so high as 10,857,000. I have felt it due, sir, to the honourable member behind me, to make these observations in explanation and support of what he has said. The honourable metnber has undertaken a task of great responsibility, and one attended with great labour, with a view to promote a public object. His exertions, and the manner in which he has made out the grounds of his opinion, en title him to the thanks of this house and of the country; and as I, sir, think that the investigation which he has set on foot into every branch of the public expenditure will be attended with the best possible effects, I have felt it my duty to give what support it has lain in my power to give him. Mr. Rose, Mr. Lockhart, and Mr. H. Thornton spoke to different points in the discussion. The question was then loudly called for, and was put on Mr. Wardle's 32 motions. The first motion was "for an account of the expense of the royal staff, for the last three years, distinguishing the numbers employed at home and abroad." The motion was carried without a division. The second was the total expense of the local militia to the present time. Mr. Huskisson said, he had no objection to grant such accounts as ministers should in their judge. ment conceive within the spirit and scope of the honourable gentleman's motions. If in the next session he thought any of these accounts not sufficiently particular, he might then move for a further account at that time. Mr. Wardle said that he should be perfectly satisfied. All the motions were then passed, with some slight observations. Among the number were, accounts of the expenses of the royal waggon train, of the Manx fencibles, of fortifications, Martello towers, and military canals, printing and stationary for both houses of par liament. House of Lords, Wednesday June 21. The chancellor stated to their lordships, that the lords commissioners appointed by the king had received two commissions from his majesty, signed by his own hand, one for giving the royal assent to a bill agreed to by both houses of parliament, and the other for proroguing the parliament. The lords commissioners then desired the attendance of the hon. house of commons in the house of lords to hear his majesty's gracious communication; and on the appearance of the speaker and the members of the house of commons, the lord chancellor read his majesty's most gracious speech. [See Public Papers.] CHAPTER CHAPTER VI. Introductory Observations-Brief recapitulatory Sketch of the Affairs of Spain during 1808-Their melancholy State at the End of that Year Interest taken by the British Nation in the Cause of the Patriots-Their Disappointment and Indignation at the Convention of Cintra-Board of Inquiry on this Subject-Proceedings of the Board-Their Importance, as affording a historical Document-Abstract of the Evidence laid before the Board-Transactions of Sir Arthur Wellesley till the Arrival of Sir Harry Burrard-First Point of Difference respecting the Plan of Operations between the two Generals-Reasons assigned by Sir Harry Burrard for the Army not advancing-Evidence respecting the Degree of Defeat sustained by the French at Vimeira-Arrival of Sir Hugh DalrympleArmistice proposed by the French General-Discussions on the Articles of it-Advantages supposed to result from the Convention-Report of the Board on the Conduct of the Generals-A more definite Opinion called for by His Majesty-General Nicholls's Reasons for disapproving of the Convention-The Earl of Pembroke's-Lord Moira's Objections to the Armistice and Convention-Remarks on the Issue of the Board's Pro ceedings. HE situation of affairs, on the continent of Europe, at the termination of the year 1808, provad, with a melancholy certainty, the continued and undiminished operation of those causes, some of which we briefly sketched in the introductory observations to the his torical department of the last volume of our Register, as producing and accounting for the success of the French arms, and the establishment and extension of French power. During the progress of that year more prosperous and happier era appeared to be dawning on Europe, worn out by a cruel and destructive warfare for nearly twenty years; and writhing under the most foul and tyrannical oppression, that ever cursed this portion of the globe. The enemy of peace and liberty, hitherto feebly and partially opposed by the people of those countries which he had conquered, met in Spain with a resist ance at once unexpected and formidable. The happiest results were anticipated from the enthusiastic and heroic insurrection of such a people as Spain possessed ;-a people, who, amidst superstition and ignorance, still preserved some of the most proud and dignifying features of the human character. The situation and nature of the country which they inhabited, were also justly regarded as affording no slight additional source of hope, that they would ultimately succeed in rescuing themselves from the oppression and tyranny of Bonaparte. It was, indeed, to be expected, that, at the first onset, they would be compelled compelled to yield a temporary superiority and triumph to the systematic and powerful attacks of the innumerable hordes that would be poured in against them, aided by the most perfect military discipline and skill, and headed by generals of the most consummate talent and activity. But, fortunately, it was hoped, for their cause, before Bonaparte could assemble, and lead against them, a very superior and formidable force, they had only to cope with comparatively small hostile armies,-separated from each other, taken unawares,-headed by generals of no great reputation or skill, and exposed on all sides to the fury of the Spanish people. The unforeseen and unexpected resistance into which they had suddenly burst forth, favoured them also in another respect. It afforded them an opportunity of proving that Bonaparte might be blind to his own interests, foiled in his schemes, at least for a season, and proved not invincible, at least in his armies. These and other considerations of a similar nature, filled even those who were not apt to be sanguine, and who thought not lightly, or with prejudice, of Bonaparte's power and resources, with the fond expectation of witnessing the revival of liberty and independence springing up amidst the people of Spain, and spreading from them, and by their means, over the rest of the continent. This cherished and pleasing expectation ripened almost into certainty, when the armed peasantry of Spain, though unused to a military life, deprived of the foresight and resources of a regular and established government, and deserted by too many of their nobles, defeated and took prisoners the army of Dupont, chased the usurper from Madrid, and compelled the French to concentrate themselves on the Ebro. Hitherto the provisional juntas and the people of Spain had performed their duty in its most ample and honourable extent, and fulfilled whatever those who hailed their insurrection with joy had predicted with confidence. It was expected and anticipated, that the whole effective population of Spain, rushing forward in one impene trable and irresistible mass, would free their country from the presence of their oppressors, and close against them, for ever, those barriers which nature had planted for their protection and defence. How cruelly and dreadfully, then, were the friends of Spanish independence disappointed, when the precious moments of