant to another railway company is made, the limits of which overlap the lands reserved.—Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mus£ Land, Logging & Manuf'g Co. (C.

Lands claimed to be within Mexican grants are not public lands, within the operation of a railroad grant, if the question of the location of the boundaries of the private grant is undetermined.-Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Brown (C. C.) 333; Same v. Bray, Id.

Swamp lands.

The secretary of the interior approved a list of lands to be allotted to the state of Michigan under the swamp lands act, such list being based On erroneous Surveys, which were known to the state to be erroneous, and to be in process of correction by the general government. Before a patent was issued, corrected lists were prepared, omitting some lands included in the first list, and patents were issued for the lands included in the corrected lists. Held, that the title of the state did not attach to the lands in the first list upon its approval, before the issue of a patent, so as to prevent subsequent correction of the errors, and to remove from the operation of the grant lands not properly within it.—Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust (C. C. A.) 155.

The act of March 3, 1857. was not intended to apply to and confirm old lists of lands passing under the Swamp lands act, which were founded on erroneous surveys, and have been superseded by new lists; nor to override the power of the secretary of the interior to correct mistakes.— #" Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust (C. C.

..] loo.

Lists of lands for allotment to the state of Michigan, under the swamp lands act, were selected by the surveyor general, and reported by him to the commissioner of the land office. The lists were afterwards Superseded by lists made in accordance with corrected surveys. Held, that

the act of March 3, 1857, did not have the ef- . fect of confirming the original selection.--Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Pack (C. C. A.) 170; Same v. Butman, Id.

Spanish grants.

A claim by a grantee of an '# Spanish grant, dated in 1788, including the Hot Springs in the city of Hot Springs, Ark., will be presumed to be abandoned in an action in 1894 to recover such land, though the heirs of the grantee sued under Act May 26, 1824, for confirmation of the claim.—Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co. (C. C.) 637.

Under the regulations of the governor of the province of Louisiana of February 18, 1770, no title to land standing in the name of the king was conveyed by a paper purporting to be a Spanish grant made by the governor of such province, in the absence of any actual survey of the grant, and the filing of a copy thereof in the office of the Scrivener of the government, and a putting of the grantee in pedal possession according to the form prevailing in Spain and ##vince-Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co. (C.

RAILROAD COMPANIES.

See, also, “Master and Servant.”

Land grants, see “Public Lands.” Mechanics’ liens, see “Mechanics' Liens.

It is the settled policy of courts to treat a railroad as an entirety and prevent its sever# if possible.—Compton v. Jesup (C. C. )

The legislature of South Carolina has power to authorize municipal corporations to issue railroad aid bonds.—Town of Darlington v. Atlantic Trust Co. (C. C. A.) 849.

The act of Minnesota of March 1, 1877, permitting any railroad corporation to finish certain incomplete railway lines, and acquire the land grants appertaining thereto, was not intended to forfeit the lands within the grant, previously conveyed by the government of the state, nor to declare its deeds void; and the corporation completing the road acquired no rights in such lands.—St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 2; St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., Id.

Whether the lien given by section 3192 of McClain's Iowa Code applies to rolling stock of a railway in favor of the lessor of depot grounds, quaere.—Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City & N. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 72.

The mere filing of a stockholders' bill, asking the appointment of a railroad receiver to secure a better management until the company’s debts can be discharged, and service of process thereunder, does not of itself draw the company's property into the possession of the court so as to prevent the company from surrendering to the seller, in partial extinguishment of the purchase price, part of a lot of steel rails which have not yet been laid.-Illinois Steel Co. v. Putnam (C. C. A.) 515.

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Complainants, who had agreed to furnish part
of the cash to complete the purchase of a rail-
road under foreclosure, made a contract with
S., their agent, for the purchase, by which he
agreed to have the company which was to be
Organized to operate the road execute certain
notes, and secure them by a mortgage, and to
have part of such notes deposited as security
for the repayment of the cash advanced by com-
plainants, which they desired to borrow. Such
notes and mortgage, which were never used,
were afterwards canceled, and a new mortgage
issued to secure bonds Which were used in Com-
pleting the road, and were bought by a third
party in good faith. In a suit to which all per-
sons interested were parties, the rights of all
such persons, including complainants, were ad-
judicated, and stock of the railroad company
was allotted to complainants in return for their
advances. Held, that complainants acquired no
lien superior to that of the mortgage securing
the £ds-Peninsular Iron Co. v. Eells (C. C.
A.) 24.

