« ForrigeFortsett »
the tug and the cargo owner.-The Thomas Quigley (C. C. A.) 336.
A tug held liable for the loss of a tow by reason of injuries received when she was being pulled off from a pile of stone on which she had grounded in Satilla river, in Georgia, on the ground that the master of the tug failed to warn the tow of the obstruction, which had existed and been known for many years, and also to| exercise due care in releasing her.-The Inca (D. C.) 36.
A tug, undertaking a towage service, is bound to the exercise of ordinary care and maritime skill, and the master is bound to know the channel and its usual currents, and dangers which are known generally to men experienced in its navigation, and to exercise such skill and knowledge for the protection of his tow.-The
Inca (D. C.) 36.
A tug held liable for the loss of a canal boat, which comprised one of her tow of six vessels in East river, on the ground of negligence in making up the tow in view of weather conditions, and in not landing the canal boat at request of her master when the danger became apparent.-The Ganoga (D. C.) 399.
A tug, which continued a voyage up the Hudson river through floating ice against the protest of the master of a tow, held liable for an injury to the tow from the ice, for failure to exercise the degree of care imposed on her by the circumstances for the safety of the tow. The Joseph Peene (D. C.) 489.
In determining the profits made by a defendant from the sale of an article in a suit for unfair competition, the expenses of making the sales must be deducted from the gross profits.Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack (C. C. A.) 514.
A retail dealer held chargeable with unfair trade in advertising "Baker's" cocoa and chocolate, and furnishing customers who called for it by such general name the articles made by W. H. Baker, instead of the product of Walter Baker & Co., which has established its sole right to such general designation.-Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack (C. C. A.) 514.
one previously used by complainant.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
A trade-mark adopted by a defendant for a compound oil sold in bottles held not to infringe
Labels and cartons used by complainant and those subsequently adopted by defendant compared, and held not to show such similarity as to charge defendant with unfair competition.G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
The fact that a defendant has been and still is a large purchaser of an article made by complainant as a jobber does not create any trust relation between them which precludes it from placing on the market a competing article of its own manufacture.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
fringement of a trade-mark, in that it does not Unfair competition is distinguishable from innecessarily involve the question of the exclusive right of another to the use of the name, symbol, or device copied or imitated.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
See "Counties"; "Municipal Corporations."
§ 1. Infringement and unfair competi-Oil
Where defendant has deliberately engaged in unfair trade, complainant is entitled to recover damages and profits from the time the violation of his rights commenced.-Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack (C. C. A.) 514.
That defendant issued a circular advertising an article of its manufacture, to some extent similar to one issued by complainant and inclosed in the cartons containing its goods, does not constitute unfair competition, where defendant's circulars are not so inclosed, and are sent only to jobbers, and do not come into the hands of retail purchasers.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
The adoption by defendant for a new product of a label, distinctive from those previously used by it for similar articles, is not evidence of an intention to fraudulently obtain the trade of a competitor, where its prior labels were also distinctive from each other, and the new article was different from any before made.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Čement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
The law of unfair competition is intended only to prevent fraudulent practices, inducing confusion of goods and deception of the public, and cannot be used to prevent legitimate competition.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
Unless a defendant adopts means calculated to injure complainant through unfair competition, the intention is immaterial; there being no ground for relief where there has been no injury.-G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 703.
The name "Hooton's Cocoa" held sufficiently like "Van Houten's Cocoa," made by complainants, and which had a prior reputation and sale, to cause confusion and deception to purchasers, and to entitle complainants to an injunction restraining its use by defendants, unless with a clear statement that the article was not that made by complainants.-Van Houten v. Hooton Cocoa & Chocolate Co. (C. C.) 600.
§ 1. Actions.
In an action of trespass for removing sand from the beach in front of plaintiff's lot, plain
tiff is not entitled to recover as damages the expense incurred in a chancery suit instituted against defendant to determine the rights of ocean lot owners, which is still pending on appeal. Murray v. Pannaci (C. C. A.) 529.
To justify the imposition of exemplary damages for a trespass, there must be evidence that the injury was inflicted maliciously or wantonly, or at least with wrongful motive.-Murray v. Pannaci (C. C. A.) 529.
In an action of trespass, where there is no evidence from which the extent of the injury to plaintiff's property can be determined, nominal damages only are recoverable.-Murray v. Pannaci (C. C. A.) 529.
See "New Trial."
Harmless error, see "Appeal and Error." § 5.
For salvage, see "Salvage," § 2.
Combinations in restraint of trade, see "Monopolies," § 1.
An unsecured creditor of a deceased person held not entitled to maintain a suit in equity in the federal Circuit Court against the executor for an accounting, in the absence of fraud, gross wrong, or unreasonable delay on the part of such executor.-Thiel Detective Service Co. v. McClure (C. C.) 55.
§ 2. Establishment and enforcement of trust.
Trust funds in the hands of an insolvent will be protected for the benefit of the beneficiaries, where it is possible to trace the same and segregate them from the insolvent's assets.-In re Gaskill (D. C.) 235.
§ 2. Instructions to jury.
Where the decided weight of evidence on an issue is in favor of one party, it is proper for the judge in a federal court to express his opinion to that effect in his charge to the jury, leaving it to them, however, to determine the fact. -Butler v. Barret & Jordan (C. C.) 944.
1. Accounting and compensation of trustee.
TROVER AND CONVERSION.
Admissions as evidence, see "Evidence," § 2. Conversion of property of bankrupt estate by trustee in bankruptcy, see "Bankruptcy," § 4. § 1. Actions.