Bonaparte's inability to act, from the weakness and disasters of his armies, and the unprepared condition in which the Spanish insurrection found him, were witnessed passing away in indecision and inactivity! Bonaparte did not fail to take advantage of this remissness on the part of the Spaniards. He did not indeed hurry on the march of his armies beyond the Pyrenees, nor appear himself at their head till every circumstance and operation necessary for their maintenance, their regular progress, and their success, were completely and fully secured. This conduct, to many, appeared irresolute, slow and timid: be cause he did not immediately come forward in impetuous and open attack, they concluded that he was apprehensive of defeat, and unable to recover from the con sternation and surprise into which the unexpected insurrection and resistance of the Spaniards had thrown him. But when all was ready, ready, and not before; when the equipment of his army was complete; when his schemes, laid with the utmost skill, secrecy, and penetration, were ensured success adequacy, promptness and efficacy of the means employed, he showed himself still possessed of his former talents, and prepared to act with his wonted activity and energy. The Spanish armies sunk beneath the immense force brought against them; they were every where defeated, driven back, dispersed, or broken up. The capital of their country was again polluted by the presence of the usurper; and at the close of the year, not many were so sanguine as to look forward to that independence, which a few months before had been deemed almost secured and established. Still there were many circumstances attending the affairs and situation of Spain, melancholy andunfortunate as they were, which forbade the indulgence of complete despair. Although from the imbecility and inactivity of their provisional government, and from the want of regular and steady courage, aided by discipline and skill among their troops, every contest with the enemy ended in their defeat and dispersion, they did not appear disposed to submit or capitulate. Only the territory covered by the French armies, or within the immediate reach of their power and vengeance, could properly be said to be subdued. Their troops were conquered, but the nation preserved its spirit, its hopes, and its strong and animating antipathy to the invaders of their soil. The contrast between Spain after her defeats, and the other nations of the continent which had been subdued by the French emperor, was 1809. striking and consoling-when the latter were defeated in the field, submission and conquest in its most degrading and unqualified sense immediately followed, and experienced little or no interruption from the burst of national feeling; the people appeared to regard the contest as merely between the two opposing armies; they probably wished well to their own; but when it was conquered and compelled to submit, they yielded themselves up without resistance to their new masters. In Spain, on the contrary, the people looked upon themselves as most immediately concerned in the contest, and seemed firmly persuaded, that while they were determined not to be tame and quiet subjects of their invader, his power must be limited, precarious and temporary, notwithstanding their national armies had fled before him. Such was the state of Spain at the termination of the year 1808, preserving its hopes and its determination to resist its oppressor, amidst disasters so tremendous and continued, as to have infused despair into the breasts of its most sanguine friends and well wishers. Of these, none were so enthusiastic as the British nation. They therefore hailed with pleasure and high expectation the determination of the British government to assist the patriotic Spaniards. Much was expected from this assistance. Besides the advantage it was hoped it would afford to the Spanish cause, the British nation looked forward to the laurels which their armies would reap when opposed to the legions of Bonaparte; they antici pated triumphs that would bring the glory and fame of the British soldiery more nearly on a level with that of the British navy. The pe culiar situation of the French army in Portugal, which our troops were commissioned to attack,-cut off from all assistance, and almost from all communication with the other forces of Bonaparte in the peninsula; in the midst of an irritated and revengeful people, eager to retaliate for the misery and pil. lage they had suffered,-naturally heightened the hopes that British valour would speedily render most glorious and decisive assistance to the cause of its allies. All that was expected from the valour of our troops was fully accomplished. Junot's army was twice completely beaten; but these victories served only to benefit our enemies: our generals, superior to the French in the field, were foiled by their adroitness and skill in the cabinet. The disgraceful and disastrous convention of Cintra proved an unworthy and lamentable consequence of the splendid and decisive victory of Vimeira. The British nation, justly and deeply indignant at this complete frustration of their high and wellfounded hopes, and anxious to wipe off the disgrace which this convention affixed on their name, and to make some small atonement for the injury done to their allies, loudly and universally called for the punishment of those, by whose advice and authority the blood of its soldiers had been thus wantonly thrown away, its own honour tar nished, and the cause of the Spanish patriots not merely neglected, but absolutely injured in an essential manner. The British government, however, did not seem disposed to take up the affair in the same serious light in which it was viewed by the people; it was, indeed, declared by very high authority, that the convention of Cintra "had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation;" but though it was thus justly designated and denounced, the steps taken to affix the stigma and punishment where it ought to fail, were slow, forced, and unwilling, and ended in a measure certainly not adequate to the importance of the transaction, nor such as was likely either to satisfy the people, or bring the guilty to adequate punishment. Instead of the ordinary and decisive measure of a court-martial, a court of inquiry was instituted. Some of the leading and most important facts and circumstances which were brought to light during the sitting of this court, were briefly noticed in our volume for last year. As the decision and opinion of the court were not made public till the beginning of this year, the evidence produced before it falls properly under our present consideration. This evidence is materially interesting and important in two points of view: in the first place, as it obviously will enable us to form an accurate, clear, and impartial opinion on the propriety, the necessity, or advantage of the convention of Cintra, and consequently on the fairness and justice of the opinion delivered by the different members of the court; and secondly, as it supplies us with an historical document of great utility, in filling up what was incomplete, in correcting what was inaccurate, and in linking together what was loose and unconnected in the narrative of the operations of our army in Portugal. It is so extremely difficult for the historian, who gives to the public the events of the immediately past year, to gain access to complete and full autho |