Liability for negligence.
It is not error to refuse to instruct a jury that
the engineer of a train, which has collided with
another, d a right to proceed towards the
crossing where the collision occurred if the head-
light of such other train was not lighted, when
the engineer in question was bound not to pro-

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ceed if he could discover such other train by the
use of ordinary care.—Chicago, St. P. & K. C.
Ry. Co. v. Chambers (C. C. A.) 148.

REAL BEOPERTY.

There can be no abandonment of a legal title
to land by mere failure to assert it, in the ab-
sence of adverse possession.—East Tennessee
Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin (C. C. A.) 446.

RECEIVERS.

Of corporation, see “Corporations.”

Receivers of a railroad are not responsible for
injuries caused primarily by an inevitable acci-
dent, though the consequences may have been
aggravated by the inefficiency of employés of
the receivers, in whose selection due care was
not used.—Central Trust Co. of New York v.
East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. (C. C.) 635.

Property in the hands of a receiver cannot
be reached by proceedings for the collection of
taxes without the consent of the court.-Oakes
v. Myers (C. C.) 807.

Independently of statute, a receiver is not
subject to garnishment except by consent of the
court appointing him.–Central Trust Co. of
#" v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. (C.

Reformation.
Of contracts, see “Equity.”

Regulation of Commerce.
See “Constitutional Law.”

Religious Societies.

Devise to, see “Charities.”

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Where a motion is made by a defendant in a
state court after he has filed a petition for re-
moval to the federal court, and is afterwards
brought on in the federal court, the irregularity
is waived by the plaintiff by seeking an ad-
journment without raising the objection.—Kinne

v. Lant (C. C.) 436.

Where, pending an action by a corporation, a
receiver is appointed, under foreclosure of a
mortgage made by it, coupons of bonds secured
by the mortgage maturing after the receiver-
ship cannot be allowed as set-off, if the re-
ceiver is not entitled to be made a party plain-
tiff in the action.—Wheeling Bridge & Terminal
Ry. Co. v. Cochran (C. C. A.) 141.

In West Virginia all matters of set-off, though
accruing pendente lite, may be allowed.—Wheel-
ing Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cochran (C.
C. A.) 141.

It seems that When the jurisdictional facts.
authorizing removal of a cause to a federal

court exist, but are not properly stated in the
petition for removal, such petition may be
amended to show the facts properly.—Robert-
# #scottish Union & National Ins. Co. (C.
C.) 173.

The allegation that a defendant is “a com-
panv duly chartered and incorporated under the
laws of Great Britain” is a sufficient statement
of the citizenship of such corporation for the
purposes of removal to a federal court.—Robert-
# Mascottish Union & National Ins. Co. (C.

Where an action commenced in a state court
by attachment of £ of the defendant ex-
ceeding in value $2,000, upon a claim of less than
$2,000, is removed into the circuit court by a
receiver of the defendant’s property, who has
been made a party because he claims the ex-
clusive possession of the attached property, the
amount in controversy, so far as it relates to
the receiver's right to remove the cause, is the
value of the property attached.—Hoover & Allen
Co. v. Columbia Straw-Paper Co. (C. C.) 945.

Res Judicata.
See “Judgment.”

Review.
On appeal, see “Appeal.”

Risks of Employment.

See “Master and Servant.”

SALE.
See, also, “Wendor and Purchaser.”

A contract to sell and deliver 10,000 barrels
of oil, at a stipulated price, in such quantities
per week as the buyer may desire, to be paid
for as delivered, but which contains no agree-
ment on the part of the buyer to purchase and
receive any particular quantity of oil, is not
binding, for want of mutuality.-American Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. Kirk (C. C. A.) 791.

SALVAGE.