In an action for conversion of certain stock, a finding that defendant had converted the stock and dividends held a sufficient finding that the stock was in defendant's possession and that defendant had acted in defiance of plaintiff's title thereto.-Eureka County Bank v. Clarke (C. C. A.) 325.
§ 1. Reception of evidence.
Where a conspiracy to swindle is charged, evidence of the separate acts and declarations of the alleged members thereof may be admitted
in advance of proof, prima facie, of the exist-See "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names," § 1.
Where a verdict rendered was just, the court was not required to grant a new trial on the ground that the jury disregarded certain erro-1. neous instructions as to damages.Lazier Gas Engine Co. v. Du Bois (C. C. A.) 834.
See "Customs Duties."
Conspiracy to defraud, see "Conspiracy," § 1.
Indians, see "Indians."
Right to salvage against United States for goods on which duties have been paid, see "Salvage."
Government and officers.
Under Rev. St. §§ 3504, 3506 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 2340, 2341], and Const. art. 2, § 2, held, that the cashier of a mint was not an officer, and so was not liable for the theft by the chief clerk of money from the vault of the mint, the combination of the lock of which both had.
United States v. Cole (C. C.) 614.
A bond given by the cashier of the mint held authorized by and to have been taken under Rev. St. §§ 3496, 3501, 3506 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 2338, 2339, 2341].-United States v. Cole (C. C.) 620.
§ 2. Actions.
The right of the United States to maintain an action in respect to a governmental matter cannot be affected by a state enactment requiring a notice to be given or demand made as a conA plaintiff, who had without right taken prop-dition precedent to suit.-McKnight v. United erty owned by defendant, held bound to restore the same before she could maintain trover for property of her own taken by defendant.-Hoffman v. Wilson (C. C. A.) 694.
States (C. C. A.) 659.
A claim for salvage is one founded on implied contract, and, where made against the
United States and not exceeding $1,000. a suit
See "Forcible Entry and Detainer."
Limits of jurisdiction, see "Courts," § 2.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
§ 1. Rights and liabilities of parties.
The record of a deed under which the grantee has entered into possession is notice to the world of the extent of his possession.-Scott v. Mineral Development Co. (C. C. A.) 497.
Removal of federal prisoner to other district for trial, see "Criminal Law," § 3.
Specific performance of contract, see "Specific WATERS AND WATER COURSES.
§ 1. Domicile or residence of parties. The right of a defendant to be sued in the district of which he is a resident is not strictly jurisdictional, but is a personal privilege, which may be waived, and which is waived by a general appearance.-Von Voight v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (C. C.) 398.
See "Master and Servant," § 1.
See "Municipal Corporations."
See "Trespass," § 1.
In civil actions, see "Trial," § 3.
Carrier as warehouseman, see "Carriers," § 1.
Order for warrant to be issued by bank as as-
Of exemption for liability on insurance policy, see "Insurance," § 6.
Of right to be sued in district of residence, see "Venue," § 1.
By insured, see "Insurance." § 4.
A city ordinance requiring a water company to furnish water at the same rates paid by the citizens of another city held not to include rates charged by such city after it had exercised its statutory right to purchase and operate the corporation's plant therein.-Armour Packing Co. v. Metropolitan Water Co. (C. C. A.) 851.
A mortgage trustee for the bondholders of a water company held to have such an interest in a contract by a city to pay water rentals to the company as entitled it to maintain a suit for the enforcement of such contract independently of the company.-Columbia Ave. Savings Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co. v. City of Dawson (C. C.) 152.
The action of a city, sustained by a state court, in repudiating a contract with a water company and in preparing to construct a competing system of waterworks, held to constitute an impairment of the contract, which entitled a mortgage trustee of the company to maintain a suit in a federal court of equity for the en
forcement of the contract and to enjoin the
A water company, chartered for the purpose of supplying a city and its inhabitants with water, is a quasi public corporation, and it is its duty to supply water to all who apply therefor and offer to pay the rates, without discrimination.-Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co. (C. C.)
The bondholders of a water company held
master, through his failure to keep the bottom in such condition that it could lie safely, or to take proper care to prevent its injury.-The Thomas Quigley (C. C. A.) 336.
A water company, chartered for the purpose of supplying a city "and its inhabitants" with water, is not justified in refusing water to one who has contracted with property owners in the city to sprinkle streets, on the ground that the contractor himself is not an "inhabitant" of the city.-Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co. (C. C.) 251.
The temporary absence of the master of a lighter on Sunday, when it was moved by a tug without his knowledge and contrary to the usual custom, held not to charge the owner with the fault contributing to its injury through the fault of the tug and the cargo owner.-The
A water company has no right to refuse to supply water to one who applies therefor in good faith and is able and willing to pay the rates charged, on the ground that in making his application he failed to comply with certain technical rules, without giving him the opportunity to supply alleged omissions or informalities in his application, and where, under substantially similar circumstances, water is furnished to a business competitor of such applicant.-Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co. (C. C.) 251.
The owner of a wharf held liable for injury to a barge using the same by settling on a submerged piling, of which he had no knowledge, but could have learned by proper diligence.The Nellie (D. C.) 213; Campbell v. Wetherill, Id.
The owner of a wharf is liable for injury to a lighter, brought there at his instance without a
§ 1. Construction.
A devise construed, and held, under Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 4650. to vest the devisee with title in fee simple on the birth to him of a legitimate child.-Yocum v. Parker (C. C.) 722; Same v. Kennedy, Id.
Experts, see "Evidence," § 4.
WORK AND LABOR.
Liens for work and materials, see "Mechanics'
It is the province of a water company to sup-
Writ of error, see "Appeal and Error."
Estates for years, see "Landlord and Tenant."
WEST PUBLISHING CO., PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS, ST. PAUL, MINN.