Where a tug, upon request, for 18 hours
stood by certain barges, which were in a situa-
tion of apprehended danger from ice in a sudden
gale, and rendered various services to them, held,
that this was a salvage service, presumably ben-
eficial, without absolute proof that they Would
have been worse off without such help; and
that $250 upon a valuation of $3,000 should be
awarded.—The Thomas Quigley (D. C.) 936;
The £emiah F. Barnes, Id.; Tice v. The Hud-
SOI), 10.

Two thousand one hundred dollars allowed on
a valuation of $55,000, for the services of a ves-
sel with her steam pump and hose, aided by a
Small tug and a shore hose and pump company,
in putting out fire in a cargo of hemp, nearly all
being saved.—The Merjulio (D. C.) 935.

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A charter of a ship to bring asphalt to New
York, the ship to be “fitted with shifting boards
and bulkheads, suitable for carrying asphalt
cargo safely, to be done by owner's agent, but at
charterer's expense,” imposes upon the owner
the duty of providing suitable bulkheads and
fittings, and where the same are insufficient,
and break under the weight of the cargo, caus-
ing delay and expense for unloading, refitting,
and reloading, he cannot recover charter hire,
or a general average expense, for such delay
and costs. The act of February 13, 1893,
known as the “Hartzr Act,” is not applicable to
such a contract.—Hine v. New York & Bermu-
dez Co. (D.C.) 920.

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' A charter of a British ship to San Francisco
xporters was signed in Liverpool by the Eng-
ish correspondents of the San Francisco brokers
through whom the contract was made, without
revious authority from the charterers, and
after the alteration of a material provision
which they had insisted upon. The charterers
eceived no notice of the change until a copy of
he charter was transmitted to them through
the San Francisco brokers. They immediately
otified the latter that they should insist upon
he condition, and were assured by them that
there would be no trouble about it. The change
Was not made, however; and, upon receiving
notice from the brokers of the arrival of the
ship, they refused to receive her. Held, that
there was no ratification of the charter or waiver
of the condition in question.—Starr Co. v.
Galgate Ship Co. (C. C. A.) 234

The charter of a British ship by San Fran-
cisco exporters , was negotiated in San Fran-
cisco through brokers, whose English corre-
spondents signed the charter party in Liverpool,
as agents of the charterers, without previous'
authoritv. and after alteration of a material
provision insisted upon by the charterers. The
San Francisco brokers notified the charterers
of the execution of the charter party, without
informing them of the alteration; and, in re-
sponse to their request, the charterers answered,
confirming the charter party. Held, that the
letter of confirmation, having been written in
ignorance of a material alteration, was inopera-
tive, and that the transaction could not be re-
garded as a contract effected by bought and
sold notes.—Starr & Co. v. Galgate Ship Co.
(C. C. A.) 234.

A vessel employed and used with malicious
intent in arresting, without process, another
vessel, is liable for the damages and expenses
thereby occasioned.—Weyant V. The Petersburg
(D. C.) 387.

Carriage of goods.
. A ship is liable for damages to a cargo of sugar
by water leaking through the deck, which was
in poor condition.—Howell V. The Mary L. Pe-
ters (D. C.) 919.

Where cases of oil were carried at shipper's
risk to Rio, and there, according to local regu-
lations, delivered in open lighters to the cus-
toms authorities, and the consignees, though
duly notified, delayed for nine weeks to pay the
duties and take the oil ashore, held, that the ship
was only liable for loss by breakage and leakage
while on board, and for a reasonable time, after
discharge into the lighters, in which to pay
duties, and that for an alleged further shortage
she was not responsible.—Guimaraes v. Pro-
ceeds of The Seguranca (D. C.) 1014.

Alleged error of the master in filling, at Sea,
a tank having a latent defect, is not an error,
“in the management of the vessel,” within the
meaning of the third section of the act of Feb-
ruary 13, 1893 (27 Stat. 445):-Wuppermann v.
The Carib Prince (C. C. A.) 254; Middleton v.
Same, Id.; Cardenas v. Same, Id.; Gillespie v.
Same. Id.

The second section of the act of Feb. 13, 1893
(27 Stat. 445), does not forbid shipowners to

relieve themselves by contract from the rigidity
of the implied warranty of seaworthiness, pro-
vided due diligence is used at the commence-
ment of the voyage to make the ship seaworthy.
–Wuppermann v. The Carib Prince (C. C. A.)
254; Middleton v. Same, Id.; Cardenas v. Same,
Id.; Gillespie v. Same, Id.

Exceptions in a bill of lading of “latent de-
fects in hull” include a latent defect existing at
the commencement of the voyage, and limit the
implied warranty of seaworthiness.—Wupper-
mann v. The Carib Prince (C. C. A.).254; Mid-"
dleton v. Same, Id.; Cardenas v. Same, Id.;
Gillespie V. Same, Id

. Section 3 of the act of February 13, 1893, re-
lieving vessels and owners from liability for
faults or errors in navigation or management
if due diligence has been used to make the ves-
sel seaworthy, and have her properly manned,
equipped, and supplied, applies to foreign ves-
sels carrying freight to or from American ports,
as well as to American vessels.—The Silvia (C.
C. A.) 230: Franklin Sugar-Refining Co. v.
Red Cross Line, Id.

Having ports closed at the commencement of
a voyage only, by heavy glass covers, leaving
Open additional iron covers, does not constitute
unseaworthiness; and, if failure to close the
iron covers constitutes negligence, it is negli-
gence in the management of the vessel, from
liability for which the owner and vessel are
freed by section 3 of the act of February 13,
1893.—The Silvia (C. C. A.) 230; Franklin
Sugar-Refining Co. v. Red Cross Line, Id.

The between decks, when perfectly tight and
strong, is not an improper place for the stowage
of molasses.—Bregaro V. The Centurion (C. C.
#! 382; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Same,

Where sugar was stored in the hold with hogs-
heads of molasses in the between decks above
it, and some of the molasses casks were broken
by a heavy sea which heaved the ship to an
angle of 45 degrees, and the molasses ran down
the scupper pipes and damaged the sugar, held,
on the evidence, that the cargo was properly
stowed, and that the damage was caused by
peril of the sea, from the consequences of which
the ship was exempt under the bill of lading.—
Bregaro V. The Centurion (C. C. A.) 382; Amer-
ican Sugar Refining Co. v. Same, Id.

A steamer making daily trips touched at a
landing to deliver freight, but, no one being
present to receive the same or pay the charges,
it was retained on board, the master sending
word to the consignee to have some one ready to
take the goods on the following day. On that
day no one was on hand, and the goods were
kept on board for still another day, whereupon
the vessel was libeled and arrested by the con-
signee for conversion of the goods. Held, that
there was no conversion.—The Hattie Palmer
(C. C. A.) 380; Hawkins v. Davis. Id.

Spanish Grants.
See “Public Lands.”

Special Laws.
See “Constitutional Law.”

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

Specific performance may be decreed though
the complainant does not specifically allege his
readiness to perform, if a previous tender is
alleged and the decree can be made conditional
upon his performance.—Lee v. Electric Typo-
graphic Co. (C. C.) 519.

A contract for the sale of real estate, agree-
ing to secure a deferred payment “by mortgage
on property worth two for one,” is not too indefi-
nite for specific performance.—Horton v. Mc-
Kee (C. d' 404.

Specific performance of a contract for the sale
of real estate cannot be decreed unless the com-
plainant clearly and definitely offers to com-
ply with the contract on his part, especially as
to any stipulations expressed in general terms
only.—Horton v. McKee (C. C.) 404.

A bill, alleging an agreement by complain-
ant to aid in selling certain patents, to Sur-
render a license and assign another patent, in
consideration of a share in the proceeds of the
sale; that a sale was made free from com-
plainant's license, which may accordingly have
become merged by estoppel; and that complain-
ant has performed his part, of the contract.-
is not demurrable.—Lee v. Electric Typographic
Co. (C. C.) 519.

STATES AND STATE OFFI-
CERS.

Laws N. Y. 1893, c. 711, § 13, sanctions the
bringing of a suit against the comptroller, as
such, to recover possession of lands held by
him under the act.—Saranac Land & Timber
Co. v. Roberts (C. C.) 521.

A suit against the auditor of a state to re-
strain him from acting under a statute alleged
to be unconstitutional, on the ground that his
acts will irreparably damage complainant, is
not a suit against the state. —Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Henderson (C. C.) 588.

Statute of Limitations.
See “Limitation of Actions.”

STATUTES.

An action on a statute of one state can be
sustained in a federal court in another state,
without pleading such statute.—Noonan v. Dela-
ware, L. & W. R. Co. (C. C.) 1.

STATUTES CONSTRUED.

UNITED STATES.

CONSTITUTION.
Amend. 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
STATUTES AT LARGE.

1789, Sept. 24, ch. 20, $33, 1 Stat. 91..886, 887
1822, March 30, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 659....... 526

1824, May 26, ch. 173, 4 Stat. 52..... 637, 638
1827, March 2, ch. 51, 4 Stat. 234. . . . . . . . 526
1844, June 17, ch. 95, 5 Stat. 676. . . . . . . . 637
1856, June 3, ch. 43, 11 Stat. 20.......... 993
1857, March 3, ch. 117, 11 Stat. 251...156, 170
1864, May 5, ch. 80, 13 Stat. 66.......... 993
1864, July 2, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 265........ 807
1864, July 2, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365. . . .993, 934
1866, July 27, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292. . . . . . . 609
1870, June 11, ch. 126, 16 Stat. 149. . . . . . 637
1871, Feb. 21, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 426... .886, 887
1874, June 22, ch. 396, 18 Stat. 193. . . . . . 886
1875, Feb. 8, ch. 36, 18 Stat. 307..... ... 536
1877, March 3, ch. 108, 19 Stat. 377. . . . . . 69
1883, March 3, ch. 121, 22 Stat. 488. . . . . 536
1883, March 3, ch. 121, § 7, 22 Stat. 523..
904, 905
1885, Feb. 26, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332. . . . . . 883
1885, March 3, ch. 354, art. 21, 23 Stat. 438 395
1887, Feb. 4, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. . . . . . . 881
1887, Feb. 23, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414. . . . . . 883
1887, March 3, ch. 359, 34 Stat. 565. . . . . 433
1887, March 3, ...ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552. . . . . 685
1888, Aug. 13, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. . . . . 685
1888, Sept. 13, ch. 1015, § 12, 25 Stat. 478 475
1888, Oct. 19, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566..... 883
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567. . . . . . 536
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, § 1, Schedule A,
par. 24, 26 Stat. 568. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, § 1, Schedule I,
par. 349, 26 Stat. 592. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, § 1, Schedule J,
par. 373, 26 Stat. 594. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, § 1, Schedule N,
par. 458, 26 Stat. 601. ... ............. 186
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, § 2, Free List, par.
566, 26 stat. 665 ' ". . . . . ." ". 421
1890, Oct. 1, ch. 1244, § 2, Free List, par.
653, 26 Stat. 607. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
1891, March 3, ch. 517. § 7, 26 Stat. 826. . 23
1891, March 3, ch. 517. §'5, subd. 6, 26
Stat. 827 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
891, March 3, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. . . . . 883
1893, Feb. 13, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445. . .919, 920
1893, Feb. 13, ch. 105, § 2, 27 Stat. 445. . 254
893, Feb. 13, ch. 105, § 3, 27 Stat. 445. . 230
1893, Nov. 3, ch. 14, 28 Stat. 7. . . . . . . . . . 475
1894, Aug. 27, ch. 349, par. 248, 28 Stat. |
526 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
1894, Aug. 27, ch. 349, § 1, Schedule K,
par. 283, 28 Stat. 530. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
1894, Aug. 27, ch. 349, § 1, Schedule K,
par. 297, 28 Stat. 531. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
1894, Aug. 27, ch. 349, Schedule N, par.
338, 28 Stat. 534. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
1894, Aug. 27, ch. 349, Free List, par. 467,
28 Stat. 539. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
1895, Feb. 18. Circuit Court of Appeals. . 23
1895, Feb. 26, ch. 131, 29 Stat. 683. . . . . . 807
REVISED STATUTES.
$$ 753–761 . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . 652
$915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
$ 1014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881, 886, 887
$ 2.320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... 811
$ 2.338 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 811
§ 2902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - . . . . . . . 904
$2907 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . 904
$2922 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - .... 859
$ 4046 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 536
$ 4288 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
§ 4900 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
$ 5480 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .347, 348

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